Unpublished Clarification: Testimonial Inconsistencies Alone Do Not Trigger a Mental-Competency Inquiry; Adverse Credibility Can Make Country-Conditions Evidence Irrelevant to CAT Relief

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Fourth Circuit’s unpublished per curiam decision in Sandra Yesenia Escobar-Amaya v. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General (No. 24-1679), decided October 17, 2025. The panel (Chief Judge Diaz, Judge Harris, and Judge Rushing) denied a petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order that upheld an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).

The petitioner alleged severe domestic abuse by a former partner in El Salvador and claimed she sought refuge in the United States to escape further harm. The IJ rejected her claims primarily on an adverse credibility finding rooted in inconsistencies in her testimony and prior sworn statements. On the CAT claim—which is not automatically defeated by adverse credibility—the IJ further found the non-testimonial evidence insufficient to meet the “more likely than not” torture standard.

On appeal, Ms. Escobar-Amaya argued that (1) the IJ should have initiated a mental-competency assessment under Matter of M-A-M- because the identified inconsistencies reflected cognitive impairment rather than mendacity, and (2) the IJ and BIA improperly disregarded expert country-conditions evidence that, in her view, demonstrated a likelihood of torture arising from a custody dispute in a country where battered women allegedly lack protection. The BIA rejected both arguments. The Fourth Circuit affirmed.

Although unpublished and therefore nonbinding in the Fourth Circuit, the decision clarifies two practical points:

Testimonial inconsistencies, standing alone, do not trigger a duty to conduct a mental-competency inquiry under Matter of M-A-M-.
An adverse credibility finding may render otherwise probative country-conditions evidence irrelevant to a CAT claim where that evidence presupposes membership in a category (e.g., battered or abused women) that the applicant did not credibly establish.

Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit denied the petition for review. As to competency, the court declined to resolve the precise standard of review (substantial evidence vs. de novo) for the BIA’s ex post assessment where the IJ made no express competency finding, holding that the agency’s determination survives even under de novo review. The panel agreed with the BIA that the record showed no “indicia of incompetency” warranting a competency inquiry: (1) neither the petitioner nor counsel raised competency concerns; (2) the hearing transcript reflected rational understanding and responsive engagement; (3) her psychological evaluation indicated concentration, attention, and memory “within normal limits”; and (4) mere memory lapses or inconsistent testimony, without more, do not equate to incompetency. The IJ therefore was not required to set aside credibility concerns under Matter of J-R-R-A-.

On asylum and withholding, the adverse credibility finding was dispositive because the petitioner lacked independent corroboration sufficient to carry her burden. On CAT, applying substantial-evidence review, the court found no error in the agency’s determination that the petitioner failed to show it is more likely than not she would be tortured if removed. The IJ and BIA reasonably treated the proffered country-conditions evidence as irrelevant given the failure to credibly establish that she belonged to the group (battered or abused women) to which that evidence pertained. The court also rejected the petitioner’s attempt to repurpose a single credited threat (directed at her mother) via country-conditions context as a threat to her; the same lack of a credible predicate applied.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474 (BIA 2011) — Establishes the framework for assessing competency in immigration proceedings. IJs must look for “indicia of incompetency” (e.g., inability to understand/respond, distractibility, off-topic answers, or medical reports) and, only if such indicia appear, undertake measures to determine competency and consider safeguards. The Fourth Circuit agreed with the BIA that the record here did not reveal such indicia.
Diop v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 70 (4th Cir. 2015) — Holds that an IJ’s factual finding of competency is reviewed for substantial evidence and endorses M-A-M-’s framework. This panel flagged but did not resolve whether Diop’s standard also governs when the IJ made no express competency findings and the BIA assessed the issue after the fact; it deemed the agency’s conclusion correct even under de novo review.
Matter of J-R-R-A-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 609 (BIA 2015) — Addresses how competency concerns affect credibility assessments and instructs IJs to adopt safeguards and avoid penalizing an incompetent respondent for inconsistent testimony attributable to cognitive limitations. The court distinguished J-R-R-A- on the facts; the record here did not show comparable symptoms, behavior, or counsel-raised concerns.
Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361 (4th Cir. 2004) — Establishes that an adverse credibility finding can defeat asylum/withholding in the absence of corroboration (pp. 369–70) and also that CAT claims are analytically distinct from asylum/withholding (p. 371), requiring consideration of other evidence. The IJ complied by assessing additional evidence for CAT and finding it insufficient.
Rodriguez-Arias v. Whitaker, 915 F.3d 968 (4th Cir. 2019) — Sets standards for reviewing CAT determinations: factual findings under substantial evidence and abuse of discretion where the agency arbitrarily ignores relevant evidence (pp. 971–72). The panel found no such error.
Salgado-Sosa v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 451 (4th Cir. 2018) — When the BIA issues its own opinion and affirms the IJ, courts review both decisions (p. 456). The panel followed that approach.
Salgado v. Sessions, 889 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2018) — Cited for the proposition that the “mere inability to remember certain events and give certain testimony does not amount to mental incompetency” (p. 988). The panel used this to reject equating inconsistencies with incompetency.
Ibarra Chevez v. Garland, 31 F.4th 279 (4th Cir. 2022) — Cited in accord for the proposition that where the applicant fails to credibly establish the predicate connection to the category to which country-conditions evidence pertains, such evidence cannot salvage the claim (p. 293).

