Introduction

In Peterkin v. Carr, No. 24-1148-cv (2d Cir. Nov. 14, 2025) (summary order), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the Eastern District of New York’s grant of summary judgment to New York City Police Department Detective Douglas Carr and Officer Jose Albarracin on two surviving claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by pro se plaintiff, Meuris Peterkin: (1) Fourth Amendment false arrest and (2) Fourteenth Amendment deprivation-of-food while detained as a pretrial detainee.

The case stems from Peterkin’s arrest and approximately 19 hours and 20 minutes of detention on October 14–15, 2018, after multiple reports to police that he was harassing and threatening a family member. While the district court had earlier sua sponte dismissed a host of other claims, it allowed these two to proceed. On defendants’ motion, the district court (Judge LaShann DeArcy Hall) granted summary judgment; the Second Circuit now affirms.

The key issues on appeal were:

• Whether officers had probable cause to arrest Peterkin—defeating his § 1983 false arrest claim under New York law—even if the offense ultimately relied on differed from the stated arrest reason.
• Whether the alleged deprivation of food during under 20 hours of pretrial detention met the objective “seriousness” threshold and the mens rea requirement (deliberate indifference) under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Although decided by nonprecedential summary order, the panel’s reasoning reaffirms two important operational rules in the Second Circuit: (1) a putative victim’s signed account—absent reasons to doubt veracity—can establish probable cause for any qualifying offense, and (2) conditions-of-confinement claims based on temporary food deprivation require evidence of harm and deliberate indifference, with personal involvement by the named officers.

Summary of the Opinion

Applying de novo review and construing the record in favor of the pro se plaintiff, the Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the officers on both claims.

• False arrest: The court concluded that officers had probable cause to arrest based on multiple complaints and a signed statement by the putative victim (a cousin-in-law), reporting that Peterkin repeatedly followed, harassed, and threatened her. Because there was no reason to doubt the complainant’s veracity, this evidence sufficed to establish probable cause for at least second-degree menacing under N.Y. Penal Law § 120.14(2). Under Second Circuit law, probable cause to arrest for any crime defeats a false arrest claim, regardless of whether that crime is the one the officer cited at the time.
• Fourteenth Amendment food-deprivation claim: The court held that Peterkin failed to show an objectively serious deprivation or that either officer acted with deliberate indifference. He never requested food during the approximately 19-hour detention and exhibited no apparent symptoms indicating a need for food. The record showed Detective Carr last interacted with Peterkin four hours after arrest, and there was no evidence Officer Albarracin was involved in the detention at all.

The panel also noted that Peterkin abandoned any challenge to the district court’s earlier sua sponte dismissal of other claims by failing to brief them on appeal.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Sotomayor v. City of New York, 713 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2013): Sets the de novo standard of review for summary judgments and requires courts to draw reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. The panel expressly applied this standard, ensuring that even with pro se leniency, the summary judgment burden remained with the defendants once they showed no genuine dispute of material fact.
• McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 864 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2017): Reiterates liberal construction of pro se filings; the court again acknowledged this obligation but clarified it does not replace evidentiary requirements at summary judgment.
• Alberty v. Hunter, 144 F.4th 408 (2d Cir. 2025): Confirms that § 1983 false arrest claims are governed by the law of the state where the arrest occurred. This anchored the court’s reliance on New York elements of false arrest.
• Carruthers v. Colton, 153 F.4th 169 (2d Cir. 2025): Articulates the four elements of false arrest under New York law: intent to confine, awareness, lack of consent, and lack of privilege. The “privilege” prong collapses into the existence of probable cause, which is a complete defense.
• Kee v. City of New York, 12 F.4th 150 (2d Cir. 2021): Establishes that probable cause to arrest for any offense is a complete defense to false arrest “whether or not that particular crime was closely related to the offense the officers said was the reason for arrest.” This principle was outcome-determinative once the panel found probable cause for second-degree menacing.
• Betts v. Shearman, 751 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2014): Clarifies that probable cause exists when officers have reasonably trustworthy information sufficient for a person of reasonable caution to believe a crime was committed. It specifically authorizes reliance on information from a putative victim or eyewitness absent circumstances raising doubts about veracity. The panel relied on Betts to treat the complainant’s signed statement and repeated reports as adequate.
• Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2017): Governs pretrial detainee conditions-of-confinement claims under the Fourteenth Amendment and sets out a two-pronged test: an objective prong (sufficiently serious deprivation posing an unreasonable risk to health) and a mens rea prong (at least deliberate indifference). The opinion applied Darnell to assess both the seriousness of a roughly 19-hour food deprivation and the officers’ mental state.
• Green v. Dep’t of Educ. of City of N.Y., 16 F.4th 1070 (2d Cir. 2021): Demonstrates abandonment-by-omission on appeal: issues not briefed are deemed forfeited. The panel uses Green to deem abandoned Peterkin’s challenges to the district court’s earlier sua sponte dismissals.
• Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a): Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; the panel quotes and applies this standard.

