Victim Identification Plus Corroborating Circumstances Suffice for Probable Cause; Unknown Omissions Do Not Vitiate Warrants — The Fourth Circuit’s Clarification in Moretti v. Thorsdottir

Introduction

In a published opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, of both federal and Virginia malicious prosecution claims brought by John Scott Moretti against Detective Helga Thorsdottir of the Prince William County Police Department. The core issue was whether the operative complaint plausibly alleged a lack of probable cause to support Moretti’s arrest and prosecution for serious sexual offenses against a minor (referred to as “Jane Doe”). The panel, per Judge King and joined by Judges Thacker and Berner, held that the complaint and its attached exhibits demonstrated probable cause as a matter of law, thereby defeating the essential element common to both the § 1983 and Virginia common-law malicious prosecution claims.

The decision is notable for two reasons. First, it synthesizes Fourth Circuit probable cause jurisprudence in the malicious prosecution context, emphasizing that repeated victim identification, coupled with modest corroboration, can satisfy probable cause even in the absence of physical evidence of the alleged sexual abuse and even if earlier tips included details consistent with someone other than the defendant. Second, in a separate concurrence, Judge Thacker (joined by Judge Berner) urges courts and practitioners to replace the term “child pornography” with “child sexual abuse material (CSAM),” aligning judicial terminology with the substance of the harm and contemporary professional usage.

Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. It held that:

The complaint and its integral exhibits showed that Detective Thorsdottir had probable cause when she sought warrants and pursued Moretti’s arrest and prosecution. Central to that conclusion were multiple, consistent victim identifications of “Scott Moretti” as the abuser, detailed accounts of abuse including the display of a handgun, statements by the victim’s parents corroborating the closeness and timing of the children’s friendship and visits to Moretti’s home, and the recovery of a handgun from Moretti’s residence.
Moretti’s theory of a Franks/Miller violation—that the detective either made false statements with reckless disregard for the truth or omitted material facts—failed as a matter of pleading. The purportedly exculpatory suicide hotline transcript was not alleged to have been in the detective’s possession when she sought the arrest warrant, and omissions must be both known and material (i.e., necessary to the magistrate’s probable cause finding) to support a claim.
Because probable cause existed, the federal Fourth Amendment claim necessarily failed, and the court did not need to reach qualified immunity. The state-law malicious prosecution claim failed for the same reason, as lack of probable cause is an essential element under Virginia law.

In concurrence, Judge Thacker clarified that the later nolle prosequi was not solely due to the victim’s unwillingness to proceed; the Commonwealth’s Attorney indicated that additional information favorable to the defense undermined proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The concurrence also urged broader adoption of “child sexual abuse material” in place of “child pornography.”

Background and Procedural Posture

The record reflects a 2018 CPS referral after Doe disclosed sexual abuse to a suicide hotline, describing her abuser as her father’s friend who had again been present in the home. The investigation went inactive when Doe declined to identify her abuser to police. In 2019, while in residential treatment after a suicide attempt, Doe disclosed to a therapist that “Scott Moretti” had abused her when she was between eight and twelve. Assigned to the reopened case, Detective Thorsdottir conducted a five-hour forensic interview in which Doe repeatedly identified Moretti and gave detailed accounts of abuse, including a handgun threat and nude photographs; six handwritten statements from Doe corroborated these accounts. Doe’s parents corroborated the girls’ close friendship, Doe’s frequent presence at Moretti’s home, and other contextual details.

A search of Moretti’s person and home (warrants issued by a magistrate) yielded multiple electronics and a handgun. A forensic review found no child sexual abuse material. In May 2020, a magistrate issued arrest warrants for forcible sodomy and indecent liberties; a grand jury returned indictments. In 2022, the Commonwealth entered a nolle prosequi after the defense obtained a 2018 suicide hotline transcript (by subpoena) that described the abuser as the father’s best friend who was the best man at the parents’ wedding—details not consistent with Moretti. Moretti sued for malicious prosecution under § 1983 and Virginia law; the district court dismissed for failure to plausibly plead lack of probable cause. The Fourth Circuit affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983): The court reaffirmed the “totality-of-the-circumstances” approach and emphasized that probable cause requires only a probability of criminal activity, not a prima facie case. The opinion’s refrain that the “probable cause bar is a low one” is rooted in Gates.
United States v. Gray, 137 F.3d 765 (4th Cir. 1998): Used to underscore that probable cause demands more than mere suspicion but less than evidence sufficient to convict.
Smith v. Munday, 848 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2017): Reinforces that the court evaluates the information the officer had at the time of seeking the warrant.
Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1991): A key authority for the proposition that a victim’s identification by name is powerful evidence of probable cause and that officers need not exhaust every potentially exculpatory lead before probable cause is established.
Wadkins v. Arnold, 214 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 2000): Quoted for the principle that reasonable officers are not required to “resolve every doubt” prior to a probable cause determination.
Miller v. Prince George’s County, 475 F.3d 621 (4th Cir. 2007): Provides the Franks-based framework for § 1983 malicious prosecution claims premised on false statements or omissions—requiring deliberate falsehoods or reckless disregard for the truth, and that omissions must be material to probable cause.
United States v. Colkley, 899 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1990): Clarifies that omitted facts must be necessary to the magistrate’s finding of probable cause to be “material.”
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978): The foundational decision establishing that a warrant is invalid if supported by deliberately or recklessly false statements or material omissions.
Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178 (4th Cir. 1996); Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636 (4th Cir. 2012): Frame § 1983 malicious prosecution as a Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim hinging on the presence or absence of probable cause.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Industries, 637 F.3d 435 (4th Cir. 2011); Secretary of State for Defence v. Trimble Navigation Ltd., 484 F.3d 700 (4th Cir. 2007); Southern Walk at Broadlands Homeowner’s Ass’n v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175 (4th Cir. 2013): Confirm the rule that courts may consider complaint exhibits at the motion-to-dismiss stage and that exhibits control over conflicting allegations.
Lewis v. Kei, 708 S.E.2d 884 (Va. 2011): Sets out the elements for Virginia malicious prosecution; lack of probable cause is essential.

