Precedents and Authorities Cited and Their Influence

• United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984): Establishes the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The Court applied Leon’s framework and rejected two exceptions invoked by Vasquez: (3) an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause that reliance is unreasonable; and (4) a warrant so facially deficient that reliance is unreasonable. The Court concluded that because the issuing judge had been orally apprised that Vasquez displayed child pornography on his phone and photographed MV, it was objectively reasonable for officers to rely on the warrant’s validity.
• Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 13.1: Requires that a warrant be supported by an affidavit or recorded testimony under oath and describe with particularity the place and items. The Court acknowledged the affidavit’s deficiency but leaned on the issuing judge’s testimony about the pre-issuance oral briefing to support good-faith reliance. While it underscored that including such information in the affidavit would have been “better practice,” it held the totality supported reasonable reliance.
• Sims v. State, 356 Ark. 507, 157 S.W.3d 530 (2004) and Wagner v. State, 2010 Ark. 389, 368 S.W.3d 914: Confirm the de novo review of suppression decisions under the totality of circumstances and the judicial role of ensuring the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding probable cause.
• Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990): Cited for the proposition that child pornography is used by pedophiles to seduce children. The Court invoked Osborne to connect images on Vasquez’s phone to grooming conduct relevant to the rape investigation, strengthening both particularity and nexus.
• Evidence-law authorities:
  • Ark. R. Evid. 404(a)(1), 405: McClellan v. State, 264 Ark. 223, 570 S.W.2d 278 (1978), and federal Advisory Committee Notes explain that specific-instance proof is disfavored and generally restricted to when character is itself an essential element.
  • Ark. R. Evid. 608(b): Gustafson v. State, 267 Ark. 278, 590 S.W.2d 853 (1979), sets the three-part test: good faith, probative value on truthfulness outweighing prejudice, and relation to truthfulness. Rhodes v. State, 276 Ark. 203, 634 S.W.2d 107 (1982), emphasizes that the misconduct must be probative of truthfulness, not merely of bad character or violence.
  • Ark. R. Evid. 613: Governs impeachment by prior inconsistent statements and requires procedural safeguards, including identifying the inconsistency and affording an opportunity to explain or deny. Brigance v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 213, 548 S.W.3d 147, shows incorrect application can be an abuse of discretion.
  • Standards of review and discretion: Beard v. State, 2020 Ark. 62, 594 S.W.3d 29 (abuse of discretion standard and prejudice requirement); Lowery v. State, 2019 Ark. 332, 586 S.W.3d 644; McClanahan v. State, 2010 Ark. 39, 358 S.W.3d 900; Reeves v. State, 374 Ark. 415, 288 S.W.3d 577 (incorrect legal application equals abuse). The Court also invoked historic formulations that discretion is guided by law, not whim (Ex parte Batesville G B.R. Co., 39 Ark. 82 (1882); Overton v. Alston, 199 Ark. 96, 132 S.W.2d 834 (1939); Taylor v. State, 2024 Ark. 68).
  • Harmless-error doctrine: Lawson v. State, 2024 Ark. 143, 697 S.W.3d 529; Johnston v. State, 2014 Ark. 110, 431 S.W.3d 895; Buford v. State, 368 Ark. 87, 243 S.W.3d 300 (2006); Beard, supra. The Court synthesized these to hold the error “slight” in the face of “overwhelming” proof.
  • Contextual note: The Court flagged that the court of appeals’ earlier reversal in Vasquez’s first trial (limiting SANE testimony) had been overruled by Romick v. State, 2025 Ark. 57, 709 S.W.3d 816, thereby providing current doctrinal support for the SANE expert testimony given in this case.

