Voluntary Dismissals, Moot Injunctions, and Pro Se Counterclaims: A Comprehensive Commentary on Ain Jeem, Inc. v. Puckett (11th Cir.)

1. Introduction

The Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished decision in Ain Jeem, Inc. v. Carl Ellen Puckett, Jr., No. 23‑13380 (11th Cir. Dec. 4, 2025), arises from a mass trademark enforcement action involving online sales of alleged counterfeit Kareem Abdul‑Jabbar memorabilia. Although labeled “Not for Publication,” the opinion provides a useful synthesis of several recurring federal procedural issues:

• When and how a plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) after a defendant has filed counterclaims;
• The limits of appellate jurisdiction over temporary restraining orders (TROs) and the effect of mootness when an injunction expires;
• How courts treat pro se litigants’ pleadings, including counterclaims, cross‑complaints, and attempts at third‑party practice;
• The operation of the final‑judgment rule and the dismissal of premature appeals.

The dispute centers on a single $30 sale of a commemorative Kareem Abdul‑Jabbar plate on Etsy by pro se defendant‑counterclaimant Carl Puckett, yet the procedural history is unusually dense: multiple district court orders, cross‑complaints against numerous third parties (including Etsy and counsel), repeated recusal motions, two prior unsuccessful appeals, and a mandamus petition, culminating in the present appeal after final judgment.

This commentary examines the opinion’s factual background, summarizes the court’s holdings, and analyzes the governing precedents and legal reasoning. It also explains the key concepts in accessible terms and considers the decision’s practical and doctrinal impact, particularly for mass IP enforcement suits and for pro se defendants drawn into such litigation.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 The Underlying Dispute

Plaintiff‑appellee Ain Jeem, Inc. owns trademarks associated with basketball legend Kareem Abdul‑Jabbar. In June 2021, it filed suit in the Middle District of Florida against more than 75 defendants—online sellers using platforms like Amazon, eBay, and Etsy—alleging sale of counterfeit or confusingly similar products.

One of those defendants was Puckett, operating an Etsy storefront under the username “Devildogstreasure.” Puckett had purchased a commemorative Kareem Abdul‑Jabbar plate from a Goodwill store. The plate bore an NBA logo and, according to Puckett, was an authentic, licensed product. He later resold the plate on Etsy for about $30.

Shortly after filing the complaint, Ain Jeem obtained an ex parte temporary restraining order. Among other things, the TRO:

• Prohibited defendants from selling goods bearing Ain Jeem’s marks or confusingly similar marks;
• Authorized expedited discovery to identify the individuals behind the online accounts and their associated financial accounts;
• Directed online marketplaces and processors (e.g., Etsy, PayPal), upon notice, to restrain funds “related to ongoing account activity” for defendants’ benefit;
• Required Ain Jeem to post a $10,000 bond to secure potential damages for wrongful restraint.

After receiving notice, Etsy deleted Puckett’s account and PayPal froze his account. According to Puckett, this effectively shut down his online business, which he claimed had inventory valued over $86,000. According to Ain Jeem’s evidence, however, the actual frozen balances in his Etsy and PayPal accounts were under $355, and his historical sales volume on Etsy was modest.

2.2 District Court Proceedings

Puckett, a disabled Tennessee veteran proceeding pro se (without counsel), responded vigorously:

• He answered the complaint, disputing personal jurisdiction (arguing insufficient contacts with Florida) and asserting that the plate was authentic.
• He asserted a counterclaim for tortious interference and injunctive relief “against” Abdul‑Jabbar personally, although Abdul‑Jabbar was not a party to the case.
• He petitioned to modify the TRO, challenging the authenticity allegation, complaining about the asset freeze and Etsy account closure, accusing plaintiff’s counsel of extortion (based on a $7,500 settlement offer), and seeking sanctions and reciprocal restraints on Ain Jeem’s accounts.

