Waiver-Induced Mootness on Appeal: Sixth Circuit Dismisses NCAA’s Preliminary-Injunction Appeal and Declines Munsingwear Vacatur

Introduction

This published Sixth Circuit decision arises from a high-profile antitrust challenge to the NCAA’s “JUCO Rule,” which counts seasons of junior-college competition toward an athlete’s four-season limit for NCAA eligibility. After Vanderbilt quarterback Diego Pavia obtained a preliminary injunction allowing him to play in the 2025 season and blocking application of the NCAA’s restitution rule, the NCAA appealed. While that appeal was pending, however, the NCAA issued a blanket waiver that independently rendered Pavia eligible to compete in 2025 regardless of the injunction.

The court holds that the NCAA’s appeal is moot at the preliminary-injunction stage because the waiver gives Pavia complete relief for the 2025 season, leaving no effectual relief the appellate court can provide. The court also declines to vacate the district court’s injunction under United States v. Munsingwear, because the NCAA itself caused the mootness by issuing the waiver. Although the panel does not reach the merits of Pavia’s Sherman Act claim, two concurrences (Judge Thapar and Judge Hermandorfer) map out the contested antitrust terrain that will matter on remand, including market definition, the analytic framework for eligibility rules, and the NCAA’s asserted procompetitive justifications in a rapidly evolving college-sports economy.

Summary of the Opinion

- Holding: The appeal from the preliminary injunction is dismissed as moot. The NCAA’s post-injunction waiver ensures Pavia’s 2025 eligibility and neutralizes the restitution rule, so there is no effectual relief the court can grant. The court also denies vacatur of the injunction under Munsingwear because the NCAA, as the appellant, caused the mootness by issuing the waiver.

- Mootness analysis: Article III requires a live case or controversy at all stages. An appeal of preliminary relief is moot when intervening events eliminate any practical effect a ruling could have. Here, the NCAA’s waiver covers Pavia for 2025 regardless of the appellate outcome. The court rejects both parties’ attempts to fit the dispute within the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception. It further flags voluntary cessation as a thorny but forfeited theory; neither party briefed it in response to the court’s request for supplemental submissions.

- Vacatur: Applying Sixth Circuit precedent, the court declines to vacate because the NCAA has not satisfied the requirement that the party seeking vacatur did not cause the mootness. The injunction therefore remains on the books while the merits proceed below.

- Merits not reached: The court emphasizes that the underlying case remains live, notably as to Pavia’s claim for 2026 eligibility, and that the preliminary injunction did not prejudge the merits. Discovery and final adjudication remain the proper avenue to resolve the antitrust challenge to the JUCO Rule.

Case Background and Procedural Posture

Diego Pavia’s football career began at the New Mexico Military Institute (a junior college in the NJCAA), where he played two seasons, followed by two seasons at New Mexico State University (NCAA Division I), and one at Vanderbilt. The NCAA’s “JUCO Rule” counts junior-college seasons toward the four-season cap for “intercollegiate competition,” and the NCAA’s five-year eligibility window further constrains participation. COVID-era relief meant Pavia’s 2020 JUCO season did not count, but his 2021 JUCO season did, leaving him out of eligibility for 2025 under the JUCO Rule.

Pavia sued the NCAA in fall 2024, alleging that counting JUCO seasons toward the Division I cap violates Section 1 of the Sherman Act. He sought injunctive relief enabling him to play in 2025 and 2026 and an order barring use of the NCAA’s restitution rule if he played while an injunction was in effect. The district court granted a preliminary injunction for 2025 and enjoined enforcement of the restitution rule as to his 2025 participation. The NCAA appealed.