Legal Reasoning

1) Competency: When Must an IJ Inquire?

The court adopted the BIA’s M-A-M- framework: the IJ must look for “indicia of incompetency” in the hearing and record; if present, the IJ must evaluate competency and apply safeguards. The record reflected:

No objection or request by counsel regarding competency.
A hearing transcript demonstrating rational understanding and responsive exchanges—a functional grasp of the proceedings’ nature and purpose (the M-A-M- definition of competency).
A psychological evaluation diagnosing conditions that can be associated with concentration/memory challenges, but expressly finding her concentration, attention, and memory “within normal limits,” and describing coherent, detailed narration of traumatic events.
Inconsistencies in testimony on critical details—insufficient, without more, to trigger a competency inquiry per Salgado (9th Cir.).

On that record, the IJ had no duty to initiate a competency evaluation, and thus no obligation to disregard inconsistencies or to discount credibility concerns as J-R-R-A- might require where incompetency exists. The court contrasted the petitioner’s record with the marked indicators in M-A-M- (multiple psychiatric reports, prior incompetency findings in criminal court, on-the-record requests for psychiatric help) and J-R-R-A- (overtly disordered behavior and counsel-raised cognitive concerns). The petitioner’s evidence fell well short.

2) Adverse Credibility and Statutory Protection (Asylum/Withholding)

Relying on Camara, the court confirmed that an adverse credibility finding can be dispositive of asylum and withholding absent sufficient independent corroboration. Because the petitioner’s case rested on testimonial assertions of domestic abuse and she did not produce independent evidence to overcome the credibility deficit, the IJ properly denied those forms of relief.

3) CAT: Country-Conditions Evidence and the “More Likely Than Not” Standard

CAT protection requires demonstrating that it is “more likely than not” that the applicant would be subjected to torture if removed (8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2)). The court reviewed for substantial evidence and considered whether the agency arbitrarily ignored relevant evidence (Rodriguez-Arias).

The petitioner’s theory was that, given endemic deficiencies in protecting battered women in El Salvador—particularly in the context of custody disputes—her return posed a likelihood of torture. The IJ and BIA determined that the adverse credibility ruling severed the necessary link: because the petitioner did not credibly establish that she is a battered or abused woman, country-conditions evidence pertaining to that group did not apply to her. The Fourth Circuit endorsed this relevance filter, citing Ibarra Chevez in accord. The panel also rejected the petitioner’s attempt to bootstrap a single credited threat to her mother into a threat to herself via generalized country-conditions context; absent credible evidence placing her in the affected category, the country-conditions materials did not bear on her individualized risk.

4) Standard of Review for BIA Competency Assessments When the IJ Made No Express Findings

The panel noted—and left unresolved—whether Diop’s substantial-evidence review of IJ competency findings also governs cases where the IJ made no express competency finding and the BIA addressed competency in the first instance on appeal. The court bypassed the issue by concluding that the BIA’s competency determination was correct even under the petitioner’s preferred de novo standard. Practically, this leaves the choice-of-standard question open in the Fourth Circuit for a future, potentially published case.

