Voluntary Parental Disappearance as Statutory Neglect: Commentary on In re A.A.-1 and E.A. (W. Va. 2025)

Voluntary Parental Disappearance as Statutory Neglect:
Commentary on In re A.A.-1 and E.A. (Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, 2025)

I. Introduction

The memorandum decision in In re A.A.-1 and E.A., No. 24-693 (W. Va. Nov. 25, 2025), affirms the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her two children based primarily on her voluntary disappearance, her failure to participate in the abuse and neglect proceedings, and her failure to engage in reunification services.

The case is procedurally a Rule 21 memorandum decision, but it provides a clear and relatively sharp application of West Virginia’s statutory definition of “neglected child” to situations where a parent is “missing” in a practical sense—unreachable and absent from the children’s lives—even when that parent was once the subject of a formal missing-person report. It also reinforces established principles governing:

  • What evidence can support a neglect adjudication;
  • When a court may conclude that there is “no reasonable likelihood” that conditions of neglect can be substantially corrected;
  • The extent to which mental health issues do—or do not—entitle a parent to more time or lesser alternatives before termination.

This commentary examines the factual and procedural background, summarizes the Court’s holdings, explores the key precedents and statutes applied, and analyzes the broader implications of the decision for West Virginia’s abuse and neglect jurisprudence.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Family Circumstances and Filing of the Abuse and Neglect Petition

In April 2024, the West Virginia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) filed an abuse and neglect petition in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County concerning two children, A.A.-1 and E.A. The petition alleged that:

  • Both parents were known substance abusers;
  • The family was homeless, and the parents’ whereabouts were, at times, unknown;
  • A missing-person report had been filed regarding the mother (A.A.-2);
  • From approximately February to March 2024, the parents resided sporadically at a homeless shelter with the children;
  • At the shelter, the father exhibited controlling behavior toward the mother, allegedly forcing her to take twice the prescribed dosage of her medication;
  • Shelter staff reported suspicions of methamphetamine use by the parents, citing observations of pacing, agitation, and rapid weight loss.

A DHS worker later testified that, for much of the previous year, the children had effectively been living with their paternal grandfather because the parents had “disappeared,” and the grandfather did not want the children to be homeless. Critically:

  • The mother left the children with the grandfather without conferring legal authority for educational or medical decisions;
  • The grandfather himself was ultimately deemed an “inappropriate caregiver” due to his own Child Protective Services (CPS) history;
  • As a result, the children were removed from the grandfather’s care and placed in DHS custody.

B. Circuit Court Proceedings

1. Preliminary Hearing (May 2024)

The preliminary hearing in May 2024 was the only hearing the mother personally attended.

At this hearing, a DHS worker testified that:

  • The children had been with the paternal grandfather for most of the previous year;
  • The parents had effectively disappeared, leaving the children with the grandfather without proper documentation or legal authority;
  • DHS later learned the grandfather was an inappropriate caregiver due to CPS history, prompting the children’s removal into state custody.

That preliminary evidence would later be judicially noticed at the adjudicatory phase.

2. Adjudicatory Hearing (July 2024)

The adjudicatory hearing took place in July 2024. The mother did not appear in person, but she was represented by counsel.

The circuit court granted DHS’s motion to take judicial notice of:

  • The prior testimony at the preliminary hearing;
  • The contents of the abuse and neglect petition;
  • Other evidence presented at the preliminary stage.

Based on the evidence before it—including the judicially noticed preliminary evidence—the court found that:

  • The mother had left the young children with an inappropriate caregiver (the grandfather);
  • She then became unreachable and essentially disappeared from the children’s lives;
  • There was clear and convincing evidence that both parents had neglected the children.

3. Dispositional Hearing (September 2024)

The dispositional hearing occurred in September 2024. Again, the mother did not attend but was represented by counsel.

A CPS worker testified that:

  • The mother had virtually no contact with DHS during the proceedings, except for a single telephone call;
  • During that call, the mother stated she was at a mental health hospital in Columbus, Ohio;
  • When DHS contacted the hospital, staff reported the mother was no longer a patient there;
  • DHS had no reliable information about her current whereabouts;
  • The mother did not participate in services, did not attend multidisciplinary team (MDT) meetings, and did not engage with any case planning or rehabilitative efforts.

The circuit court found:

  • The mother’s participation in the case was limited to her appearance at the preliminary hearing;
  • She failed to follow through with a reasonable family case plan or rehabilitative efforts designed to address the neglect;
  • There was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future;
  • Termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests.

The circuit court therefore terminated the mother’s parental rights. The father’s rights were also terminated; the children’s permanency plan was adoption in their current foster home.

C. Appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

On appeal, the mother challenged:

  1. The sufficiency of the evidence supporting the adjudication of her as a neglecting parent; and
  2. The decision to terminate her parental rights rather than allowing her more time to address her mental health issues.

The Supreme Court, applying its typical standard of review for abuse and neglect appeals, elected to decide the case without oral argument and issued a memorandum decision under West Virginia Rule of Appellate Procedure 21.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s October 29, 2024 dispositional order terminating the mother’s parental rights.

The Court held that:

  1. Sufficiency of Evidence at Adjudication. There was clear and convincing evidence that the children were “neglected” within the meaning of West Virginia Code § 49-1-201, particularly because they were left without necessary care “because of the disappearance or absence of the child’s parent.” The mother’s voluntary disappearance and failure to equip the children’s caregiver with authority and information constituted neglect.
  2. Termination Without Further Delay. Under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) and § 49-4-604(d)(3), and the precedents in In re Kristin Y. and In re R.J.M., the circuit court properly terminated parental rights without employing less restrictive alternatives. The mother:
    • Failed to attend hearings (beyond the preliminary hearing);
    • Failed to participate in services or the family case plan; and
    • Had no ongoing contact with DHS or the children.
    This established “no reasonable likelihood” that the conditions of neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future.
  3. Mental Health Argument Rejected. The mother’s assertion that she needed more time to address mental health issues did not outweigh the statutory standards or the children’s welfare. Her total lack of engagement in the process justified immediate termination.

The Court found no clear error in the circuit court’s factual findings and saw no legal error in the application of the statutory framework. The termination order was therefore affirmed.

IV. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Standard of Review – In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011)

The Court reiterated its established standard of review in abuse and neglect appeals, citing syllabus point 1 of In re Cecil T.:

  • Factual findings of the circuit court are reviewed for “clear error.”
  • Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo (i.e., without deference).

This framework is significant because the mother’s appeal largely attacked the adequacy of the evidence at adjudication and the legal sufficiency of the grounds for termination. The Court’s adherence to Cecil T. underscores that appellate intervention is limited unless the circuit court’s findings lack evidentiary support or misapply the law.

B. Mode of Proof – In re Joseph A., 199 W. Va. 438, 485 S.E.2d 176 (1997), and In re S.C., 168 W. Va. 366, 284 S.E.2d 867 (1981)

The mother argued that the evidence at adjudication was inadequate to prove neglect. In response, the Court cited syllabus point 1 of In re Joseph A. (quoting In re S.C.), which holds:

The statute governing adjudication does not specify any particular manner or mode of testimony or evidence by which DHS must meet its burden of proof.

This principle legitimizes the circuit court’s reliance on:

  • Judicial notice of prior testimony at the preliminary hearing;
  • The contents of the petition;
  • Other evidence developed earlier in the process.

The Court effectively rejected any argument that DHS was required to re-present live testimony or adopt a specific evidentiary format at adjudication, so long as the totality of the evidence reached the “clear and convincing” threshold.

C. Statutory Definition of “Neglected Child” – W. Va. Code § 49-1-201

A central legal anchor of the decision is West Virginia Code § 49-1-201, which defines “neglected child.” In relevant part, the statute covers a child:

“[w]ho is presently without necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision because of the disappearance or absence of the child’s parent.”

The Court underscored the phrase “because of the disappearance or absence of the child’s parent” (emphasis in the opinion), connecting this directly to the mother’s voluntary disappearance and lack of contact.

D. Adjudication Standard – W. Va. Code § 49-4-601(i)

West Virginia Code § 49-4-601(i) governs the adjudicatory stage and requires:

  • The court must determine whether the child is abused or neglected and whether the parent is an abusing or neglecting parent;
  • The findings must be based on conditions existing at the time of the filing of the petition;
  • The evidence must satisfy the “clear and convincing” standard.

The Supreme Court focused on the conditions at the time of the April 2024 petition: the mother’s absence, the children’s placement with an inappropriate caregiver, and the lack of legal authority and support for the grandfather to provide basic care.

E. Termination Standards – W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) & (d)(3)

At the dispositional stage, the Court relied on West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) and § 49-4-604(d)(3).

  • Section 49-4-604(c)(6) authorizes termination of parental rights:
    “[u]pon a finding that there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future and[] when necessary for the welfare of the child.”
  • Section 49-4-604(d)(3) defines a situation where “no reasonable likelihood” exists, including when:
    “[t]he abusing parent . . . [has] not responded to or followed through with a reasonable family case plan or other rehabilitative efforts . . . designed to reduce or prevent the abuse or neglect of the child.”

