Voluntary Intoxication Instructions in Georgia Must Include “Permanent Brain Function Alteration” Limitation; Intoxication Alone Does Not Render a Confession Involuntary Absent Police Coercion

Introduction

In Woschula v. State (Supreme Court of Georgia, Oct. 15, 2025), the Court affirmed the convictions of Anthony Woschula for malice murder and related offenses arising from the June 2018 shooting death of Victor Clark. The case reached the Supreme Court after a jury trial in which the State presented extensive physical and testimonial evidence—including the defendant’s own post-arrest admissions—tying Woschula to Clark’s killing and subsequent concealment.

On appeal, Woschula raised three principal claims: (1) the trial court erred by refusing his requested jury instruction on voluntary intoxication; (2) the court improperly admitted “other-acts” evidence under OCGA § 24-4-404(b) (Rule 404(b)); and (3) his post-arrest statements to law enforcement were involuntary because of drug intoxication and thus inadmissible under federal due process. The Supreme Court rejected each argument.

The Opinion clarifies and reinforces two important doctrinal points: first, that a voluntary intoxication charge in Georgia must include the narrow “permanent brain function alteration” limitation; and second, that intoxication alone does not render a confession involuntary under the Fourteenth Amendment absent coercive police activity. The Court also applied non-constitutional harmless-error review to assume without deciding a Rule 404(b) question.

Summary of the Opinion

Voluntary intoxication instruction: No error—indeed, no plain error—in refusing the requested charge because it misstated Georgia law by omitting the requirement that voluntary intoxication can negate criminal intent only where it causes a “permanent brain function alteration” (OCGA § 16-3-4(c); Perez v. State; Horton v. State; Bright v. State; Simpson v. State).
Rule 404(b) evidence: Assuming (without deciding) that admitting an earlier incident involving drugs and guns was an abuse of discretion, any error was harmless given the overwhelming admissible evidence of guilt and the limited prejudicial impact (Wilson v. State; Harris v. State; Heard v. State; State v. Orr; Naples v. State).
Voluntariness of post-arrest statements: No due process violation; absent evidence of coercive police conduct, a defendant’s intoxication does not make a confession involuntary under the Fourteenth Amendment. The statements were voluntary under the totality of circumstances (Colorado v. Connelly; State v. Franklin; Blackburn v. Alabama; Evans v. State; Livingston v. State). Judgment affirmed; all Justices concurred.

Factual and Procedural Background

The State’s evidence showed that Woschula and his father, Paul, lived together; Victor Clark, a friend of Paul’s, periodically stayed in the home. On June 19, 2018, Clark disappeared. The next morning, after odd exchanges in which Woschula told his father he “didn’t have a problem anymore” and referenced Clark being “in the back of [a friend’s] trunk,” deputies located Clark’s car nearby. Clark’s body—wrapped in a blanket—was found in the trunk. He had been shot multiple times.

Upon arrest, deputies found Toyota keys (matching Clark’s car) on Woschula. After waiving his Miranda rights twice (on arrest day and the next day), he admitted shooting Clark, gave detailed accounts of the weapons and locations, and directed police to the stashed guns. Forensic testing tied casings to those firearms. At trial, Woschula testified and admitted the shooting but argued voluntary manslaughter, asserting he “snapped” due to an attempted sexual assault by Clark and long-standing trauma. He introduced expert testimony on sexual abuse dynamics, PTSD, and the effects of methamphetamine use. The jury convicted on all counts, and the court entered a life sentence plus consecutive terms for related offenses.

Detailed Analysis

I. Standards of Review and Preservation

Jury-instruction issue: Because defense counsel did not renew an objection after the charge was given, review was for plain error only (Jivens v. State; Behl v. State). Plain error requires a clear or obvious error, not affirmatively waived, that likely affected the outcome and seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
Rule 404(b) issue: The Court assumed error but applied non-constitutional harmless-error review. An error is harmless if it is “highly probable” it did not contribute to the verdict; appellate courts weigh the evidence de novo as reasonable jurors would (Wilson v. State; Harris v. State; Heard v. State).
Voluntariness of statements: The voluntariness conclusion is reviewed de novo, with underlying factual findings accepted unless clearly erroneous (Quintanar v. State).

II. Voluntary Intoxication Instruction: The “Permanent Brain Function Alteration” Requirement

Georgia law is categorical: “Voluntary intoxication shall not be an excuse for any criminal act or omission” (OCGA § 16-3-4(c)). The Supreme Court has recognized an exceedingly narrow exception for the “extreme situation” in which intoxication causes an alteration of brain function that negates intent—and even then the alteration “must be more than temporary” (Perez v. State, citing Horton v. State). Bright v. State distilled the requirement as “permanent brain function alteration” that negates the requisite mens rea.

Here, the defense requested a charge stating: If drug influence impairs a person’s mind to the extent he cannot form the intent to commit the charged act, he is not criminally responsible. The Supreme Court held this instruction was legally incorrect because it omitted the essential limiting principle that, in Georgia, voluntary intoxication can negate intent only where it causes enduring (more-than-temporary) brain function alteration. Under Simpson v. State, a trial court does not err in refusing an instruction that is not a correct statement of law. Accordingly, there was no error—let alone “clear or obvious” error under plain-error review—in refusing to give the requested charge.

