Introduction

This decision is the Utah Supreme Court’s first comprehensive interpretation of the state’s Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA), Utah’s anti-SLAPP regime enacted in 2023. The dispute arose after a parent, Jason Krause, raised concerns at a public charter school board meeting and to administrators about a teacher, Stuart Mackey, allegedly engaging in inappropriate and physically abusive conduct with students. Mackey sued for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), abuse of process, and intentional interference with economic relations (tortious interference).

Krause moved to dismiss under UPEPA’s special motion for expedited relief. The district court denied the motion, holding UPEPA inapplicable and, alternatively, finding that Mackey had established prima facie cases on all claims. On direct appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reverses in part, vacates in part, and remands — announcing key statewide precedents about what “public concern” means under UPEPA, how courts should treat inferences on these motions, and what plaintiffs must prove at the prima facie stage, including the critical requirement to make a prima facie showing that the allegedly defamatory statements are not privileged.

At the same time, the Court makes clear that not every tort attached to a defamation suit survives early scrutiny: Mackey’s IIED and abuse-of-process claims fail as a matter of law on UPEPA review, while defamation and tortious interference survive only to the extent the plaintiff can, on remand, make a prima facie showing that no applicable privilege protects the speech at issue.

Summary of the Judgment

• UPEPA applies. The Court holds that Krause’s speech — a parent’s reporting of alleged student mistreatment by a public-school teacher during a school board public comment session and to administrators — is speech “on a matter of public concern.” It adopts the U.S. Supreme Court’s Snyder v. Phelps definition and “content, form, and context” test.
• Inference standard under UPEPA. Courts should review the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, consistent with Rule 56 practice, except that in defamation cases courts independently decide whether statements are capable of a defamatory meaning without drawing inferences favoring a defamatory reading.
• Three-step UPEPA framework reaffirmed. (1) Moving party shows UPEPA applies; (2) plaintiff must establish a prima facie case for each essential element; (3) defendant can still prevail by showing failure to state a claim or no genuine issues of material fact.
• Defamation claim. The Court holds Mackey made a prima facie showing on publication, falsity, fault (negligence, as private figure), and damages. But it vacates and remands because Mackey must also make a prima facie showing that no applicable privilege protects Krause’s speech — a burden the district court misallocated to the defendant.
• Tortious interference. This claim rises or falls with defamation because “improper means” can be satisfied by defamation. It is remanded for the same privilege analysis.
• IIED and abuse of process. Both claims fail at the prima facie stage. The alleged conduct is not “atrocious and utterly intolerable,” and Mackey failed to show the “willful act” element independent of process.
• Fees and costs. On remand, the district court must award costs, reasonable attorney fees, and reasonable litigation expenses related to the motion, consistent with UPEPA.

Key Issues and Holdings

• What qualifies as a “matter of public concern” under UPEPA? The Court adopts Snyder v. Phelps: a matter “of political, social, or other concern to the community” and of legitimate news interest; use content-form-context analysis.
• What is the inference standard on UPEPA motions? Same as summary judgment: view facts and reasonable inferences for the nonmovant, except for the specialized defamation-capable-of-defamatory-meaning inquiry.
• What must a defamation plaintiff show at the UPEPA prima facie stage? Every essential element, including lack of privilege once raised — even though lack of privilege is not a pleading requirement on the complaint.
• Are IIED and abuse-of-process viable add-ons in anti-SLAPP contexts? Not here: Mackey failed to cross the “outrageousness” threshold for IIED and could not show the distinct “willful act” independent of process for abuse of process.

Analysis

A. The UPEPA Framework Clarified and Applied

UPEPA authorizes a special motion for expedited relief to strike claims arising from protected activity, defined to include communications in or regarding governmental proceedings and speech on matters of public concern. The statute is to be “broadly construed” to protect expressive rights. The Court distills a three-step test (UTAH CODE § 78B-25-107(1)):

1. Applicability. Defendant must show the claim targets protected activity (UTAH CODE § 78B-25-102(2)).
2. Plaintiff’s prima facie burden. Plaintiff must present “some competent evidence” on each essential element of the claim (Winegar v. Slim Olson; Burton v. Youngblood), including lack of privilege once privilege is raised.
3. Defendant’s backstop. Even if plaintiff makes a prima facie showing, the defendant can prevail by showing failure to state a claim or no genuine issues of material fact (akin to Rule 12/56 standards).

