Upholding § 922(g)(3) After Bruen: Disarming Current Drug Users Is Analogous to Founding‑Era Limits on the Intoxicated and the Mentally Ill

Introduction

United States v. John P. Seiwert is the Seventh Circuit’s first comprehensive, post-Bruen treatment of the federal unlawful drug user firearm ban in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). After a jury convicted Seiwert on two § 922(g)(3) counts, he raised three issues on appeal:

• Section 922(g)(3) violates the Second Amendment (facial and as-applied),
• Section 922(g)(3) is unconstitutionally vague, and
• The evidence was insufficient to support the verdicts.

Applying the Supreme Court’s text-and-history framework in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen and its elaboration in United States v. Rahimi, the Seventh Circuit (Judge Lee, joined by Judges Hamilton and Scudder) affirmed. The court held that § 922(g)(3) is constitutional as applied to Seiwert because Founding-era and Reconstruction-era regulations disarming intoxicated individuals and confining (and thereby disarming) the dangerously mentally ill are “relevantly similar” analogues. The court also rejected Seiwert’s vagueness challenge as foreclosed by circuit precedent and found the evidence overwhelming.

Summary of the Opinion

The court assumed, without deciding, that drug users are among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment and that the firearms at issue are in common use. It then turned to history. Unable to find precise Founding-era predecessors, the court reasoned by analogy as Bruen and Rahimi instruct. It identified two closely analogous traditions:

• Statutes and practices disarming or restricting intoxicated persons from using or carrying arms, and
• Statutes authorizing confinement (and consequent disarmament) of those so mentally ill as to pose a present danger.

Because Seiwert admitted to using crack a “couple hours” before police arrived, and to daily heroin and crack use for twenty years—supported by paraphernalia, texts, and surveillance—the court held § 922(g)(3) constitutional as applied. That as-applied ruling defeated the facial challenge under Salerno’s “no set of circumstances” standard. The court further held that its prior decision in United States v. Cook foreclosed a facial vagueness attack and that any as-applied vagueness claim failed because Seiwert’s conduct fell squarely within the statute. Finally, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the government, the court found ample evidence that he was a knowing unlawful user when he possessed the firearms and knew of his status as such.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

• Bruen (597 U.S. 1 (2022)): Replaced means-end scrutiny with a text-and-history test. The Seventh Circuit followed Bruen’s two-step approach: (1) assume the Second Amendment’s text covers the conduct; (2) require the government to justify the regulation by showing consistency with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation, using analogical reasoning where exact matches are absent. The court used Bruen’s “how and why” metrics to assess whether burdens and justifications are comparable.
• Rahimi (602 U.S. 680 (2024)): Provided a worked example of Bruen’s analogical method by upholding § 922(g)(8) using surety and “going armed” laws. The Seventh Circuit relied on Rahimi for two points: courts may reason by analogy to well-established historical practices, and the government need not produce a “historical twin.” It also adopted Rahimi’s caution against defining “the people” as only “law-abiding, responsible” citizens.
• Heller (554 U.S. 570 (2008)) and Konigsberg (366 U.S. 36 (1961)): Heller supplied the baseline individual-rights understanding; Konigsberg was quoted in Bruen for the “unqualified command” of the Second Amendment once tradition supports a restriction.
• Yancey (621 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2010)) and Atkinson (70 F.4th 1018 (7th Cir. 2023)): The court acknowledged that Yancey had upheld § 922(g)(3) under pre-Bruen means-end analysis and therefore took a “fresh look” as required by Atkinson.
• Rahimi and Salerno/Patel/McCullen: For the facial versus as-applied structure, the court borrowed Rahimi’s recitation of Salerno’s demanding standard (“no set of circumstances”) and McCullen’s instruction to prefer as-applied rulings to avoid unnecessary constitutional questions, starting with the narrower route.
• Veasley (98 F.4th 906 (8th Cir. 2024)) and Harris (144 F.4th 154 (3d Cir. 2025)): Sister-circuit decisions analogizing § 922(g)(3) to historical regulations of mental illness. The Seventh Circuit aligned with these decisions in holding that chronic drug use causing significant and present impairment justifies disarmament by historical analogy.
• Connelly (117 F.4th 269 (5th Cir. 2024)) and Daniels (124 F.4th 967 (5th Cir. 2025)): The Fifth Circuit rejected § 922(g)(3) where the government failed to show intoxication at the time or comparably persistent impairment. The Seventh Circuit distinguished Connelly on precisely that basis and indicated Daniels’ caveat: the government might prevail if it shows drug use so regular and severe that it functionally parallels severe mental illness.
• Cook (970 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2020)) and Johnson (576 U.S. 591 (2015)): Cook bars facial vagueness challenges where the defendant’s conduct is clearly proscribed; Johnson held that some clear applications do not save an otherwise vague statute. The Seventh Circuit reaffirmed Cook’s framework and held that, at minimum, Seiwert’s as-applied vagueness claim fails because his conduct plainly qualifies as unlawful use. It also noted the Tenth Circuit reversal of Morales-Lopez, which had briefly accepted a vagueness claim.
• Maez (960 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2020)) and Triggs (963 F.3d 710 (7th Cir. 2020)): Cited for the proposition that the government need not prove knowledge that possession was unlawful; rather, it must show knowledge of the status that makes possession unlawful (here, that the defendant knew he was an unlawful user or addict).
• Dalhouse (534 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2008)) and Cote (504 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 2007)): Standards of review—de novo for constitutionality and sufficiency challenges.

