Vanderlan v. Jackson HMA: Affirming Government’s Deference in Dismissing Qui Tam Actions under FCA §3730(c)(2)(A)

Introduction

Vanderlan v. Jackson HMA, decided April 18, 2025 by the Fifth Circuit, addresses the scope of the United States Government’s power under the False Claims Act (“FCA”) to dismiss privately-initiated (“qui tam”) suits. Dr. W. Blake Vanderlan sued his employer, Jackson HMA, L.L.C. (doing business as Central Mississippi Medical Center), alleging violations of the FCA. After a protracted six-and-a-half-year litigation, the Department of Justice moved under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) to dismiss Vanderlan’s claims, over his objection. Vanderlan insisted on an evidentiary hearing; the district court denied relief. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.

Key issues:

Does § 3730(c)(2)(A)’s requirement of “notice and an opportunity for a hearing” mandate a live, evidentiary hearing?
What standard of review applies to government motions to dismiss pre-answer under Rule 41(a)(1)?
Did the district court exceed its authority by granting the dismissal with prejudice as to the relator?

Parties:

Appellant/Relator: Dr. W. Blake Vanderlan
Appellee/Government: United States of America
Defendant: Jackson HMA, L.L.C. (Merit Health Central – Jackson)

Summary of the Judgment

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of the government’s § 3730(c)(2)(A) motion to dismiss Vanderlan’s FCA qui tam action with prejudice as to him (but without prejudice to the United States).

Major holdings:

Jurisdiction: The court has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because the government’s pre-answer dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) was with prejudice to Vanderlan and final.
No live evidentiary hearing required: § 3730(c)(2)(A) demands only a “hearing” on written submissions; the district court properly held multiple rounds of briefing and argument.
Deference to Rule 41(a)(1) dismissals: Pre-answer dismissals under Rule 41(a)(1) warrant even greater deference than post-answer dismissals under Rule 41(a)(2).
No error in statutory interpretation: The government’s interest in avoiding interference with an ongoing administrative settlement justifies dismissal; no further judicial inquiry was required.
Forfeiture of settlement-hearing argument: Vanderlan did not adequately press his § 3730(c)(2)(B) settlement-approval theory below, so that argument is forfeited.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1. United States ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources, Inc. 599 U.S. 419 (2023): Holding that government dismissals under § 3730(c)(2)(A) are governed by Rule 41 standards and require “substantial deference.” Polansky’s dictum clarified that pre-answer dismissals under Rule 41(a)(1) involve no adjudicatory role beyond considering constitutional constraints.

2. United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928 (2009): Establishing that qui tam relators are “statutorily designated agents of the United States” and that the government is the “real party in interest.”

3. McNinch & Rainwater (1958): Tracing the FCA’s origins to Civil War–era war‐contracting fraud and the need to “protect the funds and property of the Government.”

4. Credit Suisse AG, 117 F.4th 155 (4th Cir. 2024) and Brutus Trading, LLC, No. 20-2578, 2023 WL 5344973 (2d Cir. Aug. 21, 2023) (unpublished): Both circuits held that § 3730(c)(2)(A) “hearing” means a hearing on briefs; live evidence is not required.

5. Elbaor v. Tripath Imaging, Inc., 279 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 2002): Discussing Rule 41(a)(2) but held inapplicable to a Rule 41(a)(1) dismissal.

Legal Reasoning

The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning proceeds in four steps:

Appellate Jurisdiction: Under Rule 41(a)(1), a pre-answer dismissal is final if it is with prejudice to the relator. The government’s notice specified dismissal “with prejudice” as to Vanderlan, rendering the order appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Hearing Requirement: Neither § 3730(c)(2)(A) nor Rule 41(a)(1) mandates a live evidentiary hearing. The “hearing” requirement is satisfied by written submissions and argument, consistent with administrative‐law analogues and sister circuits’ holdings.
Deference to Pre-Answer Dismissals: Rule 41(a)(1) dismissals do not require a court order—they rest on the plaintiff’s or government’s notice. They merit greater deference than Rule 41(a)(2) dismissals because no adjudicatory threshold exists and the government is the real party in interest.
Proper Application of § 3730(c)(2)(A): The government demonstrated interference with administrative settlement negotiations and offered factual support (e.g., the Selden Letter). The district court, in substantial compliance with Rule 41 standards, reasonably concluded that dismissal served the Government’s interests.

Impact

The decision cements a uniform approach across circuits:

Pre-answer government dismissals under § 3730(c)(2)(A) and Rule 41(a)(1) require only a “hearing” on briefs, not a live evidentiary proceeding.
District courts must afford maximum deference to the government’s dismissal decisions, constrained only by a colorable due-process or equal-protection claim.
Relators face a high bar to challenge government dismissals—that threshold will be constitutional, not substantive or merit-based.

This ruling will likely accelerate the government’s ability to terminate unpromising or duplicative qui tam actions before significant litigation expense accrues.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Qui tam action: A lawsuit filed by a private individual (relator) on behalf of the United States to recover funds lost to fraud. The relator receives a share of any recovery, but the government controls the case.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A): The FCA provision allowing the government to dismiss a relator’s case—“notwithstanding the objections of the person initiating the action”—after notice and a hearing.
Rule 41(a)(1) vs. Rule 41(a)(2):
- (a)(1) permits pre-answer or pre-summary-judgment dismissals by notice, with no court order required.
- (a)(2) governs post-answer dismissals and requires a court order (and typically factors like prejudice to the non-movant).
“Hearing” under § 3730(c)(2)(A): Judicial consideration of written submissions and argument—no live testimony needed unless constitutionally required.
Substantial deference: A principle from Polansky directing courts to respect the government’s dismissal choice, absent a clear constitutional violation.

Conclusion

Vanderlan v. Jackson HMA clarifies and strengthens the government’s authority to terminate qui tam suits under the FCA. By confirming that § 3730(c)(2)(A) requires only a hearing on the briefs, and by emphasizing the paramount role of Rule 41(a)(1) dismissals, the Fifth Circuit aligned itself with sister circuits and Polansky’s directive for “substantial deference.” Relators must now overcome a formidable threshold if they wish to contest government dismissals—limited to exceptional constitutional claims. This decision will shape the early disposition of FCA litigation and reinforce the federal government’s control over private enforcement actions.