While the appeal was pending, the NCAA issued a waiver allowing athletes who had used a season at a non-NCAA school and used their fourth season in 2024, and who are otherwise eligible, to play in 2025. The NCAA confirmed that Pavia fell within the waiver and represented that the waiver would remain in effect regardless of the appellate outcome. Pavia agreed with that understanding.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents and Authorities That Shape the Court’s Decision

Article III mootness principles:
- Brown v. Yost (6th Cir. 2024) (en banc): Appeals are moot when no effectual relief is possible; the live status of the underlying case does not salvage a moot appeal from preliminary relief.
- Church of Scientology v. United States (U.S. 1992) and Ohio v. EPA (6th Cir. 2020): Emphasize the “effectual relief”/“practical effect” test.
- Resurrection School v. Hertel (6th Cir. 2022) (en banc): Preliminary-injunction appeals can become moot due to intervening changes; exceptions are narrowly applied.
- Welty v. Dunaway (6th Cir. 2025): Illustrates intervening events can moot an appeal when relief would be ineffectual.
- Kingdomware Technologies v. United States (U.S. 2016) and Spencer v. Kemna (U.S. 1998): Define the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception—short duration plus reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will face the same action again.
- Radiant Global Logistics v. Furstenau (6th Cir. 2020): Some controversies, “by their nature,” can be fully litigated within the relevant timeframe.
- Fourqurean v. NCAA (7th Cir. 2025): Another circuit reached the merits of a similar NCAA-eligibility challenge in time to affect the relevant season, undercutting the “evading review” argument.
Voluntary cessation doctrine and forfeiture:
- Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw (U.S. 2000) and United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass’n (U.S. 1968): A defendant’s voluntary cessation moots a case only if it is absolutely clear the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to recur.
- Already, LLC v. Nike (U.S. 2013): Illustrates the stringency of the “unconditional and irrevocable” standard sometimes at play when defendants attempt to moot through covenants.
- DeFunis v. Odegaard (U.S. 1974): Courts may accept parties’ representations to define the scope of a dispute.
- Taylor v. Pilot Corp. (6th Cir. 2020) (Thapar, J., concurring): Parties can forfeit arguments for jurisdiction. Here, both parties forfeited voluntary-cessation arguments by not briefing them despite a court request.
Munsingwear vacatur:
- United States v. Munsingwear, Inc. (U.S. 1950): Addresses vacatur when a case becomes moot while on appeal.
- Marketing Displays International v. Shaw (6th Cir. 2024): In the Sixth Circuit, the party seeking vacatur must show the order has preclusive effect and that the movant did not cause the mootness. The NCAA failed the second prong here.
Broader antitrust backdrop (raised in concurrences):
- NCAA v. Alston (U.S. 2021): Confirms application of antitrust scrutiny to NCAA compensation restraints; rejects categorical amateurism immunity; calls for careful analysis of market realities.
- NCAA v. Board of Regents (U.S. 1984): Found that some horizontal restraints are necessary to produce a joint product like college sports, but not all restraints are justified.
- Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery (U.S. 1985): Addresses concerted refusals to deal and when facially anticompetitive conduct may warrant per se condemnation or rule-of-reason analysis.
- Sixth Circuit market-definition cases: NHLPA v. Plymouth Whalers (2003); Kentucky Speedway v. NASCAR (2009).
- Professional sports antitrust cases (as context for labor restraints): Smith v. Pro Football (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mackey v. NFL (8th Cir. 1976); Clarett v. NFL (2d Cir. 2004) (labor exemption context); Linseman v. WHA (D. Conn. 1977); Kapp v. NFL (N.D. Cal. 1974); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro (C.D. Cal. 1971).

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) No effectual relief on appeal. The hinge of the mootness ruling is straightforward: a case remains live only if the court can grant effectual relief. Because the NCAA’s waiver independently authorizes Pavia’s 2025 participation and makes the restitution rule irrelevant (he is not competing while ineligible), reversing the preliminary injunction would not change anything of practical consequence for the 2025 season. That ends appellate jurisdiction at this stage.

b) Exceptions to mootness do not apply. The “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception requires both short duration and a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will face the same action again. The panel explains:

Evading review: Eligibility disputes like this one do not inherently evade review; in fact, absent the waiver, the court likely could have resolved the appeal in time for the season. The Seventh Circuit did just that in Fourqurean.
Capable of repetition for the same complaining party: The action on appeal involves only Pavia’s 2025 ineligibility; the NCAA’s waiver eliminates any reasonable expectation that he will be subjected to that same 2025 denial. Although Pavia pursues 2026 eligibility on the merits, that is a distinct controversy that remains live in the district court.

