Waiver by Incoherent Briefing and the Risk of Appellate Sanctions: Commentary on Kibbons v. Peloso (7th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Seventh Circuit’s nonprecedential disposition in Pamela Kibbons v. Anthony Peloso & Board of Education of Taft School District 90, No. 25-1390 (7th Cir. Dec. 12, 2025).

Although the decision is marked a “NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION” and thus does not constitute binding precedent within the circuit, it provides a sharp and instructive illustration of several critical themes in modern federal practice:

how waiver-by-underdeveloped-argument operates at both the trial and appellate levels,
the minimum standards of appellate briefing under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28,
the circumstances under which an appeal can become frivolous and expose counsel to sanctions under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, and
the interaction of district court sanctions (Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927) with separate sanction exposure in the court of appeals.

Substantively, the case began as a typical employment dispute under Title VII, accompanied by state-law claims. Procedurally, it ended as a cautionary tale about litigant and attorney conduct. The Seventh Circuit not only affirmed summary judgment for the defendants but also ordered plaintiff’s counsel to show cause why he should not be sanctioned for a frivolous, rule-violating appeal.

II. Background of the Case

A. The Parties and Employment Relationship

Taft School District 90 in Lockport, Illinois, hired Dr. Pamela Kibbons in 2016 on a two-year contract to serve in a dual role as superintendent and principal. Anthony Peloso was the president of the school board.

During her tenure, Kibbons alleged that Peloso engaged in conduct she perceived as harassing:

He allegedly asked her on multiple occasions to go across the street to a cemetery to drink.
He purportedly entered her office frequently to work on his laptop and watch her work.
He twice instructed her to climb a ladder to the school rooftop while she was wearing a skirt and high-heeled shoes, which she found embarrassing, particularly because he watched her.

After her two-year contract expired, the Board offered to renew it, but Kibbons declined and resigned. She then filed an EEOC charge alleging harassment, retaliation, and constructive discharge, and received a right-to-sue letter on November 30, 2018.

B. District Court Litigation

In February 2019, Kibbons filed suit in the Northern District of Illinois. Her First Amended Complaint alleged four claims:

Title VII hostile work environment (sex-based harassment),
Title VII constructive discharge,
Breach of contract by the Board, and
Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) under state law, based on the same course of alleged conduct by Peloso.

After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment (December 2023). While that motion was pending, Kibbons filed an extensive motion for sanctions in April 2024, asserting wide-ranging misconduct by defense counsel during discovery. A magistrate judge recommended denial of sanctions in June 2024, finding the motion untimely and unsupported by any sanctionable discovery violation.

In September 2024, the district court:

Granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims,
Held that Kibbons had abandoned her claims by failing to meaningfully respond to the defendants’ arguments on summary judgment, and
Affirmed the magistrate judge’s denial of discovery sanctions.

Kibbons then moved for reconsideration. The defendants, in turn, moved for Rule 11 sanctions in December 2024, citing her “vexatious motions and filings.” In March 2025, the court:

Denied reconsideration,
Granted Rule 11 sanctions against Kibbons’s counsel, finding he lacked a subjective good-faith basis that the claims were well grounded in fact or law, and
Imposed additional sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for filings that showed “a serious and studied disregard for the orderly process of justice.”

The district court ordered Kibbons to pay $75,867.50 in attorney’s fees to the defendants as a sanction. She appealed the merits, the denial of her sanctions motion, and (at least nominally) the sanction awards.

III. Summary of the Seventh Circuit’s Disposition

The Seventh Circuit, in a per curiam order without oral argument, did the following:

Affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, holding that:
- Kibbons waived or abandoned all four claims in the district court by failing to substantively respond to defendants’ summary judgment arguments; and
- On appeal she again waived any challenge to the district court’s reasoning by failing to present developed arguments engaging that reasoning.
Affirmed the denial of Kibbons’s discovery sanctions motion, agreeing that:
- The motion was untimely and
- Her objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendation were waived and unsupported, relying on irrelevant authority and conclusory accusations of perjury and bad faith.
Found Kibbons’s appellate briefs noncompliant with Rule 28 and substantially deficient:
- No coherent statement of the case,
- No adequate summary of the argument,
- Minimal citation to authority and the record, and
- Arguments largely irrelevant to the district court’s reasons for ruling.
Determined the appeal to be frivolous in substance, in that the result was “foreordained” by the lack of developed legal argument and noncompliance with appellate rules.
Ordered plaintiff’s counsel to show cause within 21 days why he should not be sanctioned or otherwise disciplined under Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 28 and 38 for filing incoherent, rule-violating briefs.

