Vacated-Precedent Reliance Is Not Remandable Error When the BIA Affirms on Independent, Dispositive Grounds and the Petitioner Waives Merits

I. Introduction

In Brenda Organiz-Perez De Lorenzo v. Pamela J. Bondi, No. 23-2767 (7th Cir. Jan. 12, 2026) (nonprecedential), the Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review challenging the denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).

The petitioners are Brenda Beatriz Organiz-Perez De Lorenzo and her two minor children (as riders on her application), all citizens of Guatemala. The respondent is the Attorney General of the United States. The case arose from removal proceedings initiated after petitioners entered the United States without admission or parole, rendering them removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).

The central appellate issue was procedural and legal: the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) cited a then-controlling Attorney General decision on “particular social group” that was later vacated while the case was pending before the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”). Organiz-Perez De Lorenzo argued this intervening change required remand. The Seventh Circuit rejected that argument because the BIA affirmed on independent, dispositive grounds without relying on the vacated authority—and because the petitioner did not challenge those dispositive grounds on appeal, thereby waiving them.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit reviewed both the IJ and BIA decisions because the BIA adopted and affirmed while adding analysis. It held that any change in law concerning “particular social group” did not warrant remand because the denial rested on multiple alternative grounds that independently defeated relief, including (as characterized by the IJ and unchallenged on appeal): (1) lack of a nexus between the threats and a protected ground, (2) failure to show the Guatemalan government was unwilling or unable to protect, and (3) failure to show internal relocation within Guatemala would be unreasonable; the IJ also found the threats did not rise to persecution.

The court further held that because Organiz-Perez De Lorenzo did not substantively contest these dispositive findings in her opening brief, she waived them, foreclosing appellate relief.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Scope and standards of review

• Osorio-Morales v. Garland, 72 F.4th 738, 741–42 (7th Cir. 2023): Cited for (a) reviewing both IJ and BIA when the BIA adopts and affirms with added analysis, and (b) the proposition that it can be reasonable to expect asylum seekers to seek assistance from authorities before concluding the government is unable or unwilling to protect them.
• Mateo-Mateo v. Garland, 124 F.4th 470, 474 (7th Cir. 2024): Cited for the asylum burden framework under the INA and for the “unable or unwilling to control” requirement when persecution is by private actors.

2. The “nexus” requirement for asylum/withholding

• de Paz-Peraza v. Bondi, 140 F.4th 390, 394 (7th Cir. 2025): Cited to describe “nexus” as the requirement that persecution be “on account of” membership in the proffered group.
• Granados Arias v. Garland, 69 F.4th 454, 462 (7th Cir. 2023): Cited for the nexus formulation and the need to show persecution is based on membership in the identified social group.
• Melnik v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 278, 285 (7th Cir. 2018): Quoted (via Granados Arias) for the proposition that the fear of persecution must be based on membership in the social group.

3. Relationship between asylum and withholding

• Martinez-Martinez v. Bondi, 147 F.4th 831, 835 (7th Cir. 2025): Cited for the shared protected grounds between asylum and statutory withholding under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A), while noting withholding has a more stringent future-persecution standard.

4. CAT legal framework

• Mabuneza v. Garland, 16 F.4th 1222, 1225 (7th Cir. 2021): Cited for the CAT standard: more likely than not the applicant would be tortured if removed (referencing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2)).
• Orellana-Arias v. Sessions, 865 F.3d 476, 489 (7th Cir. 2017): Cited for the requirement to address regulatory CAT factors, consistent with 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3)(i)-(iv).
• Singh v. Bondi, 141 F.4th 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2025): Cited for the proposition that CAT eligibility requires inability to reasonably relocate within the country of nationality.
• Herrera-Garcia v. Barr, 918 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2019): Cited for the requirement (when harm is by private actors) to show government “acquiesce[d]” in torture.

5. Attorney General/BIA social-group authorities and the “intervening law” argument

• Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018) (“Matter of A-B- I”): The IJ cited this when concluding the proposed social group was not cognizable.
• Matter of A-B-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 307 (A.G. 2021): Cited as the intervening change vacating the earlier framework during the pendency of the appeal to the BIA.
• Matter of S-S-F-M-, 29 I. & N. Dec. 207 (A.G. 2025): Noted by the court as later overruling Matter of A-B- and reinstating the prior framework—though the court treated this as ultimately immaterial because other flaws were dispositive.

