Unpreserved Sentencing-Explanation Challenges Trigger Plain-Error Review; Minimal Reasons Suffice for Within-Guidelines Illegal-Reentry Sentences in “Conceptually Simple” Cases

I. Introduction

United States v. Jonathan Canil-Lopez (11th Cir. Dec. 29, 2025) is an unpublished Eleventh Circuit decision affirming a 46-month sentence for illegal reentry after removal following an aggravated felony conviction, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). The appeal raised two recurring sentencing issues in federal practice: (1) whether the district court sufficiently explained the chosen sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), and (2) whether the sentence was substantively unreasonable under the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.

The parties were the United States of America (Plaintiff-Appellee) and Jonathan Canil-Lopez (Defendant-Appellant), who had previously been removed, returned unlawfully, served a prior federal illegal-reentry sentence, was removed again, and then returned unlawfully yet again.

The case is noteworthy less for altering sentencing doctrine than for illustrating how the Eleventh Circuit operationalizes: (a) preservation rules for procedural sentencing claims, (b) the “reasoned basis” requirement for sentencing explanations, and (c) the discretion to emphasize deterrence for repeat offenders—particularly in illegal-reentry cases.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. It held that:

Procedural reasonableness: Because Canil-Lopez did not preserve an objection to the adequacy of the sentencing explanation, the court reviewed only for plain error and found none. The district court’s explanation—emphasizing his prior illegal reentry and stating that its individualized § 3553(a) assessment supported 46 months—provided a sufficient “reasoned basis.”
Substantive reasonableness: The within-guidelines 46-month sentence was not an abuse of discretion. The district court reasonably gave significant weight to deterrence given repeated illegal reentries.

The panel also clarified a common mislabeling: an argument that the district court did not adequately explain the sentence is a procedural challenge, not a substantive one.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Framework for reasonableness review

United States v. Trailer, 827 F.3d 933 (11th Cir. 2016): The opinion uses Trailer to restate the two-step sentencing review: (1) procedural error check (including inadequate explanation), then (2) substantive reasonableness under the totality of the circumstances and § 3553(a). This provides the structural backbone of the panel’s analysis.
United States v. Jackson, 997 F.3d 1138 (11th Cir. 2021): Cited for the proposition that a sentence may be unreasonable either procedurally or substantively. The citation is deployed to categorize Canil-Lopez’s claims correctly.
United States v. Oudomsine, 57 F.4th 1262 (11th Cir. 2023): Performs double duty. First, it supports the classification that an insufficient explanation is a procedural issue. Second, it supplies the substantive-reasonableness standard (“abuse of discretion” under § 3553(a)).

2. Preservation and plain-error review

United States v. Steiger, 99 F.4th 1316 (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc): This is the key preservation precedent. The panel relies on Steiger to conclude that because Canil-Lopez objected only to substantive reasonableness (not to the adequacy of the explanation), his procedural claim was unpreserved and thus reviewed for plain error. The opinion also borrows Steiger’s pragmatic observation that compliance with § 3553(c) “isn't onerous” and that, in simple cases, a brief statement may suffice.

3. Adequacy of sentencing explanations

United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020): Provides the controlling articulation that the explanation must reveal a “reasoned basis” for the decision. The panel uses this to uphold the district court’s explanation as adequate.
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007): Quoted (via Steiger) for the “conceptually simple” case principle: when the record shows the judge considered evidence and arguments, a statement that a within-guidelines sentence is appropriate may be enough. The panel treats this as particularly applicable here given the repeated illegal reentry and a within-guidelines sentence at the top of the range.

4. Substantive reasonableness and factor-weighting discretion

United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2015): Cited for the burden allocation: the defendant bears the burden of showing the sentence is unreasonable.
United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) and United States v. Campa, 459 F.3d 1121 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc): Supply the familiar Eleventh Circuit formulation for substantive unreasonableness—failure to consider relevant factors, reliance on improper factors, or clear error of judgment in balancing proper factors. These cases anchor the court’s deference to district-court weighing.
United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349 (11th Cir. 2022): Used to emphasize that district courts may weight some § 3553(a) factors more than others and may give particular weight to deterrence when a defendant repeatedly commits the same type of offense. This is central to rejecting Canil-Lopez’s variance request.
United States v. McQueen, 727 F.3d 1144 (11th Cir. 2013): Supports the district court’s discretion to emphasize deterrence, reinforcing the notion that repeat conduct justifies stronger deterrent sentencing choices.
United States v. Blanco, 102 F.4th 1153 (11th Cir.) and United States v. Perkins, 787 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2015): Cited for the expectation that a within-guidelines sentence is ordinarily substantively reasonable. The opinion uses this “ordinary expectation” to bolster affirmance, especially since 46 months was within the post-adjustment range (37–46 months).