The district court:

• Denied Puckett’s petition to modify the TRO;
• Extended the TRO several times but eventually allowed it to expire on September 14, 2021;
• Explicitly declared that, after expiration, no injunctive restraints remained in place against “DEVILDOGSTREASURE or Carl Puckett.”

Separately, Puckett and his wife Marcella (also pro se) filed a “Cross Complaint” naming multiple third‑party defendants, including:

• Kareem Abdul‑Jabbar;
• Etsy;
• Ain Jeem’s attorneys and law firm (Akerman LLP);
• Others allegedly involved in freezing his accounts and prosecuting the case.

They alleged violations of constitutional rights and a host of state‑law claims: tortious interference, abuse of process, malpractice, fraud, and later proposed RICO claims. They sought millions of dollars in damages from each third‑party defendant.

In response, the district court:

• Granted Ain Jeem’s motion to dismiss Puckett’s original counterclaim (noting it was improperly directed against a non‑party, Abdul‑Jabbar), but allowed Puckett to file an amended counterclaim;
• Struck Puckett and Marcella’s cross‑complaint and denied their motion for leave to file a third‑party complaint, holding that the asserted claims were not proper third‑party claims (they were not claims for indemnity or contribution on Ain Jeem’s claims) and that leave had not been obtained before filing;
• Granted Ain Jeem’s Rule 41(a)(2) motion to voluntarily dismiss all claims against Puckett without prejudice, emphasizing that this removed any risk of liability to Ain Jeem and left Puckett free to pursue his counterclaims independently.

Puckett then filed an amended counterclaim against Ain Jeem itself, asserting state‑law claims including:

• Tortious interference with contractual relations and economic advantage,
• Fraud and perjury,
• Unfair business practices,
• Malicious prosecution,
• Abuse of judicial process.

Ain Jeem moved to dismiss this amended counterclaim, arguing that it was barred by various doctrines (including Florida’s litigation privilege) and, in the alternative, that the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over purely state‑law claims. Puckett did not respond. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the amended counterclaim without prejudice.

At that point, all claims between Ain Jeem and Puckett had been resolved. Puckett nonetheless later filed a second amended counterclaim, which the court struck because:

• The prior amended counterclaim had already been dismissed;
• No leave to amend further had been granted;
• By then, Puckett was “no longer a party” to the action.

The district court ultimately resolved the remaining claims against the other defendants and entered a final order closing the case.

2.3 Prior Appellate and Collateral Proceedings

Before final judgment, Puckett filed multiple notices of appeal and collateral attacks:

• First appeal (2021): Sought review of several orders, including denial of his petition to modify the TRO. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, explaining:
  • There was no final judgment;
  • TROs are generally not appealable;
  • Even if the TRO functioned as a preliminary injunction, any challenge was moot because the injunction had been dissolved and any preliminary injunction did not apply to Puckett;
  • The orders were not appealable under the collateral order doctrine.
• Second appeal (2022): Challenged orders dismissing the complaint against him, dismissing his amended counterclaim, striking the cross‑complaint, and denying recusal motions. The Eleventh Circuit again dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because claims against other defendants remained pending; there was no final judgment. Certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court.
• Mandamus petition: Sought recusal of the district and magistrate judges and vacatur of their orders. The Eleventh Circuit denied in part and dismissed in part.
• Separate RICO lawsuit in Tennessee: Puckett and Marcella later sued in the Western District of Tennessee, asserting RICO claims against Ain Jeem, Abdul‑Jabbar, Etsy, the Florida district judge and magistrate judge, and Ain Jeem’s counsel. That action was dismissed for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed (as reported in a footnote).

After final judgment in the Florida case, Puckett and Marcella filed the notice of appeal that produced the present Eleventh Circuit opinion.