Notably, the court did not revisit the substance of the underlying Title VII and state-law claims. The decision turns almost entirely on procedural default, waiver, and sanctions.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The Central Doctrinal Theme: Waiver Through Non-Argument

The opinion’s backbone is the doctrine of waiver—not just in the sense of failing to raise issues at all, but in the modern Seventh Circuit sense of failing to properly develop issues with meaningful legal argument and record citation.

Drawing on Lukaszczyk v. Cook County, 137 F.4th 671 (7th Cir. 2025), the court reiterates that:

“Waiver occurs when a party intentionally relinquishes a known right.”

But the court then explains, referencing Bradley v. Village of University Park, 59 F.4th 887 (7th Cir. 2023), that waiver in the appellate context also arises where parties:

fail to raise an issue in the district court,
fail to raise it in their opening brief on appeal,
do not present a developed argument that engages the district court’s reasoning, or
fail to respond in a reply brief to a new argument raised by appellees.

The court repeatedly cites longstanding law that:

Underdeveloped, perfunctory, or conclusory arguments are waived. (Puffer v. Allstate, 675 F.3d 709 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955 (7th Cir. 1991)).
It is not enough to mention an issue “in general terms”; parties must explain why the law and record favor their position. (Fednav Int’l Ltd. v. Continental Ins. Co., 624 F.3d 834, 841 (7th Cir. 2010)).
The parties, not the court, bear the responsibility to allege facts and show their legal relevance. (Economic Folding Box Corp. v. Anchor Frozen Foods Corp., 515 F.3d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 2008)).

Against this doctrinal backdrop, the court holds that Kibbons:

Abandoned her claims in the district court by failing to respond meaningfully to defendants’ summary judgment arguments; and
Waived any appellate challenge by failing to present coherent, record-based, legally supported arguments attacking the district court’s reasoning.

B. Application to the District Court’s Summary Judgment Ruling

The Seventh Circuit reviews summary judgment de novo, citing Osborn v. JAB Management Services, Inc., 126 F.4th 1250, 1258 (7th Cir. 2025), but there is virtually nothing to review because of the manner in which Kibbons litigated.

The district court had granted summary judgment on four independent grounds:

Hostile work environment (Title VII) – Defendants argued the claims were time-barred; Kibbons did not respond to this argument, thereby waiving it.
Constructive discharge (Title VII) – Again, Kibbons failed to respond to defendants’ arguments; the claim was deemed abandoned.
Breach of contract – The claim was premised on the same facts as the constructive discharge theory, and Kibbons failed to identify any specific contractual term breached or evidence supporting breach. The claim was thus waived and unsupported on the merits.
IIED – The response brief did not even mention “intentional infliction of emotional distress,” so the court treated the claim as abandoned.

The Seventh Circuit endorses the district court’s view that it is not the judge’s job to reconstruct legal theories from a “disjointed” set of factual assertions and undeveloped arguments. The court cites Williams v. Dieball, 724 F.3d 957 (7th Cir. 2013), and Puffer to reinforce the principle that arguments not presented with specificity in the district court are waived and cannot be revived on appeal.

In effect, the appellate court holds that the merits of the discrimination and tort claims are not properly before it. The only cognizable issues are procedural—waiver, sanction rulings, and appellate practice.

C. Waiver and Abandonment on Appeal

On appeal, things worsen for Kibbons. The court concludes that her opening brief:

Does not clearly identify which district court rulings are being challenged.
Requests a special master and evidentiary hearing about alleged perjury and evidence fabrication, rather than squarely addressing the legal bases of the summary judgment order.
Recites the summary judgment standard and some case law without tying these authorities to evidence in the record.
Spends most of its pages attempting to reframe factual disputes and prior discovery conflicts rather than engaging with the actual reasoning of the district court.
Devotes disproportionate attention to accusing defense counsel of “bad behavior,” perjury, and fabrication, with no concrete, record-based legal argument.