On step one, the Court holds that a parent’s school-board comments and related reports to administrators about alleged student abuse by a public teacher plainly relate to a matter of public concern under Snyder v. Phelps. Using Snyder’s content-form-context approach, the Court rejects a narrower California articulation requiring that speech “contribute to the public debate” (Wilbanks v. Wolk). The Court’s reasoning reflects UPEPA’s broad-protection directive and aligns with Washington’s treatment of the uniform act (M.G. v. Bainbridge Island School District #303).

On the inference standard, the Court clarifies that UPEPA’s instruction to consider material “that could be considered” on a Rule 56 motion (UTAH CODE § 78B-25-106) does not alter Utah’s default approach: courts view facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant. The one carve-out tracks earlier defamation doctrine: courts independently decide whether statements are capable of defamatory meaning, without indulging inferences favoring a defamatory reading (Jacob v. Bezzant).

B. Defamation: Elements Met at a Prima Facie Level Except for Privilege

Utah defamation requires showing publication of statements “concerning” the plaintiff; falsity; that the statements are defamatory; lack of privilege; fault; and damages (West v. Thomson Newspapers; Mathews v. McCown). The Court holds Mackey carried his prima facie burden on four elements and clarifies two important doctrinal points.

1. Publication “concerning” Mackey

Even though Krause did not name Mackey at the school board meeting, post-meeting context tied the remarks to him: the superintendent learned three days later that Mackey was the subject (Pratt v. Nelson permits identification by extrinsic facts showing an “ascertainable person”). That suffices at the prima facie stage.

2. Falsity and substantial truth

Viewing the record in Mackey’s favor, the Lehi Police and DCFS investigations are prima facie evidence the reported incidents were not substantially true. Witness accounts suggested an accidental rock drop rather than an intentional throw, and the student who allegedly was thrown across desks reported losing balance after a joking head rub. Substantial truth is a robust defense (Davidson v. Baird; Bustos), but at this stage Mackey offered enough to proceed.

3. Fault standard and plaintiff status

The Court treats Mackey as a private plaintiff; thus he need only show negligence (Seegmiller; Ferguson v. Williams & Hunt). Evidence suggesting Krause aired serious allegations based largely on his daughter’s reports — with disputed “interview” corroboration — supports a prima facie showing that he failed to exercise reasonable care in verification.

4. Damages

Temporal proximity between the board meeting, immediate administrative actions, termination within days, and ensuing police/DCFS investigations supports a prima facie showing of causation and harm. Although UMA had earlier warned Mackey about conduct, the sequence and administrative reliance on the allegations suffice at this threshold stage.

5. The pivotal privilege ruling

This is the decision’s most significant statewide clarification. While lack of privilege is not a pleading requirement, once privilege is raised, plaintiffs bear the ultimate burden to prove lack of privilege in defamation (Mathews v. McCown). Translating that rule to UPEPA’s prima facie framework, the Court holds that a plaintiff must present prima facie evidence that the statements are unprivileged or that any conditional privilege was abused. The district court erroneously placed this burden on the defendant and truncated its privilege analysis. The case is remanded to determine whether Mackey can meet the prima facie “lack of privilege” element. Potentially implicated privileges (for the trial court to analyze on remand) may include:

• Legislative/official proceeding privileges for statements in quasi-legislative bodies like public school boards;
• Common-interest or public-interest conditional privileges for reports to school officials, law enforcement, and child protection authorities;
• Abuse of privilege via malice, reckless disregard, or excessive publication.

6. “Defamatory” as an element clarified

To remove confusion in the case law, the Court expressly confirms that “defamatory” is indeed a required element a plaintiff must prove.

C. IIED: The “Outrageousness” Threshold Not Met

IIED under Utah law requires conduct intended to cause severe emotional distress (or with knowledge it would result) and that is “outrageous and intolerable,” meaning “atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community” (Samms v. Eccles; Retherford v. AT&T; Prince v. Bear River; Restatement (Second) § 46). Even accepting that Krause used inflammatory language and sought retribution, his acts — compiling notes, criticizing a teacher at a board meeting, and reporting alleged incidents to officials — do not clear Utah’s extraordinarily high bar. The Court distinguishes sustained campaigns of harassment or eviction-like abuses (Retherford; Cabaness; Pentecost) and cites analogous decisions refusing to treat false reports to authorities as “outrageous” (Dennis v. DeJong; Lyles v. Micenko). The IIED claim should have been dismissed under UPEPA at step two.

