Unobjected PSR Facts, Hostage Inferences, and Upward Variances: A Commentary on United States v. Renaldo Smith (11th Cir.)

I. Introduction

The Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished per curiam decision in United States v. Renaldo Smith, No. 24‑12417, affirms a substantial upward variance in sentencing for a defendant who assaulted federal officers and discharged a firearm during an armed standoff. Although “not for publication,” the opinion is a useful illustration of several recurring themes in federal sentencing:

How far a district court may go in varying upward from the Sentencing Guidelines for violent conduct against law enforcement;
The evidentiary role of the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) and the consequences of failing to object to its factual content;
The degree of deference the Eleventh Circuit gives district judges on both procedural and substantive reasonableness;
The high bar for proving “unwarranted sentencing disparities” under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6); and
The limited constraining effect of significant mental health mitigation when the offense conduct is exceptionally dangerous.

This commentary examines the opinion in depth, focusing on the court’s handling of disputed factual inferences (particularly its acceptance of a “hostage” characterization based on unobjected PSR material) and its endorsement of a large upward variance from the guideline range in a violent law-enforcement-encounter case.

II. Summary of the Opinion

Smith pleaded guilty to:

One count of assaulting a federal law enforcement officer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a) (Count Two); and
One count of discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) (Count Sixteen).

The Guidelines:

Count Two: total offense level 19, criminal history category IV, advisory range 46–57 months (statutory maximum 20 years);
Count Sixteen: mandatory minimum 120 months’ imprisonment, to run consecutively.

The district court imposed:

180 months on Count Two (a very substantial upward variance from 46–57 months); and
120 months on Count Sixteen (the mandatory minimum),

for a total of 300 months (25 years), with the federal sentence to run consecutive to any future state sentences for probation violations or pending state charges.

On appeal, Smith raised two principal arguments:

Procedural reasonableness: The district court allegedly relied on clearly erroneous facts about a prior incident at Fort Bliss (Texas), specifically characterizing that event as involving a “hostage” without evidentiary support.
Substantive reasonableness: The 180‑month sentence on Count Two (and resulting 300‑month total) was allegedly unreasonably high, particularly given his mental health issues and alleged sentencing disparities with another federal defendant who shot at a federal agent.

The Eleventh Circuit rejected both challenges and affirmed:

Procedural holding: No clear error occurred. The district court could plausibly infer hostage-taking from unobjected-to PSR statements describing Smith’s conduct (pushing his girlfriend and her daughter, barricading himself, and the response of “hostage negotiators”).
Substantive holding: The upward variance was supported by a compelling justification under § 3553(a), including the gravity of the offense, Smith’s lengthy and violent criminal history, his prior standoff-like conduct at Fort Bliss, and the need to protect the public and deter future misconduct. Smith failed to demonstrate an unwarranted sentencing disparity because he provided insufficient information about the comparator’s criminal history and other relevant characteristics.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The January 2023 Warner Robins Standoff

In January 2023, a U.S. Marshals Service fugitive task force executed several outstanding arrest warrants for Smith at a residence in Warner Robins, Georgia. Key facts:

Agents surrounded the house, knocked, and repeatedly announced “police with a warrant.”
Smith partially opened the door, was told to come outside, then slammed the door and refused to exit.
After agents forced entry with a battering ram, gunshots immediately came from inside the house, forcing officers to retreat and take cover. A multi-hour standoff ensued, with a SWAT team responding.
Smith refused to surrender, told officers he would not go back to prison, and texted the mother of his child that he was “going to shoot it out with police” and “wasn't going back to prison.”
Officers deployed a robot and saw Smith with both a pistol and an assault rifle; at one point he pointed the pistol at his own head, indicating suicidal intent.
After tear gas was deployed, Smith fired multiple rounds toward the officers, who returned fire and eventually wounded him in the arm, after which he surrendered.
No officers were injured; officers recovered loaded firearms (pistol and assault rifle) and additional ammunition.