Legal Reasoning

1. False Arrest (Fourth Amendment via § 1983, applying New York law)

The court began from settled ground: under New York law, false arrest consists of four elements, but the existence of probable cause for any offense renders the confinement privileged and defeats the claim. The panel’s analysis proceeds in two steps:

1. Probable cause framework: Officers may rely on reasonably trustworthy information from putative victims or eyewitnesses, and such information presumptively suffices absent red flags about veracity (Betts). Moreover, the probable cause inquiry is offense-agnostic; if officers had probable cause for any offense supported by the facts, the false arrest claim fails even if a different charge was cited at arrest (Kee).
2. Application to the record: NYPD reports and Detective Carr’s affidavit documented that the complainant, Sadier Emmanus (Peterkin’s cousin-in-law), made multiple complaints that Peterkin was threatening, following, and harassing her, and she supplied a signed statement before the arrest. The panel found no evidence of circumstances casting doubt on her veracity. On those uncontested facts, officers had probable cause to arrest for at least second-degree menacing under N.Y. Penal Law § 120.14(2), which—per the panel’s quotation—covers repeated following or a course of conduct intentionally placing another in reasonable fear of physical injury, serious physical injury, or death. That conclusion defeated the false arrest claim in its entirety under Kee.

Notably, the panel did not need to resolve whether probable cause existed for additional offenses; one sufficed. Nor did the panel need to address qualified immunity because the existence of probable cause itself foreclosed liability.

2. Deprivation of Food (Fourteenth Amendment, pretrial detainee)

Darnell supplies a two-pronged analysis:

• Objective prong: The deprivation must be sufficiently serious—alone or in combination—to present an unreasonable risk of serious damage to health (physical or mental).
• Mens rea prong: The officer must act with at least deliberate indifference to the condition—i.e., be aware of and disregard, or be effectively reckless with respect to, the risk posed by the deprivation.

The panel found the record lacking on both prongs:

• No evidence of harm or risk of serious harm: Peterkin neither requested food during the approximately 19-hour detention nor showed evidence of observable symptoms related to lack of food. The record therefore did not establish that the temporary deprivation posed an unreasonable risk of serious harm to his health.
• No deliberate indifference/personal involvement: The evidence showed Detective Carr last interacted with Peterkin roughly four hours after the arrest, and there was no record evidence that Officer Albarracin participated in the detention at all. Without proof that either defendant knew or should have known about an excessive risk resulting from the food deprivation and disregarded it—and given the absence of any request for food or obvious distress—the mens rea prong was not met. The absence of Albarracin’s involvement provides an independent ground for summary judgment because § 1983 requires personal participation in the alleged constitutional violation.

Impact and Implications

Although this is a nonprecedential summary order (citable under FRAP 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1 with the “SUMMARY ORDER” notation), it is instructive in several ways:

