Introduction

In Ross v. Department of Services for Children, Youth and Their Families, Division of Family Services (DFS), the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed a Family Court order terminating the parental rights of Carl Ross (“Father”) to his daughter, a medically complex child born in January 2016. The appeal came to the Court via a no-merit brief under Supreme Court Rule 26.1(c) (Delaware’s analogue to an Anders-type procedure in certain civil appeals), with appointed appellate counsel seeking to withdraw after concluding no arguable issues existed. The Supreme Court agreed, finding the appeal “wholly without merit” and affirming the termination of parental rights (TPR).

The case centers on the statutory ground of “failure to plan” under 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5), the statutory requirement of additional conditions (here, the child’s extended time in DFS custody), and a best-interests analysis under 13 Del. C. § 722. It highlights a recurring and practically significant theme in TPR jurisprudence: regular visitation, standing alone, cannot overcome a parent’s persistent failure to achieve stability, complete case-plan services, or demonstrate the capacity to meet a child’s specialized medical needs. It also underscores the importance of the State’s “reasonable efforts” to reunify, the deference afforded to trial courts’ credibility determinations, and the contours of Rule 26.1(c) review in appeals from TPR orders.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court affirmed the Family Court’s April 2, 2025 order terminating Father’s parental rights on the statutory ground of failure to plan, supported by the additional statutory condition that the child had been in DFS custody for more than one year (13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5)(a)). The Family Court found—and the Supreme Court agreed—that DFS proved by clear and convincing evidence that:

• Father did not complete essential case-plan elements (notably, a parenting class), did not obtain stable housing or employment, and did not acquire training to manage his daughter’s significant medical needs (including G-tube, central line, and total parenteral nutrition).
• DFS made reasonable efforts to reunify the family.
• Termination was in the child’s best interests under 13 Del. C. § 722, given her complex medical needs, Father’s lack of demonstrated capacity to manage those needs, and his history of noncompliance and instability.

The Court applied settled standards of review: de novo for legal questions; limited review for factual findings to ensure record support and absence of clear error; and abuse of discretion where the trial court correctly applied the law. Deferring to Family Court credibility determinations, the Supreme Court rejected Father’s argument that communication breakdowns with DFS caused his noncompliance, citing evidence that he declined to complete the parenting class and told the CASA he would not complete his case plan. The Court concluded that Father’s appellate counsel performed a conscientious review and properly determined there were no meritorious issues. The judgment was affirmed and the withdrawal motion was declared moot.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Wilson v. Division of Family Services, 988 A.2d 435 (Del. 2010) — The Court relied on Wilson to recite the familiar standards of review in TPR appeals: legal issues are reviewed de novo; factual findings are reviewed for support in the record and clear-error; where the trial court correctly applies the law, the appellate court reviews for abuse of discretion. Wilson frames the appellate lens through which the Court assessed the Family Court’s determinations here.
• Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202 (Del. 1979) — Cited for the principle that appellate courts do not substitute their judgment for the trial court in matters of witness credibility. This was pivotal because Father gave conflicting testimony about his awareness of the case plan, while DFS witnesses and the CASA testified he received and understood it.
• Shepherd v. Clemens, 752 A.2d 533 (Del. 2000) — The touchstone for the two-step TPR framework: (1) establish a statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence; and (2) determine, also by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the child’s best interests under § 722. This framework structured both the Family Court’s and Supreme Court’s analyses in Ross.
• Powell v. Department of Services for Children, Youth & Their Families, 963 A.2d 724 (Del. 2008) — Reaffirmed that the clear and convincing evidence standard applies to both prongs of the TPR analysis. The Court invoked Powell to confirm that burden, which DFS met here.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning followed the statutory blueprint meticulously:

1. Statutory Ground — Failure to Plan (13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5)).

   “Failure to plan” commonly includes lack of progress on case-plan tasks designed to achieve reunification. Here, Father did obtain an evaluation that did not recommend treatment, but he failed to complete a parenting class, refused to undertake it on the view that it was unnecessary, maintained no verified stable employment, and had not secured appropriate housing. Critically, he did not acquire the training necessary to attend to his daughter’s complex medical regimen—an omission that goes to the heart of “planning” for her daily safety and care.

2. Additional Condition — Child in Care Over One Year (§ 1103(a)(5)(a)).

   The record established the child had been in DFS custody well in excess of one year. Combined with Father’s lack of material progress, this satisfied the statute’s added conditions for terminating rights on a failure-to-plan ground.

3. Reasonable Efforts to Reunify.

   The Family Court found, and the Supreme Court affirmed, that DFS made reasonable efforts to reunify. The case plan was developed and approved; services were offered; and the agency engaged with Father. The lack of progress was not attributable to State inaction but to Father’s refusal to complete key services and to stabilize his circumstances. The Court expressly rejected Father’s attempt to shift causation to “communication issues,” finding the proof did not support that narrative.

4. Best Interests of the Child (13 Del. C. § 722).

   Applying § 722’s multi-factor framework, the Family Court, affirmed by the Supreme Court, gave decisive weight to the child’s complex medical needs and Father’s lack of demonstrated ability to meet them. While the Court acknowledged Father’s consistent visitation and the child’s enjoyment of those visits, it found that such contact did not translate into the capacity to provide daily care, medical management, and stability. The best-interests analysis in this context properly focused on health, safety, permanency, and the child’s need for a caregiver trained and able to meet an intensive medical regimen.