The court describes these as “few bare assertions” that the district court erred, which are “insufficient to preserve either issue for appeal” (citing Puffer, 675 F.3d at 720). Applying Klein v. O’Brien, 884 F.3d 754, 757 (7th Cir. 2018), the panel notes that an appellant who does not engage the reasons for which she lost “has no prospect of success.”

The upshot: even if some error had lurked in the district court’s analysis, the Seventh Circuit would not reach it, because the appellant’s inadequate briefing has waived any meaningful appellate review.

D. The Discovery Sanctions Motion and Timeliness

A substantial part of Kibbons’s appellate presentation focused not on the merits of her discrimination claims but on perceived discovery misconduct by the defendants and their counsel. This strategy failed at multiple levels.

The magistrate judge had earlier warned that a contemplated sanctions motion appeared untimely, noting that:

“it is unclear why plaintiff intends to seek discovery related sanctions now, more than two months after fact discovery cutoff and presumably even longer after the underlying misconduct that defendants allegedly engaged in.”

Six months later—long after fact discovery closed—Kibbons finally filed a sprawling sanctions motion (41 pages plus over 300 pages of exhibits), which the magistrate judge characterized as:

“nothing more than a laundry list of plaintiff's counsel's grievances with how defendants and their attorneys have comported themselves during the discovery process and a rehashing of multiple discovery disputes that plaintiff brought and lost—some on multiple occasions.”

The magistrate judge denied the motion as untimely, having considered proper factors such as:

when the movant learned of the alleged discovery violation,
how long she waited before bringing it to the court’s attention, and
whether discovery had already been completed.

On objections, the district court found that Kibbons:

Advanced unsupported propositions and cited irrelevant cases (e.g., Pope v. Taylor, 100 F.4th 918 (7th Cir. 2024), a habeas case; Novotny v. Plexus Corp., 777 F. App’x 164 (7th Cir. 2019), a judicial estoppel case; and Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36 (2022), a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution case).
Used these cases to seek extraordinary remedies (e.g., judicial estoppel) that had no clear connection to the discovery disputes at issue.
Levied serious accusations of perjury based largely on the fact that defendants’ deposition testimony was consistent across time—an “argument” that the court found unpersuasive and unsupported.

The Seventh Circuit agrees that these objections were waived due to failure to meaningfully respond to the magistrate judge’s actual reasoning, and it upholds the denial of sanctions as entirely proper.

E. Noncompliance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28

A central feature of the appellate court’s analysis is the diagnosis of serious deficiencies in both the principal and reply briefs under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28 and Seventh Circuit Rule 28.

Rule 28 requires, among other things:

A concise statement of the case, setting out the facts relevant to the issues submitted for review. (Rule 28(a)(6))
A summary of the argument—a succinct, clear, and accurate statement of the arguments made in the body of the brief. (Rule 28(a)(7))
An argument section with the appellant’s contentions, reasons, and citations to authorities and the record. (Rule 28(a)(8))

The court finds that Kibbons’s briefs fail these minimum requirements:

No coherent, focused procedural or factual narrative relevant to the issues on review.
No meaningful summary tying together the arguments.
Assertions untethered to record citations or legal authority.

The opinion gives concrete examples from the principal brief:

Broad declarations that landmark decisions of the Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit were “disregarded,” without identifying which holdings or how.
Unsubstantiated accusations that opposing counsel “ignored discovery obligations” and later their “obligations to tell the truth under oath.”
Demands for a supplemental privilege log without legal support demonstrating its necessity or relevance.
Headings such as “Litigation Over Attorneys’ Fees Is a Waste of Judicial Resources” that are disconnected from any developed legal argument.

The reply brief is, if anything, more striking:

It devotes pages to praising Kibbons’s performance as superintendent and principal (e.g., securing textbooks, soliciting donations to beautify the school)—irrelevant to the legal basis for summary judgment.
It includes 14 pages of photographs of school improvements, again with no bearing on whether legal claims were waived, time-barred, or factually supported under Rule 56.
It refuses to engage with the district court’s rationale or defendants’ brief and instead continues unsupported accusations of perjury and spoliation.