Legal Reasoning Under Bruen and Rahimi

1) Textual Step: “The people” and covered conduct

Although the government argued that only “law-abiding, responsible citizens” are covered by “the people,” the court—mindful of Rahimi’s skepticism about that gloss—assumed, without deciding, that drug users like Seiwert are part of “the people” and that the firearms involved are commonly used arms. That neutral assumption pushed the analysis into history, where the government bears the burden to justify § 922(g)(3).

2) Historical Step: Relevant analogues and the “how/why” inquiry

Acknowledging there are no Founding-era statutes that precisely ban firearm possession by “unlawful drug users,” the court reasoned by analogy to two well-established regulatory traditions that address the same public-safety problem—armed persons whose cognitive faculties are impaired, thereby creating a heightened risk of violence or accident.

• Intoxication analogues:
  • Longstanding laws treated public drunkenness as a public-order problem warranting confinement, sureties, and sanctions; several statutes specifically limited armed conduct by intoxicated persons (e.g., colonial/early-American laws restricting firing or carrying arms while drunk; 19th- and early 20th-century laws criminalizing going armed while intoxicated).
  • “How” and “why”: These measures burdened the right by suspending or constraining armed conduct during periods of impairment to prevent foreseeable harms. Section 922(g)(3) similarly disarms individuals whose mental functioning is presently impaired by drugs, targeting the same risk.
  • Application to Seiwert: He used crack “a couple hours” before the search, admitted daily heroin and crack use for twenty years, and was waiting on more drugs. The court supplemented this with scientific consensus (as recounted in the opinion) that heroin and cocaine produce immediate cognitive and behavioral impairment, including severe drowsiness, clouded judgment, or psychosis.
• Mental-illness analogues:
  • Founding-era authorities regularly authorized confinement of those “so far disordered in [their] senses” as to be dangerous, with confinement lasting only as long as the dangerous condition persisted. That practice necessarily entailed disarmament. By the 19th and early 20th centuries, several states also prohibited selling firearms to persons of “unsound mind.”
  • Founding discussions and treatises often likened drunkenness to temporary insanity. The court extended that insight to chronic and severely impairing drug use.
  • Application to Seiwert: The record reflected both present impairment (same-day use) and enduring impairment from chronic heavy use, producing deficits in attention, memory, executive function, and impulse control—functionally comparable to the kinds of conditions historically addressed through confinement or disarmament of the dangerously mentally ill.