3. Summary of the Eleventh Circuit’s Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit (Pryor, Brasher, and Abudu, JJ., per curiam) resolved three principal issues:

1. Voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2): The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Ain Jeem to voluntarily dismiss its claims against Puckett without prejudice after he had filed counterclaims. Because Puckett’s counterclaims were permitted to remain for independent adjudication and he suffered no “clear legal prejudice” beyond the mere prospect of a second lawsuit, the requirements of Rule 41(a)(2) and Eleventh Circuit precedent were satisfied. His argument that the complaint should instead have been dismissed for lack of standing, lack of personal jurisdiction, or as a shotgun pleading failed because he suffered no prejudice from the ground the court chose for dismissal.
2. Challenge to the TRO and asset restraints: The court dismissed this portion of the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Whether treated as a TRO or as a de facto preliminary injunction, any injunctive relief affecting Puckett expired on September 14, 2021. Because no restraints remained in effect, the appeal was moot—the court could grant no “effectual relief.”
3. Prior appellate orders: Puckett implicitly asked the Eleventh Circuit to revisit its earlier orders dismissing his previous appeals for lack of jurisdiction. The panel stated that, even assuming it could reconsider those orders in this appeal, there was “plainly” no error: at the time of those appeals, there was no final judgment and, as previously held, no applicable exception to the final‑judgment rule (including no applicable collateral‑order jurisdiction).

The court therefore:

• Affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects except the TRO challenge;
• Dismissed the appeal in part for lack of jurisdiction as to the TRO/asset restraint issue.

4. Detailed Legal Analysis

4.1 Voluntary Dismissal Under Rule 41(a)(2)

4.1.1 The Rule 41(a)(2) Framework

Once a defendant has answered or moved for summary judgment, a plaintiff can no longer unilaterally dismiss its claims by notice under Rule 41(a)(1). Instead, dismissal requires a court order under Rule 41(a)(2):

“Except as provided in Rule 41(a)(1), an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff’s request only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper.”

Where the defendant has filed a counterclaim before the motion to dismiss, the rule adds an important qualification:

“If a defendant has pleaded a counterclaim before being served with the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss, the action may be dismissed over the defendant’s objection only if the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication.”

Eleventh Circuit precedent emphasizes that:

• Dismissals under Rule 41(a)(2) are presumptively without prejudice unless the court specifies otherwise;
• A district court should ordinarily grant such a motion unless the defendant would suffer “clear legal prejudice” beyond the “mere prospect of a second lawsuit.” Arias v. Cameron, 776 F.3d 1262, 1268 (11th Cir. 2015);
• The applicable standard of review is “abuse of discretion.” Potenberg v. Boston Sci. Corp., 252 F.3d 1253, 1255 (11th Cir. 2001).

4.1.2 Application in Ain Jeem

The district court granted Ain Jeem’s Rule 41(a)(2) motion, dismissing all claims against Puckett without prejudice while allowing his counterclaims to remain pending. That procedural posture complied precisely with the text of Rule 41(a)(2): Puckett’s counterclaims could be “independently adjudicated,” so the court was permitted to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint over his objection.

On appeal, Puckett argued that the district court should not have granted voluntary dismissal at all. In his view, the court should have dismissed Ain Jeem’s claims instead:

• For lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction due to alleged lack of standing;
• For lack of personal jurisdiction over him (as a Tennessee resident with allegedly insufficient Florida contacts);
• As an improper “shotgun pleading,” a disfavored type of complaint in the Eleventh Circuit that aggregates multiple causes of action without clarity.

The Eleventh Circuit rejected these arguments by focusing on prejudice (or lack thereof). Even assuming, arguendo, that Puckett’s jurisdictional and pleading objections had merit, the remedy would still have been a dismissal without prejudice:

• If the court found no Article III standing, it would have been compelled to dismiss without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. Wiand v. ATC Brokers Ltd., 96 F.4th 1303, 1311 (11th Cir. 2024).
• If the court found no personal jurisdiction over Puckett, it similarly would have dismissed without prejudice. Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1221 (11th Cir. 1999).
• If it deemed the complaint a “shotgun pleading,” the Eleventh Circuit’s rule requires that the plaintiff be given an opportunity to amend before the case could be dismissed with prejudice. Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2018).

