Unwritten Qualification Thresholds as Evidence of Pretext:
A Comprehensive Commentary on Scott v. Macon-Bibb County, Georgia (11th Cir. 2025)

Introduction

In Scott v. Macon-Bibb County, Georgia, No. 24-11388 (11th Cir. July 10, 2025), the Eleventh Circuit revisited two familiar—but often misunderstood—features of Title VII practice: (1) the evidentiary standard for circumstantial proof of discrimination after McDonnell Douglas, and (2) the circumstances under which a party may seek additional discovery under Federal Rule 56(d).

Teresa J. Scott, a Black employee in the Tax Assessor’s Office (“TAO”) of Macon-Bibb County, alleged that the County and two supervisors (Andrea Crutchfield and Jody Claborn) discriminated against her by refusing to reclassify her from “Appraiser II” to “Appraiser III,” despite her passing score on the requisite state examination and multiple recommendations from her immediate supervisor. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and denied Scott’s post-discovery Rule 56(d) motion to defer the ruling. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit:

• Reversed the grant of summary judgment on Scott’s Title VII claim, holding that a reasonable jury could infer intentional race discrimination from the “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence; and
• Affirmed the denial of Scott’s Rule 56(d) motion, stressing counsel’s obligation to pursue discovery diligently.

Although the court characterized its opinion as “non-publishable,” the decision nonetheless clarifies several points that will guide future discrimination litigation within the circuit—most notably, that an employer’s post-hoc reliance on an unwritten qualification standard (here, a score of 80 on the Appraiser III exam) can itself constitute powerful evidence of pretext sufficient to defeat summary judgment.

Summary of the Judgment

1. Title VII Claim (Reversed): The Eleventh Circuit held that Scott presented enough circumstantial evidence—a “convincing mosaic”—for a jury to find intentional discrimination. This evidence included (a) long delays in reclassification despite passing the examination, (b) repeated recommendations from her supervisor, (c) comparators of different races who were reclassified within 30 days, and (d) shifting reasons offered by the employer, culminating in an unwritten “80-score” rule first invoked deep into the litigation.
2. Rule 56(d) Motion (Affirmed): The panel upheld the district court’s refusal to defer summary judgment because Scott’s counsel waited until after discovery closed to seek additional materials, failing to show the diligence demanded by Rule 56(d).
3. §§ 1981 and 1983 Claims (Affirmed): Scott did not challenge the district court’s reasoning on those claims in any meaningful way, so the grants of summary judgment on those counts remained undisturbed.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Provided the burden-shifting framework for circumstantial discrimination claims. The district court required Scott to identify a “similarly situated” comparator under this framework; the Eleventh Circuit sidestepped that narrow inquiry by emphasizing the alternative “convincing mosaic” avenue.
• Lewis v. City of Union City, 934 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2019). Clarified comparator analysis; here, the defendants relied on Lewis to argue Scott lacked proper comparators. The panel acknowledged Lewis but emphasized that comparator evidence is just one facet of a broader mosaic.
• McCreight v. AuburnBank, 117 F.4th 1322 (11th Cir. 2024). Reaffirmed that “convincing mosaic” is “a metaphor, not a legal test.” The Scott court quoted McCreight to underscore that summary-judgment analysis focuses on the totality of circumstantial evidence rather than rigid doctrinal boxes.
• Rioux v. City of Atlanta, 520 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2008). Cited for the axiom that courts must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant at summary judgment.
• Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313 (11th Cir. 1990) and Virgilio v. Ryland Group, Inc., 680 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2012). Governed review of Rule 56(d) motions.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Unwritten Qualification Standard as Evidence of Pretext.
   • Written policy required a “passing grade of 70.”
   • The County asserted, for the first time two years into litigation, that a score of 80 was mandatory.
   • The panel found the emergence of this new rationale—unsupported by policy manuals, state regulations, or consistent practice—created a genuine dispute of material fact which only a jury could resolve.
   • Shifting explanations are classic pretext indicators (cf. Cleveland v. Home Shopping Network, 369 F.3d 1189 (11th Cir. 2004)).
2. “Convincing Mosaic” Approach.
   The court reiterated that a plaintiff can survive summary judgment without satisfying each element of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case if the circumstantial evidence, taken together, permits an inference of discrimination. Here, that mosaic included:
   • Earlier recommendations for promotion by Scott’s supervisor;
   • Evidence that non-Black colleagues were promoted promptly;
   • Defendants’ shifting justifications (lack of supervisory experience, no open positions, missing 80 score); and
   • The contradiction between written policy and alleged unwritten practice.
3. Role of Comparator Evidence.
   The district court faulted Scott for failing to identify comparators who, like her, scored below 80. The panel responded that the point was not the comparators’ test scores but the employer’s differential treatment after each employee became eligible for reclassification. A jury could view the County’s acceptance of an unwritten “80 rule” only when a Black candidate sought reclassification as discrimination.
4. Rule 56(d) Discretion.
   Scott’s counsel learned of a potentially relevant internal investigation in March 2023 but did nothing until after discovery closed in July and a summary-judgment motion was filed in August. The Eleventh Circuit treated that delay as fatal under Virgilio, illustrating that Rule 56(d) is a shield for the diligent, not a fallback for the dilatory.