Legal Reasoning

1) Suppression: Affidavit Deficiency, Oral Nexus, and Good Faith

The affidavit recited the officer’s experience, MV’s allegations of multiple deviate sexual acts, recovery of Vasquez’s phone, and a belief that the phone might contain digital evidence of the rapes. Missing, however, was a specific nexus tying the phone to the crimes. At the suppression hearing, the issuing judge testified that, prior to receiving the affidavit, the detective told him by phone that MV said Vasquez had photographed her with the phone and had shown her child pornography. That detail—absent from the affidavit—supplies a direct nexus.

Under Leon, the question is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the officers’ reliance on the warrant was objectively reasonable. The Court found it was. The issuing judge had contemporaneous oral knowledge of the critical facts; the affiant and executing officer did not mislead the judge; and there was no abandonment of judicial neutrality. Though the affidavit itself was “concededly deficient,” the combined circumstances supported good-faith reliance. The Court did not hold that unrecorded oral information satisfied Rule 13.1’s formal requirements for issuance; rather, it held that such information can support the Leon good-faith analysis when shown credibly after the fact.

On particularity, the warrant authorized searching the phone and seizing “any digital evidence related to the rape being investigated by the Paragould Police Department.” Given the judge’s and detective’s shared knowledge that MV reported being shown child pornography on the phone and being photographed, the category was not an open-ended license; it was tethered to the rape investigation, including grooming and corroborative evidence. Citing Osborne, the Court recognized child pornography as a grooming tool, further connecting the scope to the crime under investigation.

2) Evidentiary Rulings: Rules 404(a)(1), 608(b), and 613

The trial court permitted the State to cross-examine Vasquez about details from orders-of-protection proceedings with his girlfriend occurring over a year after the charged rapes. The Supreme Court held this was an abuse of discretion for three reasons:

• Rule 404(a)(1) / 405: The State used specific instances (alleged violent conduct) to imply a violent propensity. Vasquez did not place a pertinent character trait at issue, and violent character is not an element of rape; therefore, specific-instance proof was improper.
• Rule 608(b): The alleged acts (following, grabbing, smacking, threats) were not probative of truthfulness as Rule 608 requires. Gustafson’s test was not satisfied because the questions targeted bad acts of violence, not deceptive conduct.
• Rule 613: The State’s after-the-fact pivot to “prior inconsistent statements” did not satisfy Rule 613’s procedure. The prosecutor did not clearly identify an inconsistency or provide a proper opportunity to explain or deny before deploying extrinsic impeachment. The Court noted the trial court’s own uncertainty mid-examination—underscoring the misapplication of the rule.

3) Harmless Error: Overwhelming Evidence and Slight Error

Applying Lawson/Johnston, the Court concluded that the evidentiary error was harmless because (a) the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and (b) the error was slight. It emphasized:

• MV’s detailed testimony: She described multiple acts, including digital penetration, cunnilingus, penile penetration causing pain, and use of specific sex toys (purple vibrator and pink device)—with sensory detail.
• Corroboration from the scene and physical items: The purple vibrator was kept in a toolbox—precisely as MV stated—and Vasquez acknowledged storing it there. MV retrieved it immediately after disclosure. DNA swabs from the vibrator showed Vasquez as the major male contributor, consistent with MV’s account of his use of the device. The pink device carried Abigail’s DNA as the major female contributor; other contributors were inconclusive.
• Phone content: Images of a prepubescent female’s genitalia/buttocks were found on Vasquez’s phone, corroborating MV’s testimony that he showed her child pornography.
• Contextual corroboration and opportunity: MV routinely slept on a sectional sofa with Vasquez; her mother (Abigail) worked long hours and had drug-dependency issues, explaining lack of adult supervision. MV testified Vasquez used food and attention to entice her—consistent with grooming.
• Medical/expert testimony: SANE Nurse Smith testified that normal genital exams occur in approximately 90% of child-sex-abuse cases, penetration does not invariably destroy the hymen, vaginitis can be consistent with penetration, delayed disclosure is common, and grooming via attention and pornography is typical.
• Additional corroboration of predisposition and methods: A witness (Edwards) recalled Vasquez discussing ways to conceal child pornography on a phone, aligning with MV’s description of being shown such images.