Synthesis: Collectively, these precedents yield a strongly deferential appellate posture: when a defendant fails to preserve a procedural objection, plain-error review is difficult to satisfy; and on substance, district courts receive wide latitude to prioritize deterrence and to impose within-guidelines sentences, particularly for repetitive conduct.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The sentencing record and the narrowed guidelines range

A distinctive feature of the sentencing hearing was the district court’s practical handling of a potential criminal-history dispute. Canil-Lopez sought a continuance to investigate whether he had pled to Georgia driving offenses. The court noted that a 46-month sentence would remain within the advisory range even if the contested point were excluded, and it offered to disregard that point. After that concession, the criminal history category dropped from IV to III, shifting the advisory range from 46–57 months to 37–46 months. The district court then imposed 46 months (the top of the revised range).

That procedural posture matters because it strengthened the record that the district court was attentive to fairness and accuracy while still treating the offense conduct and recidivism as warranting a guidelines sentence.

2. Procedural reasonableness: preservation and sufficiency of explanation

The panel’s procedural analysis proceeds in two moves:

Preservation: Applying United States v. Steiger, 99 F.4th 1316 (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc), the court holds the issue unpreserved because the defendant objected only to substantive reasonableness. Result: plain-error review.
Merits under plain error: The panel reiterates the statutory duty to state reasons in open court under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), and the requirement of a “reasoned basis” under United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567. It then treats this as a “conceptually simple” case in the Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 sense: repeated illegal reentry, within-guidelines range, and an on-record statement that the § 3553(a) factors justify the chosen sentence.

Importantly, the panel does not say more explanation would be undesirable—only that it was not legally required on this record, under this standard of review.

3. Substantive reasonableness: deterrence and repeat illegal reentry

Turning to substance, the panel applies the abuse-of-discretion standard described in United States v. Oudomsine, 57 F.4th 1262 and the en banc substantive-unreasonableness framework of United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (citing United States v. Campa, 459 F.3d 1121). It then emphasizes:

The district court could legitimately prioritize deterrence given that Canil-Lopez committed the same crime repeatedly (a point supported by United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349 and United States v. McQueen, 727 F.3d 1144).
The sentence was within the advisory range, and under United States v. Blanco, 102 F.4th 1153 (quoting United States v. Perkins, 787 F.3d 1329), such sentences are ordinarily expected to be reasonable.

The court thus rejects the claim that the district court improperly balanced the § 3553(a) factors or wrongly denied a downward variance based on the defendant’s history (childhood entry, cultural ties, age at prior offense, and family ties).

C. Impact

Although labeled “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” the decision has practical significance for litigants and district courts in the Eleventh Circuit:

Preservation discipline: Sentencing counsel who wish to challenge the adequacy of the explanation must object clearly on procedural grounds at sentencing. Otherwise, Steiger channels the claim into the much narrower plain-error lane.
Low explanatory threshold in straightforward, within-guidelines cases: The opinion reinforces that minimal explanations can suffice when the record shows the judge considered the parties’ arguments and the case fits the “conceptually simple” mold described in Rita v. United States.
Deterrence as a dominant factor for repeat illegal reentry: By approving heightened emphasis on deterrence for repeated illegal reentry, the decision signals that variance arguments grounded in personal history may carry less weight when recidivism is pronounced and recent.
Guidelines anchoring effect: The court’s “ordinary expectation” that within-guidelines sentences are reasonable (per United States v. Blanco) continues to make top-of-range sentences difficult to overturn, absent a clear misweighing or improper factor.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness: Procedural concerns how the sentence was imposed—e.g., correct guidelines calculation, consideration of § 3553(a), and an adequate explanation under § 3553(c). Substantive concerns whether the final length and terms of the sentence are reasonable given the facts and § 3553(a).
Preservation: To preserve an issue for appeal, a party generally must raise a specific objection in the district court. If the objection is not made, appellate courts often apply plain-error review, which is much harder for the appellant to win.
Plain error: A demanding appellate standard used when an issue was not properly preserved. The appellant must typically show an error that is clear (“plain”) and that affected substantial rights, and even then the appellate court may decline to correct it.
Downward variance: A sentence below the advisory guideline range based on the judge’s application of § 3553(a) factors (as opposed to a guidelines “departure,” which is based on specific guideline provisions).
Within-guidelines sentence: A sentence that falls inside the advisory range recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines after calculating the offense level and criminal history category.
§ 3553(a) factors: The statutory considerations guiding federal sentencing, including the nature of the offense, defendant’s history, deterrence, public protection, and avoiding unwarranted disparities, among others.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Jonathan Canil-Lopez underscores three practical rules in Eleventh Circuit sentencing appeals: (1) an inadequate-explanation claim is procedural and must be preserved to avoid plain-error review; (2) in “conceptually simple” cases resulting in a within-guidelines sentence, a brief on-record statement tied to § 3553(a) and the defendant’s recidivism can satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c); and (3) district courts act within their discretion when they give substantial weight to deterrence for defendants who repeatedly commit the same offense, such as illegal reentry.