I. Introduction

United States v. Tomarcus Baskerville (with codefendants Courtland Springfield and Thomas Earl Smith) arises from a violent “gang war” in the Memphis suburbs involving a Vice Lords offshoot known as the “Junk Yard Dogs.” Federal prosecutors charged fifteen members in a superseding indictment with racketeering-related crimes, including racketeering conspiracy, violent crimes in aid of racketeering (murder and attempted murder), and firearms offenses.

Three defendants—Baskerville (gang “Chief of the Streets”), Smith (high-ranking leader), and Springfield (a “representer”)—went to trial. After a four-week jury trial, the jury returned a split verdict: convictions for all three on racketeering conspiracy; additional convictions for Baskerville on murders/attempted murders and related firearms counts; Springfield on attempted murders and related firearms counts tied to the August 23, 2020 “Dead End” shooting; and Smith on attempted murder and a § 924(c) firearm count tied to the June 17, 2020 Willie Perry shooting.

The appeals presented six issue clusters, but the opinion’s most consequential guidance concerns: (1) how Sixth Circuit doctrine treats alleged jury intimidation and the scope of a district court’s investigation under Remmer v. United States; (2) waiver/forfeiture when defense counsel opposes juror questioning; and (3) the Sixth Circuit’s continued rejection of a default “presumption of prejudice” from external juror contacts. The court also corrected an Alleyne v. United States mandatory-minimum sentencing error on Smith’s § 924(c) count.

II. Summary of the Opinion

• Convictions affirmed: The Sixth Circuit rejected sufficiency challenges by Baskerville and Smith and upheld evidentiary rulings admitting phone-communication charts.
• Jury-intimidation claims rejected: The court held that Springfield waived any claim that the district court should have individually questioned jurors because counsel urged the court to “leave them alone,” and Smith at best forfeited such an argument, triggering plain-error review which he could not meet.
• No presumptive prejudice: Consistent with Sixth Circuit precedent since United States v. Pennell, defendants bore the burden to show actual bias for mistrial relief; the record (foreperson assurances, juror poll, split verdict) supported the district court’s impartiality finding.
• Sentence vacated for Smith: The court accepted the Government’s concession that imposing a 10-year mandatory minimum for “discharge” under § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) violated Alleyne v. United States because the jury found only “use or carry,” not discharge; the proper minimum was five years under § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). Smith’s sentence was vacated and remanded.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Role

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The court applied the canonical sufficiency framework from Jackson v. Virginia (whether “any rational trier of fact” could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing evidence favorably to the prosecution). Sixth Circuit gloss reinforced the deference owed to the jury: United States v. Wagner, United States v. Davis (6th Cir. 2007), United States v. Brown, and United States v. Gardner.

For Baskerville’s VICAR convictions, the court relied on United States v. Woods to identify elements and then used Tennessee accomplice-liability principles (Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-402(2)) to show that ordering or directing violence can constitute “committing” the violent act under state law incorporated by 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a). The opinion also cited United States v. Zemlyansky (2d Cir.) for the common-sense proposition that bosses cannot avoid liability by “buffering” commands through subordinates.

2. RICO Conspiracy: Agreement Standard

For Smith’s RICO conspiracy challenge, the court emphasized the distinction between substantive RICO and RICO conspiracy: under United States v. Hills, a conspiracy conviction requires proof the defendant agreed that someone would commit at least two predicate acts, not that the defendant personally committed two. It anchored the “intent to further an endeavor” theory in United States v. Householder, and it used Salinas v. United States and United States v. Gardiner for the proposition that intent and agreement may be inferred and need not be formal. The gang-membership-plus-participation line of cases—United States v. Tisdale and United States v. Ledbetter—supported the inference that leadership, planning presence, and facilitation actions can satisfy conspiracy intent.

When Smith argued the Government had “shifted theories,” the court invoked the rule that a general verdict stands if at least one valid ground is supported by sufficient evidence, citing United States v. Mari and Griffin v. United States, along with Sochor v. Florida.