Citing Sullers v. Int’l Union Elevator Constructors, Local 2, 141 F.4th 890 (7th Cir. 2025), the court emphasizes that while the bar for a Rule 28-compliant brief is low, there is still a threshold below which a brief is not usable. The court contrasts this case with:

Sullers, where a sparse but minimally coherent brief still allowed a merits disposition; and
McCurry v. Kenco Logistics Services, LLC, 942 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2019), where a Title VII brief “laden with assertions that ha[d] no basis in the record and arguments that ha[d] no basis in the law” was deemed frivolous and Rule 28-violating.

The court also references Shipley v. Chicago Board of Election Commissioners, 947 F.3d 1056 (7th Cir. 2020), where claims were waived for having only a few cursory, unexplained sentences in the briefs, and cites Jaworski v. Master Hand Contractors, 882 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 2018), and Avitia v. Metropolitan Club of Chicago, Inc., 49 F.3d 1219 (7th Cir. 1995), to reinforce that the purpose of appellate review is to evaluate the district court’s reasoning, which requires “meticulous compliance” with briefing rules.

F. Frivolous Appeals and Rule 38 Sanctions

The court then turns to sanctions. Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, a court of appeals may award damages and costs if an appeal is frivolous and if sanctions are otherwise appropriate.

The opinion quotes the Seventh Circuit’s own Practitioner’s Handbook for Appeals, citing:

Harris N.A. v. Hershey, 711 F.3d 794, 802 (7th Cir. 2013);
Lorentzen v. Anderson Pest Control, 64 F.3d 327, 331 (7th Cir. 1995);
Ashkin v. Time Warner Cable Corp., 52 F.3d 140, 146 (7th Cir. 1995); and
East St. Louis v. Circuit Court, 986 F.2d 1142, 1145 (7th Cir. 1993),

for the proposition that an appeal is frivolous “when the result is foreordained by a lack of substance of appellant's arguments.”

The court also notes that noncompliance with appellate rules both:

wastes judicial time and resources, and
frustrates proper review,

citing McCurry and Sambrano v. Mabus, 663 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 2011), as cases where sanctions were appropriate or imposed for Rule 28 violations and frivolous filings.

Importantly, the panel draws a distinction between:

“just poor written advocacy” (which does not necessarily warrant sanctions), and
briefs that are not even “reasonably coherent,” referencing Stanard v. Nygren, 658 F.3d 792, 801–02 (7th Cir. 2011).

The court concludes that Kibbons’s appellate submissions fall into the latter category:

“This is not a case of just poor written advocacy. Rather, Kibbons’s briefs are not even ‘reasonably coherent.’ … Kibbons’s counsel has fallen short of the reasonable standards of practice in his briefs and filings.”

Accordingly, instead of immediately imposing sanctions, the panel issues an order to show cause to counsel under Rules 28 and 38, giving him 21 days to explain why sanctions or discipline should not be imposed.

G. Relationship to District Court Rule 11 and § 1927 Sanctions

At the trial level, the district court imposed:

Rule 11 sanctions for pursuing claims without a good-faith basis in fact or law, and
28 U.S.C. § 1927 sanctions for multiplying the proceedings “unreasonably and vexatiously.”

On appeal, Kibbons nominally challenges the fee award but does so in a perfunctory way, asserting only that she and her counsel “have done absolutely nothing wrong in this case.” The Seventh Circuit treats this as another waived argument for lack of development (again invoking Puffer and Berkowitz).

The panel then cites Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 407 (1990), to clarify the jurisdictional and functional separation between trial-level sanctions and appellate-level sanctions:

“The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure place a natural limit on Rule 11’s scope … [o]n appeal, the litigants’ conduct is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.”

Thus, the fact that the district court has already sanctioned counsel under Rule 11 and § 1927 does not insulate him from additional appellate sanctions for his conduct in the court of appeals. Each level of the federal system polices its own processes.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Waiver vs. “Losing on the Merits”

It is important to distinguish between:

Losing on the merits – where the court reaches and rejects your legal claim based on the law and evidence; and
Waiver/abandonment – where the court never reaches the merits because the party did not properly present or develop the issue.