c) Voluntary cessation is forfeited. The panel notes that voluntary cessation would require showing it is not reasonably expected that the NCAA will revert. While acknowledging that the NCAA’s written and oral representations, plus reliance interests and the late stage of the season, suggest reversion is unlikely, the court expressly does not decide the doctrine’s applicability because neither party briefed it despite being asked. The argument is therefore forfeited.

d) No Munsingwear vacatur. Applying the Sixth Circuit’s two-part test, the court holds vacatur is inappropriate because the NCAA itself caused the mootness by issuing the waiver. Without satisfying the “not-caused-by-the-movant” prong, the NCAA cannot obtain vacatur. The preliminary injunction thus remains on the books while the merits proceed.

e) Merits and discovery unaffected. The panel underscores that preliminary-injunction rulings decide only the status quo pending litigation. The district court’s discovery stay tied to the appeal should not be read to make the merits contingent on the appellate outcome; the underlying case remains active, particularly as to Pavia’s 2026 eligibility claim.

3) The Concurrences: Roadmap for the Antitrust Merits

Judge Thapar’s concurrence catalogs unresolved questions the parties must address on remand:

Market definition: Whether the relevant market is Division I football labor or a broader “college football labor” market, and what economic evidence supports those contours.
Analytic framework: Whether eligibility rules like the JUCO Rule should be analyzed as concerted refusals to deal (potentially closer to per se concerns) or under the rule of reason; the plaintiff’s boycott theory was floated late and needs development.
Evidence of competitive effects: The record is thin. Pavia needs evidence of actual anticompetitive effects; the NCAA needs evidence supporting its asserted procompetitive benefits (e.g., product quality, consumer demand) and a coherent fit with other eligibility waivers and exceptions.
Market realities: Massive recent shifts—school-paid compensation (post-Alston developments), NIL-collective recruiting, transfer flexibility, and even the 2025 waiver—may alter how the rule affects price, output, and labor conditions.
Comparators and spillovers: Effects on junior colleges versus Division II/III programs, and whether eliminating the JUCO Rule would require similar treatment across NCAA divisions.

Judge Hermandorfer’s concurrence narrows the economic lens to the Division I football labor market:

Labor-market focus: The JUCO Rule excludes a class of experienced former-JUCO players from a later season of Division I competition, reallocating roster spots to less-experienced players and plausibly suppressing earnings for that excluded cohort.
Monopsony and wages: In highly differentiated talent markets, adding supply can increase competition for top talent and raise wages and output, cutting against the NCAA’s premise that more eligible players always depress compensation. The NCAA conceded that output and price effects are relevant to antitrust harm.
Burden on the NCAA: If Pavia shows anticompetitive effects, Alston requires the NCAA to rebut with economic evidence, not policy assertions, and to account for changed market realities.

Impact and Implications

A. Appellate Procedure and Litigation Strategy

Mootness at the PI stage: Defendants who grant complete interim relief may moot an appeal of a preliminary injunction. This decision clarifies that even when the underlying merits continue, a PI appeal is dismissed if there is no practical effect left for the court to grant.
Risk of no vacatur: Parties who cause mootness risk losing Munsingwear vacatur in the Sixth Circuit. Here, the NCAA’s strategic choice to issue a waiver preserved Pavia’s 2025 play but forfeited vacatur, leaving the district court’s order in place.
Voluntary cessation: If a party intends to preserve appellate jurisdiction despite interim changes, voluntary-cessation arguments must be timely briefed. Forfeiture removes a possible path to appellate review despite changed circumstances.

B. NCAA Governance and Athlete Eligibility

System-wide waivers: The NCAA’s reliance on broad waivers can resolve near-term disputes but may invite dismissal of appeals while leaving district-level reasoning unvacated. Repeated use of waivers might reduce opportunities for appellate clarification of eligibility rules.
Restitution rule: When eligibility is independently conferred (e.g., via a waiver), litigation over the restitution rule becomes irrelevant for the covered period. Institutions may see reduced risk when athletes play under such waivers.