3. Jury Intimidation, Remmer Duties, and Appellate Review Limits

The opinion’s most precedent-setting portion synthesizes Sixth Circuit doctrine governing “external influence” on jurors. The baseline comes from Remmer v. United States, which characterizes “private communication, contact, or tampering” with jurors as constitutionally significant and contemplates a hearing probing circumstances, impact, and prejudice. The court framed the Sixth Circuit’s operational rules through: United States v. Rigsby (credible allegations require sufficient investigation), United States v. Herndon (meaningful opportunity to prove bias; “Remmer hearings”), and more recent applications including United States v. Kechego and United States v. Jackson (6th Cir. 2025).

The court’s deference to the district judge’s chosen investigative scope is grounded in United States v. Shackelford (quoted via Rigsby) and elaborated in United States v. Taylor and United States v. Mack: district courts must balance the need to investigate with the risk that probing can itself “highlight” and exacerbate juror fear.

Two procedural doctrines were decisive:

• Waiver (unreviewable): Using United States v. Olano and United States v. Perry, the court held Springfield waived an individual-juror-questioning argument because counsel affirmatively urged the court to stop questioning and let the jury deliberate.
• Forfeiture / plain error: For Smith, who did not request juror-by-juror questioning and aligned with anti-“taint” concerns, the court applied plain-error review consistent with United States v. Walker, United States v. Mack, and Kechego. The absence of a clear, binding rule requiring sua sponte individual questioning—especially over defense opposition—defeated any “clear or obvious” error showing.

The defendants’ reliance on United States v. Corrado (Corrado I) and United States v. Davis failed because those cases involved an absence of meaningful investigation (or a “minimalist” response) to serious interference. By contrast, the district court here: conferred with counsel; interviewed the foreperson twice on the record; ensured jurors were not assuming the source of incidents; and polled each juror post-verdict. The court also distinguished the “unusual posture” of United States v. Lanier (Lanier I) and United States v. Lanier (Lanier II), where investigative failures and loss of evidence deprived defendants of a meaningful chance to prove bias.

4. No Default Presumption of Prejudice in the Sixth Circuit

On mistrial motions, the court reaffirmed Sixth Circuit doctrine that defendants must prove actual bias and that “prejudice is not to be presumed,” tracing to United States v. Pennell and Smith v. Phillips. The court rejected the argument that United States v. Olano requires a presumption, noting Sixth Circuit precedent has long coexisted with Olano and that presumed prejudice is, at most, reserved for “extreme or exceptional” cases involving conflicts akin to those discussed in Justice O’Connor’s Phillips concurrence. The court cited Johnson v. Luoma and English v. Berghuis for that narrow (and possibly non-viable) implied-bias window.

Importantly, the court treated the alleged intimidation here as troubling but not self-proving of partiality—especially where jurors expressly affirmed impartiality and did not attribute threats to either side.

5. Summary Charts and Evidentiary Doctrine

On “phone charts,” the court applied the Sixth Circuit’s summary-evidence framework from United States v. Bray and United States v. Kerley, describing “secondary-evidence summaries” as a hybrid of Rule 1006 summaries and Rule 611 pedagogical aids. The decision emphasized: accuracy, reliability, material assistance to the jury, and the necessity of a limiting instruction.

The court rejected a rigid “minimum volume” requirement and found probative value outweighed unfair prejudice under Rule 403, relying on cases such as United States v. Harvel and Old Chief v. United States. It also noted the renumbering of demonstrative-aid authority to Rule 107 (effective December 2024), while treating the standard as substantively unchanged.

6. Mandatory Minimums and Alleyne

The sentencing correction is straightforward: under Alleyne v. United States, any fact increasing a mandatory minimum must be found by the jury. Because the verdict form reflected only “use or carry” under § 924(c)(1)(A)(i)—and explicitly not discharge—the 10-year mandatory minimum under § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) was unlawful. The Government’s concession led to vacatur and remand for resentencing.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Leadership Liability in VICAR/Racketeering Violence

The court’s Baskerville analysis underscores that “not present” is not “not responsible.” By coupling (i) Tennessee’s solicitation/direction theory of criminal responsibility with (ii) evidence of hierarchical control, war declarations, and communication patterns, the court treated command responsibility as legally sufficient when state law recognizes liability for directing the offense. The opinion thus reinforces an evidentiary roadmap for VICAR prosecutions against leadership: structured hierarchy + directive statements + corroborating communications can satisfy the “committed” element.