Notably, the Court resolved the issue on the instruction’s legal sufficiency and did not need to decide whether the trial evidence warranted any intoxication-related instruction. This emphasizes a practical lesson: Georgia trial courts are not obliged to rewrite an inaccurate requested charge; to preserve the issue, defense counsel must tender a correct statement of law that includes the “permanent brain function alteration” requirement.

III. Rule 404(b) Other-Acts Evidence: Assumed Error, Harmlessness Found

The State presented an old incident in which, years before the homicide, a friend (Christina Funk) called to Woschula from downstairs; he, allegedly high on methamphetamine, appeared at the top of the stairs holding a gun in each hand and told her not to approach. The exact date was uncertain, but both parties agreed it occurred several years prior and involved no injuries. On appeal, Woschula argued this was inadmissible character evidence under OCGA § 24-4-404(b).

Without deciding the admissibility under Rule 404(b), the Supreme Court held that any error was harmless. Applying the “highly probable” standard, the Court emphasized:

Overwhelming properly admitted evidence of guilt: Defendant’s two Mirandized admissions with corroborating details; possession of the keys to Clark’s vehicle; Clark’s body found in the trunk; ballistics linking recovered guns to the crime; defendant’s inculpatory statement to his father (“you don’t have a problem anymore”).
Additional consciousness-of-guilt evidence: Efforts to conceal the body and flight upon police arrival (State v. Orr).
Minimal prejudice from the prior incident: It was remote in time, involved a different person, caused no harm, and added little beyond the undisputed fact of defendant’s methamphetamine use.

Given this context, the Court concluded it was highly probable the Funk-incident evidence did not contribute to the verdict (Naples v. State).

IV. Voluntariness of Post-Arrest Statements: Intoxication Plus No Coercion Is Not a Due Process Violation

After a Jackson–Denno hearing, the trial court found that both of Woschula’s recorded, Mirandized interviews were voluntary under the totality of the circumstances: while he was emotional and “coming off of something,” he was coherent, responsive, and provided verifiable details. On appeal, Woschula argued due process involuntariness based on intoxication.

The Supreme Court affirmed, grounding its analysis in the Fourteenth Amendment framework articulated in Colorado v. Connelly: coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to a due process finding of involuntariness. A defendant’s mental condition, including intoxication or drug influence, is relevant only insofar as it bears on susceptibility to coercion. Absent evidence of coercive tactics, even significant intoxication does not render a confession involuntary as a matter of constitutional due process (State v. Franklin; Blackburn v. Alabama; Evans v. State; Livingston v. State).

Because Woschula neither argued nor showed coercive police conduct, his due process challenge failed as a matter of law.

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

OCGA § 16-3-4(c): Codifies the rule that voluntary intoxication is no excuse. This statute is the baseline prohibition, to which the case law has appended a narrow, enduring-impairment exception.
Perez v. State (309 Ga. 687, 2020), Horton v. State (258 Ga. 489, 1988), Bright v. State (265 Ga. 265, 1995): These cases define and constrain the intoxication-based exception—requiring an alteration of brain function that is “more than temporary,” often summarized as “permanent brain function alteration,” and one that negates intent. The Woschula Court relies on these to deem the requested instruction incomplete and incorrect.
Simpson v. State (289 Ga. 685, 2011): A trial court does not err by refusing to give an instruction that is an incorrect statement of law. This permits refusal of the defense’s flawed charge without requiring the court to correct and give it.
Jivens v. State (317 Ga. 859, 2023); Behl v. State (315 Ga. 814, 2023): State the plain-error framework applied because the defense did not renew its objection after the charge.
Wilson v. State (322 Ga. 76, 2025); Harris v. State (314 Ga. 238, 2022); Heard v. State (309 Ga. 76, 2020): Provide the non-constitutional harmless-error standard and the directive that appellate courts assess prejudice de novo, weighing evidence as reasonable jurors would.
State v. Orr (305 Ga. 729, 2019): Authorizes treating concealment and flight as evidence of consciousness of guilt.
Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436, 1966); Jackson v. Denno (378 U.S. 368, 1964): Supply the foundational safeguards and procedure for evaluating custodial statements and voluntariness.
Colorado v. Connelly (479 U.S. 157, 1986); State v. Franklin (318 Ga. 39, 2024); Blackburn v. Alabama (361 U.S. 199, 1960); Evans v. State (308 Ga. 582, 2020); Livingston v. State (264 Ga. 402, 1994): Establish that coercive police activity is necessary to render a confession involuntary under due process, and identify the totality factors (lucidity, coherence, awareness) used to assess voluntariness. These authorities foreclose intoxication-alone voluntariness claims.
Quintanar v. State (322 Ga. 61, 2025): Controls the appellate standard of review for voluntariness determinations: de novo, with deference to trial-level factual findings unless clearly erroneous.
Naples v. State (308 Ga. 43, 2020): Illustrates harmlessness where other-acts evidence, even if erroneously admitted, is overwhelmed by strong admissible proof.