The court considered, but was wary of, broader “dangerousness” rationales. It found several government-cited sources—laws disarming political or religious dissidents, and “going armed” statutes aimed at terrorizing conduct—poor matches on these facts. As Judge Lee explained, disarming Catholics or political opponents addressed different concerns; “going armed” and surety laws could justify disarming those who threaten others with weapons, but the record contained no evidence that Seiwert engaged in such threatening conduct. This narrowing is consequential: it guards against watering down the right by analogizing at too high a level of generality.

Bottom line under Bruen/Rahimi: As applied to a defendant with contemporaneous drug use and long-term impairment, § 922(g)(3) imposes a comparable burden for a comparably justified reason to well-established intoxication and mental-illness regulations. That suffices to sustain the law as applied here.

3) Facial challenge fails under Salerno/Rahimi

Having sustained § 922(g)(3) as applied to Seiwert, the court rejected his facial challenge. Rahimi reiterates that to prevail facially, a challenger must show “no set of circumstances” under which the law is valid. Because the statute was constitutional in this application, the facial claim necessarily failed.

4) Vagueness

Seiwert’s facial vagueness challenge is foreclosed by United States v. Cook’s rule that a defendant whose conduct is clearly covered cannot mount a facial vagueness attack. He argued Johnson v. United States undermines Cook, but the Seventh Circuit found that contention previously rejected. His as-applied vagueness claim also failed: the jury was instructed that “unlawful user” means regular and repeated use during a period reasonably covering the time of firearm possession; the evidence (admissions of daily heroin/crack use over two decades, same-day use, drug paraphernalia, texts, surveillance, gun-for-drugs exchange) plainly satisfies that standard.

5) Sufficiency of the evidence

The elements given to the jury were:

• Knowing possession of a firearm,
• At the time of possession, being an unlawful user of or addicted to a controlled substance,
• At the time of possession, knowledge of that status (that he was an unlawful user or addicted), and
• Interstate-commerce nexus.

The “unlawful user” instruction required regular and repeated use during a period reasonably covering the time of possession. The government did not need to prove that Seiwert knew it was unlawful for him to possess a gun; it only needed to show he knew his status (Maez; Triggs). The court held a rational jury could easily find all elements beyond a reasonable doubt given admissions, corroborating texts and video, paraphernalia, and surveillance.

Impact and Practical Implications

1) A clarified, narrower path for § 922(g)(3) after Bruen

This opinion delineates a concrete, evidence-driven pathway for sustaining § 922(g)(3) prosecutions in the Seventh Circuit:

• Prove contemporaneous use relative to possession (e.g., same-day use) or
• Prove long-term, frequent, and severe drug use producing ongoing cognitive impairment analogous to intoxication or dangerous mental illness.

Evidence likely to matter includes admissions of daily use, paraphernalia indicative of active use, drug-for-guns exchanges, contemporaneous communications seeking drugs, and surveillance or video corroboration.

2) Guardrails against overbroad analogies

The court’s refusal to rely on generalized “dangerousness” analogies (e.g., disarming political or religious foes, or “going armed” without terrorizing conduct) cabins the government’s historical argument to closer fits—intoxication and dangerous mental illness. That limits § 922(g)(3)’s application to cases featuring clear, present impairment or chronic impairment akin to historical categories.

3) Circuit alignment and divergence

• Alignment: The Seventh Circuit aligns with the Eighth (Veasley) and Third (Harris) Circuits, sustaining § 922(g)(3) where the record shows persistent and present impairment analogous to mental illness or intoxication.
• Divergence: The Fifth Circuit (Connelly; Daniels) has struck down § 922(g)(3) as applied where there is no proof of intoxication at the time of possession or no evidence of chronic impairment comparable to severe mental illness. Seiwert distinguishes those cases and points to the Fifth Circuit’s suggested limiting principle: § 922(g)(3) may be justified if the government shows present intoxication or ongoing, severe impairment.