In each scenario, the upshot for Puckett would be materially the same as a voluntary dismissal without prejudice:

• He would no longer face liability to Ain Jeem in the current action;
• He would remain vulnerable to a possible future suit (e.g., if jurisdiction or pleading defects were later cured);
• He would not obtain a merits adjudication exonerating him from liability.

Because Rule 41(a)(2) allows dismissal unless a defendant faces “clear legal prejudice” beyond the potential for a second lawsuit, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Puckett could not show prejudice from the choice of dismissal ground. His position after a Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal was functionally equivalent to his position had the court accepted any of his alternative dismissal theories. Thus, no abuse of discretion occurred.

The court also briefly noted that Puckett challenged the denial of his motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order. Applying the abuse‑of‑discretion standard from Jenkin v. Anton, 922 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2019), and Maradiaga v. United States, 679 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2012), it found no error—but did not elaborate because the core issue was the propriety of the underlying Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal, which it had already upheld.

4.2 Appellate Jurisdiction, TROs, and Mootness

4.2.1 Appeals from TROs vs. Preliminary Injunctions

Ordinarily, federal appellate courts have jurisdiction over:

• “Final decisions” of district courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1291;
• Interlocutory orders “granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions,” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).

A temporary restraining order is usually:

• Short‑lived (typically 14 days, extendable once),
• Designed to preserve the status quo until a preliminary‑injunction hearing; and
• Not appealable as of right because it is not considered a “final” or appealable interlocutory injunction. Fernandez‑Roque v. Smith, 671 F.2d 426, 429 (11th Cir. 1982).

However, courts sometimes treat a purported TRO as a de facto preliminary injunction—and therefore appealable—when it has the practical characteristics of an injunction (e.g., longer duration, notice and adversarial hearing, substantial effect on the parties).

4.2.2 The Mootness Problem

Even when an injunction (or injunction‑like order) is appealable, the appeal must present a live controversy. Under the mootness doctrine:

“An appeal is moot 'when, by virtue of an intervening event, a court of appeals cannot grant any effectual relief whatever in favor of the appellant.'” – United States v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corrs., 778 F.3d 1223, 1228 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149 (1996)).

One such intervening event is the expiration of the challenged injunction:

• The Eleventh Circuit has “consistently held that the appeal of a preliminary injunction is moot where the effective time period of the injunction has passed.” Vital Pharms., Inc. v. Alfieri, 23 F.4th 1282, 1289 (11th Cir. 2022).
• Once an injunction has expired and no further injunctive relief is possible, the appellate court cannot grant effectual relief and must dismiss for mootness.

4.2.3 Application: Expired Restraints and Lack of Jurisdiction

In Ain Jeem, Puckett objected to the TRO that had frozen his PayPal funds and prompted Etsy to close his storefront. He alleged procedural defects and substantive wrongfulness in the asset restraint. By the time of this appeal, however:

• The TRO had expired on September 14, 2021;
• The district court had explicitly recognized that “no restraints or other injunctive relief” remained in effect against Puckett or his account;
• No subsequent preliminary injunction applied to him.

The Eleventh Circuit therefore did not need to decide whether the TRO was appealable as an injunction or truly a non‑appealable TRO. Even assuming it was appealable, the case was moot—the injunction no longer existed, and no current restraints could be lifted.

Practically, this means that Puckett’s residual remedies, if any, would be limited to:

• Seeking damages secured by the $10,000 injunction bond in the district court for wrongful restraint (if he could show both wrongfulness and actual damages within the bond’s limits); or
• Bringing separate damages actions under state tort theories (subject to defenses like litigation privilege and jurisdictional bars).

What he could not do is secure appellate review of an expired injunction. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed this part of his appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

4.3 Pro Se Litigants, Liberal Construction, and Abandonment

The panel reiterated two longstanding Eleventh Circuit principles:

• Courts must construe pro se filings liberally and hold them “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Campbell v. Air Jam. Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014).
• Appellate courts also read pro se briefs liberally, but “issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned.” Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008).

