Urbonas v. Gullison: Rhode Island Supreme Court Re-defines the Reach of the Acquiescence Doctrine and Affirms Appellate Re-Characterisation Power

1. Introduction

In Kristina Urbonas v. John Gullison, No. 2024-60-Appeal (R.I. July 3 2025), the Rhode Island Supreme Court delivered a nuanced property decision that simultaneously narrows the doctrine of acquiescence, breathes new life into prescriptive easements, and warns trial courts against granting relief to non-pleading parties. The dispute centered on a five-foot strip of land, historically used as a walkway, lying between Urbonas’ residence at 5 Bowser Court and the adjacent parcel at 51 Kingston Avenue owned by NRI 51 Kingston Partnership (successor to John Gullison). After decades of amicable use, renovations by Gullison triggered litigation over ownership, access, and parking rights.

At the Superior Court level, the trial justice awarded title to the strip under the doctrine of acquiescence, and—without any request—extended the same relief to “other abutters” on Bowser Court. NRI appealed, challenging both the doctrinal analysis and the unsolicited grant. In a decision that is likely to influence Rhode Island real-property practice, the Supreme Court:

Vacated the trial court’s reliance on acquiescence and its award of title,
Held that relief cannot be extended to non-pleading parties,
Yet nonetheless affirmed Urbonas’ right to use the strip by recognising an easement by prescription, and
Exercised its discretion to forgive serious appellate-procedure missteps regarding late transcripts.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court (Robinson, J.) ruled as follows:

Procedural Rescue. Despite NRI’s failure to request transcripts within the deadlines of Sup. Ct. R. 10 & 11, the justices declined to dismiss the appeal, invoking their inherent power to reach the merits “in the interest of justice.”
Relief to Non-Parties Vacated. Paragraph 5 of the Superior Court’s final judgment—which quieted title in “other abutters”—was vacated. The Court reiterated that trial courts may not grant relief that has not been pleaded or tried by consent (citing Providence Journal v. Conv. Ctr. Auth.).
Acquiescence Claim Rejected. The doctrine is available only when the disputed strip is the actual boundary between the parties’ adjoining estates. Here, the dominant boundary lay between NRI and Bowser Court; therefore, the elements of mutual recognition of a boundary line were unsatisfied.
Prescriptive Easement Recognised. Exercising its prerogative to affirm on alternative grounds, the Court found clear and convincing evidence of a continuous, open, and hostile use of the walkway for more than ten years. Urbonas therefore acquires a non-exclusive easement—not full title—over the strip.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

DeCosta v. DeCosta, 819 A.2d 1261 (R.I. 2003) – doctrinal articulation of acquiescence: mutual recognition of a boundary for the statutory period.
Butterfly Realty v. Romanella & Sons (Butterfly II), 93 A.3d 1022 (R.I. 2014) – high burden and “solicitude for record owners” in prescriptive claims.
Miller v. Metropolitan Prop. & Cas., 111 A.3d 332 (R.I. 2015) – appellate courts may affirm on grounds different from those relied on below.
Providence Journal Co. v. Conv. Ctr. Auth., 824 A.2d 1246 (R.I. 2003) – limits on granting unrequested relief.
Reitsma v. Pascoag Reservoir, 774 A.2d 826 (R.I. 2001) – hostility element of prescription; owner must object or consent.
Rhode Island Mobile Sportfishermen, Inc., 59 A.3d 112 (R.I. 2013) – foot-traffic alone insufficient under §34-7-4.

These cases collectively shaped the Supreme Court’s pathway: a restrictive view of acquiescence, a demanding standard for prescription, yet a flexible appellate prerogative.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Procedural Leniency. Rules 10 & 11 set 20- and 60-day transcript/record deadlines. NRI missed both, filed the wrong petition in the wrong court, yet the Supreme Court held that the filing “in no way adversely affected this Court’s jurisdiction.” By invoking Wilkinson v. Harrington, 243 A.2d 745 (R.I. 1968) (justice as ultimate goal), the justices underscored discretionary authority to forgive procedural defects where no prejudice results.

