Voluntary Cessation, Mootness, and Mandamus in School Transportation Disputes:
Commentary on State ex rel. Siebold v. Columbus City Schools Bd. of Edn., 2025-Ohio-5245

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Ohio’s per curiam opinion in State ex rel. Siebold v. Columbus City Schools Board of Education, 2025-Ohio-5245, addresses a recurring but under-litigated intersection of school transportation law, administrative remedies, and Ohio’s doctrine of mootness in mandamus actions.

The relator, Marrisa Siebold, is the parent of a student attending Tree of Life Christian Schools Middle School, a private (nonpublic) school located within the Columbus City School District. After the district’s board of education adopted “impracticality” resolutions under R.C. 3327.02 and declined to transport many private- and charter-school students for the 2024–2025 school year, Siebold rejected payment in lieu of transportation, requested mediation under R.C. 3327.02(E), and filed an original action in mandamus in the Supreme Court of Ohio. She sought to compel the Columbus City Schools Board of Education (“the board”) to provide her child with interim transportation pending completion of the mediation and any ensuing administrative hearing.

However, while the mandamus action was pending, the board began providing the very transportation Siebold sought. The central question thus became not whether the board had violated R.C. 3327.02(E)(2)—a question the facts strongly suggested—but whether the case remained justiciable once the requested transportation was being provided. Siebold urged the Court to apply the “voluntary cessation” exception to mootness, arguing that the board could simply stop complying later, and therefore the case should proceed to judgment to prevent recurrence of unlawful conduct.

The Court unanimously rejected that position, dismissed the action as moot, and clarified the limited role of mandamus in enforcing statutory duties once the requested act has already been performed. The most significant doctrinal contribution of the opinion is its explicit refusal to import the voluntary-cessation exception into an original mandamus action where the respondent has performed the act sought to be compelled. In doing so, the Court reinforces long-standing limits on using mandamus as a tool for prospective or systemic oversight.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual and Statutory Background

Under R.C. 3327.01, Ohio school districts must generally provide transportation to students in grades K–8 who live more than two miles from the school they attend, including those enrolled in nonpublic (private) and community (charter) schools. However, R.C. 3327.01 and 3327.02 allow a district to declare such transportation “impractical” for certain students, in which case the district may offer payment in lieu of transportation.

To lawfully declare transportation “impractical” and shift to payment in lieu, the district must:

Consider the six statutory factors in R.C. 3327.02(A) (time/distance, number of students, cost, parity with similarly situated students, disruption, alternative modes),
Adopt a resolution of impracticality under R.C. 3327.02(B) at least 30 days before the district’s first day of instruction, and
Provide detailed notice to the parents, the affected private/charter school, and the Department of Education and Workforce (“DEW”).

If a parent rejects payment in lieu and requests mediation, R.C. 3327.02(E)(1) requires DEW to mediate and, if necessary, conduct an R.C. Chapter 119 administrative hearing. Crucially, while that dispute-resolution process is pending, R.C. 3327.02(E)(2) mandates that the district must provide interim transportation to the student. If the district fails to do so, R.C. 3327.02(F) allows DEW to impose a financial sanction on the district and redirect funds to the nonpublic or charter school.

In early 2024, in response to a bus-driver shortage, Columbus began exploring the use of impracticality resolutions for 2024–2025. By June 2024 it had decided that transportation would be impractical for an unspecified number of private- and charter-school students. Yet it continued issuing impracticality determinations into August 2024, after the statutory deadline of July 22, 2024 (30 days before the August 21 first day of school). Siebold was among those notified late that transportation for her child had been deemed impractical.

Siebold rejected the offer of payment in lieu of transportation and requested mediation. Despite the statutory command to provide interim transportation upon such a request, the board did not do so at the start of the school year, prompting Siebold to file this mandamus action on September 10, 2024.

