Validating Pandemic-Related and Pretrial Motions Delays Under the Sixth Amendment: United States v. Murdaugh

Introduction

In United States v. Carl Murdaugh (No. 23-4472, 4th Cir. April 8, 2025), the Fourth Circuit clarified how the Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial guarantee applies when prolonged pretrial delays arise from a public-health emergency, counsel substitutions, judicial turnover, and late-filed pretrial motions.

Background:

• Parties: Defendant–Appellant Carl William Murdaugh (“Murdaugh”) vs. United States of America.
• Charges: Multi-state drug trafficking conspiracy (52-count federal indictment) and related state charges.
• Procedural Posture: Murdaugh remained on bond for state charges in mid-2019, was federally indicted, then taken into custody after a fatal DUI arrest in November 2020. He pleaded guilty in January 2023 to conspiracy to possess heroin with intent to distribute and appealed on speedy trial grounds.
• Key Issue: Whether nearly three and a half years of pretrial delay violated Murdaugh’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.

Summary of the Judgment

The Fourth Circuit, in an unpublished per curiam opinion, applied the four-factor Barker v. Wingo framework and held:

1. Length of Delay: The 3½-year interval was presumptively prejudicial.
2. Reason for Delay: Valid reasons included: COVID-19 jury-trial suspensions under district court standing orders; multiple defense counsel substitutions and the retirement of the original presiding judge; late suppression and dismissal motions requiring transcript preparation.
3. Assertion of Right: Murdaugh invoked his speedy trial claim belatedly—over two years after indictment and almost a year after arraignment—diminishing the weight of this factor.
4. Prejudice to Defendant: Murdaugh failed to show oppressive incarceration, anxiety beyond ordinary, or impairment of his defense; mere length of detention was insufficient.

Balancing these factors, the court concluded no Sixth Amendment violation occurred and affirmed the conviction.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

• Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972): Established the four-factor speedy trial test (length of delay, reason, defendant’s assertion, prejudice).
• United States v. Woolfolk, 399 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 2005): Threshold for presumptively prejudicial delay.
• United States v. Hall, 551 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 2009): Requirement to balance the four Barker factors.
• United States v. Pair, 84 F.4th 577 (4th Cir. 2023): COVID-19 delays recognized as valid reasons and treated under factor two.
• United States v. Villa, 70 F.4th 704 (4th Cir. 2023): Measuring delay from first indictment when later indictments build on initial charges.
• United States v. Robinson, 55 F.4th 390 (4th Cir. 2022): De novo review and timeliness of asserting the right.
• United States v. Eccleston, 615 F. App’x 767 (4th Cir. 2015): Pretrial motions on the eve of trial justify delay under factor two.
• United States v. Grimmond, 137 F.3d 823 (4th Cir. 1998): Defining prejudice sub-categories.
• Ricon v. Garrison, 517 F.2d 628 (4th Cir. 1975): Emphasizing impairment of defense as most serious prejudice.
• United States v. Shealey, 641 F.3d 627 (4th Cir. 2011): Requiring specific showing of oppressive incarceration.

2. Legal Reasoning

Applying Barker, the Fourth Circuit conducted a “functional” inquiry:

1. Length of Delay: The near three-and-a-half-year delay crossed the presumptive threshold (Woolfolk), conceding factor one in Murdaugh’s favor.
2. Reason for Delay: The court cataloged valid justifications:
   • Public-health restrictions suspended jury trials for 21 months (Pair).
   • Delays in discovery review due to pandemic protocols at Murdaugh’s detention facility.
   • Counsel substitutions and judicial retirement requiring re-familiarization.
   • Late-filed suppression and Speedy Trial Act motions on the eve of trial necessitating transcript work (Eccleston).
   Collectively, these reasons outweighed any improper delay.
3. Assertion of Right: Murdaugh waited 27 months after indictment and 11 months post-arraignment to assert the right. The court found this untimely (Robinson).
4. Prejudice: Murdaugh provided no specific evidence of oppressive detention conditions, heightened anxiety, or defense impairment. Generalized detention claims failed under Shealey and Ricon.

On balance, factors two through four tipped decisively toward the government, negating a constitutional violation.

3. Impact

United States v. Murdaugh carries several important consequences:

• It reaffirms that pandemic-related standing orders and public-health crises can constitute valid reasons for delay under Barker factor two.
• It underscores the necessity for defendants to invoke their speedy trial rights promptly and vigorously at early proceedings.
• It clarifies that mere length of detention, without evidence of oppressive conditions or demonstrable prejudice to defense, will not suffice to establish constitutional harm.
• It limits Sixth Amendment challenges in multi-defendant and complex-discovery cases where defendant-led continuances and counsel turnover contribute to delay.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Barker v. Wingo Framework: The Supreme Court requires balancing four factors to decide if a trial delay is unconstitutional:

1. Length of Delay – How long did the defendant wait?
2. Reason for Delay – Were the delays the government’s fault, or justified?
3. Assertion of Right – Did the defendant demand a speedy trial promptly?
4. Prejudice – Did the delay hurt the defendant’s case, cause oppressive detention, or undue stress?

Presumptively Prejudicial Delay: A delay that crosses a certain length (typically a year or more) “triggers” the Barker analysis—it doesn’t automatically violate the Constitution, but it requires closer scrutiny.

Conclusion

United States v. Murdaugh confirms that when a global pandemic, coordinated continuances, counsel withdrawals, judicial turnover, and late pretrial motions collectively prolong a case, those factors can legitimately justify delay and defeat a Sixth Amendment speedy-trial claim absent concrete prejudice. Defendants must assert their rights early, and mere passage of time, without oppressive conditions or proven impairment of defense, will not suffice for constitutional relief. This decision will guide courts in assessing speedy trial claims in the context of public emergencies and complex multi-defendant litigation.