US v. Quarles: Reaffirming the No-Suspicion Forensic Border-Search Exception for Mobile Devices

Introduction

United States v. David Alan Quarles (11th Cir. May 19, 2025) presented the Eleventh Circuit with an opportunity to revisit and reaffirm the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s border-search exception as it applies to modern electronic devices. Quarles—convicted after a jury trial on multiple charges including sex trafficking, child trafficking, and conspiracy—challenged only the district court’s refusal to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless border search of his cell phone upon re-entry into the United States. While the defendant did not contest his trial procedure or the length of his 420-month sentence, he maintained that:

• The forensic examination of his phone at the border violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
• The 47-day interval between his phone’s seizure and the issuance of a search warrant was constitutionally unreasonable.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit—sitting in non-argument calendar—affirmed the district court, holding that under binding precedent no suspicion or warrant is required to conduct a forensic search of an electronic device at the border, and that, under the facts, the delay in obtaining a warrant did not render the seizure unreasonable.

Summary of the Judgment

1. Background & Procedural Posture:

• Coast Guard agents investigating suspected human trafficking flagged Quarles in a law-enforcement database.
• Quarles and his associate departed on an international cruise; upon return, CBP, CGIS, and HSI officers inspected and seized Quarles’s cell phone at Port Canaveral without a warrant, based on the border-search exception. He provided the device’s passcode voluntarily.
• Investigators performed an immediate physical inspection, then a forensic extraction on April 27, 2019. Later, HSI obtained a search warrant (issued June 13, 2019) and conducted a second extraction.
• Quarles moved to suppress all evidence derived from his phone, arguing the initial seizure and the lengthy delay in obtaining a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.

2. District Court Ruling:

• Denied suppression, citing United States v. Touset and United States v. Vergara: no suspicion or warrant required at the border for electronic device searches.
• Found the 47-day delay in obtaining a warrant reasonable under the totality of circumstances and, alternatively, protected by the good-faith exception.

3. Eleventh Circuit Holding:

• Affirmed: the Fourth Amendment does not impose a probable cause or reasonable-suspicion requirement for forensic searches of cell phones at the border.
  “The border-search exception allows warrantless, suspicionless forensic extraction of device data upon entry.”
• Under the balancing test, the retention of Quarles’s phone pending warrant application was not unduly prejudicial, given the phone’s obvious evidentiary value and the agencies’ diligence.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

• United States v. Ramsay, 431 U.S. 606 (1977): Established that border searches are “reasonable” per se, without probable cause or warrant, because the sovereign interest in controlling what enters the country outweighs the individual’s ordinary privacy expectations.
• United States v. Vergara, 884 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2018): Held that a forensic search of a cell phone at the border required neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion.
• United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2018): Confirmed that no level of suspicion is required for forensic border searches of electronic devices; reasonable-suspicion threshold applies only to highly intrusive body searches (strip searches, X-rays).
• United States v. Pulido, 133 F.4th 1256 (11th Cir. 2025): The Eleventh Circuit’s most recent reaffirmation that Riley’s warrant requirement for search-incident-to-arrest does not limit border-search exception for electronic devices.
• Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014): Held that incident-to-arrest searches of cell phones generally require a warrant. The court in Quarles explained Riley does not disturb the border-search exception.

2. Legal Reasoning

A. Border-Search Exception Remains Robust

• The court reaffirmed that the “single fact” of entry from abroad renders searches of persons or property reasonable without any individualized suspicion.
• Electronic devices, though containing vast personal data, are treated as property at the border; Touset held that only bodily searches implicate personal-dignity interests requiring reasonable suspicion.
• Riley’s context was domestic arrests, not borders; the sovereign interest in preventing contraband entry trumps the general privacy interest in cellphone contents.

B. Delay in Obtaining a Warrant: Totality of the Circumstances

• Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable seizures; prolonged detention of property awaiting a warrant must be justified by balancing law-enforcement needs against possessory interests.
• Relevant factors (Laist/Mitchell prototypes):
  1. Significance of possessory interest: mitigated here because Quarles gave passwords and never requested return.
  2. Duration of detention: 47 days.
  3. Government interest in evidence preservation: high, given clear indicia of human-trafficking activity uncovered on initial inspection and extraction.
  4. Diligence of law enforcement: substantial – immediate physical inspection, prompt extraction, transfer between agencies, good-faith warrant application.
• Unlike Mitchell (21-day delay with agent’s unjustified absence), here agents acted diligently; each transfer or procedural step (initial extraction, transfer from CGIS to HSI, warrant application) bore a legitimate investigatory purpose.
• Conclusion: detention did not exceed the bounds of reasonableness under the totality test; suppression unwarranted.

3. Impact

• Confirms that the border-search exception extends fully to forensic searches of electronic media, without a requirement of individualized suspicion or probable cause.
• Solidifies preclusion of Riley-based arguments to expand privacy protections at the border, reducing uncertainty for federal agents conducting device searches.
• Provides guidance on how courts will analyze post-seizure delays in warrant procurement: emphasize governmental diligence, the device’s evidentiary value, and the reduced possessory interest once passwords are provided.
• Signals to defendants that challenges to border-device searches will face high hurdles absent a showing of bad faith or extraordinary delay in warrant processes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Border-Search Exception: A long-standing rule allowing U.S. officers to search travelers or goods crossing U.S. borders without a warrant or probable cause, because national security and customs enforcement interests are paramount at entry points.
• Forensic Extraction: The process of creating a bit-for-bit copy of a mobile device’s entire digital contents—including text messages, call logs, photos, app data, and deleted files—for investigative review.
• Reasonable Suspicion vs. Probable Cause: Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard, requiring specific and articulable facts suggesting criminal activity. Probable cause requires a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found. Under the border exception, neither is needed for device searches.
• Good-Faith Exception: Even if a warrant application is defective, evidence need not be suppressed if officers acted with an objectively reasonable belief in the warrant’s validity.
• Mitchell-Laist Balancing Test: A multifactor analysis assessing whether a delay between seizure and warrant application unreasonably infringes possessory rights—factors include delay length, government interest, and law-enforcement diligence.

Conclusion

United States v. Quarles stands as a clear and thorough reaffirmation of the border-search exception’s application to modern electronic devices. The Eleventh Circuit held that:

• No suspicion—reasonable or probable—is required before conducting a full forensic search of a cell phone upon re-entry into the United States.
• A multi-week delay in securing a search warrant, when grounded in diligence and legitimate investigatory needs, does not render the seizure an unreasonable Fourth Amendment infringement.

This decision fortifies law-enforcement authority at U.S. borders, clarifies the limits of Riley in the border context, and offers a practical framework for evaluating detention-period challenges. For practitioners and travelers alike, Quarles underscores that the Fourth Amendment’s protections yield at the physical threshold of the nation, especially regarding digital devices carrying evidentiary value.