The Court found that the mother’s total non-participation in services and her failure to appear for hearings (after the preliminary stage) fell squarely within § 49-4-604(d)(3), justifying termination under § 49-4-604(c)(6).

F. Termination Without Less Restrictive Alternatives – In re Kristin Y. and In re R.J.M.

The Court cited syllabus point 5 of In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011), which incorporates syllabus point 2 of In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980):

“Termination of parental rights . . . may be employed without the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives when it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood . . . that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected.”

The Court also quoted syllabus point 1 of R.J.M., in part:

“[C]ourts are not required to exhaust every speculative possibility of parental improvement before terminating parental rights where it appears that the welfare of the child will be seriously threatened.”

By invoking these precedents, the Court emphasized that:

  • A circuit court is not obligated to sequentially attempt every form of lesser intervention (e.g., additional improvement periods, supervised custody, or further extensions), where there is no realistic prospect of parental improvement;
  • The welfare and stability of the children can justify immediate termination when factual findings support the statutory standards.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Sufficiency of Evidence at Adjudication

The mother argued that the evidence presented at adjudication did not rise to the level of clear and convincing proof of neglect. The Supreme Court disagreed.

Key components of the Court’s reasoning:

  1. Judicial Notice of Earlier Evidence. The circuit court lawfully took judicial notice of:
    • Testimony from the preliminary hearing;
    • The petition and associated evidence.
    Under Joseph A. and S.C., DHS is not confined to any particular evidentiary format at adjudication. The relevant question is whether, in aggregate, the evidence is clear and convincing.
  2. Voluntary Disappearance and Inadequate Caregiver. The Court specifically highlighted that:
    • The mother left her young children with the paternal grandfather for an extended period;
    • She failed to provide the grandfather with necessary documentation or authority for medical and educational decisions;
    • The grandfather was later determined to be an inappropriate caregiver because of his CPS history;
    • The mother then became unreachable, effectively disappearing from her children’s lives.
  3. Application of the Statutory Definition of “Neglected Child.” The Court applied § 49-1-201 and found that the children were without necessary care “because of the disappearance or absence” of their mother. Her voluntary absence, coupled with placement with an inappropriate caregiver, placed the children squarely within the statutory definition of neglected children.

The Court pointedly rejected the mother’s attempt to rely on her status as the subject of a missing-person report. It concluded that:

  • Her disappearance was “voluntary,” in the sense that she chose to absent herself from the children’s lives and from the process;
  • She was “only ‘missing’ to her children and their caregiver,” meaning there was no evidence of involuntary disappearance (such as abduction or incapacitation preventing contact).

The Court thus treated the missing-person label as legally insignificant where the underlying reality is voluntary abandonment.

B. The Mother’s Absence Does Not Immunize Her from a Neglect Finding

A noteworthy principle emerging from the decision is that a parent cannot shield herself from a neglect adjudication by disappearing.

The Court stated in substance that:

  • The mother’s “willing absence” from the children’s lives “cannot insulate her from her clear failure to properly provide for their care.”
  • Section 49-1-201 is written precisely to capture situations where the children are deprived of necessary care due to a parent’s disappearance or absence.

This reinforces that neglect can be established through:

  • What the parent fails to do (non-support, non-contact, non-provision of care);
  • As well as what the parent affirmatively does.

C. Grounds for Termination: No Reasonable Likelihood of Correction

At disposition, the critical legal question was whether circumstances met the statutory criteria for termination under § 49-4-604(c)(6) and (d)(3).

The Court held that:

  • The mother did not respond to or follow through with a “reasonable family case plan” or other rehabilitative efforts;
  • She failed to appear at hearings beyond the preliminary stage;
  • She did not engage in services, MDT meetings, or communication with DHS, save for one phone call during which she claimed to be hospitalized for mental health treatment.

The Court placed particular weight on her complete non-engagement:

  • The mother’s absence from hearings indicates a refusal or inability to engage with the court process itself;
  • Her lack of participation in offered services goes directly to § 49-4-604(d)(3), which focuses on failure to respond to rehabilitative efforts.

Given these facts, the Court agreed with the circuit court that there was “no reasonable likelihood” that the conditions of neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future as required by the statute.

D. Mental Health and the Request for More Time

The mother argued that terminating her rights in approximately three months (from the July adjudication to the September disposition; slightly longer from the petition’s filing) was premature given her mental health challenges.

The Court declined to accept this argument, emphasizing that:

  • Mental health issues, by themselves, do not mandate additional time or lesser alternatives where the parent is not meaningfully participating in services or the case plan;
  • The mother’s single claim of being at a mental health hospital was not corroborated as a long-term treatment context (DHS confirmed she was no longer a patient there);
  • There was no evidence that she was actively engaged in treatment or that further delay would realistically correct conditions of neglect.