5. Standard of Review and Credibility Deference.

   The Supreme Court emphasized deference to the Family Court’s factual findings and credibility determinations. Father’s inconsistent testimony regarding knowledge of his case plan was weighed against DFS and CASA testimony; the trial court believed the latter, and the record supported that choice.

6. Rule 26.1(c) No-Merit Procedure.

   After independently reviewing the record and the submissions, the Court agreed with counsel that there were no arguable issues for appeal and affirmed on the merits, rendering the withdrawal motion moot. This reflects the Court’s gatekeeping function under Rule 26.1(c) to ensure that even when counsel deems an appeal meritless, the Court confirms the absence of reversible error.

Impact and Significance

Although the Court’s disposition is an order applying settled law, Ross carries practical significance in several respects:

• Clarification for Medically Complex Children: The case underscores that a parent’s ability to plan must be commensurate with the child’s actual needs. For children requiring specialized medical care, “planning” necessarily includes acquiring training and demonstrating reliable competence to perform daily medical tasks. Failure to do so—despite regular visitation—supports termination on a failure-to-plan basis.
• Visitation Is Not Dispositive: The Court makes plain that consistent visitation, while positive, does not offset noncompliance with case-plan requirements, instability in housing/employment, and lack of capacity to meet a child’s specialized needs.
• Reasonable Efforts and Parental Agency: Ross reaffirms that when DFS presents a reasonable plan and offers services, a parent’s refusal to engage cannot be excused by generalized claims of “communication problems,” particularly when the record shows explicit refusals to complete key services.
• Appellate Practice Under Rule 26.1(c): The decision confirms that TPR appeals can be resolved on a Rule 26.1(c) no-merit record where counsel demonstrates conscientious review and the Court independently finds no arguable issue. Practitioners should ensure that the record clearly documents service offerings, parental notice, and efforts at engagement.
• Permanency for Children in Long-Term Care: The case reflects the judiciary’s continued emphasis on permanency, especially where a child has spent a prolonged period in State custody and has significant medical needs that require a high degree of caregiver reliability and competence.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Failure to Plan” (13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5)): A statutory ground for TPR that focuses on whether a parent has made adequate, sustained progress on a court-approved case plan designed to remedy the issues that led to the child’s placement. It often includes requirements like completing parenting classes, addressing substance abuse or mental health issues, securing safe and stable housing, maintaining employment, and, where relevant, demonstrating the ability to meet a child’s medical needs.
• Additional Conditions (§ 1103(a)(5)(a)-(e)): When the State seeks termination for failure to plan, it must also prove at least one of several additional conditions, such as the child’s prolonged time in State custody. In Ross, the condition satisfied was that the child had been in DFS custody for more than a year.
• Reasonable Efforts: The State must show it took reasonable steps to help the family reunify (for example, creating a case plan, offering services, facilitating visitation, and attempting to engage the parent). The emphasis is on reasonableness, not perfection.
• Best Interests of the Child (13 Del. C. § 722): A multi-factor analysis focusing on the child’s safety, health, emotional well-being, stability, relationships, and adjustment to home/school/community, among other considerations. The child’s special needs and the parent’s capacity to meet them are central.
• Clear and Convincing Evidence: A higher burden than “preponderance of the evidence” but lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt.” It requires that the evidence produce a firm belief or conviction that the allegations are true. In TPR cases, both the statutory ground and the best-interests finding must be established by clear and convincing evidence.
• Supreme Court Rule 26.1(c) (No-Merit Brief): A procedure where appointed counsel who, after conscientious review, finds no arguable appellate issues may file a brief explaining the case and why the appeal lacks merit and may seek to withdraw. The appellant can submit personal points. The Court independently reviews the record to confirm there are no non-frivolous issues before affirming.
• Deference to Credibility Determinations: Appellate courts generally will not reweigh who to believe among witnesses. If the trial judge’s credibility findings are supported by the record, they stand on appeal.

Conclusion

Ross v. DSCYF/DFS is a careful application of Delaware’s established TPR framework. It reinforces several practical and doctrinal points: (1) “failure to plan” is measured by real progress on a case plan, including the capacity to meet a child’s specific needs; (2) consistent visitation does not negate persistent noncompliance with case-plan requirements or an inability to provide necessary daily medical care; (3) the State’s reasonable efforts are assessed in light of the services offered and the parent’s engagement; (4) both the statutory ground and the best-interests determination must be proven by clear and convincing evidence; and (5) on appeal, deference to the trial court’s fact-finding and credibility assessments is decisive absent clear error or legal misapplication.

For children with intensive medical needs, Ross underscores that permanency decisions will turn on a parent’s proven ability and willingness to undertake specialized training and provide stable, competent daily care. The Court’s affirmance under Rule 26.1(c) also signals that appeals lacking arguable issues—where the record reflects refusal to engage in essential case-plan services and sustained instability—will not disturb Family Court judgments grounded in thorough findings and supported by robust evidence.