B. Charges, Competency, and Plea

A federal grand jury indicted Smith on:

One count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1);
Fourteen counts of assaulting a federal law enforcement officer, 18 U.S.C. § 111(a); and
One count of discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii).

At defense counsel’s request, a forensic psychologist evaluated Smith. She diagnosed:

Unspecified schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorder;
Antisocial personality disorder;
Alcohol, cannabis, and opioid use disorders; and
Unspecified depressive disorder.

However, she concluded he was competent: he understood the proceedings and could assist in his defense. The district court agreed.

Smith then pleaded guilty to:

One § 111(a) count (Count Two); and
The § 924(c) discharge count (Count Sixteen),

in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges.

C. Criminal History and the Fort Bliss Incident

The PSR detailed a lengthy record beginning in childhood:

Extensive juvenile delinquency starting at age nine, with over ten adjudications by age sixteen.
At 16 (adult court, 2007): Robbery by force at a convenience store (using a pistol), revoked first-offender probation after new armed robbery/burglary/theft conduct; ultimately sentenced to 20 years (9 in custody, remainder probation).
2012–2013: Released on parole, quickly involved in methamphetamine and marijuana possession and fleeing an officer; convicted and sentenced to 10 years (18 months in custody), with parole again revoked.
2019: While on probation, caught with hydrocodone and marijuana; pending Georgia charges and probation revocation.
2019 domestic violence incident: Assault on the mother of his child; bail jumping charge when he failed to appear; he later pled guilty to bail jumping and received 60 days; underlying domestic charges were dropped.
2020 high-speed chase: Fled a traffic stop, admitted there was a firearm in the car, led officers on a high-speed chase, abandoned the vehicle, and escaped. Officers recovered a loaded pistol, ammunition, marijuana, scales, and packaging materials. He was charged with eluding, possession with intent, and felon-in-possession; again faced probation revocation.

The PSR also recounted a prior standoff-type incident at Fort Bliss, Texas (December 2021 / New Year’s Eve):

At his girlfriend’s on-base housing, Smith—described as drunk—pushed her and her daughter, took his girlfriend’s gun, and “barricaded himself” inside her home.
Military police, “hostage negotiators,” and other officers responded and attempted to persuade him to come out; he refused.
Officers eventually entered and arrested him; he was released that same day and banned from Fort Bliss.
A federal indictment later followed in the Western District of Texas for felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition (later voluntarily dismissed while this appeal was pending).

These events, particularly the Fort Bliss standoff, played a central role in the district court’s assessment of Smith’s risk and in the Eleventh Circuit’s review.

D. Guidelines Calculation

For Count Two (assault on a federal officer):

Total offense level: 19;
Criminal history score: 9 (placing him in criminal history category IV);
Resulting advisory range: 46–57 months;
Statutory maximum: 20 years (240 months).

For Count Sixteen (§ 924(c) discharge count):

Guideline sentence: 120 months (fixed by the statutory mandatory minimum for discharging a firearm under § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii));
Required to run consecutively to any sentence on Count Two.

The PSR flagged that an upward variance could be appropriate given 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Smith objected only to this upward-variance suggestion, but not to the factual recitation of his prior conduct, including Fort Bliss.

E. Sentencing Arguments

1. Government’s Position

The government urged an upward variance, emphasizing:

Nature and circumstances of the offense: Smith twice opened fire on law enforcement, in the context of a prolonged, dangerous standoff, demonstrating “blatant disregard for the safety and lives of others.”
Criminal history: A long pattern of violent behavior, repeated probation/parole violations, and the fact that the offense occurred while on probation.
Fort Bliss incident: A strikingly similar scenario where Smith barricaded himself with a firearm and refused to surrender, viewed as evidence that the Warner Robins standoff was not a one-off aberration. The government went further—without evidentiary support—speculating he might have regretted not shooting at Fort Bliss and “promised himself” to do so next time.
§ 3553(a) purposes: Seriousness of the offense, respect for the law, just punishment, deterrence, and protection of the public.