In this case, the court:

• Gave Puckett several procedural concessions in the district court (e.g., leave to re‑plead his counterclaim, liberal readings of his filings);
• Nevertheless enforced procedural rules, such as:
  • The requirement that counterclaims must be directed against actual parties;
  • The rule that cross‑complaints and third‑party complaints must be authorized and must fit within proper third‑party practice (i.e., indemnity or contribution);
  • The rule that amendments require leave once a pleading has been dismissed.
• On appeal, treated his pro se brief liberally in framing the issues (including his implicit challenge to earlier appellate orders), but held him to the abandonment doctrine for any issues not properly briefed.

The opinion does not catalog which specific arguments were deemed abandoned, but ends by noting succinctly that “any other issue on appeal lacks merit,” signaling that the court either found such arguments inadequately presented or plainly insubstantial.

4.4 Third-Party Practice and Improper Cross‑Complaints

Although not a direct subject of appellate reversal or affirmance (the relevant orders came earlier), the opinion describes an important part of the procedural history: Puckett and Marcella’s attempt to drag numerous third parties—Etsy, Abdul‑Jabbar, opposing counsel—into the litigation via a “Cross Complaint” and a proposed third‑party complaint.

Federal third‑party practice is governed largely by Rule 14:

• A defending party may, with leave of court if filed later than 14 days after serving the original answer, serve a third‑party complaint on a non‑party “who is or may be liable to it for all or part of the claim against it.”
• That is, third‑party claims must be derivative—such as indemnity or contribution—not wholly independent causes of action.

By contrast, Puckett and Marcella’s cross‑complaint:

• Asserted independent federal constitutional, RICO, and state‑law tort claims;
• Did not seek to shift or apportion liability on the underlying trademark claims brought by Ain Jeem;
• Targeted parties who were not co‑defendants in the main action and had no derivative liability for Ain Jeem’s claims against Puckett.

The district court:

• Struck the cross‑complaint; and
• Denied leave to file the proposed third‑party complaint for failure to meet the Rule 14 criteria.

The Eleventh Circuit’s current opinion recounts these rulings as background, implicitly endorsing the district court’s application of third‑party practice rules. The key lesson is that defendants cannot transform an intellectual‑property enforcement action into a sweeping omnibus lawsuit against platforms, judges, and opposing counsel via a “cross‑complaint” unless the procedural prerequisites and substantive requirements of Rule 14 and Rule 13 are satisfied.

4.5 Motions for Reconsideration

Puckett filed motions for reconsideration challenging, among other things, the dismissal of his amended counterclaim and the order granting voluntary dismissal. Reconsideration in the Eleventh Circuit is governed by a demanding standard: it is appropriate only to correct manifest errors of law or fact, or to consider newly discovered evidence that could not have been presented earlier with reasonable diligence. See Jenkin v. Anton, 922 F.3d 1257, 1263–64 (11th Cir. 2019); Maradiaga v. United States, 679 F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th Cir. 2012).

The Eleventh Circuit found no abuse of discretion in denying reconsideration, in large part because:

• The original dismissal of claims under Rule 41(a)(2) and the subsequent dismissal of the amended counterclaim (without prejudice) were within the district court’s broad discretion; and
• Puckett’s reconsideration motions largely repeated prior arguments or disagreements with the court’s conclusions, which is insufficient to warrant reconsideration.

4.6 The Final‑Judgment Rule and Earlier Appeals

A significant part of this procedural saga involves Puckett’s earlier, premature appeals. Federal appellate jurisdiction generally requires:

• A “final decision” that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing else for the court to do but execute the judgment (28 U.S.C. § 1291); or
• A specific statutory or rule‑based exception (e.g., § 1292(a)(1) for injunctions, Rule 54(b) certifications, or the collateral order doctrine).

