Virginia Petit Larceny as Categorically a Crime Involving Moral Turpitude

Introduction

In Eugenia Bautista Chavez v. Pamela Jo Bondi, the Fourth Circuit addressed whether a 2011 Virginia petit larceny conviction categorically constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) for immigration‐relief purposes. The petitioner, Ms. Chavez—a Mexican national removable based on her larceny conviction—sought cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), arguing that Virginia’s claim‐of‐right defense and the de minimis value of stolen property foreclose a finding of moral turpitude. The court confronted issues of first impression in the wake of the Supreme Court’s Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo decision, which altered agency‐deference principles.

Summary of the Judgment

The Fourth Circuit denied Chavez’s petition for review. Applying the categorical approach, the court held that:

Virginia petit larceny under Va. Code § 18.2-96 is a specific‐intent offense requiring an intent to permanently deprive the owner of property.
Virginia’s claim‐of‐right (abandonment) defense is purely subjective—requiring an honest, good‐faith belief—and does not render larceny a negligent offense.
The act of taking another’s property without consent and with intent to deprive permanently is inherently reprehensible, regardless of the item's monetary value.
Loper Bright’s rollback of Chevron deference did not disturb the settled precedents that theft offenses with the requisite intent categorically involve moral turpitude.

Accordingly, Chavez’s petit larceny conviction is a CIMT, making her ineligible for cancellation of removal.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024): Overruled Chevron deference but preserved stare-decisis for past agency interpretations.
Ortega-Cordova v. Garland, 107 F.4th 407 (4th Cir. 2024): Reaffirmed categorical approach to CIMT after Loper Bright.
Granados v. Garland, 17 F.4th 475 (4th Cir. 2021): Defined the two essential elements of CIMT: (1) culpable mental state; (2) reprehensible conduct.
Sotnikau v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 731 (4th Cir. 2017): Clarified that negligent crimes lack the specific intent required for moral turpitude.
Nunez-Vasquez v. Barr, 965 F.3d 272 (4th Cir. 2020): Held that statutory negligence standards preclude CIMT finding.
Diaz-Lizarraga, 26 I. & N. Dec. 847 (B.I.A. 2016): Board precedent treating all theft with intent to permanently deprive as CIMTs.
Liebenow II, 20 N.E.3d 242 (Mass. 2014): Massachusetts high court held claim‐of‐right defense is purely subjective.
Welch v. Commonwealth, 896 S.E.2d 867 (Va. Ct. App. 2024): Virginia court confirmed good‐faith intent requirement for larceny without an objective‐reasonableness overlay.

Legal Reasoning

Categorical Approach and De Novo Review: The court independently examined the elements of Virginia petit larceny, rejecting administrative deference post-Loper Bright but respecting prior agency interpretations under stare decisis and Skidmore v. Swift & Co.
Culpable Mental State: Virginia larceny is a common-law specific intent crime—“wrongful taking…with intent to deprive the owner permanently.” The claim-of-right defense negates intent only if the defendant holds an honest, good-faith belief that the property was abandoned. The court concluded this subjective standard does not permit convictions for negligent takings.
Reprehensible Conduct: Permanent deprivation of another’s property intrinsically violates societal moral norms. The court declined to draw a monetary‐value threshold (e.g., de minimis value) that could render petty theft non-reprehensible, consistent with decades of Board and federal cases treating all theft with intent as a CIMT.
Agency Deference Post-Loper Bright: Although Chevron deference is gone, prior Board holdings on theft remain persuasive. The court afforded them “due respect” and upheld the categorical classification.
Procedural Motion to Reconsider: The challenge to a temporary BIA member’s tenure echoed Salomon-Guillen v. Garland (4th Cir. 2024), which upheld consecutive six-month appointments. It was thus without merit.

Impact

This decision cements that state petit larceny statutes with specific intent and permanent‐deprivation elements will be treated uniformly as CIMTs in the Fourth Circuit. It signals to immigration practitioners:

Claim-of-right or minor‐value arguments will rarely defeat CIMT classifications for larceny.
Post-Loper Bright, courts will rely on categorical analysis anchored in state-law elements and settled agency precedents.
Future challenges to CIMT findings must confront both intent and moral‐turpitude precedents.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Categorical Approach: A framework that looks solely at the statutory elements of an offense, not the facts of an individual’s conduct, to decide if it is a CIMT.
Crime Involving Moral Turpitude (CIMT): An offense that (1) requires a blameworthy mental state (usually specific intent) and (2) involves conduct so inherently base or vile that it offends societal moral standards.
Claim-of-Right Defense: In larceny law, a defendant may avoid liability by showing an honest belief (subjective) that she had a legal right to the property—even if that belief was unreasonable.
Chevron Deference: A doctrine that previously required courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. Loper Bright curtailed that deference in legal interpretation, though past precedents still bind under stare decisis.

Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Chavez v. Bondi clarifies that Virginia petit larceny is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. It underscores that:

Specific intent to permanently deprive and inherently wrongful taking satisfy the dual elements of a CIMT.
Virginia’s claim‐of‐right defense remains a purely subjective test and does not transform larceny into a negligent offense.
Value of stolen property—even de minimis—does not negate the reprehensible nature of unauthorized permanent deprivation.

In the broader legal context, Chavez reinforces the categorical approach and preserves consistent treatment of theft offenses in immigration law, bridging post‐Loper Bright administrative law with long‐standing moral‐turpitude jurisprudence.