B. Procedural History in the Supreme Court

The Court denied the board’s initial motion to dismiss and granted an alternative writ of mandamus, thereby requiring the filing of an answer, evidence, and full briefing. See 2024-Ohio-5522. During this period:

The board proffered an affidavit from its transportation executive director, Rodney Stufflebean, stating that 102 students whose families had requested mediation—including Siebold’s child—were “routed, with the intent to transport” as of early October 2024.
Siebold confirmed in her own affidavit that her child began receiving transportation on October 9, 2024, though she complained about chronic lateness and communication issues.

Both sides filed multiple motions to submit “revised evidence” under S.Ct.Prac.R. 3.13(B)(3). The Court:

Granted leave for:
- Siebold’s Exhibits E and F:
  - Exhibit E: a May 28, 2025 letter from Columbus stating that it was again declaring transportation impractical for her child under R.C. 3327.02.
  - Exhibit F: Siebold’s June 18, 2025 affidavit explaining why she missed a DEW mediation notice that had been sent only by email.
- The board’s revised evidence: an affidavit from assistant general counsel Justin M. Dortsch and attached exhibits supporting the board’s account of the mediation scheduling and Siebold’s nonattendance.
Denied leave to file Exhibit G:
- An unauthenticated August 2025 letter purportedly from Stufflebean stating that, due to ongoing operational constraints, the district would not provide transportation during mediation for some students and would instead pay DEW-ordered compensation.

The Court admitted Exhibits E, F, and the Dortsch affidavit because they were unopposed and caused no apparent prejudice. It rejected Exhibit G as unauthenticated, not shown to relate to Siebold’s own child, and directed at a different impracticality determination during a different mediation.

C. Holding and Disposition

The Court held that the case was moot because the board had already provided the specific relief that Siebold sought in her mandamus complaint—interim transportation pending resolution of the mediation/administrative process under R.C. 3327.02(E)(1). Citing long-standing mandamus precedent, the Court reiterated that:

A writ of mandamus will not issue to compel an act that has already been performed; and
Mandamus cannot be used to compel the general observance of laws in the future.

The Court further held that the “voluntary cessation” exception to mootness does not keep a mandamus case alive when the respondent has already performed the act that the relator sought to compel. That exception applies to cases seeking to stop or invalidate certain conduct, not to cases seeking to compel the performance of a statutory duty that has now been satisfied.

Finally, the Court rejected Siebold’s belated references to damages under R.C. 2731.11 and attorney fees, finding that:

She had not requested such relief in her complaint, and
R.C. 2731.11 allows damages only when a writ of mandamus is actually granted—something that cannot occur once the case is moot because the act has been performed.

Accordingly, the Court:

Granted the parties’ motions for leave to file certain revised evidence;
Denied Siebold’s motion to file Exhibit G;
Dismissed the mandamus action as moot; and
Overruled as moot the board’s evidentiary objections.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Mandamus Elements and Limits

The Court reiterated the classic three-part test for mandamus, citing State ex rel. Love v. O’Donnell, 2017-Ohio-5659, ¶ 3:

The relator must have a clear legal right to the requested relief;
The respondent must have a clear legal duty to provide that relief; and
The relator must lack an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Although the Court did not reach the adequacy of alternative remedies (such as DEW’s authority to order payments under R.C. 3327.02(F)), it squarely addressed the first two elements: the relator’s right and the respondent’s duty, both of which are intimately tied to whether there remains any live controversy for a court to decide. Once the district began providing interim transportation, the “right” and “duty” had been satisfied—leaving nothing concrete for a writ to command.

To underscore the effect of post-filing compliance on mandamus actions, the Court cited a line of prior decisions:

State ex rel. Kirk v. Burcham, 1998-Ohio-224:
- “A writ of mandamus will not issue to compel an act already performed.” ¶ 7.
- “[A] writ of mandamus will not issue to compel the general observance of laws in the future.” ¶ 10.
State ex rel. Law Office of the Montgomery Cty. Pub. Defender v. Rosencrans, 2006-Ohio-5793, ¶ 15:
- Recognized that once a respondent performs the act requested in a mandamus action, the case is generally moot.
State ex rel. Madsen v. Jones, 2005-Ohio-4381, ¶ 11:
- Reaffirmed that a writ cannot issue when the requested action has already been taken.

