Validation of Mid-Deliberation Juror Substitution in North Carolina: Upholding the Twelve-Person Jury Requirement

Introduction

State of North Carolina v. Eric Ramond Chambers, decided May 23, 2025 by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, addressed a fundamental question arising from a first-degree murder and assault trial in Wake County: whether N.C.G.S. § 15A-1215(a), the statute authorizing substitution of an alternate juror after deliberations have begun (so long as the jury is instructed to restart its deliberations and no more than twelve jurors ever participate), violates Article I, Section 24 of the North Carolina Constitution, which guarantees conviction only by “the unanimous verdict of a jury in open court.” Defendant Chambers, self-represented and absent during key proceedings, did not object at trial to the replacement of Juror #5 by an alternate after deliberations had already commenced. After a unanimous Court of Appeals vacated the convictions—holding the mid-deliberation substitution effectively created a thirteen-member jury—the State sought discretionary review. The Supreme Court granted review to resolve two questions: waiver of the constitutional challenge and the statute’s constitutional validity.

Summary of the Judgment

Chief Justice Newby, writing for a 6–1 majority, reversed the Court of Appeals. The Court held:

Waiver: Although defendant failed to object at trial, challenges to the structure of a criminal jury (number and composition) are deemed preserved under Rule 10(a)(1) due to their constitutional significance.
Constitutionality of § 15A-1215(a): The statute does not violate Article I, Section 24. Its two built-in safeguards—the cap that “in no event shall more than [twelve] jurors participate” and the mandatory instruction to restart deliberations—ensure that the verdict is rendered by a constitutionally valid jury of twelve.
Reversal: Because the trial court properly instructed the jury to begin deliberations anew with the alternate in place, there was no constitutional violation; the Court of Appeals’ decision was reversed and the convictions reinstated.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

The Court’s analysis turned on decades of North Carolina precedent defining the jury’s “essential attributes” under Article I, Section 24: number, impartiality, and unanimity. Key cases included:

Whitehurst v. Davis (1800): Per curiam, new trial required where thirteen persons participated in verdict, stressing that even slight departures from the “ancient mode” imperil the jury institution.
State v. Dalton (1934): Held constitutional a statute allowing alternates to replace a juror before final submission because the alternate then fully participates in deliberations, preserving the twelve-person requirement.
State v. Bindyke (1975): Recognized “fundamental irregularity of constitutional proportions” where an alternate is present in the jury room during deliberations, requiring reversal per se.
State v. Bunning (1997): Substitution of an alternate during sentencing deliberations in a capital case was reversible error because it resulted in more than twelve persons participating in the verdict.

These decisions establish a clear rule: a jury’s verdict must come exclusively from the twelve duly impaneled jurors whose unanimous agreement determines guilt or innocence.

2. Legal Reasoning

The Court applied the de novo standard to constitutional questions. It first resolved waiver by recognizing structural defects in jury composition as non-waivable under Rule 10(a)(1), citing Bindyke and Bunning for the proposition that jury-structure errors demand automatic review.

Turning to § 15A-1215(a), the Court presumed the statute’s constitutionality. It then identified the statute’s two critical safeguards:

Numerical Cap: “In no event shall more than [twelve] jurors participate in the jury’s deliberations.”
Restart Instruction: A mandatory order that, upon substitution, the jury “begin its deliberations anew,” wiping the slate clean of any discussion in which the excused juror took part.

Because a jury is presumed to follow its instructions (State v. Prevatte, 2002), the Court concluded the “restart” command effectively neutralizes any risk of a thirteen-person verdict: all deliberations resume with precisely twelve jurors (the original eleven and the new alternate) from square one. Under this reading, § 15A-1215(a) aligns with the constitutional mandate for a twelve-person unanimous verdict.

3. Impact

By upholding mid-deliberation substitution with restart instructions, the decision:

Preserves trial efficiency and flexibility by allowing alternates to step in at any point pre-verdict, reducing mistrials caused by juror illness or unavailability.
Clarifies that structural jury rights are automatically reviewable, reaffirming defendants’ protections under Article I, Section 24.
Limits the reach of Bunning to cases where no statutory mechanism—like the “restart” requirement—exists, distinguishing capital sentencing juries and older statutes.

Future trial courts will now have clear guidance on handling alternate substitutions without risking constitutional infirmities, and appellate courts will apply this two-prong statute-plus-instruction test in analogous disputes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Structural Error: A defect so fundamental (e.g., wrong number of jurors) that it cannot be cured by harmless-error review or retrial on the record; it requires automatic reversal.
De Novo Review: Courts re-examine legal issues (like constitutional questions) from scratch, giving no deference to lower-court conclusions.
Presumption of Instruction Compliance: The legal principle that jurors are presumed to obey the judge’s instructions, allowing courts to assume they properly restarted deliberations.
Alternate Juror: A backup juror sworn in alongside the regular panel, who may replace a regular juror under specified conditions.

Conclusion

State v. Chambers establishes a new, binding precedent in North Carolina: statutes permitting mid-deliberation juror substitutions are constitutional so long as (1) no more than twelve jurors ever deliberate and (2) the jury is expressly instructed to restart deliberations from square one. This decision reconciles modern trial exigencies with the centuries-old guarantee of a twelve-person unanimous jury under Article I, Section 24. By delineating clear, workable safeguards, the Court ensures that the “ancient mode” of jury trial remains inviolate while accommodating practical needs in today’s courts.