• Probable cause from victim accounts: The ruling reinforces the enduring Second Circuit principle that a putative victim’s detailed, signed complaint—particularly following multiple reports—ordinarily furnishes probable cause, absent concrete reasons to doubt veracity. Officers may rely on such statements without independently corroborating each detail, so long as nothing in the circumstances flags unreliability.
• “Any offense” defense to false arrest: Plaintiffs cannot salvage a false arrest claim by contesting the label or statutory citation used at arrest; once the record supports probable cause for any offense, the claim fails. This underscores the practical importance, for both police and civil litigants, of evaluating the full mosaic of facts against all potential offenses reasonably indicated by the complainant’s account.
• Short-term deprivation claims: For pretrial detainees alleging food deprivation over a limited duration, plaintiffs will need evidence of objective seriousness (e.g., medical vulnerability, symptoms, or longer duration) and proof that defendants knew of and disregarded a substantial risk. Failure to request food or to present evidence of manifest harm makes summary judgment likely, especially when individual defendants had minimal or no involvement.
• Pro se litigants and appellate practice: The case also illustrates that liberal construction of filings does not relieve pro se litigants of evidentiary burdens at summary judgment, and that issues not briefed on appeal are deemed abandoned.
• Documentation practices: For law enforcement, contemporaneous documentation—incident reports, affidavits, and signed statements—can be decisive on probable cause and on the scope of each officer’s personal involvement. For detention facilities, records of meal provision, detainee requests, and officer interactions can be outcome-determinative in conditions claims.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Summary judgment (Rule 56): A mechanism to resolve cases without trial when no reasonable jury could find for the non-movant on the material facts. Courts view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant but require admissible evidence, not mere allegations.
• Probable cause: A practical, common-sense standard. Officers have probable cause to arrest if, based on reasonably trustworthy information, a reasonable person would believe the suspect committed a crime. Reliable reports from victims or eyewitnesses can, by themselves, satisfy this standard unless there are reasons to doubt credibility.
• False arrest under New York law: The plaintiff must show intentional, aware, nonconsensual confinement that is not privileged. The privilege exists if officers had probable cause to arrest for any crime. Thus, the presence of probable cause is a complete defense.
• “Any offense” rule: Even if the officer verbally cites offense A at the scene, the false arrest claim fails if the facts established probable cause for offense B. The match between citation and facts is not legally dispositive.
• Menacing in the second degree (N.Y. Penal Law § 120.14(2)): As quoted by the panel, this offense covers repeatedly following or engaging in a course of conduct intentionally placing or attempting to place another in reasonable fear of physical injury, serious physical injury, or death. Multiple reports and a signed statement describing threats and repeated following can meet this standard for probable cause.
• Pretrial detainee Fourteenth Amendment standard (Darnell): Two prongs must be met: (1) the deprivation must be objectively serious, posing an unreasonable risk of serious harm; and (2) the officer must have acted with at least deliberate indifference to that risk. Brief deprivations without harm, requests, or obvious distress often fail the standard.
• Deliberate indifference: A culpable state akin to recklessness: the official knew or should have known of a substantial risk of serious harm and disregarded it. If an officer is not present, has no ongoing role, or receives no indication of a risk, this prong is typically unmet.
• Personal involvement (Section 1983): Liability attaches only to officers personally involved in the constitutional violation. Merely being employed by the agency or being present at an earlier stage is insufficient without evidence of participation or knowledge with disregard of the risk.
• Abandonment on appeal: Issues not raised in an appellant’s brief are deemed abandoned and will not be reviewed.
• Precedential status of summary orders: In the Second Circuit, summary orders do not have precedential effect, though they may be cited under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1, with the “SUMMARY ORDER” notation and service requirements for pro se parties. They are often persuasive illustrations of existing law.

Conclusion

Peterkin v. Carr underscores two practical doctrines that frequently resolve § 1983 litigation at summary judgment. First, a putative victim’s consistent, signed statement—absent specific reasons to doubt reliability—establishes probable cause for any qualifying offense, extinguishing a false arrest claim regardless of the arresting officer’s initial charge designation. Second, conditions-of-confinement claims premised on temporary food deprivation require concrete evidence of an objectively serious risk and deliberate indifference by officers personally involved; the absence of a food request, symptoms, or proof of involvement typically defeats such claims.

While nonprecedential, the order synthesizes and applies core Second Circuit principles from Betts, Kee, and Darnell, and clarifies that pro se status does not relax summary judgment standards or appellate preservation rules. For law enforcement and correctional agencies, thorough contemporaneous documentation remains crucial. For civil-rights plaintiffs, success will often turn on developing evidence of both objective severity and individual defendant culpability. The Second Circuit’s affirmance in Peterkin reflects a pragmatic application of established doctrine to a common fact pattern in false arrest and short-term conditions-of-confinement cases.