C. Antitrust Law in College Sports

Scope after Alston: The court’s concurrences reinforce that eligibility rules, not just compensation rules, may face antitrust scrutiny. But the NCAA may justify some horizontal restraints necessary to produce the joint product of intercollegiate athletics.
Factual rigor: Future challenges will turn on robust economic evidence. Courts will expect concrete data on market definition, wage/output effects, consumer demand, and feasible less-restrictive alternatives, if any.
Labor-market framing: The Division I football labor market, with highly differentiated talent and monopsony features, complicates simplistic supply-wage claims. Evidence on how excluding experienced JUCO players affects wages, quality, and output will be central.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Mootness: A case is moot if the court can no longer grant relief that would change the parties’ situation. On appeal from a preliminary injunction, the question is whether a ruling would have practical effect during the preliminary period.
Effectual relief: Relief that makes a concrete difference to the parties. If an intervening event already guarantees the requested relief, there is nothing left for the court to do.
Capable of repetition, yet evading review: A narrow exception where (1) the challenged action ends too quickly to be fully litigated and (2) the same party is likely to face the same action again. Both prongs must be met.
Voluntary cessation: A defendant’s decision to stop the challenged conduct does not automatically moot a case. To moot, it must be absolutely clear the conduct will not recur. Parties must timely raise and brief this doctrine.
Munsingwear vacatur: When a case becomes moot on appeal, appellate courts sometimes vacate the lower court’s decision to avoid preclusive effects. In the Sixth Circuit, the movant must show the order would be preclusive and that the movant did not cause the mootness.
JUCO Rule: An NCAA eligibility policy counting junior-college seasons toward the four-season cap for intercollegiate competition, affecting how many NCAA seasons a former JUCO athlete may play.
Restitution rule: An NCAA bylaw authorizing penalties if a school plays an ineligible athlete who competes under a preliminary injunction that is later dissolved. If a waiver makes the athlete eligible, that restitution risk evaporates for the covered period.
Market definition (antitrust): Identifying the product and geographic space in which competition occurs. It sets the bounds for analyzing market power and competitive effects.
Monopsony: Market power on the buyer side (here, schools purchasing athlete services). A monopsonist can depress wages below competitive levels and restrict the quantity of labor.
Concerted refusal to deal: A coordinated agreement among buyers not to deal with a class of sellers (or workers). Depending on context, may face per se condemnation or rule-of-reason analysis.

What Remains for the District Court on Remand

Define the relevant market(s) with evidence: Is it Division I football labor specifically, or a broader college football labor market?
Select the appropriate legal framework: Rule of reason versus characterizing the JUCO Rule as a concerted refusal to deal.
Develop an evidentiary record: Empirical data on how the JUCO Rule affects wages, roster allocation, competitive balance, quality of play, and consumer demand; evidence of actual market foreclosure and output effects.
Address changed market realities: The advent of direct school payments, NIL recruiting, transfer liberalization, and widespread waivers all bear on competitive effects and justifications.
Consider cross-division dynamics: Interactions with Division II/III, and whether eliminating the JUCO Rule would have spillover effects or require parity across divisions.
Evaluate procompetitive justifications: Assess whether the JUCO Rule is reasonably necessary to maintain a sub-professional product, and whether less restrictive alternatives exist or are impractical.

Conclusion

This published decision establishes a clear procedural marker in the Sixth Circuit: when a defendant’s post-injunction actions provide a plaintiff complete relief for the preliminary period, an appeal from the preliminary injunction is moot because there is no effectual relief left for the appellate court to grant. Attempts to invoke exceptions must be carefully supported and timely briefed; here, both the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception and any voluntary-cessation theory fell short. And when the appellant causes the mootness, Munsingwear vacatur will be denied.

On the merits, however, the case is very much alive. The concurrences anticipate the next phase: a rigorous antitrust inquiry into the NCAA’s JUCO Rule, grounded in market definition, credible economic proof of competitive effects, and sober attention to the transformed economics of college sports post-Alston. The court signals both caution and discipline—caution about judicial overreach into complex regulatory design, and discipline in demanding a thorough, data-driven record. For litigants and institutions alike, the message is twofold: procedural shortcuts can foreclose appellate review while leaving lower-court injunctions intact, and future eligibility-rule challenges will turn not on slogans about amateurism, but on hard evidence about how the rules actually affect labor markets, prices, and output in the modern NCAA ecosystem.