D. Abuse of Process: Missing the Required “Willful Act” Beyond Process

Abuse of process demands both an ulterior purpose and a “willful act in the use of process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding” — conduct independent of legal process itself that corroborates the improper purpose (Hatch v. Davis; Crease; Restatement (Second) § 682). The Court warns against the “conceptual trap” of equating the allegedly improper motive with the process used. Here, even assuming that a school board public comment forum, a police report, or a report triggering DCFS review are “processes,” Mackey identified no distinct, corroborating willful act like the leveraging conduct in Templeton Feed & Grain (seizing turkeys at Thanksgiving to coerce payment). The abuse-of-process claim thus fails at the prima facie step.

E. Tortious Interference: Tracking Defamation via “Improper Means”

Tortious interference requires intentional interference with economic relations by improper purpose or improper means causing injury (Giusti; C.R. England). Defamation can supply “improper means” (Ferguson). As a result, this claim’s fate is tethered to defamation on remand: if the defamation claim survives privilege analysis at the prima facie stage, so may the interference claim; if privilege applies, both claims falter.

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1) U.S. Supreme Court and Other Jurisdictions

• Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011): Adopted as Utah’s standard for “matter of public concern” — speech relating to political, social, or other community concerns and of legitimate news interest; courts analyze content, form, and context.
• M.G. v. Bainbridge Island School District #303 (Wash. Ct. App. 2025): Persuasive authority applying Snyder’s “public concern” definition under Washington’s UPEPA analog — supports Utah’s alignment with the uniform act’s approach.
• Wilbanks v. Wolk (Cal. Ct. App. 2004): The district court borrowed a narrower California “contribution to public debate” gloss; the Utah Supreme Court rejected it in favor of Snyder’s broader standard.
• Templeton Feed & Grain v. Ralston Purina (Cal. 1968): Shows what qualifies as the necessary distinct “willful act” in abuse of process — coercive acts beyond mere use of process — and informs Utah’s insistence on that element (via Hatch).
• Dennis v. DeJong (E.D. Pa. 2013); Lyles v. Micenko (D.D.C. 2005): Persuasive federal cases concluding that even false reports to authorities typically do not constitute the “outrageous” conduct needed for IIED.

2) Utah Defamation, Privilege, and Burden Rules

• West v. Thomson Newspapers (Utah 1994); Mathews v. McCown (Utah 2025): Elements of defamation; Mathews clarifies that lack of privilege is the plaintiff’s ultimate burden when privilege is raised — a clarification UPEPA now operationalizes at the prima facie stage.
• Pratt v. Nelson (Utah 2007): “Of and concerning” can be shown by extrinsic facts demonstrating an ascertainable person, even without expressly naming the plaintiff.
• Jacob v. Bezzant (Utah 2009): Courts do not draw inferences favoring a defamatory meaning when deciding if statements are capable of a defamatory meaning — a narrow carve-out from the general inference rule.
• Seegmiller v. KSL (Utah 1981); Ferguson v. Williams & Hunt (Utah 2009); O’Connor v. Burningham (Utah 2007): Private-figure standard (negligence) where speech concerns public matters; public figures must prove actual malice (New York Times v. Sullivan).
• Winegar v. Slim Olson (Utah 1953); Burton v. Youngblood (Utah 1985): “Prima facie” means competent evidence on each element — the yardstick UPEPA adopts in step two.

3) Utah IIED and Abuse-of-Process Doctrine

• Samms v. Eccles (Utah 1961); Retherford v. AT&T (Utah 1992); Cabaness v. Thomas (Utah 2010); Pentecost v. Harward (Utah 1985): Together set Utah’s very high “outrageousness” threshold; the Court reaffirms that mere malice, exaggeration, or even false reporting rarely suffices without egregious, sustained abuse.
• Hatch v. Davis (Utah 2006); Crease v. Pleasant Grove City (Utah 1974): Abuse of process needs both an ulterior purpose and a distinct willful act beyond the process itself; the opinion relies heavily on Hatch to reject Mackey’s claim.

4) Utah Tortious Interference

• Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth (Utah 2009); C.R. England v. Swift (Utah 2019): Elements and definition of “improper means.”
• Ferguson v. Williams & Hunt (Utah 2009): Confirms defamation can constitute improper means — linking the interference claim to the fate of defamation here.