Those cases form the backbone of the Court’s ruling: they stand for the proposition that mandamus is inherently backward-looking and command-based. It orders performance of a duty; it does not declare policies, adjudicate past wrongs once cured, or guarantee future compliance.

2. Mootness and the Voluntary-Cessation Doctrine

Siebold sought to keep her case alive by invoking the “voluntary cessation” doctrine. That doctrine, articulated in federal jurisprudence and cited in Ohio cases, prevents defendants from “picking off” lawsuits by temporarily stopping challenged conduct only to resume it after the case is dismissed.

The Court traced the doctrine’s modern articulation to Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, 528 U.S. 167 (2000), quoted through Highland Tavern, L.L.C. v. DeWine, 2023-Ohio-2577 (lead opinion), ¶ 25:

[A] case might become moot if subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.

But in Highland Tavern, which involved a declaratory challenge to the constitutionality of an expired administrative rule, the Court (in a lead opinion) declined to apply the voluntary-cessation exception and ultimately dismissed the case as moot. In Siebold, the Court went further, distinguishing that entire line of voluntary-cessation cases as categorically different from mandamus.

Siebold relied on federal cases such as:

Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298 (2012):
- A 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class action where a union’s offer of refunds did not moot a challenge to forced assessments for political expenditures.
United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199 (1968):
- An antitrust enforcement action where the Supreme Court held that cessation of challenged behavior did not moot the case.

Both Knox and Concentrated Phosphate involve government or private defendants ceasing contested conduct in an attempt to avoid injunctive or declaratory relief. Those contexts are fundamentally prospective and prohibitory: the plaintiffs seek orders to stop conduct or to declare it unlawful. Mandamus, by contrast, is a command to do a specific act the law already requires.

The Court thus emphasized that none of the voluntary-cessation precedents cited by Siebold arose in a mandamus posture where the requested act had already been completed. The Court noted that Siebold could identify no Ohio decision applying voluntary cessation to keep a mandamus case alive under those circumstances.

3. Damages and Attorney Fees in Mandamus

Siebold attempted, in a footnote in her merits brief, to argue that potential damages under R.C. 2731.11 and attorney fees saved the case from mootness. The Court rejected this argument on two independent grounds:

Pleading defect: She had not requested damages or attorney fees in her mandamus complaint. Citing State ex rel. Duncan v. Chambers-Smith, 2025-Ohio-978, ¶ 17, the Court held that a relator is not entitled to relief that was never pled.
Substantive limitation of R.C. 2731.11: That statute authorizes damages only if “judgment in a proceeding for a writ of mandamus is rendered for the plaintiff.” Since the act had already been performed, the Court could no longer grant the writ. No writ, no damages.

This thread is crucial: the Court avoids creating a backdoor by which future litigants might attempt to preserve otherwise-moot mandamus actions solely by referencing the possibility of damages, especially without having pled them from the outset.

4. Procedural Rule on Revised Evidence

The Court applied S.Ct.Prac.R. 3.13(B)(3), which permits parties to seek leave to file revised evidence. Relying on its earlier application of that rule in State ex rel. Slager v. Trelka, 2024-Ohio-5125, ¶ 13, the Court granted unopposed motions to file revised evidence where no prejudice resulted. This underscores the Court’s flexibility in allowing supplementation of the record in original actions, so long as due process and fairness are maintained.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Existence (and Satisfaction) of the Statutory Duty

At the outset, there was no serious dispute that, once Siebold requested mediation, the board was under a clear statutory duty to provide interim transportation under R.C. 3327.02(E)(2). The statute is mandatory: during “the mediation and subsequent appeal process,” the district “shall provide transportation for the pupil” until the matter is resolved or the administrative hearing concludes (¶ 7).

