Unrelated Questioning After Mission Tasks Are Complete Unlawfully Prolongs Traffic Stop and Taints Consent: Sixth Circuit in United States v. Moffitt

Introduction

In United States v. Frankie L. Moffitt, No. 24-5536 (6th Cir. Sept. 23, 2025) (not recommended for publication), the Sixth Circuit reversed a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress a firearm found under the hood of a vehicle during a roadside search. The case centers on a familiar but exacting Fourth Amendment question: when does officer inquiry during a traffic stop stray from the “mission” of the stop and impermissibly prolong the seizure without independent reasonable suspicion?

Deputy Sheriff Wyatt Harper stopped Moffitt for alleged erratic driving, obtained identification and registration, and—after completing a warrants check and asking several context-framing questions—asked whether there was anything illegal in the car and requested consent to search. The search included lifting the hood and locating a pistol in the engine compartment. Moffitt, a felon, later moved to suppress, arguing that (1) the stop was unlawfully prolonged and (2) consent did not extend to the engine compartment. The magistrate judge recommended suppression for undue prolongation but concluded consent covered the whole car; the district court disagreed on prolongation and denied suppression altogether. Moffitt pleaded guilty to 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), preserving his suppression appeal.

The Sixth Circuit reverses, holding that Harper’s questioning about illegal items and request for consent occurred after the officer had finished (or, at a minimum, paused) tasks tied to the traffic infraction, thereby unlawfully extending the stop in violation of Rodriguez v. United States. The court therefore does not reach the scope-of-consent question because consent was tainted by the illegal extension.

Summary of the Opinion

Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Clay concludes:

• Traffic stops are constitutional only when limited in scope and duration to tasks tied to the traffic infraction, unless new reasonable suspicion arises.
• Officer Harper’s questions about hotel activity, contraband, and consent to search were unrelated to the traffic violation and occurred at a time when no mission-related tasks were ongoing (warrants check was complete; officer was not actively processing a citation or otherwise pursuing the infraction).
• Even brief prolongation of a stop beyond the time reasonably necessary to handle the traffic mission is unconstitutional without independent reasonable suspicion; here there was none, and the government did not argue otherwise.
• Because the stop was unlawfully prolonged, Moffitt’s consent was tainted and could not validate the search under Florida v. Royer. The court declines to decide whether generalized consent includes the car’s engine compartment.
• The government forfeited any reliance on the good-faith exception by not raising it on appeal.

The judgment is reversed and the matter remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Informed the Decision

The panel’s analysis is anchored in a cohesive body of Fourth Amendment caselaw defining the “mission” of a traffic stop and the limits on unrelated inquiries:

• Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015): The cornerstone. A stop may “last no longer than is necessary” to address the traffic infraction. Unrelated inquiries are permissible only if they do not extend the duration, unless supported by independent reasonable suspicion. The panel quotes and applies Rodriguez’s “what the officer in fact did” lens.
• Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009): Unrelated inquiries do not transform a stop into an unlawful seizure so long as they do not measurably extend the stop. The panel reconciles this with Rodriguez by emphasizing that any added time beyond mission tasks must be supported by reasonable suspicion (citing Sixth Circuit cases adopting the “any time added” formulation).
• Sixth Circuit framework:
  • United States v. Williams, 68 F.4th 304 (6th Cir. 2023): Any time added to a stop beyond what is necessary for the mission must be grounded in independent reasonable suspicion.
  • United States v. Jordan, 100 F.4th 714 (6th Cir. 2024): Reiterates mission-limited duration and permissible context-framing questions.
  • United States v. Whitley, 34 F.4th 522 (6th Cir. 2022): Unrelated questions may be acceptable if asked concurrently with mission tasks (e.g., while driver retrieves documents), but once an officer abandons mission tasks, the stop morphs into a separate investigation.
  • United States v. Lott, 954 F.3d 919 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Stepp, 680 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Lyons, 687 F.3d 754 (6th Cir. 2012): Distinguish permissible “context-framing” questions from unrelated criminal probing that prolongs the stop.
  • United States v. Bell, 555 F.3d 535 (6th Cir. 2009): A stop can be unlawfully extended even if no citation has been issued; courts must rely on objective evidence (including video) over contrary findings.
  • United States v. Urrieta, 520 F.3d 569 (6th Cir. 2008); Hernandez v. Boles, 949 F.3d 251 (6th Cir. 2020): Even very brief extensions are unlawful absent reasonable suspicion.
  • United States v. Blair, 524 F.3d 740 (6th Cir. 2008): Without reasonable, articulable suspicion, actions that expand scope/duration violate the Fourth Amendment.
• Parallel authority in other circuits:
  • United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc): Stop unlawfully prolonged by contraband questioning.
  • United States v. Landeros, 913 F.3d 862 (9th Cir. 2019); United States v. Clark, 902 F.3d 404 (3d Cir. 2018): Unrelated inquiries that extend the stop are unconstitutional.
  • United States v. Gomez, 877 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017): Emphasizes assessing what the officer actually did, not generalized notions of average stop duration.
  • United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328 (4th Cir. 2008): Recognizes fact-specific evaluation of stop length.
• Consent taint and remedial doctrines:
  • Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983): Consent obtained during an unlawful detention is tainted and ineffective to justify a search (absent attenuation, which was neither argued nor found).
  • United States v. Archibald, 589 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2009): Government forfeits unraised good-faith arguments; here, the panel notes that the good-faith exception was not asserted on appeal.
• Video evidence controls factual disputes:
  • Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007): Appellate courts should view facts as depicted by video.
  • Bell, 555 F.3d at 538 n.3: District findings contradicted by video are discounted. The panel relies on bodycam footage to correct the district court’s description of license-handling and the flow of events.
• Sixth Circuit fact patterns allowing overlapping questions:
  • United States v. Garrido-Santana, 360 F.3d 565 (6th Cir. 2004): Contraband questions asked while officer was still preparing a citation and awaiting database returns did not extend the stop.
  • United States v. Whitley, supra: Unrelated questions permissible during the driver’s retrieval of documents; but once the officer paused the mission to discuss a scale, the stop “morphed” into a drug investigation.
  • United States v. King, No. 24-1089, 2025 WL 2172432 (6th Cir. July 31, 2025): Drug inquiry did not prolong the stop because the officer was simultaneously verifying license information on his computer. The Moffitt panel distinguishes King because no mission tasks were ongoing when Harper posed contraband/consent questions.

Legal Reasoning: The “Mission Tasks” Boundary and Micro-Timing Matters

The court’s reasoning turns on a precise, real-time reconstruction of what tasks were on deck when Harper asked about contraband and sought consent:

• Mission tasks for a routine stop include running warrants/records checks, confirming license/registration/insurance, asking brief context-framing questions (travel plans, destination), and issuing a citation or warning.
• By the time Harper asked “Is there anything illegal in the vehicle?” and “You have any issues with me searching it?”, he had already:
  • Completed the warrants check (no outstanding warrants),
  • Received and held the registration, and
  • Repeated context questions and then moved on to hotel-related inquiries—no longer tethered to the swerving infraction.
• Critically, the record showed no concurrent mission activity (e.g., he was not actively checking the registration, writing up a citation, or using the in-car computer) at the moment he asked about contraband and consent. The panel underscores that simply not having issued a ticket yet does not preserve mission status; the dispositive point is whether mission tasks are actually being pursued at that moment.
• Under Rodriguez and Sixth Circuit precedents (Williams, Urrieta, Hernandez), even minimal additional time devoted to non-mission inquiries is constitutionally significant and requires independent reasonable suspicion. The government conceded no such suspicion existed.
• Because the unlawful prolongation preceded the consent, the consent was tainted under Royer and could not validate the search. This mooted the scope-of-consent issue (i.e., whether general consent extends to the engine compartment).
• The panel expressly notes that the government did not argue the good-faith exception on appeal; accordingly, it is forfeited and cannot save the evidence from suppression.