2. Defense Position

Smith requested a within-guidelines sentence, or at most a total of 240 months (120 + 120). He stressed:

Mental state at the time: He was in a “desperate state” with auditory hallucinations, suicidal ideation, and self-directed messages of failure; he told loved ones he wanted to die.
Personal history: Severe childhood adversity, frequent school changes, early diagnoses of ADHD, depression, and oppositional defiant disorder; loss of two uncle father-figures to suicide; minimal consistent mental-health treatment; progressive deterioration of mental health in and out of custody, with worsening substance abuse.
Improvement while medicated: Since his forensic evaluation and medication, his behavior in jail had stabilized; he pledged adherence to treatment in the future.
Fort Bliss: He did not dispute the PSR’s facts but attacked the government’s speculation about his motives (regret and premeditated intent to shoot in the future) as “complete speculation” without evidence. He noted he was quickly released after Fort Bliss and was only charged with felon-in-possession, with no allegation he harmed anyone.
Sentencing disparity: He invoked another Middle District of Georgia case where a defendant who shot at a federal agent received a 319‑month sentence after trial on assault, brandishing under § 924(c), and drug conspiracy charges. Smith argued he should receive a “substantially shorter” sentence because he pleaded guilty and no drug counts were involved.

F. The District Court’s Sentence

The district court announced that the guidelines (46–57 months on Count Two, plus the mandatory 120 months on Count Sixteen) failed to capture the gravity and seriousness of the offense. In its § 3553(a) discussion, the court emphasized:

Nature and seriousness of the instant offense: A dangerous standoff culminating in Smith firing on officers.
Criminal history and pattern: Extensive violent and drug-related criminal record, repeated failures on supervision, and prior conduct at Fort Bliss resembling the instant offense.
Fort Bliss specifics: The court noted that the only charge from Fort Bliss was felon-in-possession, but viewed the conduct as involving far more—Smith barricaded himself and “armed himself,” and the court characterized the event as involving a “hostage.” It found it “a mystery” that he was quickly released, enabling him to return to Georgia “armed to the teeth,” and observed how quickly the Warner Robins standoff followed Fort Bliss.

On that basis, the court imposed:

180 months on Count Two (vs. 46–57 months under the Guidelines);
120 months (mandatory minimum) on Count Sixteen;
All federal time to run consecutive to any sentences in pending state/probation-revocation matters.

IV. Precedents Cited and Their Role

A. Framework Cases on Sentencing Review

United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371 (11th Cir. 2010) – Establishes the two-step sentencing reasonableness review: (1) procedural; then (2) substantive reasonableness, both under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Also notes that the party challenging the sentence bears the burden of showing unreasonableness.
United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2014) and United States v. Trailer, 827 F.3d 933 (11th Cir. 2016) – Define “procedural error” to include miscalculation of the guidelines, failure to consider § 3553(a), use of clearly erroneous facts, treating guidelines as mandatory, or failing to explain the sentence.
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) – The Supreme Court’s leading case: appellate courts review sentences for abuse of discretion, considering the “totality of the circumstances”; major variances require more significant justifications than minor ones; and district courts must provide sufficiently detailed explanations.
United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) – Articulates the “definite and firm conviction” language for finding a “clear error of judgment” in weighing § 3553(a) factors; emphasizes that there is a range of reasonable sentences, and appellate courts should not substitute their judgment merely because they would have imposed a different sentence.
United States v. Early, 686 F.3d 1219 (11th Cir. 2012) – Clarifies that an upward variance must be supported by a justification “compelling enough” to support the degree of variance and “complete enough” for meaningful appellate review.
United States v. McBride, 511 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2007) – Holds that district courts are not required to discuss every § 3553(a) factor or explain in detail how each factor contributes to the sentence, so long as the record reflects meaningful consideration.
United States v. Croteau, 819 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2016) – Reiterates that the weight afforded to any given § 3553(a) factor is left to the district court’s discretion.
United States v. Grushko, 50 F.4th 1 (11th Cir. 2022) – Notes that a sentence significantly below the statutory maximum is an indicator of reasonableness, though not dispositive.

