Waiver of an AEDPA §2244(d)(1)(C) Limitations Defense Precludes Sua Sponte Review

Introduction

In Núñez Pérez v. Escobar Pabón, 64 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2024), the First Circuit addressed whether a state (or Commonwealth) respondent to a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 may effectively waive an affirmative statute-of-limitations defense by declining to assert it in the answer, and whether a district court may then raise that defense on its own. The petition arose from David Núñez-Pérez’s challenge to his 2006 Puerto Rico convictions (carjacking and manslaughter) on double jeopardy grounds under Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 579 U.S. 59 (2016). Núñez filed his § 2254 petition in 2019, but the Commonwealth respondents argued that it was untimely. The District Court granted the writ, relying on equitable tolling even under the more generous limitations period of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C). On appeal, the Commonwealth challenged only the District Court’s equitable tolling analysis. The First Circuit affirmed on a different ground: the respondents had waived the § 2244(d)(1)(C) defense by knowingly omitting it from their answer, and the District Court had no discretion to resurrect that waived defense.

Summary of the Judgment

The petition attacked Puerto Rico convictions obtained after a related federal conviction for carjacking, invoking the Supreme Court’s 2016 ruling in Sánchez Valle that Puerto Rico and the United States are not separate sovereigns for double jeopardy purposes.
The Commonwealth respondents moved to dismiss as time-barred under the one-year statute of limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), contending Sánchez Valle was not retroactive.
The District Court concluded that § 2244(d)(1)(C) applied (Sánchez Valle announced a new, retroactive rule), that Núñez had missed that deadline by 11 days, but that he qualified for equitable tolling under Holland v. Florida. It therefore granted the habeas petition.
The First Circuit held that the respondents had “intelligently” waived any limitations defense under § 2244(d)(1)(C) by failing to raise it in their answer, asserting only § 2244(d)(1)(A). Once waived, the District Court could not “revive” it sua sponte. Having no other timely-filing defense on appeal, the respondents could not prevail, and the judgment granting the writ was affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) – The default AEDPA limitations period: one year from the date the state judgment became final.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C) – Alternate start date for newly recognized, retroactive constitutional rules “made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.”
Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198 (2006) – Held that courts may raise a forfeited time-bar defense sua sponte when the State’s mistake is inadvertent, but may not disregard an intelligent waiver.
Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. 463 (2012) – Clarified that only forfeited defenses may be resurrected by the court; an intentional waiver by the State forecloses sua sponte consideration.
Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010) – Established the standard for equitable tolling of AEDPA’s limitations period (diligence + extraordinary circumstances).
Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 579 U.S. 59 (2016) – Held that Puerto Rico and the United States are one sovereign for double jeopardy purposes.

Legal Reasoning

Waiver vs. Forfeiture of AEDPA Defenses. By Rule 5(b) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c), a respondent must affirmatively plead a statute-of-limitations defense. If omitted inadvertently, a court may under Day raise it; if intentionally waived, a court may not under Wood.
Respondents’ Conduct. The Commonwealth respondents in their motion to dismiss and in their answer insisted only that § 2244(d)(1)(A) applied (because Sánchez Valle was not retroactive) and never defended §§ 2244(d)(1)(C), (B), or (D) as alternative grounds for timeliness. They were aware of § 2244(d)(1)(C) and the 11-day gap, yet chose not to allege it in their answer.
District Court’s Sua Sponte Intervention. After the answer was filed, the District Court sua sponte raised the § 2244(d)(1)(C) time-bar, ordered supplemental briefing, and ultimately rejected it on equitable tolling grounds. Under Wood, once a respondent intelligently waives an AEDPA defense, the court lacks discretion to resurrect it.
Affirmance on Waiver Ground. Because the respondents advanced no other basis to reverse the grant of the writ, and because their § 2244(d)(1)(C) defense was waived, the First Circuit affirmed without reaching the merits of equitable tolling.

Impact

This decision clarifies that in § 2254 proceedings the respondent’s deliberate choice not to assert a limitations defense under any AEDPA provision cannot be undone by a district court’s sua sponte intervention. It underscores the importance of carefully framing all timeliness defenses in the answer and demarcates the boundary between waiver (no court-raised revival) and forfeiture (possible court-raised revival) of AEDPA defenses. Future litigants must be alert: an affirmative decision to omit a limitations defense is final and precludes judicial rescue.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Waiver vs. Forfeiture of Defenses. Forfeiture occurs when a party neglects a defense by mistake or inadvertence – courts may sometimes raise it sua sponte. Waiver is an intentional decision to give up a known right or defense – courts cannot resurrect it.
AEDPA’s Limitations Statute (28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)).
1. Subsection (1)(A): One year from finality of state court judgment.
2. Subsection (1)(C): One year from the date a new constitutional rule is announced and made retroactive.
Sua Sponte. When a court raises an issue on its own initiative, without prompting by the parties.
Equitable Tolling. A limited doctrine allowing extension of the AEDPA deadline if the petitioner shows (1) diligent pursuit of rights and (2) extraordinary circumstances beyond his control.

Conclusion

Núñez Pérez v. Escobar Pabón establishes that a habeas respondent’s strategic decision not to assert a § 2244(d)(1)(C) statute-of-limitations defense in its answer constitutes an intelligent waiver, barring any district court from raising that defense on its own. This ruling preserves the principle of party presentation in habeas corpus practice and compels respondents to include all timeliness arguments at the outset. It thereby promotes procedural clarity, respects litigants’ strategic choices, and ensures that courts do not overreach by reviving waived defenses under the guise of sua sponte review.