Why This Decision Matters: Practical and Doctrinal Impact

Although unpublished, Moffitt meaningfully sharpens the Sixth Circuit’s application of Rodriguez and related doctrine:

• Micro-timing is decisive. Officers may ask unrelated questions only if doing so does not add time to the stop—and that requires the officer to be actively engaged in mission tasks at that precise moment (e.g., running checks, drafting citation). The mere fact that a citation has not yet issued is not enough.
• “Overlap” is permitted but must be real. Cases like Garrido-Santana, Whitley, and King remain good law: unrelated questions can be asked during ongoing mission activity. Moffitt clarifies that courts will interrogate the record (especially video) to ensure the overlap is genuine, not pretextual.
• Consent risks suppression if obtained mid-prolongation. If an officer secures consent after the stop has already been unlawfully extended, the consent is likely invalid as fruit of the poisonous tree unless the government can show attenuation—an argument not raised here.
• Bodycam footage is pivotal. The panel corrects district-level factual statements when contradicted by the video. Prosecutors and defense counsel should expect appellate courts to rely on the visual record for timing, task sequencing, and precise content of conversations.
• Training and policy implications for law enforcement. To avoid suppression:
  • Continue mission tasks while asking any unrelated questions (e.g., keep typing the citation, running queries).
  • Or, end the traffic mission and explicitly transition to a consensual encounter by returning documents and informing the driver they are free to go—then seek consent.
  • Develop articulable facts giving rise to reasonable suspicion before pivoting to unrelated criminal investigation.
• Litigation pointers.
  • Defense counsel: Build a second-by-second timeline from bodycam; emphasize pauses in mission tasks; argue “any time added” standard; challenge boilerplate claims that tasks were “still ongoing.”
  • Prosecutors: Establish contemporaneous mission activity during questioning; preserve good-faith and attenuation arguments; document in reports when mission tasks are concurrent.
  • Trial courts: Avoid findings inconsistent with video; apply the “what the officer in fact did” test rather than comparative notions of typical stop duration.
• Unresolved terrain: scope of general vehicle-consent. The panel expressly sidesteps whether consent to search a “vehicle” includes the engine compartment. Practitioners should be prepared to litigate this in future cases; many courts broadly construe vehicle-consent to include containers and compartments, but engine searches can raise distinct questions where disassembly or non-obvious access is involved.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Mission of the stop: The set of tasks reasonably necessary to address the traffic violation (license, registration, insurance checks; warrants checks; brief safety and context questions; writing a ticket/warning).
• Reasonable suspicion: Specific, articulable facts that, taken together with rational inferences, suggest additional criminal activity beyond the traffic violation.
• Prolongation: Adding time to the stop beyond what is necessary for the mission. Under Sixth Circuit law, even brief added time (seconds) can be unconstitutional without reasonable suspicion.
• Unrelated inquiries: Questions aimed at detecting ordinary criminal wrongdoing (e.g., “Do you have anything illegal?”). Permissible only if they do not add time, or if justified by reasonable suspicion.
• Consent taint: Consent to search obtained during an unlawful detention is presumed tainted and invalid unless the taint is purged by attenuation (a break in the causal chain).
• Good-faith exception: A narrow exception to exclusion where officers reasonably rely on binding precedent or defective warrants; it must be argued by the government, or it is forfeited on appeal.
• Video-controls-facts principle: Appellate courts will credit bodycam/dashcam footage over conflicting testimonial or written findings.
• Nonprecedential decision: “Not recommended for publication” means the opinion is not binding precedent under Sixth Circuit rules, but it can be persuasive and is consistent with published Sixth Circuit and Supreme Court authority.

Conclusion

United States v. Moffitt reinforces a crisp Rodriguez principle in the Sixth Circuit: once an officer has completed—or pauses—the mission of a traffic stop, any shift to unrelated investigative questioning, even momentarily, unlawfully prolongs the seizure unless supported by independent reasonable suspicion. In that posture, consent obtained during the extension is tainted and cannot salvage the search. The panel’s careful reliance on bodycam footage and granular task sequencing signals that courts will scrutinize the precise moment officer inquiries move from permissible “context-framing” to prohibited “criminal probing.” While unpublished, Moffitt offers robust guidance to law enforcement, litigants, and trial courts: keep mission tasks truly ongoing if posing unrelated questions, or secure reasonable suspicion or a clear break to a consensual encounter. The ruling not only vindicates core Fourth Amendment limits on traffic seizures but also clarifies operational best practices to avoid suppression in routine policing.