When Puckett first appealed:

• Claims against many other defendants remained pending in the district court;
• No Rule 54(b) partial‑final‑judgment certification had been entered; and
• The only arguable hook—injunctive orders—was negated by the TRO’s expiration and mootness.

His second appeal fared no better: at that point too, the case continued as to other defendants, so there was still no final judgment.

Puckett also argued that the earlier dismissals were erroneous and sought to have the Eleventh Circuit “vacate” those prior panel orders. The present panel noted that, even assuming it had the authority to review those earlier non‑precedential panel rulings in this appeal, there was “plainly” no jurisdiction at the time those appeals were taken, so there was nothing to correct.

This illustrates both the rigidity of the final‑judgment rule and its central function: to prevent piecemeal appeals and to preserve appellate resources for complete, post‑judgment review, as occurred here.

5. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

5.1 Potenberg v. Boston Sci. Corp., 252 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2001)

Potenberg establishes that orders granting dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) are reviewed for abuse of discretion. It also emphasizes that voluntary dismissals are generally allowed absent substantial prejudice to the defendant. The Ain Jeem panel invokes this to frame its deferential review of the district court’s decision to grant the plaintiff’s motion.

5.2 Arias v. Cameron, 776 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2015)

Arias provides the key standard: a Rule 41(a)(2) motion “should be granted unless the defendant will suffer clear legal prejudice other than the mere prospect of a second lawsuit.” The Eleventh Circuit directly quotes and applies this standard, concluding that Puckett’s only real prejudice was the risk of facing another lawsuit—a risk that does not preclude voluntary dismissal.

5.3 Wiand v. ATC Brokers Ltd., 96 F.4th 1303 (11th Cir. 2024)

Wiand clarifies that dismissals for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction (e.g., for lack of standing) must be without prejudice. The Ain Jeem panel uses this to reason that even if Puckett were right on standing, the relief he would obtain—dismissal without prejudice—would not differ materially from a Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal without prejudice.

5.4 Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 1999)

Posner similarly holds that a dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction is without prejudice. Again, the panel invokes it to underscore that Puckett had no cognizable prejudice from the form of dismissal chosen by the district court.

5.5 Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2018)

This case sets forth a specific procedure for dealing with shotgun pleadings in the Eleventh Circuit: a district court must sua sponte give the plaintiff at least one opportunity to replead before dismissing the case with prejudice. In Ain Jeem, this precedent is invoked to show that even if Puckett’s shotgun‑pleading objection were valid, he still would not have been entitled to a dismissal with prejudice benefiting him; rather, the plaintiff would have been allowed to file an amended complaint.

5.6 Fernandez‑Roque v. Smith, 671 F.2d 426 (11th Cir. 1982)

Fernandez‑Roque holds that TROs are generally not appealable under § 1292(a)(1), though some TROs may have sufficient finality and duration to be treated as appealable preliminary injunctions. The Ain Jeem panel cites this as the starting point for its jurisdictional analysis, but ultimately resolves the question on mootness grounds rather than deciding whether the TRO was appealable in form.

5.7 United States v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corrs., 778 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2015)

This case provides the core definition of mootness and recognizes that an appeal is moot when an intervening event—like expiration of an injunction—means the court can no longer grant effectual relief. Ain Jeem relies on this to hold the TRO challenge moot.

5.8 Vital Pharms., Inc. v. Alfieri, 23 F.4th 1282 (11th Cir. 2022)

Vital Pharms. reiterates that appeals from preliminary injunctions are moot when the injunction’s effective period has passed. This further undergirds the panel’s dismissal of Puckett’s challenge to the expired TRO/asset‑freeze order.

5.9 Campbell v. Air Jam. Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2014) & Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870 (11th Cir. 2008)

These cases codify the Eleventh Circuit’s approach to pro se filings: liberal construction of pleadings and appellate briefs, but firm enforcement of waiver and abandonment rules. The Ain Jeem panel cites them to justify both its generous reading of Puckett’s issues and its conclusion that unbriefed issues are abandoned.