By pairing § 49-4-604(d)(3) with the Kristin Y./R.J.M. principle that courts need not exhaust speculative possibilities of improvement, the Court confirmed that:

  • A parent’s unexplained absence and non-participation can justify termination even over a relatively short time frame;
  • The child’s need for permanency and stability takes priority over speculative prospects of future parental rehabilitation.

E. Best Interests of the Children

The Court accepted the circuit court’s determination that termination was in the children’s best interests. Although the memorandum decision does not elaborate extensively, the critical considerations appear to be:

  • The children had already been displaced from their parents and then removed from an inappropriate caregiver;
  • They were in a foster home that was pursuing adoption, providing permanency;
  • Prolonged uncertainty and instability would be detrimental to their welfare.

The best-interest analysis is intertwined with:

  • The statutory requirement in § 49-4-604(c)(6) that termination be “necessary for the welfare of the child”; and
  • West Virginia’s overarching policy of securing stable, permanent placements for children in a timely manner.

VI. Clarifying Key Legal Concepts

A. “Clear and Convincing Evidence”

“Clear and convincing evidence” is a heightened standard of proof used in abuse and neglect proceedings (and some other civil contexts). It requires:

  • More than a “preponderance of the evidence” (more likely than not);
  • Less than “beyond a reasonable doubt” (the criminal standard);
  • Evidence that produces in the factfinder a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations.

At the adjudicatory stage, DHS must meet this standard to prove that a child is abused or neglected and to label a parent as abusing or neglecting.

B. Adjudicatory vs. Dispositional Hearings

  • Adjudicatory Hearing:
    • Focuses on whether abuse or neglect occurred and whether the parent is an abusing/neglecting parent under the statute;
    • Looks at the conditions as they existed at the time of filing the petition;
    • Requires clear and convincing evidence.
  • Dispositional Hearing:
    • Follows an adjudication of abuse or neglect;
    • Determines what should happen going forward (e.g., services, improvement periods, custody arrangements, termination);
    • Applies the standards of § 49-4-604 (e.g., “no reasonable likelihood” of correction, best interests).

C. “No Reasonable Likelihood” of Substantial Correction

Under § 49-4-604, a court must find that there is “no reasonable likelihood” that the conditions of abuse or neglect can be substantially corrected in the near future to justify termination.

This does not require proof that improvement is impossible in the abstract; rather, the question is whether, realistically and within a time frame that is consistent with the child’s needs, the parent is likely to correct the conditions. The statute provides examples of when this standard is met, such as when a parent fails to respond to or follow a reasonable family case plan or rehabilitative services (§ 49-4-604(d)(3)).

D. “Best Interests of the Child”

The “best interests” standard focuses on what outcome serves the child’s:

  • Safety and protection;
  • Stability and permanence (avoiding multiple placements and prolonged uncertainty);
  • Emotional and developmental needs.

In termination cases, even if a parent has some residual bond with the child, the court may terminate rights if maintaining the legal relationship undermines the child’s long-term welfare and permanency.

E. Judicial Notice

“Judicial notice” allows a court to accept certain facts or prior proceedings as true without requiring formal proof again. In this case, the circuit court took judicial notice of:

  • Testimony and evidence from the preliminary hearing;
  • The content of the petition.

This avoided duplication and was permissible under Joseph A. and S.C., which do not require a specific evidentiary form at adjudication so long as the overall proof meets the clear and convincing threshold.

F. Family Case Plan and Rehabilitative Services

A “family case plan” is a structured plan developed by DHS (typically with input from the parent and multidisciplinary team) outlining:

  • The problems that led to the abuse or neglect case;
  • The services the parent must engage in (e.g., substance abuse treatment, parenting classes, mental health counseling);
  • Specific goals, tasks, and timelines for reunification.

Failure to participate in or complete the family case plan is one statutory basis for finding there is no reasonable likelihood that conditions can be corrected (§ 49-4-604(d)(3)).

VII. Potential Impact and Broader Significance

A. Clarification on Disappearance and “Neglected Child” Status

The decision firmly links the statutory language of § 49-1-201 to modern realities of parental disappearance. It clarifies that:

  • A parent’s voluntary decision to disengage and become unreachable is itself legally significant;
  • The mere fact that a missing-person report exists does not convert a voluntary disappearance into an involuntary one;
  • If children are left without necessary care due to a parent’s absence, they are neglected under the statute.