6. Appellate disposition: harmless reliance/alternative grounds and waiver

• Draganova v. INS, 82 F.3d 716, 720 (7th Cir. 1996): Cited for affirmance where dispositive issues support the result without reliance on the flawed portion of the reasoning—i.e., the BIA may affirm if the outcome is legally sound on independent grounds.
• Cui v. Garland, 71 F.4th 592, 598 (7th Cir. 2023): Cited for the proposition that failure to establish asylum eligibility defeats the remaining claims (as framed by the court here).
• Gulomjonov v. Bondi, 131 F.4th 601, 612 (7th Cir. 2025): Cited for waiver where arguments are perfunctory.
• White v. United States, 8 F.4th 547, 552 (7th Cir. 2021): Cited for the general appellate rule: failure to raise an argument in the opening brief waives/abandons it.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The court’s treatment of the “intervening change in law” claim

The petitioner’s main theory was that remand was required because the IJ relied on a “particular social group” decision later vacated. The Seventh Circuit did not decide whether the IJ’s social-group analysis was wrong under the intervening authority because the BIA expressly stated it did “not rely upon” the vacated decision and affirmed on other grounds. That framing mattered: if the agency decision under review rests on independent, adequate grounds, an error in one component does not necessitate remand when the outcome is otherwise legally supported. The court anchored this approach in Draganova v. INS.

2. Dispositive, unchallenged grounds: nexus, government protection, and relocation

Even assuming the proposed social group (“women, a single mother, with a husband who is living in the United States and is wealthy by Guatemalan standards”) were cognizable, the IJ found no nexus: the caller targeted her for perceived money rather than animus tied to a protected ground. The Seventh Circuit emphasized that Organiz-Perez De Lorenzo did not challenge the nexus finding on appeal.

The court also noted she did not challenge other independently sufficient reasons for denial, including the finding that she did not seek police help (undermining “unable or unwilling to protect”) and the finding that she did not show internal relocation would be unreasonable (a requirement relevant to asylum and CAT, see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3)(i) and Singh v. Bondi). Because these alternative grounds were dispositive and unchallenged, the court held remand would not change the outcome.

3. Waiver as an independent barrier to relief

The opinion treats waiver as a separate, sufficient basis to deny the petition for review: by not contesting the core factual and legal findings, the petitioner left the court with no properly presented basis to disturb the agency decision. The court invoked Gulomjonov v. Bondi (perfunctory arguments) and White v. United States (opening-brief omission). This waiver analysis reinforces a practical appellate lesson: a legal change affecting one element (here, social-group cognizability) will not matter if the petitioner fails to brief other essential elements that independently defeat the claim.

4. Why asylum’s failure carried the remaining claims (as framed by this opinion)

The court concluded that because Organiz-Perez De Lorenzo “cannot establish eligibility for asylum, her remaining claims” fail as well, citing Cui v. Garland. In the structure of this case, that conclusion reflects that the same unchallenged defects (e.g., no nexus; inability/unwillingness; relocation) also foreclosed withholding and CAT as litigated here.

C. Impact

Although designated a NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION, the decision is instructive in three recurring contexts:

1. Intervening authority and “harmless error” in agency reasoning: Even if an IJ relies on authority later vacated, remand is unlikely where the BIA affirms on independent, dispositive grounds and expressly disclaims reliance on the flawed authority.
2. Nexus remains a common bottleneck for social-group claims: The opinion underscores that social-group definitional debates may be beside the point when the record supports a finding that the motive was financial (extortion) rather than “on account of” a protected ground.
3. Appellate briefing discipline (waiver): Petitioners must directly challenge each dispositive ground. An argument focused narrowly on one doctrinal development (e.g., particular social group) may fail if the agency also relied on unchallenged findings such as lack of nexus, failure to seek protection, or availability of internal relocation.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Particular social group”: A protected category under asylum law. Applicants often propose a group defined by shared characteristics (e.g., gender, family status, relationships). The legal debate can concern whether the group is legally “cognizable” under evolving administrative precedent.
• “Nexus” (“on account of”): Even if harm is serious, asylum requires proof that the harm occurred (or will occur) because of a protected ground (race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or particular social group). Targeting for money alone typically fails nexus.
• “Unable or unwilling to protect”: When the persecutor is a private actor, the applicant must show the home government cannot or will not provide protection. The Seventh Circuit has deemed it often reasonable to expect attempts to seek police help before concluding the government cannot help (as noted here via Osorio-Morales v. Garland).
• “Internal relocation”: Relief may be denied if the applicant can reasonably avoid harm by moving to another part of the country (see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3)(i); CAT analysis similarly considers relocation in this circuit’s case law).
• CAT “acquiescence”: For torture by private actors, CAT generally requires showing that public officials would acquiesce (i.e., consent or turn a blind eye), referenced here through Herrera-Garcia v. Barr.
• “Waiver” on appeal: If a party does not raise and argue an issue in the opening brief, the appellate court treats it as abandoned and will not consider it (as applied here via White v. United States and Gulomjonov v. Bondi).

V. Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s decision turns less on the shifting landscape of “particular social group” doctrine and more on appellate fundamentals: (1) the BIA can affirm without remand where it does not rely on vacated authority and other independent grounds are dispositive (consistent with Draganova v. INS), and (2) a petitioner’s failure to challenge those grounds results in waiver. The case highlights that intervening changes in immigration doctrine will not aid a petitioner who does not contest the core elements of asylum, withholding, and CAT—especially nexus, inability/unwillingness of government protection, and internal relocation.