B. Cases on PSR Facts and Clear Error

United States v. Matthews, 3 F.4th 1286 (11th Cir. 2021) – Defines clear-error review: an appellate court will reverse a factual finding only if it is left with the “definite and firm conviction” that a mistake has been made; if the district court’s account is “plausible in light of the record,” it stands.
United States v. Bennett, 472 F.3d 825 (11th Cir. 2006) and United States v. Williams, 989 F.2d 1137 (11th Cir. 1993) – Allow reliance on unobjected-to PSR statements at sentencing, including facts surrounding prior arrests, as an evidentiary basis for findings.
United States v. Martinez, 584 F.3d 1022 (11th Cir. 2009) – If a defendant objects to a PSR fact, the government must prove that disputed fact by a preponderance of the evidence; absent such an objection, the PSR is taken as admitted.

C. Cases on Sentencing Disparities

United States v. Azmat, 805 F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2015) – Explains that an unwarranted disparity claim requires comparators who are “similarly situated,” considering both the facts of the crime and the defendant’s characteristics; otherwise, there is no valid disparity claim.
United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091 (11th Cir. 2009) – Famously admonishes that “apples” must be compared to “apples” for a well-founded disparity claim; partial or incomplete comparator information is inadequate.

The Eleventh Circuit uses this body of precedent to frame its deferential review of the district court’s factual inferences and sentencing choices in Smith’s case.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Procedural Reasonableness: Clear Error and the “Hostage” Inference

Smith’s procedural argument focused narrowly on one factual characterization: the district court’s statement that the Fort Bliss incident “involved a hostage.” He contended there was no evidence that anyone was actually held hostage and that reliance on this allegedly false fact rendered his sentence procedurally unreasonable.

The Eleventh Circuit rejected this challenge by:

Emphasizing the role of the PSR. The PSR reported that:
- Smith pushed his girlfriend and her daughter;
- Then barricaded himself inside his girlfriend’s home with a gun; and
- “Hostage negotiators” were among the responding officers.
Smith did not object to any of these PSR statements. Under Bennett, Williams, and Martinez, unobjected PSR facts are valid evidentiary grounds for findings at sentencing and are deemed admitted.
Distinguishing facts from speculation. The panel does not endorse the government’s speculative theory about Smith’s motives (that he regretted not firing at Fort Bliss and resolved to shoot officers next time). Rather, the panel focuses on objective PSR facts: pushing, barricading, armed presence, and the response of hostage negotiators.
Allowing reasonable inferences. The key move is to treat the district court’s characterization of the event as involving a “hostage” as a reasonable inference from those facts. Because trained hostage negotiators were deployed to respond to an armed barricade in a residence that included his girlfriend and her child, the inference that someone was being held as a hostage was “plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety” (Matthews). Under clear-error review, if the inference is plausible, the appellate court must affirm.

In short, the opinion reinforces a robust principle: if the PSR states certain facts, and the defendant does not object, the sentencing judge may both adopt those facts and draw reasonable inferences from them without triggering clear error. Smith’s failure to object to the PSR’s Fort Bliss description left him vulnerable to the court’s more aggressive inference that the incident involved a hostage scenario.

B. Substantive Reasonableness: Justifying a Major Upward Variance

The advisory guideline range for Count Two was 46–57 months; the district court imposed 180 months (three to almost four times the guideline range). This is a “major” upward variance in Gall’s terms and must therefore be supported by a correspondingly powerful justification.

