Vindell v. Site 2 DSA Owner, LLC – Re-drawing the Boundary of the “Inherent Hazards” Exception under Labor Law § 200

I. Introduction

Vindell v. Site 2 DSA Owner, LLC, 2025 NY Slip Op 03353 (2d Dep’t June 4 2025), is a significant Second Department decision examining the reach of Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence on construction sites plagued by water and mud. The plaintiff, Deylis Vindell, was injured while dismantling temporary wooden supports in a deep excavation where nearly a foot of standing water had created a muddy base. He sued the property owners, the construction manager, and a dewatering subcontractor for negligence and violations of Labor Law §§ 200 and 241(6).

The principal issue was whether the inherent hazards doctrine—relieving owners and contractors of the duty to remedy conditions that are inherent in the work assigned—barred the plaintiff’s claims as a matter of law. The Supreme Court (Queens County) said yes and granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Appellate Division reversed in part, holding that uncertainty over the source of the water and over the plaintiff’s precise assignment created triable issues of fact, defeating summary judgment on the negligence and § 200 claims. The Court, however, affirmed dismissal of the § 241(6) claim premised on 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d), concluding that the regulation did not apply to the muddy condition at issue.

II. Summary of the Judgment

Reversal (in part): The Second Department reinstated the plaintiff’s common-law negligence and Labor Law § 200 causes of action, finding that the defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden for summary judgment.
Affirmance (in part): The Court upheld the dismissal of the Labor Law § 241(6) claim predicated on 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d) because the plaintiff neither slipped/tripped nor was he on a “floor, passageway, walkway, or other surface” contemplated by that rule.
Key Holding (New Precedent): Where the source of a dangerous condition is disputed and it is not clear that the plaintiff was hired specifically to rectify that very condition, the “inherent hazards” exception does not bar recovery under Labor Law § 200 or common-law negligence at the summary-judgment stage.

III. Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Court relied on a line of Court of Appeals and Appellate Division cases governing summary judgment and the scope of Labor Law § 200:

Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 (1986) & Winegrad v. NYU Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 (1985) – Canonical authority establishing the movant’s burden on summary judgment.
Rizzuto v. L.A. Wenger Contr. Co., 91 NY2d 343 (1998) & Comes v. NYSEG, 82 NY2d 876 (1993) – Recognize § 200 as a codification of the common-law duty to provide a safe workplace.
Gasper v. Ford Motor Co., 13 NY2d 104 (1963) & Kowalsky v. Conreco Co., 264 NY 125 (1934) – Forefathers of the inherent or integral hazard exception, relieving owners from correcting defects that are intrinsic to the assigned work.
Vitale v. Astoria Energy II, LLC, 180 AD3d 1104 (2d Dep’t 2020); Arcabascio v. Bentivegna, 142 AD3d 1120 (2d Dep’t 2016); Grasso v. NYS Thruway Auth., 159 AD3d 674 (2d Dep’t 2018) – Recent elaborations stressing fact-specific analysis of whether a hazard is truly inherent.
Reaves v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 167 AD3d 669 (2d Dep’t 2018) & Torres v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 175 AD3d 1584 (2d Dep’t 2019) – Appellate precedents denying summary judgment where the plaintiff’s role in creating or correcting the hazard was contested.
For the § 241(6) issue: Zastenchik v. Knollwood Country Club, 101 AD3d 861 (2d Dep’t 2012) and others limiting 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d) to slip/trip situations on designated “walking surfaces.”

By weaving these authorities together, the Court underscored that determining whether a condition is inherent is intensely factual; it cannot be resolved on summary judgment when evidence conflicts.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Prima Facie Burden Not Met. Defendants had to show both that the muddy condition was inherent to the plaintiff’s work and that he was hired specifically to remedy it. The record contained competing explanations for the water’s origin (leak through soil-grout walls versus adjacent groundwater seepage). That conflict alone defeated their motion.
Fact-Specific Nature of “Inherent Hazard.” Echoing Grasso, the Court stressed that the inquiry turns on the scope of the plaintiff’s assignment. ECD was hired for excavation, pile-driving and waterproofing, but there was no definitive proof that Vindell’s individual task included correcting the standing water that caused the mud.
Section 200 versus Common-Law Negligence. Because § 200 is effectively the statutory mirror of the common-law duty, the same analysis controlled both causes of action.
Industrial Code Provision Inapplicable. For § 241(6), the Court drew a bright line: 23-1.7(d) governs slipping or tripping hazards on walking surfaces. Standing in mud while swinging a sledgehammer is neither slipping, tripping, nor on a surface contemplated by the rule. Dismissal of that portion of the claim was therefore proper.

3. Likely Impact of the Decision

Narrowing Summary Judgment for Defendants. Contractors and owners can no longer rely on a broad characterization of conditions as inherent to the work where the source or responsibility for that condition is unclear.
Elevated Evidentiary Burden. Defendants must provide unambiguous proof (e.g., contracts, scope-of-work statements, expert affidavits) that the plaintiff was hired specifically to eliminate the dangerous condition.
Encouraging Proactive Site Safety. Because more cases will survive past summary judgment, owners may be incentivized to address mud, water, and other environmental hazards even when they seem intrinsic to site conditions.
Clarification of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d). Future litigants will find it harder to invoke this regulation outside classic slip/trip contexts, streamlining Industrial Code litigation under § 241(6).

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Labor Law § 200 – New York’s statutory restatement of an owner/GC’s duty to furnish a safe workplace; liability hinges on control over the worksite or creation of a dangerous condition.
Inherent Hazards Doctrine – Owners/GCs are not liable for dangers that are inseparable from, and essential to, the very work the worker was hired to perform (e.g., a roofer facing heights). Vindell limits this doctrine where the worker’s precise assignment is disputed.
Summary Judgment – A procedure allowing a court to resolve a claim without trial if there are no material factual disputes. The moving party must make a prima facie showing first.
Labor Law § 241(6) & Industrial Code – Imposes a non-delegable duty on owners/GCs to comply with specific safety rules in 12 NYCRR Part 23. A plaintiff must tie the accident to a concrete, applicable regulation.
12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d) – Targets slipping/tripping hazards on floors, platforms, and walkways. It does not cover every wet or muddy scenario—only those where a worker slips or trips on a surface meant for walking.

V. Conclusion

Vindell v. Site 2 DSA Owner refines the contours of New York’s “inherent hazards” exception. The Second Department makes clear that owners and contractors cannot short-circuit a construction-injury lawsuit by labeling a condition as part of the job when the underlying facts are contested. At the same time, the decision reinforces the strict, textual application of Industrial Code provisions under § 241(6).

Practitioners should treat Vindell as a warning: success on summary judgment now demands a granular record showing not just the existence of a hazard, but its precise nexus to the plaintiff’s work assignment. For plaintiffs, the case offers a potent counter to defendants’ oft-used inherent-hazards defense, keeping more § 200 and negligence claims alive for jury resolution.