When Siebold filed this mandamus action on September 10, 2024, the duty was unmet—her child was not being transported despite a pending mediation request. Thus, at filing, the mandamus elements appeared satisfied:

Clear legal right: Siebold’s child’s right to interim transportation under R.C. 3327.02(E)(2);
Clear legal duty: The board’s obligation to provide such transportation; and
Lack of adequate remedy: The Court did not reach this element, because mootness intervened, but the very existence of a separate statutory remedy (DEW-imposed financial penalties) loomed in the background.

However, by October 2024, the board had begun transporting Siebold’s child. The parties’ evidence was unequivocal on that point:

Stufflebean’s affidavit confirmed that Siebold’s child was among 102 students for whom interim transportation would start in early October (¶ 19); and
Siebold’s own affidavit confirmed transportation was in fact provided beginning October 9, 2024 (¶ 20).

Siebold criticized the quality and reliability of that transportation, but she did not contend that it was wholly absent after October. Thus, the Court found that the district had performed the discrete act the writ would have ordered: providing interim transportation pending resolution of the R.C. 3327.02 process.

2. Application of Mootness to Mandamus

Having determined that the act sought to be compelled had been performed, the Court applied established mandamus mootness doctrine. Citing Kirk, Rosencrans, and Madsen, the Court reaffirmed that where a government actor performs the specific duty at issue, a mandamus action ceases to present a live controversy and must be dismissed as moot (¶ 21).

This is rooted in the separation of powers and the prohibition on advisory opinions. A writ of mandamus does not serve to validate or condemn past conduct once the duty has been fully satisfied; nor does it serve as a continuing injunction to ensure the respondent obeys the law going forward. As the Court put it:

[A] writ of mandamus will not issue to compel the general observance of laws in the future. (¶ 26, quoting Kirk, ¶ 10)

The Court did not treat the alleged poor quality of the transportation (e.g., tardiness, cold exposure) as sufficient to keep the controversy live, since R.C. 3327.02(E)(2) speaks in terms of providing transportation, not prescribing its level of timeliness. Whether a separate action or remedy might address inadequate quality was beyond the scope of the decision.

3. Rejecting the Voluntary-Cessation Argument

Siebold’s central doctrinal argument was that the board’s compliance was voluntary and likely temporary. She pointed to Stufflebean’s statements implying that the board might “take the penalty” under R.C. 3327.02(F)—i.e., accept DEW’s monetary sanctions—rather than provide interim transportation when it views such service as uneconomical (¶ 22). From this, she argued the board could resume noncompliance at any time, making it “reasonable to expect” recurrence of the unlawful conduct.

The Court responded with a categorical distinction:

Voluntary-cessation cases like Laidlaw, Knox, and Concentrated Phosphate arose in contexts where plaintiffs sought declaratory or injunctive relief to prevent or invalidate ongoing or future conduct.
Mandamus actions, by statute (R.C. 2731.01), are limited to commanding performance of a specific official duty; once the duty is performed, no practical relief remains to be ordered.

Therefore, the Court held that the voluntary-cessation doctrine does not apply where:

The only relief sought is a writ commanding performance of a discrete act; and
The respondent has already performed that act.

In that setting, concerns about a defendant strategically stopping and re-starting the challenged conduct are addressed not through keeping the moot case alive, but through the possibility of future actions if and when a fresh violation occurs. However, such future violations cannot be preemptively litigated via a current mandamus action:

[A] writ of mandamus will not issue to compel the general observance of laws in the future. (¶ 26)

The Court also emphasized the absence of Ohio precedent applying voluntary cessation in this way. This serves as a clear signal to future litigants that mandamus cannot be used to obtain broad, prospective pronouncements about agencies’ statutory obligations on the theory that they might backslide.

4. Additional Evidence and Futurity Arguments

Siebold’s later-filed evidence—especially the May 28, 2025 letter (Exhibit E) declaring future impracticality for her child and the August 2025 letter (Exhibit G) about district-wide refusal to provide interim transportation—was designed to show that Columbus’s alleged pattern of noncompliance would continue. But the Court viewed that evidence as:

Either unrelated to the particular 2024–2025 interim transportation duty at issue; or
Relevant only to the prospect of future violations, which cannot sustain a present mandamus action once the original duty has been satisfied.