The Eleventh Circuit’s analysis emphasizes:

Thorough consideration of § 3553(a) factors. The district court “carefully weighed” several factors:
- Nature and circumstances of the offense: A multi-hour armed standoff, explicit threats to “shoot it out with police,” multiple rounds fired at officers after tear gas deployment, and the necessity of using force to subdue Smith.
- History and characteristics of the defendant: Extensive criminal history, including violent robbery and repeated offenses involving firearms and fleeing law enforcement; multiple revocations and failures on probation and parole.
- Need to promote respect for the law and provide just punishment: Smith had “violated every probation sentence,” reflecting entrenched disregard for legal constraints.
- Need for deterrence and protection of the public: The court regarded Smith as presenting a serious, continuing risk, as evidenced by the near repetition of the Fort Bliss pattern in Warner Robins.
Under McBride and Croteau, the district court was not required to address each factor exhaustively or assign them equal weight.
Integration of the Fort Bliss incident. While Smith was not being punished for a Texas case (and that indictment was later dismissed), the district court legitimately viewed the Fort Bliss incident as part of his “history and characteristics” and as highly probative of risk and pattern:
- Armed barricade with a firearm in a domestic context;
- Refusal to surrender, requiring a law enforcement operation involving hostage negotiators;
- Rapid recurrence of similar behavior in Georgia.
Under § 3553(a)(1), courts may consider prior conduct whether or not it resulted in conviction, and under Eleventh Circuit practice, unobjected PSR details about arrests and non-conviction conduct are routinely used in this way.
Mental health mitigation acknowledged but outweighed. Smith argued his schizophrenia-spectrum and other disorders, childhood trauma, and suicidal state reduced his culpability and risk. The panel recognizes that he presented these as mitigating factors but notes that “the weight given to any specific § 3553(a) factor is committed to the sound discretion of the district court” (Croteau). The sentencing judge evidently credited the mitigation to some extent (by not imposing the 20-year maximum on Count Two) but concluded that the risk to law enforcement and the public predominated.
Sentence below statutory maximum. The 180‑month sentence on Count Two is below the 240‑month statutory maximum. The court notes this as a supportive factor under Grushko, reinforcing reasonableness, though not independently decisive.

The panel ultimately finds no “clear error of judgment” under Irey; given the “range of reasonable sentences” for such dangerous conduct, a 180‑month term on Count Two—combined with the mandatory 120 months on the § 924(c) count—falls within that range.

C. Sentencing Disparity and Comparator Analysis

Smith’s final substantive argument was that his 300-month total created an unwarranted disparity compared to a Middle District of Georgia defendant who received 319 months for shooting at a federal agent after being convicted at trial of:

Assault on a federal officer;
Brandishing a firearm under § 924(c); and
Drug conspiracy (multiple controlled substances).

Smith argued that his circumstances were less serious—he pleaded guilty and had no drug-trafficking conviction—such that a substantially shorter sentence was required to avoid disparity.

The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument on narrow but important grounds:

Insufficient comparator information. Smith provided no information about the comparator’s:
- Criminal history;
- Criminal justice status at the time of the offense (e.g., on probation/parole); or
- Involvement in earlier dangerous incidents or patterns similar to Fort Bliss.
Without such details, the court could not determine whether the comparator was “similarly situated” as required by Azmat and Docampo.
“Apples to apples” requirement. Citing Docampo, the court reiterates that an unwarranted disparity claim must be grounded in truly comparable circumstances—“apples to apples”—not superficial similarities (e.g., both defendants shot at federal agents). Differences in history, role, and other characteristics can justify different sentences even where the core conduct (firing at officers) is similar.

Smith therefore failed to meet his burden of showing that his sentence lies outside the “range of reasonable sentences” or that it creates a prohibited unwarranted disparity.

VI. Impact and Practical Significance

A. Reinforcement of Deferential Sentencing Review

Although unpublished, Smith is consistent with, and thus reinforces, an established Eleventh Circuit approach: substantial upward variances in violent cases—especially assaults on law enforcement—will ordinarily be upheld if the district court:

Calculates the Guidelines correctly;
Explicitly references key § 3553(a) factors; and
Articulates a reasoned justification tied to seriousness, history, deterrence, and public protection.

The court’s acceptance of a massive increase from 46–57 months to 180 months (for Count Two) emphasizes just how wide that zone of discretion can be when the conduct is egregious and public safety is at stake.