Impact and Practical Significance

1) A statewide template for UPEPA litigation

• Public concern standard settled. Utah adopts Snyder’s broad test, ensuring that speech addressing alleged misconduct by public-school personnel will typically qualify as “public concern.” This eases step-one applicability showings for defendants in civic and school-governance contexts.
• Inference rule clarified. Courts should continue applying the Rule 56-style approach on UPEPA motions, protecting nonmovants with favorable inferences except for the narrow “defamatory meaning” determination.
• Prima facie “lack of privilege” now explicit. Plaintiffs cannot survive UPEPA merely by pleading defamation; where privilege is raised, they must present evidence that the speech falls outside absolute/conditional privileges or that any conditional privilege was abused. This is a central, new procedural discipline in Utah’s anti-SLAPP practice.
• Reduced traction for “add-on” torts. IIED and abuse-of-process claims — often appended to defamation to raise settlement pressure — will face exacting scrutiny under UPEPA. Without egregious facts, these claims will be pruned early.
• Fee-shifting bite. UPEPA’s mandatory fee and expense award “related to the motion” will increasingly deter weak suits targeting protected speech and encourage early anti-SLAPP motions where the statute applies.

2) For schools, parents, and public boards

• Robust space for parental advocacy. The Court recognizes that parental reports of alleged student safety issues to boards and administrators are, presumptively, matters of public concern.
• Not a blank check. The privilege analysis remains central. Conditional privileges can be lost if abused (e.g., knowing falsity, reckless disregard, or excessive publication). The remand underscores that defamatory allegations cannot hide behind “public concern” if privilege is misused.

3) Litigation practice pointers

• Defense counsel:
  • Frame early: fit speech within UPEPA’s protected categories and invoke relevant privileges from the outset.
  • Push for targeted, limited discovery (UTAH CODE § 78B-25-104(4)) where needed to establish privilege or for the Rule 56 backstop.
  • Request fees and expenses “related to the motion” (UTAH CODE § 78B-25-110).
• Plaintiff’s counsel:
  • Prepare to prove, at the prima facie stage, every element — including demonstrable damages and lack of privilege once privilege is raised.
  • Use limited discovery strategically to marshal privilege-abuse evidence (e.g., knowledge of falsity, reckless disregard, improper purpose coupled with excessive publication).
  • Be cautious with add-on torts; IIED and abuse-of-process require facts rarely present in garden-variety reputational disputes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• UPEPA (Anti-SLAPP) Motion: A defensive tool to dismiss claims early when they target protected speech or petitioning activity. It has a specific three-step burden-shifting framework and allows limited discovery and fee shifting.
• Matter of public concern: Speech about issues that would reasonably interest the community at large (political, social, safety). Courts look at what was said (content), where/how it was said (form), and the circumstances (context).
• Prima facie case: Enough evidence on each element to get past the early screening — not proof beyond doubt, but a minimal, competent showing that could support a verdict.
• Privilege in defamation:
  • Absolute privilege (e.g., in official proceedings) is complete and cannot be lost.
  • Conditional privilege (e.g., common interest, public interest, reports to authorities) protects good-faith reports but can be forfeited if abused by malice, reckless disregard, or excessive publication.
  • Under UPEPA, once the defendant raises privilege, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that no privilege applies or that it was abused.
• Defamation elements (core): Publication “about” the plaintiff; falsity; defamatory meaning; lack of privilege; fault (negligence for private figures on public concerns; “actual malice” for public figures/officials); and damages.
• IIED “outrageousness”: Utah’s bar is extremely high — conduct must be atrocious and utterly intolerable; mere anger, exaggeration, or even false police reports typically are not enough.
• Abuse of process: Suing with a bad motive isn’t enough. You must also show a distinct, improper act beyond using the process itself (e.g., seizing property to coerce unrelated payment).
• Fee shifting: If the UPEPA motion succeeds (in whole or in part as the statute permits), the court must award the moving party its fees and expenses “related to the motion.”

Conclusion

Mackey v. Krause is a foundational decision for Utah’s anti-SLAPP practice under UPEPA. The Court charts a clear path: it adopts Snyder’s capacious “public concern” test; confirms that courts apply the familiar summary-judgment inference standard (with the narrow defamation-capability exception); and, critically, holds that at the prima facie stage the defamation plaintiff must also show lack of privilege when privilege is raised. This last point meaningfully strengthens UPEPA’s early-screening function by requiring plaintiffs to grapple up front with the privileges that typically shield civic and governmental reporting.

On the merits, the Court prunes away IIED and abuse-of-process claims — signaling that add-on torts unsupported by egregious facts will not survive anti-SLAPP scrutiny — while preserving the core reputational and economic claims for a focused privilege analysis on remand. Finally, the decision underscores UPEPA’s fee-shifting teeth, directing an award of fees and costs related to the motion.

For practitioners and public participants alike, Mackey offers a robust, speech-protective framework: it safeguards good-faith reporting on public-school safety while leaving room to redress genuinely defamatory abuses, provided plaintiffs can meet the sharpened prima facie burdens UPEPA now unmistakably imposes.