Legal Reasoning

The Fourth Circuit proceeded in two steps aligned with the Miller/Franks framework: alleged false statements and alleged material omissions.

No plausible allegation of intentional or reckless falsehoods: The court emphasized that Doe identified “Scott Moretti” on multiple occasions—first in residential treatment and again during a forensic interview—providing detailed accounts consistent over time. Under Torchinsky, a victim’s naming of the perpetrator is weighty probable cause evidence. Additional corroboration—parents’ statements about the children’s friendship and sleepovers, proximity of the homes, the timeline, and recovery of a handgun consistent with Doe’s account—raised the objective probability of criminal conduct well above the low bar of probable cause. The absence of physical evidence of CSAM did not negate probable cause for the hands-on offenses alleged, and inconsistency concerns allegedly flagged by a therapist did not plausibly create a “high degree of awareness” of falsity on the detective’s part.
No plausible allegation of material omissions known at the time: The court treated as dispositive the pleading gap that the detective did not have (and plaintiff’s counsel conceded they had no reason to believe she had) the suicide hotline transcript when seeking the arrest warrant. Omissions are actionable only if known to the affiant when the warrant is sought and material—i.e., necessary to the magistrate’s finding. Other omissions (e.g., the 2018 descriptor “father’s friend,” the defendant’s travel, lack of CSAM on devices) did not negate probable cause given the multiple subsequent identifications by name and the corroboration of opportunity and context. Officers are not required to “exhaust every potentially exculpatory lead” before establishing probable cause.

With probable cause established on the pleadings, the federal Fourth Amendment claim failed. The court therefore did not reach qualified immunity. The Virginia malicious prosecution claim failed for the same reason: lack of probable cause cannot be satisfied.

Impact and Practical Consequences

Pleading standard tightened for plaintiffs: In § 1983 and Virginia malicious prosecution suits premised on warrant-based arrests, plaintiffs must plead with specificity that (a) the officer knowingly or recklessly included false statements, or omitted facts the officer actually knew, and (b) those facts were material—i.e., necessary to the magistrate’s probable cause finding. Conclusory allegations or reliance on information not known to the officer at the critical time will not survive Rule 12(b)(6).
Victim identification plus contextual corroboration will often suffice: The decision strongly signals that repeated victim identification—even in cases without physical evidence—combined with corroboration of access, opportunity, and specific details (e.g., a handgun matching a described threat) will satisfy probable cause. Earlier inconsistent descriptors (e.g., “father’s friend”) will not defeat probable cause where later identifications are specific and corroborated.
Exhibits control the narrative at the motion-to-dismiss stage: Plaintiffs attaching investigative reports and warrant applications should expect courts to credit those documents over contrary allegations. Attaching materials that reveal repeated identifications and corroboration can foreclose lack-of-probable-cause theories.
Scope of discovery constrained in pleading-stage challenges: Because the court confines its review to information in the complaint and integral, authentic exhibits (and facts known to the officer when the warrant was sought), plaintiffs who hope to rely on later-discovered exculpatory material (e.g., subpoenaed transcripts) must connect that material to the officer’s knowledge and intent at the time.
Terminology shift encouraged by the concurrence: The concurrence’s advocacy for “child sexual abuse material (CSAM)” aligns the Fourth Circuit with a growing professional and governmental consensus. Practitioners litigating in the Fourth Circuit should anticipate and adopt this terminology, even when statutes use legacy phrasing.
State-law claims track federal probable cause analysis: Because Virginia malicious prosecution requires a showing that the proceeding was instituted without probable cause, federal and state claims will often rise or fall together when the crux is probable cause.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Probable cause: A common-sense standard requiring only a fair probability that a crime occurred and that the suspect committed it. It is substantially lower than the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard required to convict and lower than the preponderance standard used in civil cases.
Malicious prosecution under § 1983: In the Fourth Circuit, this is a Fourth Amendment “unreasonable seizure” claim. A warrant or prosecution unsupported by probable cause is unreasonable. A plaintiff must show the officer procured legal process (e.g., a warrant) through false statements or material omissions made deliberately or recklessly.
Franks/Miller omission and false statement doctrine: A warrant is invalid if the affiant included deliberate or reckless falsehoods or omitted facts known at the time, where those facts are material—meaning necessary to the probable cause finding. Negligent errors are not enough.
Materiality of omissions (Colkley): An omitted fact is “material” only if adding it back would defeat probable cause; it must be necessary to the magistrate’s finding, not merely relevant.
Rule 12(b)(6) and exhibits: Courts may consider documents attached to the complaint and treat them as controlling over conflicting allegations. Plaintiffs should be strategic about what they attach.
Nolle prosequi: A prosecutor’s decision to discontinue a case. Under Virginia procedure, it is a discontinuance, not an acquittal. It can still satisfy the “favorable termination” requirement in many malicious prosecution frameworks, but this case did not turn on that element because probable cause was dispositive.
Qualified immunity: Protects officers from damages liability unless they violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. Here, the court did not need to analyze qualified immunity because it found no constitutional violation at all.
CSAM terminology: The concurrence urges replacing “child pornography” with “child sexual abuse material,” emphasizing the lack of consent and the abusive nature of the content and aligning with Department of Justice and international practice.