The Court also noted that some “bad character” information reached the jury through Abigail (e.g., Vasquez once punched and broke her windshield) without objection, lessening any incremental prejudice from the improper orders-of-protection cross-examination. Given the gravity of the charged conduct, the relatively minor nature of the remote acts, and the weight of the corroborated trial evidence, the Court deemed the error slight.

4) The Dissent’s View

Chief Justice Baker agreed the evidentiary ruling was erroneous but disagreed that the error was harmless. Distinguishing Buford (eyewitnesses) and Johnston (semen and physical trauma) from this case, she stressed that there were no eyewitnesses and no decisive physical evidence of penetration here. She analogized to Beard, where the victims’ testimony alone (however graphic) did not render errors harmless in a credibility contest. In her view, DNA on a vibrator (which Vasquez admitted handling) and child-porn images on his phone do not corroborate rape per se. Because MV’s and Vasquez’s credibility were central, introducing unrelated, violent character insinuations via the orders-of-protection questioning substantially undermined his credibility and was not “slight.”

Impact and Forward-Looking Implications

A. Digital-Device Warrants and Oral Briefings

This decision materially develops Arkansas search-warrant jurisprudence in two ways:

• Good-faith reliance can rest on an unrecorded oral nexus known to the issuing judge: Even though Rule 13.1 contemplates affidavits or recorded testimony, the Court accepted the issuing judge’s testimony about a pre-issuance oral briefing to sustain Leon good faith. Practically, this broadens the safety net for officers relying on warrants when paperwork omits crucial facts but the magistrate contemporaneously knew them.
• Particularity in digital searches contextualized: A warrant authorizing seizure of “digital evidence related to the rape being investigated” is not a general warrant when the context (known to both officer and magistrate) ties the device to grooming and corroboration (child pornography shown to the victim and photographs of the victim). Expect prosecutors to invoke this rationale when articulating device-search scope in child-sex-abuse investigations.

That said, the Court called it the “better practice” to include the full nexus in the affidavit or recorded sworn testimony. Agencies should therefore continue to contemporaneously memorialize all essential facts in writing or recorded form to satisfy Rule 13.1 on the front end and avoid suppression litigation.

B. Character Impeachment: A Clear Warning

Trial courts and prosecutors received a pointed reminder:

• Rule 404(a)(1)/405: Do not use specific instances to imply a propensity unless character is a pertinent trait placed at issue by the accused or is an element of a charge/defense.
• Rule 608(b): Limit specific-instance impeachment to conduct probative of truthfulness (e.g., deceit, fraud), not violence or temper.
• Rule 613: Observe the procedural steps for prior inconsistent statements; identify the inconsistency and provide a fair chance to explain or deny before resorting to extrinsic proof.

Although the State prevailed here on harmless error, the Court’s analysis signals limited tolerance for character shortcuts. In closer cases, similar missteps could yield reversal.

C. Harmless Error in Child-Sex-Abuse Prosecutions

The opinion refines when “overwhelming” evidence exists beyond the victim’s testimony alone. Corroboration through digital artifacts (e.g., illicit images on a phone), physical items consistent with the account (e.g., identified sex toys with DNA), opportunity evidence, and expert context can collectively elevate proof to the “overwhelming” category, even absent eyewitnesses or classic biological evidence like semen or hymenal tearing. The dissent’s limiting view underscores that litigants should frame harmless-error arguments around the quality and directness of corroboration to the actus reus.

D. SANE Expert Testimony Post-Romick

Though not the direct holding here, the Court’s acceptance of SANE testimony about normal exam rates, delayed disclosure, and grooming aligns with Romick v. State’s overruling of earlier limits. Practitioners should expect such expert context to be admissible to dispel common misconceptions and to explain seeming “gaps” in physical findings.