Voluntary Dismissal With Prejudice Confers “Substantially Prevailing” Status in CAFRA Actions:
A Commentary on United States v. Brian Moore (11th Cir. 2025)

Introduction

United States v. Brian Moore, No. 23-10971 (11th Cir. Aug. 20, 2025), addresses a recurring problem in civil forfeiture litigation: whether a claimant may recover attorney’s fees when the Government voluntarily abandons its forfeiture case with prejudice. The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion—though designated “Do Not Publish”—squarely holds that such a dismissal does render the claimant a “substantially prevailing” party under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA), 28 U.S.C. § 2465(b), and therefore triggers mandatory fee-shifting. The decision clarifies a doctrinal gap left by Buckhannon, CRST, and the Circuit’s own prior split treatment of Rule 41 dismissals, and it will likely shape how the Government (and claimants) approach forfeiture settlements going forward.

The appeal arose after federal agents at Atlanta’s airport seized $8,500 from traveler Brian Moore, later instituting a forfeiture action. Following contentious discovery, suppression briefing, and a summary-judgment motion, the Government sought a Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal with prejudice. The district court granted dismissal but denied Moore’s fee request, reasoning that because no merits ruling occurred he had not “prevailed.” The Eleventh Circuit vacated that order and remanded, holding that the combination of (1) a material change in the parties’ legal relationship, and (2) the district court’s imprimatur on that change, satisfied CAFRA’s “substantially prevails” standard.

Summary of the Judgment

The panel (Rosenbaum, Abudu, Wilson, JJ.) applied de novo review to the legal question of prevailing-party status.
It ruled that a dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2) furnishes the requisite judicial imprimatur because (a) the court must enter an order, and (b) the order forever bars the Government from refiling the same forfeiture claim.
Because the Government’s objective—permanent forfeiture—failed, and Moore recovered his currency, a material alteration of the legal relationship occurred.
Accordingly Moore “substantially prevailed,” entitling him to reasonable attorney’s fees, costs, and interest under § 2465(b)(1)(A).
The court vacated the district court’s fee denial and remanded for calculation of a reasonable award.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The panel interwove several key authorities:

Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001) — Established that a fee applicant must secure (i) a material change in the parties’ legal relationship, and (ii) a judicial imprimatur on that change.
CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC, 578 U.S. 419 (2016) — Clarified that defendants can prevail without a merits judgment if the plaintiff’s claim is “rebuffed” for any reason carrying judicial sanction.
Mathews v. Crosby, 480 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2007) — Held that defendants were prevailing parties after a voluntary dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2).
United States v. $70,670 in U.S. Currency, 929 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2019) — Denied fees where a dismissal without prejudice lacked judicial imprimatur and allowed refiling.
Affordable Aerial Photography, Inc. v. Property Matters USA, LLC, 108 F.4th 1358 (11th Cir. 2024) — Distinguished between dismissals with and without prejudice when assessing prevailing-party status.
Royal Palm Props., LLC v. Pink Palm Props., LLC, 38 F.4th 1372 (11th Cir. 2022); Beach Blitz Co. v. City of Miami Beach, 13 F.4th 1289 (11th Cir. 2021) — Provided the standard of review and reiterated Buckhannon’s two-part test.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning unfolds in two logical steps:

Material Alteration of Legal Relationship.
The Government’s forfeiture complaint sought permanent title to Moore’s cash. Dismissal with prejudice, coupled with return of the currency, completely defeated that goal. Under CRST, a defendant (or claimant) “fulfills its primary objective whenever the plaintiff’s challenge is rebuffed.” Thus Moore achieved the necessary alteration.
Judicial Imprimatur.
A Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal cannot occur without a court order. By signing the dismissal and labeling it “with prejudice,” the district court imposed a binding determination that forever bars refiling. That constitutes the “judicial imprimatur” Buckhannon demands. The panel contrasts this with $70,670, where a without prejudice dismissal left the door open for refiling and lacked judicial rejection.

Once both prongs were satisfied, CAFRA’s fee-shifting language (“shall be liable”) rendered the award mandatory, leaving only the arithmetic of a reasonable amount for remand.

Impact of the Decision

The opinion, while unpublished, carries persuasive value and practical consequences:

Clarifies Fee Entitlement in CAFRA Cases. Claimants can now point to binding Eleventh Circuit precedent that a Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal with prejudice automatically satisfies “substantial prevail” for § 2465(b) purposes.
Government Litigation Strategy. Federal prosecutors may hesitate to request dismissals with prejudice unless prepared to pay fees, possibly encouraging earlier settlement or a without-prejudice dismissal (which still risks later motions for fees if refiling is barred by limitations).
Broader Prevailing-Party Doctrine. The reasoning harmonizes fee-shifting analysis across statutes—CAFRA, § 1988, Copyright Act, etc.— reinforcing that merits rulings are not indispensable as long as judicial action materially rebuffs the opposing party.
District Court Guidance. Trial courts within the Circuit must now apply this framework, avoiding the error of treating dismissal with prejudice as a “voluntary change” unattributed to judicial action.
Potential Circuit Split. Other circuits (e.g., Fourth and Sixth) have suggested stricter views of Buckhannon; should similar CAFRA cases arise elsewhere, the Moore rule could invite Supreme Court review.

Complex Concepts Simplified

CAFRA (Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act): A 2000 statute overhauling federal civil forfeiture. § 2465(b) requires the Government to pay attorney’s fees, costs, and interest when a claimant “substantially prevails.”
Prevailing Party vs. Substantially Prevailing: Most fee-shifting statutes use “prevailing party”; CAFRA uses “substantially prevails.” Courts interpret them identically: the party must achieve a court-sanctioned material change in the legal relationship.
Rule 41(a)(1) vs. Rule 41(a)(2): (a)(1): Plaintiff may dismiss without court order if (i) before defendant serves an answer or motion for summary judgment, or (ii) by stipulation of all parties. No judicial imprimatur.
(a)(2): Requires a court order; the court may impose terms. Judicial imprimatur is present.
Dismissal “with prejudice”: Case is permanently closed on the merits; the plaintiff is barred from refiling the same claim.
Judicial Imprimatur: A formal act by the court—order, judgment, decree—that puts the court’s authority behind the change in parties’ legal rights.

Conclusion

United States v. Brian Moore cements an important principle in the Eleventh Circuit: Once the Government’s forfeiture action is dismissed with prejudice via court order, the claimant is a “substantially prevailing” party entitled to fees under CAFRA. The decision reconciles earlier intra-circuit tensions about the effect of voluntary dismissals, aligns civil-forfeiture fee practice with general prevailing-party doctrine, and places tangible financial consequences on the Government’s strategic choice of dismissal form. For practitioners, the takeaway is clear: if your client’s property is returned under a dismissal with prejudice, move promptly for § 2465(b) fees—the law is now squarely on your side.

Voluntary Dismissal With Prejudice Confers “Substantially Prevailing” Status in CAFRA Actions: A Commentary on United States v. Brian Moore (11th Cir. 2025)