C. Impact of the Decision

1. Employer Policies Must Align with Practice.
   Organizations within the Eleventh Circuit now have clearer notice that unwritten or selectively enforced standards expose them to triable discrimination claims. Compliance officers should ensure that promotion criteria are (a) documented, (b) consistently applied, and (c) disclosed to employees.
2. Strategic Use of “Convincing Mosaic.”
   Plaintiffs can survive summary judgment without “magic words.” Even when comparator evidence is imperfect, other circumstantial strands—shifting explanations, procedural irregularities, statistical outliers—may suffice.
3. Litigation Practice—Discovery Diligence.
   The affirmance on the Rule 56(d) issue cautions counsel that Rule 56(d) relief is not automatic. Requests for critical discovery must be made before the deadline; failure to do so can forfeit otherwise meritorious lines of evidence.
4. Clarifying the “Exam-Score” Trap.
   Government bodies and licensing boards often set multiple score thresholds (e.g., “pass” vs. “advanced eligibility”). Scott underscores that conflating separate thresholds—especially post-hoc—may trigger Title VII liability.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Burden-Shifting (McDonnell Douglas): A three-step process where the plaintiff must first make a minimal showing (“prima facie case”); the burden then shifts to the employer to offer a legitimate reason; finally, the plaintiff must show that reason is pretextual.
• “Convincing Mosaic”: Not a distinct test, but shorthand for the idea that the entirety of circumstantial evidence (documents, comparators, inconsistencies, remarks, statistics) can collectively allow a jury to infer discrimination—even if individual pieces seem weak in isolation.
• Rule 56(d): Allows a party opposing summary judgment to obtain more discovery if it “cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition.” The movant must:
  1. Identify the specific evidence sought;
  2. Show why it was not obtained earlier despite diligence; and
  3. Explain how it will create a genuine issue of material fact.
• Pretext: A reason given by an employer that is not the true reason, offered to hide discrimination. Shifting explanations and sudden “new requirements” are classic pretext indicators.

Conclusion

Scott v. Macon-Bibb County offers two critical lessons. First, in Title VII cases, courts must look beyond formalistic comparator analysis to the broader context. When an employer departs from its own written policies, moves the goalposts, or supplies inconsistent rationales, a jury—not a judge at summary judgment—should decide whether discrimination occurred. Second, diligent discovery practice remains paramount; Rule 56(d) cannot rescue parties who sleep on their rights.

For employers, the decision is a clarion call to audit promotion and reclassification procedures, ensuring that all operative requirements are transparent, written, and uniformly enforced. For plaintiffs and practitioners, it reinforces the power of a “convincing mosaic” and cautions that success at summary judgment often hinges on developing the factual record early and thoroughly. In the larger tapestry of Eleventh Circuit jurisprudence, Scott strengthens the principle that unwritten, selectively invoked standards are fertile ground for inferring discriminatory intent.