In Kibbons, the appellate court largely does not analyze whether the conduct she described amounted to a hostile work environment, constructive discharge, breach of contract, or IIED. Instead, it holds that she lost her opportunity to obtain that merits review by failing to:

respond substantively to summary judgment arguments, and
craft coherent, legally grounded appellate briefs.

B. Summary Judgment and “Abandonment” of Claims

Summary judgment under Rule 56 is granted when there is no genuine dispute about any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When a party moves for summary judgment and makes specific legal and factual arguments, the opposing party must:

respond to those arguments,
cite specific record evidence, and
explain why a reasonable jury could find in their favor.

If the non-movant does not respond to a particular argument or claim at all, many courts—including the Seventh Circuit—treat that claim as abandoned. That is what happened here to all four of Kibbons’s claims.

C. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28

Rule 28 lays out the basic structure of an appellate brief. Among other things, an appellant must:

Tell the appellate court what the case is about (relevant facts and procedural history).
Identify the rulings being challenged (issues on appeal).
Summarize how they intend to show error (summary of argument).
In the argument section:
- State specific legal contentions,
- Explain why those contentions are correct, and
- Cite relevant cases and record evidence.

The standard is not excessively demanding, but there must be enough structure and substance for the court to evaluate the correctness of the decision below. Mere slogans, accusations, or irrelevant material (like photographs of school beautification) do not satisfy Rule 28.

D. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 (Frivolous Appeals)

Rule 38 allows a court of appeals to sanction a party (usually through damages and costs) when:

the appeal is frivolous, and
sanctions are appropriate under the circumstances.

A frivolous appeal, as understood in the Seventh Circuit, is one where there is no reasonable prospect of reversal because:

the arguments are legally baseless,
the brief is incoherent or completely unsupported by authority or the record, or
the appeal is essentially an attempt to relitigate factual disputes without any legal footing.

The court may issue an order to show cause, giving counsel a chance to explain themselves before imposing sanctions. That is what happens here.

E. Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927

Rule 11 applies to papers filed in the district court and requires that:

claims have a basis in fact,
legal contentions are warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for change, and
filings are not made for an improper purpose, such as harassment or needless cost.

28 U.S.C. § 1927 allows sanctions against an attorney who “so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously,” generally requiring some level of bad faith or reckless disregard for the orderly process of justice.

The district court found both standards satisfied and imposed substantial monetary sanctions. The Seventh Circuit does not disturb those sanctions; it finds any challenge to them waived.

F. “Nonprecedential” Dispositions

The court marks this decision as a “Nonprecedential Disposition”, to be cited only in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1. That means:

The opinion is not binding precedent in future Seventh Circuit cases.
It may still be cited as persuasive authority, subject to local citation rules.
Its value lies mainly in illustrating how existing doctrine is applied to a particular fact pattern, not in announcing a new rule of law.

Practitioners should still take this disposition seriously because it showcases how the court will enforce waiver and briefing rules in concrete, real-world circumstances.

VI. Precedents and Their Influence

The opinion is dense with citations, many serving a didactic function to underscore norms of federal practice. A few key clusters are worth highlighting:

A. Waiver and Underdeveloped Arguments

Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 675 F.3d 709 (7th Cir. 2012) – Frequently cited for the principle that arguments not raised in the district court are waived on appeal and that perfunctory, undeveloped arguments are also waived at both levels.
United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376 (7th Cir. 1991) and United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955 (7th Cir. 1991) – Classic statements that “perfunctory and undeveloped arguments” and “skeletal” arguments are not sufficient to preserve issues.
Fednav Int’l Ltd. v. Continental Ins. Co., 624 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 2010) – Merely gesturing toward an issue is not enough; counsel must articulate a real argument.
Economic Folding Box Corp. v. Anchor Frozen Foods Corp., 515 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2008) – Reinforces that it is counsel’s job—not the court’s—to connect facts and law.

B. Rule 28 and Appellate Briefing Standards

Sullers v. Int’l Union Elevator Constructors, Local 2, 141 F.4th 890 (7th Cir. 2025) – Illustrates that while the court prefers to reach the merits, it will not do so when a brief is wholly inadequate.
McCurry v. Kenco Logistics Servs., LLC, 942 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2019) – A Title VII case where the court found a Rule 28-violating, frivolous brief laden with unsupported assertions; invoked here as a close analog to Kibbons.
Shipley v. Chicago Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 947 F.3d 1056 (7th Cir. 2020) – Demonstrates how cursory and buried sentences cannot preserve arguments for review.
Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 2001) – Recognizes that the court may dismiss an appeal outright where the appellant fails to supply even a minimally adequate brief.