5.10 Jenkin v. Anton, 922 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2019) & Maradiaga v. United States, 679 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2012)

These cases articulate the standard for reviewing denial of motions for reconsideration—abuse of discretion and a narrow focus on newly discovered evidence or clear error. Their citation signals that Puckett’s reconsideration motions did not meet this demanding standard.

6. Clarifying Key Legal Concepts

For readers less familiar with federal practice, some of the central concepts in the opinion are:

• Temporary Restraining Order (TRO): A short‑term emergency order, often issued ex parte (without hearing from the other side), to prevent immediate harm until a preliminary‑injunction hearing can be held. Typically lasts up to 14 days, renewable once. Generally not appealable.
• Preliminary Injunction: A longer‑term injunction, issued after notice and an opportunity to be heard, that preserves the status quo during litigation. Appeal of such orders is authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), but can become moot if the injunction expires.
• Rule 41(a)(2) Voluntary Dismissal: A dismissal at the plaintiff’s request after an answer or summary‑judgment motion has been filed, requiring court approval “on terms that the court considers proper.” Generally without prejudice, and allowed so long as defendants do not suffer “clear legal prejudice” beyond risk of another suit.
• Counterclaim: A claim asserted by a defendant against a plaintiff in the same action. Under Rule 41(a)(2), if a counterclaim exists, the plaintiff’s claims can only be dismissed over the defendant’s objection if the counterclaim can continue independently.
• Third‑Party Complaint (Impleader): A complaint by a defending party against a non‑party who “is or may be liable to it for all or part of the claim against it” (Rule 14). These claims must be derivative (indemnity, contribution), not independent suits on unrelated grievances.
• Cross‑Complaint / Crossclaim: A claim brought by one party against a co‑party (e.g., one defendant against another). Puckett labeled his filing a “Cross Complaint,” but it was procedurally improper because it sued non‑parties and did not fit within Rules 13(g) or 14.
• Standing: A component of Article III subject‑matter jurisdiction. A plaintiff must show an injury in fact, caused by the defendant, that is redressable by the court. Lack of standing requires dismissal without prejudice.
• Personal Jurisdiction: A court’s power to exercise authority over a particular defendant, typically based on the defendant’s contacts with the forum state. Lack of personal jurisdiction also requires dismissal without prejudice.
• Shotgun Pleading: A pleading that is vague, overly inclusive, or fails to separate distinct claims into separate counts, making it difficult to discern which facts support which legal theories. Disfavored in the Eleventh Circuit; plaintiffs must usually be given a chance to amend before dismissal with prejudice.
• Mootness: A doctrine requiring a live controversy at all stages of litigation. If events (such as the expiration of an injunction) make it impossible for a court to grant any effective relief, the case or issue is moot and must be dismissed.
• Supplemental Jurisdiction: Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, a federal court’s power to hear state‑law claims closely related to federal claims in the same case. Once all federal claims are gone, the court may choose to dismiss state‑law claims without prejudice, leaving them for state courts.
• Litigation Privilege (Florida): A substantive doctrine (referenced by Ain Jeem in its motion to dismiss) that broadly protects statements made in judicial proceedings from civil liability, even if defamatory or injurious, so long as they are related to the case.
• Mandamus: An extraordinary writ asking an appellate court to compel a lower court or official to perform a clear, non‑discretionary duty. Very rarely granted; Puckett’s mandamus petition was denied in large part.
• Collateral Order Doctrine: A narrow exception to the final‑judgment rule that allows appeal of a small class of decisions that conclusively determine important questions separate from the merits and that would be effectively unreviewable after final judgment. The Eleventh Circuit held that the orders Puckett challenged did not fit within this exception.