This has practical implications:

  • DHS may rely on parental disappearance/absence—combined with lack of adequate alternative caregiving—as a primary basis for neglect allegations;
  • Parents cannot defeat or delay adjudication simply by being physically unavailable or unlocatable, particularly if they have taken no steps to ensure safe and authorized care for their children.

B. Evidentiary Flexibility at Adjudication

By reaffirming Joseph A. and S.C., the Court supports continued flexible evidentiary practices in abuse and neglect adjudications. Judicial notice of prior testimony and petition contents is confirmed as a valid mechanism to avoid repetitive presentation.

For trial courts and practitioners:

  • Adjudications can be supported by a properly developed record at preliminary hearings;
  • Parties should recognize the strategic importance of preliminary hearings, since evidence there can be carried forward.

C. Termination Despite Short Timelines When Parents are Non-Participatory

Though the total life of the case from petition (April 2024) to disposition (September 2024) was relatively short, the Court upheld termination. This underscores:

  • Time alone is not the decisive factor; what matters is the parent’s conduct during that time;
  • Where a parent has completely failed to participate, courts are not required to wait indefinitely.

This will likely reinforce:

  • Trial courts’ willingness to move cases forward where parents are missing or non-compliant;
  • DHS’s use of statutory termination grounds without prolonged delays when there is a complete lack of engagement.

D. Mental Health, Homelessness, and Child Welfare

The opinion touches implicitly on the intersection of mental health issues, homelessness, and child protection. It suggests:

  • Mental health conditions do not immunize a parent from neglect findings;
  • To receive the benefit of consideration for additional time or alternative dispositions, a parent must be engaged—attending hearings, communicating with DHS, participating in treatment and services;
  • Without such engagement, claims of mental health problems cannot justify continued legal limbo for children.

For advocates, this highlights the importance of:

  • Ensuring parents with mental health needs are actively linked with counsel and services as early as possible;
  • Creating a documented record of participation and progress, if present, to counter arguments of non-engagement.

E. Importance of Legal Authority for Alternative Caregivers

The case also illustrates a recurring problem: informal kinship placements without formal authority. The mother:

  • Left her children with the paternal grandfather for an extended period;
  • Failed to provide legal authority or necessary information regarding the children’s medical and educational needs;
  • Did not monitor or ensure the suitability of the placement, which turned out to be inappropriate due to the grandfather’s CPS history.

This underscores that:

  • Informal arrangements, even with relatives, do not automatically satisfy parental duties;
  • Parents remain responsible for ensuring that the alternative caregiver is appropriate and empowered to act in the children’s best interests.

F. Persuasive Use of Memorandum Decisions

Although this is a Rule 21 memorandum decision rather than a full published opinion, it remains:

  • Indicative of how the Supreme Court of Appeals is currently applying child welfare statutes;
  • Persuasive authority for lower courts and practitioners on analogous facts, particularly on:
    • The treatment of voluntary disappearance under § 49-1-201;
    • The significance of a total failure to engage in services under § 49-4-604(d)(3);
    • The interplay between mental health arguments and the “no reasonable likelihood” standard.

VIII. Conclusion

In re A.A.-1 and E.A. reaffirms core principles of West Virginia abuse and neglect law while applying them to a fact pattern driven by a parent’s voluntary disappearance and non-participation.

Key takeaways include:

  • Neglect Through Absence: A parent’s voluntary disappearance and failure to ensure safe, legally empowered caregiving can constitute neglect under § 49-1-201, especially when children lack necessary care “because of the disappearance or absence” of the parent.
  • Evidence at Adjudication: DHS may rely on judicially noticed prior testimony and petition allegations; no specific evidentiary format is mandated, as long as the clear and convincing standard is met.
  • Non-Participation Justifying Termination: When a parent entirely fails to engage in services, case planning, or court proceedings, courts may find “no reasonable likelihood” of correction and terminate rights without less restrictive alternatives, in line with § 49-4-604 and Kristin Y./R.J.M.
  • Mental Health Is Relevant but Not Dispositive: Mental health concerns do not automatically require extended timelines. The parent’s actual engagement with treatment and with the case is crucial.
  • Child-Centered Permanency: The decision reflects a continued judicial focus on timely permanency and the best interests of children, rather than extended, speculative waits for parental improvement in the absence of concrete effort.

While the decision does not radically alter West Virginia’s child welfare jurisprudence, it provides a pointed application of existing law to the recurring but difficult scenario of parents who simply vanish from their children’s lives and from the court process. For practitioners, it serves as a detailed illustration of how statutory definitions of neglect, evidentiary rules at adjudication, and dispositional standards coalesce to support termination in such cases.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of West Virginia

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