2. RICO Conspiracy as Agreement to a Predicate Pattern

For Smith, the court operationalized the “agreement” standard by identifying multiple violence events from which the jury could infer assent: being present at planning meetings, executing one hit, knowing of a coordinated second hit, participating in the logistics and protection protocol during the Dead End event, and phone calls consistent with coordination. The court treated those facts as ample to find agreement that at least two predicate attempted murders would be committed.

3. Jury Intimidation: Investigation Discretion + Defense-Driven Strategy Constraints

The most practically significant reasoning is procedural: the court treated the defense’s “don’t question further” position as dispositive for later appellate complaints seeking more questioning. The decision reflects an institutional concern against “appellate about-faces,” reinforcing that trial strategy choices (avoid “taint,” push for mistrial, or both) have binding consequences on appeal.

Substantively, the court approved a calibrated investigation where: the foreperson provided detailed descriptions of incidents; jurors collectively affirmed ability to deliberate; the judge reiterated non-attribution of the incidents; and post-verdict juror polling confirmed verdicts rested on record evidence. This package was enough to support the district court’s “no actual bias” conclusion under deferential review.

C. Impact

• Trial-level playbook for suspected intimidation: The opinion validates that, at least absent preserved objections, a district court may rely on foreperson questioning plus juror polling and credibility assessments, especially when defense counsel argues that broader inquiry risks “taint.”
• Hard-edged waiver rule: Defendants who affirmatively oppose individual juror questioning may waive later Sixth Amendment claims predicated on the lack of that questioning. This will shape defense strategy in high-risk trials: counsel must choose between minimizing salience (avoid questioning) and creating a record for appellate review (request fuller Remmer procedures).
• Continued Sixth Circuit rejection of a Remmer presumption: By reaffirming United States v. Pennell, the court keeps the burden on defendants to show actual bias for mistrial relief, limiting automatic remedies even where external contact appears threatening.
• Evidence visualization approvals: The endorsement of phone-communication charts—when accurate and paired with limiting instructions—will encourage prosecutors (and defendants) to use timeline-based summaries for complex electronic evidence.
• Sentencing discipline under Alleyne: The resentencing remand reinforces that § 924(c) enhancements (brandish/discharge) must track jury findings; verdict-form precision matters.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Racketeering enterprise / RICO

A structured group (even informal) can be treated as an “enterprise” if it functions as an organization and engages in a pattern of serious crimes (“predicate acts” like murder, attempted murder, drug trafficking).

VICAR (violent crimes in aid of racketeering)

A statute (18 U.S.C. § 1959) that punishes violent crimes committed to maintain or increase one’s position in a racketeering enterprise. Liability can extend to leaders who order violence if the relevant state law makes directing/soliciting the offense criminal.

RICO conspiracy vs. substantive RICO

Substantive RICO generally requires the defendant’s own commission of at least two predicates; RICO conspiracy requires agreement that someone in the group will commit at least two predicates.

Remmer hearing

A court-managed inquiry into alleged external influence on jurors—what happened, how it affected deliberations, and whether it prejudiced the defendant. The scope is typically discretionary.

Waiver vs. forfeiture

Waiver is an intentional relinquishment (often unreviewable on appeal). Forfeiture is a failure to timely raise an issue (reviewed only for plain error).

Rule 1006 vs. Rule 611 (and Rule 107)

Rule 1006 allows admitting summaries in place of voluminous records; Rule 611 (and now Rule 107 for illustrative aids) concerns demonstratives that help explain evidence. “Secondary-evidence summaries” can be admitted as hybrids if accurate and accompanied by limiting instructions.

Alleyne error

A sentencing error occurs when a judge increases a mandatory minimum based on a fact the jury did not find beyond a reasonable doubt (e.g., “discharge” of a firearm under § 924(c)).

V. Conclusion

United States v. Tomarcus Baskerville affirms substantial racketeering and firearms convictions arising from coordinated gang violence, but its broader doctrinal contribution is procedural: it reinforces that district courts retain discretion to tailor Remmer v. United States-type inquiries, while defendants who oppose deeper juror questioning may waive later complaints—and those who fail to request it face plain-error barriers on appeal. The opinion also reaffirms the Sixth Circuit’s longstanding rule (since United States v. Pennell) that juror-contact prejudice is not presumed and must be shown as actual bias for mistrial relief. Finally, it underscores the strict linkage between jury findings and § 924(c) mandatory minimums under Alleyne v. United States, necessitating Smith’s resentencing.