Precedents Cited and Their Role

• Williamson v. Curran, 714 F.3d 432, 435–36 (7th Cir. 2013): The court reiterates that documents attached to a complaint are part of the pleadings and may be considered at screening. This undercuts the district court’s narrow view of Titus’s allegations, some of which were clarified by exhibits.
• Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 994 (7th Cir. 2020): Establishes the de novo standard of review for § 1915A dismissals and the obligation to draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.
• Balle v. Kennedy, 73 F.4th 545, 552, 557–58 (7th Cir. 2023): Confirms the plausibility standard for pro se pleadings in Eighth Amendment conditions claims and articulates the two-prong test (objective seriousness and subjective deliberate indifference). The panel uses Balle to frame the analysis.
• Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776–82 (7th Cir. 2015): Two key points: (1) liberal construction of pro se complaints; and (2) “deaf ears” doctrine—repeated requests for relief ignored by officials can show deliberate indifference. Also supports the proposition that letters to supervisory officials can establish knowledge if they turn a blind eye.
• Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 823–24 (7th Cir. 2019): Recognizes that prolonged exposure to an unflushable toilet containing standing human waste and denial of water are inhumane, reinforcing the objective seriousness of Titus’s allegations.
• Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7, 8 (2020): Supreme Court case holding that keeping a prisoner in a feces-covered cell for several days violates the Constitution. Cited to underscore that even short periods in such conditions are unconstitutional, a fortiori supporting Titus’s longer exposure.
• JACKSON v. DUCKWORTH, 955 F.2d 21, 22 (7th Cir. 1992): Early Seventh Circuit recognition that a cell smelling of human waste with a rusted-out toilet presents unconstitutional conditions.
• VINNING-EL v. LONG, 482 F.3d 923, 924 (7th Cir. 2007): Six days in a feces-covered cell without a working sink or toilet was inhumane. The court analogizes Titus’s situation to show objective severity.
• VANCE v. PETERS, 97 F.3d 987, 992–93 (7th Cir. 1996): Articulates that liability may attach where an official facilitated, approved, condoned, or turned a blind eye to a constitutional violation, framing the subjective prong here.
• SANTIAGO v. WALLS, 599 F.3d 749, 759 (7th Cir. 2010): Allegations that a grievance alerted the warden to an obvious risk and no action followed are sufficient to plead the warden’s knowledge and deliberate indifference.
• DIXON v. GODINEZ, 114 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 1997): “Deaf ears” concept: repeated pleas ignored can establish deliberate indifference.
• Rodriguez v. McCloughen, 49 F.4th 1120, 1121–23 (7th Cir. 2022): Clarifies that plaintiffs may use placeholder defendants and then substitute names through discovery; emphasizes that screening delays can affect the timeliness analysis and may constitute “good cause” in the relation-back/Rule 4(m) context and that courts should assess prejudice and compatibility with Rule 15(c)(1)(C) when allowing late substitution.

Legal Reasoning

1) The § 1915A screening standard and deference to pro se pleadings

The panel stresses that at the screening stage the court must accept well-pleaded facts as true, draw all reasonable inferences for the plaintiff, and construe pro se filings liberally. This is not an “exacting” standard; plausibility suffices. The district court’s approach effectively weighed or discounted allegations (including those clarified by exhibits and later by counsel) rather than crediting them as the screening standard requires.

2) Objective seriousness of the conditions

Titus described three months in a “condemned” cell with an inoperable toilet containing urine and feces, a pervasive stench, lack of access to any functional restroom, and an inoperable or significantly deficient sink resulting in denial of safe drinking water. The Seventh Circuit anchored its analysis in a robust line of precedent—Hardeman, Vinning-El, Jackson, and Taylor—recognizing that even short-term confinement in feces-contaminated conditions, or denial of a working sink and toilet, is inhumane. Here, the allegations spanned days initially (during which he and a cellmate begged 23 officers for relief) and continued for months, making the objective component more than plausible.

3) Subjective deliberate indifference

The subjective prong requires that defendants knew of and disregarded a substantial risk to health or safety. Titus alleged he repeatedly informed numerous officers of the unsanitary conditions and requested either repair or transfer. He further alleged that he wrote to the warden (Gomez), a placement officer (Thornton), and a maintenance supervisor, all without response and with no work order issued. The panel invoked Perez, Vance, Santiago, and Dixon to hold that these allegations plausibly demonstrate knowledge and deliberate indifference—especially at the pleadings stage, where courts may infer receipt of letters and awareness in the absence of contrary evidence.

The court expressly rejected the district court’s conclusion that letters alone could not establish supervisory liability. At least at the pleading stage, allegations that a warden actually received and ignored grievances about obvious risks suffice to plead personal involvement under the Eighth Amendment.

4) Placeholder defendants and relation back after screening delays

The district court’s categorical dismissal of claims against unnamed officers was error. The Seventh Circuit reaffirmed that there is nothing improper about naming placeholder defendants and using discovery to determine identities. Rodriguez instructs that substitution is permissible so long as Rule 15(c) is satisfied and timeliness concerns account for screening delays. The panel suggested that the time consumed by § 1915A screening may amount to “good cause” within the relation-back framework and directed the district court to assess on remand:

• Whether late substitution would unfairly prejudice the defense.
• Whether substitution is compatible with Rule 15(c)(1)(C) in this case, considering the screening delay.

This guidance cautions against penalizing prisoners for delays outside their control, particularly when the complaint plausibly alleges systemic knowledge (e.g., speaking to 23 officers) and where early discovery aimed at identifying unknown officers can be managed with minimal prejudice to defendants.

Impact and Implications

A. For Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement litigation

• The decision reinforces that prolonged exposure to human waste and denial of safe drinking water are paradigmatic examples of objectively serious deprivations.
• At the pleading stage, detailed allegations of repeated pleas for help—especially to multiple front-line officers—and written grievances to supervisors will usually suffice to allege subjective deliberate indifference.
• Supervisory liability remains viable where the supervisor is alleged to have actual knowledge and to have “turned a blind eye,” rebutting any overbroad reading that Iqbal forecloses such claims where personal knowledge and inaction are plausibly alleged.

B. For district court screening practice

• Courts must consider complaint exhibits and draw reasonable inferences in favor of pro se litigants. Dismissing with prejudice at screening should be rare where pleadings plausibly allege both prongs.
• Where a prisoner names unknown officers, courts should facilitate targeted discovery (e.g., limited interrogatories to the warden or records custodians) to identify them, rather than foreclosing claims for want of early identification.

C. For “John Doe” practice and timeliness

• Rodriguez provides a roadmap: placeholder use is permissible; screening delays may play a role in relation-back and Rule 4(m) “good cause” analyses; prejudice and compatibility with Rule 15(c)(1)(C) should be assessed case-by-case.
• This opinion signals to practitioners that early motion practice should request identification discovery promptly upon passing screening and should preserve relation-back arguments rooted in screening-caused delays.

D. Qualified immunity considerations (downstream)

Although not decided here, the court’s reliance on Taylor v. Riojas and related cases telegraphs that, by 2021, the unconstitutionality of confining inmates in feces-contaminated conditions and denying working sanitation and safe water was clearly established. Defendants may therefore face a difficult qualified immunity defense if the facts are borne out in discovery.