Impact

Competency Gatekeeping Clarified (Practically): Counsel cannot rely on testimonial inconsistencies alone to trigger a competency inquiry. To invoke M-A-M-, the record should contain clear indicia—behavior at hearing, documented cognitive impairments, or professional assessments demonstrating functional limitations in understanding, attention, memory, or ability to assist counsel.
Strategic Imperative to Raise Competency Early: The court highlighted that neither the petitioner nor counsel raised competency. Practitioners should timely alert the IJ and submit functional assessments if competency is at issue; failure to do so may weigh against a later claim that M-A-M- required action.
Adverse Credibility’s Ripple Effect on CAT: While CAT claims are not automatically defeated by credibility determinations, this case underscores that country-conditions evidence must be tethered to the applicant’s credibly established characteristics. If the evidence applies to a defined group and the applicant does not credibly establish membership, the evidence may be deemed irrelevant.
Corroboration Matters: Especially in gender-based violence claims, independent corroboration (e.g., medical records, police reports, affidavits, contemporaneous communications, shelter records) can provide the “credible link” necessary for both asylum/withholding and CAT analyses when testimonial credibility is challenged.
Open Question on Appellate Review: The unresolved standard-of-review issue for competency assessments decided by the BIA (when the IJ made no express findings) remains a live doctrinal question in the Fourth Circuit. A future published opinion may establish controlling guidance.
Unpublished but Persuasive: Although nonprecedential, the decision gives practitioners a roadmap for how panels may treat competency arguments premised primarily on inconsistent testimony and how credibility findings can circumscribe the relevance of country-conditions evidence in CAT claims.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Adverse credibility finding: The IJ concluded the applicant’s testimony was not sufficiently reliable due to inconsistencies within her testimony and with prior statements. Without adequate corroboration, this can defeat asylum and withholding claims.
Competency in immigration court (Matter of M-A-M-): A person is competent if they have a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings and can consult with counsel. IJs look for “indicia of incompetency” (like confusion, inability to respond, or professional assessments indicating cognitive limitations). If indicia exist, the IJ must evaluate competency and implement safeguards (for example, adjusting how questions are asked or, where appropriate, refraining from penalizing inconsistencies attributable to impairment).
Safeguards (Matter of J-R-R-A-): When incompetency is present, IJs must not rely on inconsistency-driven credibility findings that likely stem from cognitive impairments; they should adapt proceedings to ensure fairness.
CAT “more likely than not” standard: To win CAT relief, an applicant must show a greater than 50% chance of being subjected to torture by or with the consent/acquiescence of a public official if returned to the country of removal.
Country-conditions evidence: Reports and expert analyses about generalized conditions in a country. This evidence is probative only insofar as it relates to the applicant’s credibly established circumstances (e.g., membership in a group at heightened risk).
Standards of review:
- Substantial evidence: Highly deferential; the court upholds agency findings unless the record compels a contrary conclusion.
- De novo: The court decides the issue anew. Here, the panel found no error even under de novo with respect to competency.
- Abuse of discretion (ignoring evidence): The court may reverse if the agency arbitrarily disregards relevant evidence; the panel found no such error.

Conclusion

Escobar-Amaya is an instructive, though unpublished, decision marking two practical guideposts in removal defense. First, testimonial inconsistencies do not by themselves obligate an IJ to conduct a mental-competency inquiry under Matter of M-A-M-. Indicative behavior or professional evidence showing functional impairment is required, and counsel should raise such concerns contemporaneously. Second, while CAT protection is analytically distinct from asylum/withholding, adverse credibility can effectively circumscribe the relevance of country-conditions evidence when that evidence presupposes an attribute or group membership the applicant failed to credibly establish.

The panel left open an important doctrinal question—how to review BIA competency determinations when the IJ made no explicit competency findings—but found the BIA’s decision correct even under de novo review. Going forward, practitioners should:

Build a record of concrete “indicia of incompetency” when competency is genuinely at issue, including functional assessments tied to the ability to participate in proceedings.
Anticipate the ripple effects of credibility findings and marshal independent corroboration to establish both past events and the applicant’s membership in any group to which country-conditions evidence is directed.

Key takeaway: In the Fourth Circuit, absent clear indicia of incompetency beyond mere inconsistencies, IJs have no duty under M-A-M- to pause proceedings for a competency assessment, and adverse credibility may neutralize otherwise compelling country-conditions evidence in CAT claims where the necessary predicate link is not credibly established.