Legal Reasoning and Application

1. Why the Requested Intoxication Charge Was Incorrect

The defense’s formulation relied on generic incapacity-to-form-intent language. Georgia law does not allow a jury to excuse or mitigate criminal liability based on self-induced intoxication unless the intoxication has caused a lasting alteration in brain function sufficient to negate the requisite intent. By omitting that narrow, indispensable qualifier, the tendered instruction would have allowed the jury to consider temporary intoxication as a basis for acquittal—contrary to § 16-3-4(c) and controlling precedent. The trial court therefore acted within its discretion to refuse the charge, and no plain error could arise from declining to give an incorrect legal statement.

2. Harmlessness of Any 404(b) Error

The Court’s harmlessness analysis turned on:

Extensive admissions and corroboration: The defendant twice waived Miranda and confessed; details he supplied were verified (e.g., gun types, stash location; casings matched).
Consciousness-of-guilt behavior: Body concealment; flight from law enforcement; inculpatory remarks to his father.
Minimal marginal prejudice: The Funk incident was remote, non-injurious, cumulative of undisputed methamphetamine use, and only tenuously related to the charged conduct.

In sum, even if the other-acts evidence should have been excluded under Rule 404(b), there is no reasonable likelihood it affected the verdict.

3. Voluntariness: Coercion as a Necessary Predicate

The Court followed Connelly’s bright-line principle: Involuntariness requires coercive police action. The record showed repeated Miranda waivers, coherent answers, and corroborated detail; the defense identified no coercive tactics. Although intoxication is relevant, it does not independently render a statement involuntary. On this record, the trial court’s voluntariness finding comfortably withstands de novo review.

Impact and Practical Implications

A. Jury Instructions on Voluntary Intoxication

Defense counsel must incorporate the “permanent (more-than-temporary) brain function alteration” limitation when requesting any intoxication-related charge. A generic “inability to form intent due to intoxication” charge is legally incorrect in Georgia and may be refused without error.
Preservation matters: Counsel must renew objections after the charge is given to avoid relegation to plain-error review.
Evidentiary threshold: To merit such a charge in the first place, defense evidence must speak to enduring impairment that negates mens rea, not merely acute intoxication or withdrawal.

B. Rule 404(b) Litigation

The Court’s assumption of error coupled with a harmlessness holding underscores the decisive role of the overall evidentiary record. Where the State’s admissible proof is strong and the other-acts evidence is weakly probative or remote, reversal is unlikely.
Practitioners should continue to litigate proper-purpose, relevance, sufficiency, and Rule 403 balancing under Rule 404(b), but also build (or contest) the record on how central—or marginal—the other-acts proof is in context.

C. Confession Voluntariness Under Due Process

Defense claims based solely on intoxication or withdrawal will fail absent evidence of coercive police activity. Connelly’s coercion predicate is dispositive.
Prosecutors should create a clear record of Miranda compliance, absence of threats/promises, and the defendant’s lucidity, coherence, and awareness; recordings are powerful corroboration.
Trial courts should continue to conduct Jackson–Denno hearings and make detailed findings on the totality of circumstances.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Voluntary intoxication defense: Georgia generally bars defendants from using self-induced intoxication as a defense. Exception: only when intoxication causes a lasting change in brain function that negates the mental state required for the crime.
Plain error review: An appellate safety valve that permits reversal only for clear, outcome-affecting, and reputation-harming errors, typically applied when an issue wasn’t properly preserved at trial.
Rule 404(b) other-acts evidence: Prior bad acts can’t be used to prove a defendant’s character or propensity but may be admitted for other purposes (like motive, intent) if the probative value is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.
Harmless error (non-constitutional): Even if a mistake occurred, a conviction stands if it is highly probable the error did not contribute to the verdict.
Jackson–Denno hearing: A pretrial proceeding where the judge decides whether a confession was voluntary and therefore admissible.
Due process voluntariness: A confession violates due process only if obtained through coercive police tactics; intoxication alone does not suffice.

Conclusion

Woschula v. State reinforces two sharp-edged rules of Georgia and federal criminal procedure. First, a voluntary intoxication instruction that omits the “permanent brain function alteration” limitation is an incorrect statement of law and may be refused without error; failure to renew an objection after the charge further limits appellate review to the exacting plain-error standard. Second, under the Fourteenth Amendment, intoxication alone does not render a confession involuntary—coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to suppression on due process grounds.

The Court’s treatment of the Rule 404(b) claim—assuming error but finding harmlessness—highlights that, in the face of overwhelming admissible evidence including Mirandized admissions and corroborating forensic proof, marginal and remote other-acts evidence is unlikely to drive a different result. Together, these holdings provide clear guidance to trial courts, prosecutors, and defense counsel on precise jury-instruction drafting, preservation practices, and the evidentiary and constitutional parameters governing confessions. The judgment of conviction was therefore properly affirmed.