Venue Under Minn. Stat. § 627.01 Is Not an Element: Guilty Plea Accuracy Need Not Include Venue Facts — State v. Paulson (Minn. 2025)

Introduction

In State of Minnesota v. Matthew Douglas Paulson, 22 N.W.3d 144 (Minn. 2025), the Minnesota Supreme Court resolved a focused but consequential question in criminal plea practice: must the factual basis supporting a guilty plea also establish statutory venue in the county of prosecution? The court answered no. Writing for the court, Justice Thissen held that the venue requirement codified in Minn. Stat. § 627.01—which generally requires criminal cases to be tried in the county where the offense was committed—is not an element of the offense. Consequently, the factual basis presented at a plea hearing need not establish venue to satisfy the “accuracy” component of a valid guilty plea.

The decision clarifies the boundary between substantive elements that define criminal culpability and procedural requirements that govern where a case may be tried. It also delineates the scope of the accuracy inquiry in guilty and Alford pleas, underscoring that accuracy serves to ensure the defendant’s substantive culpability for the crime of conviction, not to police collateral procedural prerequisites such as statutory venue.

Factual and Procedural Background

The case arose from events involving S.W., a 15-year-old who had periodically left home to visit family in Wisconsin. In March 2021, after a volatile episode involving methamphetamine use, the defendant, Matthew Paulson, assaulted S.W.’s adult relative in Wisconsin, removed S.W. to his family’s property in Stacy, Minnesota, and kept her in his truck for two days. During that time, he allegedly threatened her, took her phone to prevent contact with her mother, provided methamphetamine, and sexually assaulted her twice. S.W. was later located in Anoka County during a traffic stop; she appeared extremely under the influence and reported the kidnapping and assaults.

The State initially charged Paulson in Anoka County with first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct. Paulson moved to dismiss for improper venue, asserting the offenses occurred in Isanti County. The district court denied dismissal, relying on Minn. Stat. § 627.15, which permits prosecution of child-abuse-related offenses either in the county where the abuse occurred or where the child is found. The State later added a charge of kidnapping to facilitate a felony (Minn. Stat. § 609.25, subd. 1(2)), the facilitating felony being a second-degree controlled substance offense. Paulson did not renew a venue challenge as to the added kidnapping count. He entered an Alford plea to the kidnapping offense, after the prosecutor summarized evidence showing confinement/removal of a minor without parental consent to facilitate a felony drug offense. The district court accepted the plea and sentenced him according to the agreement.

On appeal, Paulson argued his plea was inaccurate because the factual basis did not establish venue in Anoka County under Minn. Stat. § 627.01 (and no Rule 24 exception was claimed). The court of appeals rejected the argument, concluding venue is not an element of the offense. The Minnesota Supreme Court granted review on the single issue whether the failure to establish venue in the plea’s factual basis rendered the plea inaccurate.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court affirmed. It held that the statutory venue requirement in Minn. Stat. § 627.01 is not an element of any substantive offense. Therefore, the factual basis supporting a guilty plea need not establish venue to satisfy the accuracy requirement. The court emphasized that the “accuracy” requirement ensures substantive culpability—i.e., facts showing the defendant’s conduct falls within the charged crime—not compliance with procedural venue statutes. Because Paulson’s factual basis established the elements of kidnapping to facilitate a felony beyond dispute, the plea was accurate notwithstanding the absence of venue facts.

The court noted, but did not resolve, the burden-of-proof question for venue at trial (reasonable doubt versus preponderance), observing that it had previously left the issue open. It also observed that constitutional vicinage rights were not implicated because Paulson pleaded guilty before jury impanelment. The opinion expressly refrained from deciding when, or how, a defendant may assert statutory venue rights after trial has begun or following a plea.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents and Authorities Considered

The opinion carefully situates its holding within constitutional, statutory, and case law frameworks:

Due Process and elements: In re Winship requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the charged offense. The court underscored that if venue were an “element,” Winship would compel the State to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, and failure would require acquittal, not retrial.
Double Jeopardy: Burks v. United States and State v. Clark establish that when the State fails to prove an element, retrial is barred. Relying on Smith v. United States (2023), which held Double Jeopardy does not bar retrial for violations of the federal Venue/Vicinage Clauses, the court reasoned that venue violations do not negate substantive guilt—strong evidence that venue is not an “element.”
State v. Johnson (Minn. 2023): The court recently acknowledged it had not resolved the burden of proof for venue, sometimes assuming (without deciding) a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. That open question supports the conclusion that venue has not been treated as a substantive element in Minnesota.
Minnesota precedents cited by Paulson: The court distinguished State v. Giller (1917), State v. Heidelberg (1944), and State v. Timmens (1860), explaining these cases addressed where the offense occurred or statutory interpretation, not whether venue is an element. Giller was about constructive possession and the impermissibility of forum shopping; Heidelberg affirmed that evidence supported Hennepin County venue, without calling venue an element; Timmens involved crimes on a river boundary, sufficient to establish venue, again without elevating venue to an element.
Alford and plea accuracy jurisprudence: The court situated its analysis in Minnesota’s guilty-plea law—State v. Schwartz (valid plea must be accurate, voluntary, intelligent); State v. Ecker (accuracy protects against pleading to a more serious offense than evidence supports); State v. Theis and North Carolina v. Alford (permitting pleas based on acknowledged sufficiency of the State’s evidence). The court also reconciled phrasing in cases like Bonnell v. State and State v. Iverson, which speak in terms of “all elements,” by clarifying that the dispute here involves a non-element.
Additional authorities: State v. Ali (2011) (age for juvenile jurisdiction is not an element of homicide; an analogous distinction between guilt and jurisdictional or procedural facts); United States v. Miller (10th Cir. 1997) (courts treat venue differently from substantive elements).
Vicinage and waiver: The opinion reiterates that Minnesota’s Vicinage Clause guarantees a jury “of the county or district wherein the crime shall have been committed” but is not triggered until jury impanelment; it may also be waived, as discussed in State v. Fitch (2016). Because Paulson pleaded guilty, there was no vicinage issue.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in three steps:

First, it defines the accuracy requirement: a valid plea must be supported by a factual basis showing that the defendant’s conduct falls within the charged crime, thereby establishing substantive culpability. Accuracy is not a vehicle for litigating all procedural or statutory preconditions.
Second, it characterizes venue as non-substantive. Venue determines the forum, not guilt. A violation of Minn. Stat. § 627.01 does not negate the defendant’s underlying criminal conduct. That non-culpability nature aligns with Smith’s double jeopardy analysis: improper venue does not bar retrial because it does not reflect evidentiary failure on an element of guilt.
Third, it applies those principles to Paulson’s Alford plea. The prosecution’s proffer showed that Paulson removed and confined a 15-year-old without parental consent to facilitate a felony (second-degree controlled substance offense). Paulson personally acknowledged the State’s evidence created a substantial likelihood of conviction. Those facts satisfied the elements of kidnapping under Minn. Stat. § 609.25, subd. 1(2). Because venue is not part of those elements, its omission from the plea colloquy doesn’t render the plea inaccurate.

3) The Statutory and Constitutional Framework

Minn. Stat. § 627.01: Establishes the general rule that criminal cases are tried in the county where the offense was committed, defining that county to include any county where an element occurred or where property or services connected to the offense are located/performed. This statute governs forum selection, not culpability.
Minn. R. Crim. P. 24: Provides exceptions to the default venue rule; neither party argued an exception applied, and the court assumed none did. Defendants typically assert venue challenges via pretrial motion under Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.02.
Minn. Stat. § 627.15: A specialized venue provision for child-abuse-related offenses permitting prosecution either where the abuse occurred or where the child is found. It supported the trial court’s original ruling on the sex charges; but venue for the later-added kidnapping count was not litigated, and the Supreme Court did not opine on § 627.15’s reach.
Minnesota Constitution, art. I, § 6 (Vicinage Clause): Guarantees trial by jury of the county or district where the crime occurred. This right relates to jury composition and is implicated at jury impanelment; it can be waived and was not triggered here due to Paulson’s plea before any jury was seated.

4) Application to Paulson’s Alford Plea

The record established the essential elements of kidnapping to facilitate a felony: removal/confinement; lack of parental consent; and facilitation of a felony (second-degree controlled substance crime). Paulson conceded the State’s anticipated evidence would likely secure a conviction. Because venue is not an element of kidnapping, accuracy did not require proof that the offense occurred in Anoka County. The absence of venue facts in the plea colloquy therefore did not constitute a “manifest injustice” warranting plea withdrawal.