How the Court Applied These Principles to the Facts

Repeated identification: Doe named Moretti in residential treatment and again during a five-hour forensic interview, providing detailed accounts. Under Torchinsky, this strongly supports probable cause.
Corroboration: Parents confirmed the children’s close friendship, Doe’s frequent presence in Moretti’s home, and a timeline aligning with Doe’s reported abuse period. A handgun was found in Moretti’s residence, consistent with Doe’s description of a gun threat.
Earlier inconsistent descriptor: The 2018 “father’s friend” description did not negate probable cause in light of later, specific identifications by name plus corroboration. Officers are not required to settle every inconsistency or exhaust every exculpatory lead before probable cause attaches.
Omissions claim fell short: The suicide hotline transcript was not alleged to have been in the detective’s possession when she sought the arrest warrant; unknown facts cannot be “omitted” with reckless disregard. Other asserted omissions were not material given the totality of the circumstances.

The Concurrence: Two Clarifications with Broader Resonance

Reason for dismissal of the criminal case: Judge Thacker highlighted that the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s correspondence acknowledged the emergence of defense-favorable information that undermined proof beyond a reasonable doubt—independent of the victim’s unwillingness to proceed. This nuance matters for public perceptions of victims and prosecutorial decision-making.
CSAM terminology: The concurrence underscores the movement—among DOJ, international bodies, and child protection organizations—away from “child pornography” to “child sexual abuse material.” Although the majority used the statutory term, the concurrence’s language joins other Fourth Circuit opinions in 2025 adopting CSAM in footnotes, signaling a durable shift in circuit practice.

Key Takeaways

Probable cause remains a low threshold, satisfied by repeated victim identification supported by basic corroboration of access, opportunity, and specific details—even if physical evidence is lacking and earlier descriptors introduced ambiguity.
For Franks/Miller-based § 1983 malicious prosecution claims, plaintiffs must plead that the officer knew of exculpatory facts at the time and intentionally or recklessly excluded them, and that those facts were necessary to the magistrate’s probable cause finding.
Complaint exhibits are decisive at the pleading stage; attaching investigative reports can defeat a plaintiff’s own lack-of-probable-cause theory if those reports reflect substantial corroboration.
State malicious prosecution claims under Virginia law will often fail with their federal counterparts when probable cause is established; “malice” and other elements become moot.
The Fourth Circuit is signaling a preferred vocabulary—CSAM—to reflect the reality of the harm and to avoid minimizing language in cases involving sexual exploitation of children.

Conclusion

Moretti v. Thorsdottir reinforces and clarifies the Fourth Circuit’s probable cause jurisprudence at the intersection of § 1983 and state malicious prosecution claims. The court’s message is straightforward: when a victim repeatedly identifies a suspect by name and the investigation yields corroborative context consistent with the allegations, probable cause exists. Allegations that hinge on omitted exculpatory facts must show those facts were within the officer’s knowledge and were material to the magistrate’s finding. As a practical matter, plaintiffs must craft Franks/Miller pleadings with precision and restraint, and defendants can confidently invoke the totality of the circumstances and the controlling force of complaint exhibits at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.

The concurrence, meanwhile, performs an important service in calibrating courtroom language to the gravity of the offenses at issue, urging the use of “child sexual abuse material.” Together, the opinions offer both doctrinal guidance and a normative cue about how the law should speak about harms to children while administering the constitutional standards governing seizure and prosecution.