B. Relief to Non-Parties. The Court reaffirmed adversarial principles: judgments must be tethered to the pleadings and evidence. Because Fitzgerald, Jacobs, and others neither joined the acquiescence claim nor sought title, the trial justice’s sua sponte grant violated due-process expectations. Paragraph 5 was vacated; the judgment now benefits only the litigating plaintiffs.

C. Limiting the Acquiescence Doctrine. Key holding: Acquiescence applies only where the disputed strip constitutes the common boundary of the adjoining estates. Here, the five-foot strip ran between NRI and Bowser Court, not between NRI and Urbonas (except at the landing’s tip). Consequently, the element of a “recognised boundary line” failed.

D. Re-Characterising as Prescription. Invoking Miller, the Court salvaged the plaintiffs’ victory by recharacterising the facts. Unrebutted testimony placed the walkway’s existence from the 1950s, later as a grass/dirt path, used exclusively by occupants of 5 Bowser Court for ingress/egress, trash removal, and snow shovelling. Hostility was inferred from open, un-permitted use and NRI predecessors’ silence (see Reitsma). Usage exceeded ten years, satisfying §34-7-1. Because foot traffic alone cannot create a prescriptive footway (§34-7-4), the Court emphasised concurrent use for deliveries, maintenance work, and other activities tantamount to vehicular/passage rights, bringing the claim within the statutory exception.

E. Remedy Adjusted. Title remains with NRI; Urbonas receives a non-exclusive easement appurtenant to 5 Bowser Court. This distinction preserves NRI’s reversionary rights and taxation base while guaranteeing unobstructed access for the dominant estate.

3.3 Impact

Doctrinal Clarity. Practitioners can no longer invoke acquiescence where the strip lies along a public or private way; instead, prescription or adverse possession must be pleaded.
Appellate Strategy. The decision confirms that the Supreme Court may fashion alternate relief—even an unpleaded prescriptive easement—when the record supports it, reducing the risk of remand but increasing the onus on appellants to address all plausible theories.
Procedural Flexibility. While deadlines matter, the Court signalled it will not allow procedural missteps to impede substantial justice, especially where clerical or mediation-office errors contribute.
Limiting Unsolicited Relief. Trial judges are cautioned: expansion of judgments to non-parties risks reversal. Expect stricter adherence to Rule 15(b) consent principles.
Real-Estate Drafting. Title attorneys and surveyors should now scrutinise historic walkways: easement language may be prudent even absent a written grant.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Doctrine of Acquiescence: A boundary-setting rule: if two adjoining landowners silently recognise a fence, wall, or line as their boundary for at least ten years, they are estopped from later disputing it. It awards title, not merely use.
Prescriptive Easement: The right to use (not own) another’s land, acquired after continuous, open, notorious, and hostile use for ten years. It is analogous to adverse possession but delivers an easement, not fee ownership.
Hostile Use: In property law “hostile” does not mean angry; it means the claimant used the land without the true owner’s permission, in a way that would support a trespass claim.
Footway Limitation (§34-7-4): Rhode Island statute bars prescriptive rights derived solely from pedestrian use. Claimants must show broader passage (e.g., with deliveries, carts, vehicles) or other qualifying uses.
Affirm on Alternative Grounds: The appellate court’s power to uphold a correct result even if the trial court relied on the wrong legal theory.

5. Conclusion

Urbonas v. Gullison reshapes Rhode Island boundary-law in three decisive ways. First, it confines the doctrine of acquiescence to genuine boundary disputes between adjoining estates. Second, it demonstrates the Supreme Court’s willingness to re-brand a misconceived boundary claim as a successful prescriptive easement when the evidentiary record allows. Third, it underscores due-process safeguards by vacating relief bestowed upon strangers to the claim. Practitioners should adjust pleadings accordingly, ensure that all potential claimants are properly before the court, and not rely on post-trial benevolence to cure procedural lapses.