By admitting some of the evidence (E and F) and rejecting other portions (G) on authentication and relevance grounds, the Court communicated a second principle: even if future disputes involving the same parties and the same statutory scheme may arise, a present mandamus action cannot be transformed into a roving audit of the respondent’s compliance with the law over multiple years.

5. Damages and Attorney Fees Cannot Salvage Mootness

Finally, the Court disposed of Siebold’s attempt to preserve the case based on potential damages and attorney fees:

Because she did not plead damages or fees in her complaint, she could not belatedly introduce them to rescue an otherwise moot case. See Duncan, 2025-Ohio-978, ¶ 17.
Even if she had pled damages, R.C. 2731.11 conditions their availability on a successful mandamus judgment, i.e., the granting of the writ. Once the writ is unavailable due to mootness, the statutory path to damages is closed.

This reasoning prevents litigants from using unpleaded or speculative monetary claims as an anchor to keep a mandamus action alive after the underlying act has been performed. It also reinforces that mandamus damages are derivative of the writ itself, not an independent cause of action.

C. Impact and Implications

1. For School Transportation and R.C. 3327.02 Litigation

Siebold is one of the first Supreme Court of Ohio cases to apply the R.C. 3327.02(E)(2) interim transportation requirement in the context of the recent statutory scheme involving impracticality determinations, mediation, and DEW administrative hearings. While the Court did not opine on the validity of Columbus’s late impracticality resolutions or on the merits of impracticality for any particular student, it implicitly acknowledged:

The binding nature of the interim transportation duty during mediation and appeal; and
The existence of statutory penalties for noncompliance under R.C. 3327.02(F).

For parents and nonpublic schools, the decision suggests:

Mandamus can be a viable tool to trigger prompt compliance with R.C. 3327.02(E)(2) if a district refuses to transport a student after a mediation request.
But once the district begins providing that transportation—even belatedly—the mandamus case becomes vulnerable to dismissal as moot.
Systemic or prospective relief (for example, challenging district-wide impracticality practices or chronic late transportation as a policy) may require other procedural vehicles, such as declaratory/injunctive actions in a trial court, rather than mandamus in the Supreme Court.

For school districts, the opinion may be read in two ways:

It encourages districts to promptly cure noncompliance with R.C. 3327.02(E)(2) when litigation is filed, knowing that such compliance is likely to moot mandamus claims; but
It also reminds districts that noncompliance is not cost-free: DEW still retains the authority to impose monetary penalties and redirect funds under R.C. 3327.02(F), regardless of whether a mandamus action proceeds to judgment.

2. For the Doctrine of Mootness in Ohio Mandamus Actions

The central doctrinal contribution of Siebold is its clarification that:

The voluntary-cessation exception to the mootness doctrine does not extend to an original action in mandamus in which the respondent has performed the specific act the relator sought to compel.

This has several consequences:

Limitation on strategic use of mandamus: Relators cannot invoke voluntary cessation to force the Court to decide broad legal questions about a statutory scheme where the narrow, individual relief they sought has already been provided.
Preservation of the advisory-opinion bar: The Court is reaffirming its refusal to issue advisory opinions or convert mandamus into a device for system-wide directives untethered to an ongoing failure to perform a duty.
Clearer separation of remedies: Those seeking ongoing oversight or systemic reform must use other forms of action (e.g., injunctions, class actions, declaratory judgments) rather than mandamus in the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction.

3. For Pleading Strategy in Future Mandamus Cases

The Court’s discussion of damages and attorney fees offers practical lessons:

Relators who believe they are entitled to damages or fees must explicitly plead them in the mandamus complaint. Raising them only in briefing is insufficient.
Even if pled, such claims do not independently defeat mootness once the act has been performed, because R.C. 2731.11 ties damages to the actual issuance of the writ.