C. Frivolous Appeals and Sanctions

Harris N.A. v. Hershey, 711 F.3d 794 (7th Cir. 2013) and Lorentzen v. Anderson Pest Control, 64 F.3d 327 (7th Cir. 1995) – Key Seventh Circuit authorities on Rule 38 sanctions.
Ashkin v. Time Warner Cable Corp., 52 F.3d 140 (7th Cir. 1995) – Defines a frivolous appeal as one where the result is foreordained by the lack of substance in the arguments.
Sambrano v. Mabus, 663 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 2011) – Example of sanctions imposed for appellate rule violations.
Stanard v. Nygren, 658 F.3d 792 (7th Cir. 2011) – Distinguishes between merely poor advocacy and filings that are not even “reasonably coherent.”

D. Separation of District and Appellate Sanctions

Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990) – Establishes that Rule 11 does not govern appellate filings and that Rule 38 governs sanctionable conduct in the court of appeals. The Seventh Circuit invokes this to explain why district court sanctions do not preclude independent appellate sanctions.

VII. Impact and Practical Implications

A. For Employment Litigants and Counsel

Although Kibbons does not add substantive Title VII doctrine, it sends an unambiguous message to counsel handling employment and civil-rights cases:

Procedural rigor is not optional. Even potentially meritorious claims can be forfeited by defective briefing.
Summary judgment is a critical juncture. Failing to respond point-by-point to the movant’s arguments can result in wholesale abandonment of claims.
Discovery grievances must be timely and precise. Turning every lost discovery dispute into an expansive sanctions motion, especially after the close of discovery, is risky and can itself invite sanctions.
Accusations of perjury and misconduct must be grounded in the record. Courts will not tolerate unsupported attacks on opposing counsel or parties.

B. For Appellate Practice in the Seventh Circuit

This disposition is particularly important for appellate practitioners because it:

Reinforces the low but real threshold of Rule 28 – Courts may forgive imperfections, but they will not rescue a brief that is incoherent, unfocused, and unsupported.
Reaffirms the court’s willingness to impose Rule 38 sanctions – The order to show cause signals that filing a frivolous appeal can have real financial and professional consequences.
Highlights the necessity of engaging the district court’s reasoning – A brief that ignores why the appellant lost below is, for practical purposes, no brief at all.

C. On Judicial Economy and Professional Responsibility

The opinion repeatedly emphasizes that noncompliance with appellate rules:

wastes judicial time and resources, and
“frustrates the review process.”

By invoking an order to show cause for sanctions, the court signals an institutional interest in protecting the appellate docket from baseless, unstructured appeals and in enforcing professional norms among members of the bar.

While the decision is nonprecedential, its detailed critique of briefing practices will likely be read by district and appellate judges, as well as practitioners, as an implicit warning: grossly defective briefing can transform a losing case into a sanctionable one.

VIII. Conclusion

Kibbons v. Peloso is less about the substance of Title VII and more about the mechanics of federal litigation and appellate practice. The Seventh Circuit:

Affirms summary judgment because every claim was effectively abandoned through failure to respond to summary judgment arguments and failure to develop appellate arguments.
Affirms the denial of discovery sanctions because the motion was untimely and unsupported, and objections to the magistrate’s recommendation were themselves waived and irrelevant.
Diagnoses a serious Rule 28 violation, finding the briefs incoherent, unsupported, and largely unrelated to the reasons for which the appellant lost below.
Concludes that the appeal is frivolous and issues an order to show cause why Rule 38 sanctions and discipline should not be imposed against counsel.

The broader lesson is straightforward but critical: federal courts expect parties—especially those represented by counsel—to adhere to basic standards of legal argumentation and briefing. The failure to do so may not only forfeit substantive rights; it can also invite monetary and professional sanctions.

While Kibbons will not appear in official reporters as binding precedent, it stands as a concrete and sobering example of how the Seventh Circuit enforces waiver, polices its docket, and protects the integrity of the appellate process.