5) Impact and Practical Implications

The decision is narrowly framed but significant in practice:

Plea practice: Prosecutors and trial courts need not elicit venue facts during plea colloquies to satisfy plea accuracy. The focus remains on establishing the elements of the offense and the defendant’s acknowledgment that the State could prove those elements.
Defense strategy: Venue challenges must be raised by pretrial motion. Defendants cannot repackage a venue claim as a plea-accuracy challenge after pleading guilty. Counsel should evaluate venue early—particularly in multi-county fact patterns—and consider whether to seek dismissal or a change of venue before any plea.
Postconviction litigation: After Paulson, defendants seeking to withdraw pleas cannot invoke the absence of venue facts as proof of inaccuracy. Other gateways (e.g., voluntariness, intelligence, or other structural errors) remain unaffected. The opinion leaves open whether, and how, statutory venue claims may be asserted or preserved after trial begins or after a plea—issues for future cases.
Trials versus pleas: The court again declined to set the burden of proof for venue at trial (reasonable doubt vs. preponderance), keeping Johnson’s question open. Practitioners should continue to litigate that issue as appropriate at trial.
Constitution versus statute: Vicinage rights are distinct from statutory venue and were not implicated here due to the plea posture. When a jury is impaneled, vicinage must be respected or properly waived.
Remedial consequences: Echoing Smith, venue errors do not preclude retrial; they do not equate to evidentiary insufficiency on an element. Prosecutors and courts must still heed venue rules, but missteps will not necessarily produce an acquittal-bar under Double Jeopardy.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Element of the offense: A fact the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt to establish criminal guilt (e.g., for kidnapping to facilitate a felony: removal/confinement; lack of consent for a minor; purpose to facilitate a felony).
Venue: The statutorily proper county where the case should be tried; it concerns location of prosecution, not whether the defendant committed the crime.
Vicinage: A constitutional right to a jury drawn from the county or district where the crime occurred. It relates to jury composition, not mere courthouse location, and can be waived.
Plea “accuracy”: One of three requirements for a valid guilty plea (accuracy, voluntariness, intelligence). Accuracy requires a factual basis showing the defendant’s conduct fits the charged offense. It protects against overcharging and unjust convictions.
Alford plea: A guilty plea in which the defendant maintains innocence but admits the State’s evidence is likely sufficient to convict. Courts must ensure a strong factual basis demonstrating a substantial likelihood of conviction.
Double Jeopardy and venue: Failure to prove an element triggers acquittal and bars retrial. By contrast, venue error is procedural; it does not negate guilt, so retrial is generally permitted.

Unresolved Questions After Paulson

Burden of proof for venue at trial: The court again left open whether the State must prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance. Practitioners should preserve the issue via appropriate motions and jury instructions.
Post-plea or mid-trial assertion of statutory venue: The court noted it need not decide when a defendant may assert venue after trial begins; the same uncertainty likely extends to post-plea contexts. Future cases may define waiver, forfeiture, and remedies more precisely.
Scope of specialized venue statutes: The opinion did not reach whether Minn. Stat. § 627.15’s child-abuse venue flexibility applies to kidnapping-to-facilitate-felony charges. Cases involving cross-county conduct and multiple offenses will likely continue testing the reach of specialized venue provisions.

Conclusion

State v. Paulson squarely holds that Minnesota’s statutory venue rule is not an element of a crime. By tying the accuracy inquiry to substantive culpability—and by distinguishing venue as a procedural forum requirement—the court clarifies that a guilty plea’s factual basis need not contain venue facts to be valid. The opinion harmonizes Minnesota plea practice with broader constitutional principles reflected in Winship, Burks, and Smith, and it provides concrete guidance to trial courts, prosecutors, and defense counsel on how to structure plea colloquies and when to litigate venue.

Key takeaways:

Venue under Minn. Stat. § 627.01 is not an element; a plea’s factual basis need not establish venue for accuracy.
Accuracy turns on facts showing substantive culpability for the charged elements, not collateral procedural prerequisites.
Venue challenges should be raised by pretrial motion; they cannot be recast as accuracy defects post-plea.
The burden of proof for venue at trial remains unsettled in Minnesota.
Vicinage is distinct and was not implicated here; it relates to the jury and can be waived.

By decisively separating elements from venue, Paulson streamlines plea practice while preserving defendants’ ability to litigate venue at the correct procedural juncture. The ruling should reduce uncertainty in plea colloquies and focus litigants on early, targeted motions where venue is genuinely disputed.