4) Vagueness litigation in the Seventh Circuit remains an uphill climb

Cook continues to foreclose facial vagueness challenges where defendants’ conduct is clearly covered. Defendants must focus on as-applied vagueness arguments and fact-specific ambiguity. In cases like Seiwert—with extensive admissions and corroboration—those arguments will likely fail.

5) Elements and jury instructions

The opinion underscores a temporal nexus requirement for “unlawful user”: regular and repeated use during a period that reasonably covers the time of possession. Defense counsel should litigate that temporal window; prosecutors should build a record that ties use closely to possession.

6) Open questions the opinion leaves for another day

• “The people”: The court assumed, without deciding, that unlawful drug users fall within “the people,” consistent with Rahimi’s skepticism of narrowing “the people” to “law-abiding, responsible” citizens.
• Occasional or remote use: The court did not resolve whether occasional, non-contemporaneous drug use suffices. Connelly suggests it does not; Seiwert points in the same direction by demanding present or persistent impairment.
• Substance scope: The case involved heroin and crack cocaine; it does not address substances with different impairment profiles or complicated legality (e.g., marijuana under state law but unlawful federally).

Complex Concepts Simplified

• As-applied vs. facial challenge:
  • As-applied: The law is unconstitutional as used against this particular defendant, on these facts.
  • Facial: The law is unconstitutional in all or virtually all applications. Under Salerno/Rahimi, if the statute is valid in some applications, the facial challenge fails.
• Bruen’s analogical reasoning:
  • If the text covers the conduct, the government must show the regulation fits within historical tradition. Exact matches are rare, so courts look for “relevantly similar” analogues examining “how” (the burden on the right) and “why” (the justification).
  • “Not a straightjacket and not a blank check”: The analogy must be representative and well-established, not a post hoc rationalization at a high level of generality.
• “Dangerousness” caution after Rahimi:
  • Courts should avoid generic appeals to “dangerous persons.” Historical analogues must closely track the specific risk the modern law addresses, with comparable burdens and justifications.
• Void-for-vagueness:
  • A statute is impermissibly vague if people of common intelligence must guess at its meaning or it invites arbitrary enforcement.
  • In the Seventh Circuit, a defendant cannot mount a facial vagueness attack if his own conduct is clearly within the statute; he must show vagueness as applied to him.
• Knowledge of status vs. knowledge of law:
  • For § 922(g), the government must prove the defendant knew the fact making him prohibited (here, that he was an unlawful user/addicted), not that he knew the law forbids his possession. Maez and Triggs confirm that knowledge-of-law is not required.

Conclusion

United States v. Seiwert is a careful application of Bruen and Rahimi that charts a middle course for § 922(g)(3). The Seventh Circuit sustains the statute as applied where the evidence shows contemporaneous drug use and chronic, severe impairment—conditions historically treated like intoxication or dangerous mental illness, for which disarmament was a common, justified public-safety measure. At the same time, the court rejects broad “dangerousness” analogies and insists on a tighter fit between historical practice and modern prohibition.

Practically, prosecutors in the Seventh Circuit have a clear blueprint for § 922(g)(3): prove present impairment or long-term impairment akin to historical categories through robust, corroborated evidence. Defendants, conversely, will focus on temporal gaps, intermittent use, and the absence of comparable impairment. Vagueness challenges remain difficult, particularly where the record shows regular and repeated use overlapping with possession. In the broader Second Amendment landscape, Seiwert contributes to an emerging consensus among several circuits that § 922(g)(3) survives as-applied scrutiny when the facts demonstrate the kind of impairment the Founding generation historically addressed, while leaving for future cases the edges of the statute’s reach.