7. Practical and Doctrinal Impact

7.1 Impact on Mass IP Enforcement Suits Against Online Sellers

Although unpublished, the opinion reflects how federal courts in the Eleventh Circuit are likely to handle recurring features of mass anti‑counterfeiting cases:

• Asset‑Freeze TROs: Courts may authorize broad TROs freezing funds in online seller and payment processor accounts, but defendants retain the ability to petition for modification and to seek damages against a bond for wrongful restraint. When such orders are time‑limited and expire, appellate review is foreclosed by mootness unless an ongoing injunction replaces them.
• Voluntary Dismissal of Individual Defendants: Plaintiffs can strategically drop small‑volume or marginal defendants without judicial resistance so long as the defendants’ counterclaims can proceed independently and they face no prejudice beyond the chance of a future suit. This gives IP plaintiffs flexibility to streamline complex cases and focus on more significant infringers.
• Limiting Case “Sprawl” via Third‑Party Practice Rules: Defendants cannot easily transform a focused IP enforcement action into litigation over alleged wrongdoing by platforms, payment processors, counsel, and others. Rule 14’s indemnity/contribution requirement for third‑party complaints, strictly applied, prevents the case from morphing into a sprawling omnibus action.

7.2 Lessons for Pro Se Defendants

For pro se defendants like Puckett, the opinion underscores several realities:

• Courts will read pleadings liberally but will still enforce jurisdictional rules, pleading standards, and procedural requirements (e.g., leave to amend, proper party designation).
• Repeated or premature appeals are likely to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, consuming litigant time without altering the outcome.
• The label placed on a filing (“cross complaint,” “RICO claim,” etc.) does not guarantee its viability; the filing must fit within the governing procedural rules and substantive law.
• Failure to respond to dispositive motions (as when Puckett did not answer the motion to dismiss his amended counterclaim) can be fatal even when the litigant has grievances stemming from the initial lawsuit.

7.3 Reinforcing the Final‑Judgment Rule and Mootness Doctrine

The case exemplifies the discipline federal appellate courts impose through:

• The Final‑Judgment Rule: Appeals taken before all claims against all parties are resolved (absent specific certifications or exceptions) will not be entertained, no matter how strongly a litigant feels aggrieved by interim orders.
• Mootness: Challenges to time‑limited injunctions that have expired—which is common for TROs—cannot be adjudicated on appeal. Relief must be sought in the trial court via bonds or other mechanisms while the injunction is alive.

While this can be frustrating for individual litigants, the rule ensures that appellate courts address complete records and final resolutions rather than piecemeal, overlapping disputes.

8. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Ain Jeem, Inc. v. Puckett is, formally, a non‑precedential application of established doctrines: the standards for Rule 41(a)(2) voluntary dismissals, the non‑appealability and mootness of expired TROs, the treatment of pro se pleadings, and the final‑judgment rule. Yet its fact pattern—an individual online reseller, a mass trademark enforcement suit, an asset‑freezing TRO, and extensive pro se counter‑litigation—illustrates how those doctrines function in a modern, platform‑based economy.

Key takeaways include:

• A plaintiff’s decision to voluntarily dismiss claims under Rule 41(a)(2) will ordinarily be respected so long as any counterclaims can proceed independently and the defendant suffers no clear legal prejudice beyond facing a possible future suit.
• Appeals challenging TROs or preliminary injunctions that have already expired will be dismissed as moot because appellate courts cannot grant effectual relief with respect to orders that are no longer operative.
• Pro se litigants receive liberal construction but must still comply with procedural rules: proper party naming, adherence to counterclaim and third‑party practice rules, and observance of jurisdictional limits.
• The final‑judgment rule bars piecemeal appeals; litigants must generally await full resolution in the district court before obtaining appellate review.

In the broader legal landscape, Ain Jeem reaffirms that federal courts will protect the integrity of jurisdictional and procedural frameworks even in sympathetic or highly contentious cases. It offers both IP practitioners and online sellers a concrete illustration of how early injunctive relief, dismissal mechanisms, and appellate jurisdiction interact in multi‑defendant online‑marketplace litigation.