Precedents Cited

1) Appellate standard for substantive reasonableness

The panel grounded review in United States v. Irey, defining abuse of discretion as: failing to consider relevant factors due significant weight, giving significant weight to improper/irrelevant factors, or committing a clear error of judgment in weighing proper factors. United States v. Pugh was cited for the “firm and definite conviction” threshold—an intentionally deferential standard. Finally, United States v. Sotelo supplied the burden rule: the challenger bears the burden of showing unreasonableness.

These cases collectively frame why Handford’s challenge was difficult: the appellate court does not re-sentence; it asks whether the district judge’s balancing was outside the bounds of reason, not whether another judge might have sentenced differently.

2) Prior sentences as a proper § 3553(a) consideration

The opinion relied heavily on United States v. Shaw and United States v. Overstreet, both approving upward variances where “shorter sentences” had not deterred the defendant. Those decisions validate a practical sentencing inference: if prior punishments did not prevent similar criminal conduct, a longer term may be necessary to achieve deterrence and protect the public.

The court also cited United States v. Nyhuis for the unremarkable but important proposition that prior convictions are routinely used to determine sentence length. Here, the prior conviction was not merely “criminal history”; it was a prior § 922(g) conviction with violent conduct and a substantial sentence that still failed to prevent reoffending—making it highly probative of recidivism risk.

3) Guidelines are advisory; district courts may vary with adequate explanation

To rebut the claim that the guideline range was disregarded, the panel cited United States v. Booker (guidelines advisory) and United States v. Hamaker (court must consider guidelines, not treat them as binding). The panel pointed to the record: the district court determined the range, referenced it, and articulated why it was inadequate given Handford’s full history.

4) Weighting § 3553(a) factors is largely for the district court

United States v. Rosales-Bruno supported the principle that a district court may assign different weights to different § 3553(a) factors. This was central to rejecting Handford’s “you didn’t weigh mitigation enough” argument: the district court listened, but permissibly prioritized deterrence, public safety, and the seriousness of repeated armed conduct.

5) Reasonableness indicators: statutory maximum and comparator variances

The panel invoked United States v. Goldman for the common indicator that a sentence below the statutory maximum tends to support reasonableness (though it is not dispositive). It also cited United States v. Osorio-Moreno to show that large variances from a 30–37 month range can be upheld where the record reveals persistent criminality (there, “staggering 20 convictions”).

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in three linked steps that, together, establish the core rule-like takeaway of the decision:

1. Prior sentence length can be relevant under § 3553(a): The district court did not treat the prior 127-month sentence as a binding “floor,” but as an evidentiary benchmark demonstrating that substantial punishment had not achieved deterrence. Under United States v. Shaw and United States v. Overstreet, that is a legitimate sentencing inference.
2. The guideline range may underrepresent risk when criminal history “ages out”: The presentence report calculated a low range because most convictions were too old to score. The district court described guideline “peculiarities” producing an “unrepresentative” score and concluded that the advisory range failed to reflect the “entire picture.” The Eleventh Circuit accepted this as a reasoned explanation for variance.
3. Public safety and deterrence dominated because the record supported near-certain recidivism: The district court emphasized repeated violence, firearm involvement, repeated supervision violations, and a post-arrest statement interpreted as a “commitment to recidivism” (preferring prison to being “caught” without a firearm). Those facts supported greater weight on protecting the public and deterring future crimes.

Importantly, the panel treated the district court’s explanation as sufficient because it tied specific record facts to core § 3553(a) objectives. The sentence’s position below the statutory maximum and its consistency with past Eleventh Circuit approvals of large variances reinforced the conclusion that this was within the permissible range of outcomes.

Impact

Although labeled “NOT FOR PUBLICATION” and therefore not binding precedent, the opinion is likely to be cited persuasively in at least three ways:

• Prior-sentence benchmarking in repeat-offense contexts: Prosecutors may rely on this decision to argue that a prior substantial sentence for the same offense is probative of deterrence failure, justifying an upward variance when the defendant repeats the conduct.
• Underrepresented criminal history as a variance rationale: The decision reinforces that even when the guidelines correctly calculate the criminal history category, district courts may conclude the score is “unrepresentative” due to scoring rules (e.g., aged convictions) and may vary upward if the explanation is record-based and § 3553(a)-linked.
• Recidivism indicators beyond convictions: The district court’s reliance on repeated supervision failures and the defendant’s own statements reflects an expansive, holistic risk assessment. Future sentencing litigants should expect courts to treat such evidence as relevant to deterrence and public protection.

For defense counsel, the case underscores the importance of directly confronting “deterrence failure” narratives—e.g., by distinguishing the prior conviction, contesting the factual basis or weight of alleged statements, and offering concrete post-release stability evidence—rather than focusing solely on the magnitude of the variance relative to the guideline range.