Thus, litigants should not expect to use damages claims as a jurisdictional foothold to maintain mandamus actions after the substantive controversy has evaporated.

4. Institutional Signals

The opinion is per curiam and unanimous, signaling a strong institutional consensus on two points:

The Court’s continued adherence to a narrow conception of mandamus as a command to perform specific, presently-unperformed statutory duties; and
A reluctance to expand mootness exceptions in ways that would turn original actions into de facto policy-review proceedings, especially where a comprehensive statutory administrative scheme (as in R.C. 3327.02) already exists.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. What Is a Writ of Mandamus?

Mandamus is an “extraordinary” court order that requires a public official or governmental body to perform a specific duty that:

Is clearly required by law; and
Is not discretionary (i.e., not just a matter of judgment or policy).

It is not a general remedy for all types of government wrongdoing. Instead, it is a focused tool: “Do this particular thing you are legally required to do.” Once that thing is done, the tool has no remaining function.

B. Mootness and the Voluntary-Cessation Exception

A case is “moot” when a court’s decision can no longer have any practical effect on the parties. For example, if a student sues to be admitted to a school but then graduates from another school before the case is resolved, the dispute is probably moot.

The “voluntary cessation” exception is a narrow carve-out from mootness. It says that if a defendant voluntarily stops the challenged behavior after being sued, courts may still decide the case if it is not “absolutely clear” the defendant will not restart that behavior. This prevents defendants from dodging review by temporarily behaving well until the lawsuit goes away.

In Siebold, the Court explains that this exception applies mainly in lawsuits seeking to stop or invalidate certain conduct (e.g., unconstitutional rules, ongoing pollution), not in mandamus cases where the only question is whether a required act will be done. Once the act is done, there is no basis for a mandamus order, even if the plaintiff fears the government might behave unlawfully in the future.

C. Interim Transportation under R.C. 3327.02(E)(2)

When a district declares transportation “impractical” and offers payment in lieu, parents can disagree and pursue mediation and a possible administrative hearing with DEW. During that dispute, the law requires the district to keep transporting the student. This is what “interim transportation” means: the temporary, stop-gap transportation provided while the legal dispute over long-term transportation is being resolved.

D. Damages in Mandamus (R.C. 2731.11)

Ohio law allows a successful mandamus relator to recover damages caused by the official’s failure to perform a legal duty. But this is contingent: damages are available only if the court actually grants the writ. If the case becomes moot before a writ can issue—because the official eventually complies—then damages under this statute are unavailable.

V. Conclusion

State ex rel. Siebold v. Columbus City Schools Board of Education, 2025-Ohio-5245, is a tightly reasoned opinion that reinforces two core principles of Ohio public-law litigation:

Mandamus is strictly limited to compelling the performance of specific, presently unperformed statutory duties. Once the duty has been carried out, the mandamus claim is moot.
The voluntary-cessation exception to mootness, developed in declaratory and injunctive contexts, does not extend to original actions in mandamus where the respondent has already done the very thing the relator sought to compel.

In the specific context of school transportation, the Court acknowledges the mandatory nature of interim transportation under R.C. 3327.02(E)(2), but makes clear that mandamus cannot be used as an oversight mechanism to ensure future compliance with that provision. Parents and schools may still invoke administrative remedies and, in appropriate cases, alternative forms of judicial relief, but the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction in mandamus will not be used to issue advisory or prophylactic orders once the requested buses are rolling.

More broadly, Siebold confirms the Court’s commitment to a disciplined, jurisdictional approach: it will grant extraordinary relief only when a live, concrete failure to perform a statutory duty is before it, and will not stretch mootness doctrines or damages provisions to adjudicate speculative future disputes. This decision therefore stands as an important doctrinal marker on the limits of mandamus and the non-transferability of voluntary-cessation principles into that extraordinary-remedy context.

Voluntary Cessation, Mootness, and Mandamus in School Transportation Disputes: Commentary on State ex rel. Siebold v. Columbus City Schools Bd. of Edn., 2025-Ohio-5245