B. PSR Objections: The Cost of Silence

The decision underscores the importance of aggressively litigating PSR factual content at sentencing:

Smith did contest the government’s speculation about his motives but did not object to the PSR’s narrative of the Fort Bliss incident, including the presence of hostage negotiators and the sequence of events.
That unobjected description allowed the district court to draw a strong inference of hostage-taking—an inference the Eleventh Circuit deemed “plausible,” thereby surviving clear-error review.
Defense counsel who anticipate adverse inferences (e.g., “hostage situation,” “ambush,” “execution-style killing”) should consider not only objecting to PSR wording but also proactively clarifying the scope of what is—and is not—being admitted.

In practice, Smith is a cautionary tale for defense practitioners: silence can functionally concede facts and, by extension, the inferences that a sentencing judge may reasonably draw from those facts.

C. Use of Prior Non-Conviction Conduct to Justify a Variance

Smith also exemplifies how courts can rely on prior non-conviction conduct—here, the Fort Bliss incident where the indictment was later dismissed—to justify a tougher sentence:

Under § 3553(a)(1) (“history and characteristics”), prior conduct, including arrests and dismissed charges, may influence sentencing if the court finds the underlying conduct established by a preponderance.
When such conduct is detailed in the PSR and unchallenged, it becomes a powerful basis for upward variance claims, particularly where it mirrors the instant offense (both as armed barricades and standoffs with law enforcement).

For prosecutors, Smith illustrates the strategic value of thoroughly documenting dangerous prior episodes in the PSR framework; for defense counsel, it highlights why even remote-seeming incidents must be fact-checked and, if necessary, challenged.

D. Mental Health as Mitigation in Violent-Offense Sentencing

Smith’s documented psychotic and depressive disorders, history of trauma, and suicidal ideation did not yield a reduction in sentence, but they were clearly presented and considered. The decision suggests:

Mental illness is recognized as relevant to § 3553(a)(1), but it does not automatically trump public-safety concerns when the defendant has repeatedly engaged in armed confrontations with law enforcement.
Courts may still impose long sentences if they conclude such sentences are necessary to protect the public and deter further offenses, even where the defendant’s mental state is significantly impaired.
The fact that Smith’s condition reportedly stabilized with treatment in custody supports the view that long-term incarceration and consistent treatment (rather than community treatment alone) may be seen as necessary to achieve § 3553(a)(2)(C)’s protection-of-the-public objective.

Defendants with serious mental illness can thus expect careful consideration but not necessarily leniency in violent, life-threatening scenarios.

E. Raising § 3553(a)(6) Disparity Claims: Building the Record

Smith is also instructive on how not to litigate an unwarranted-disparity argument:

Smith pointed to another defendant with superficially similar conduct (shooting at a federal agent) but failed to provide essential context: the comparator’s criminal history, supervision status, prior pattern of conduct, and other relevant characteristics.
The Eleventh Circuit essentially holds that without this information, the comparison is incomplete and non-probative; the burden rests on the defendant to present an “apples to apples” comparator.

For practitioners, the lesson is clear: if § 3553(a)(6) is to be used meaningfully, defense counsel must build a detailed record of comparators, often requiring investigation beyond case captions and basic offense descriptions.

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Procedural vs. Substantive Reasonableness

Procedural reasonableness asks: Did the sentencing process follow the rules?
- Correct guideline calculation?
- Consideration of all required factors (§ 3553(a))?
- No reliance on clear factual mistakes?
- Explanation of why the chosen sentence is appropriate?
Substantive reasonableness asks: Given the facts, is the sentence actually too high or too low?
- Even if the procedure was correct, is the final sentence outside the range of what is reasonable for this defendant and offense?

B. Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) and Objections

The PSR is a report prepared by a probation officer with:
- Offense details;
- Criminal history;
- Personal background; and
- Guideline calculations.
Both sides may object to factual statements or legal conclusions.
If the defendant does not object to a factual statement, courts treat that fact as admitted and may rely on it as true at sentencing.
If the defendant does object, the government must prove the disputed fact by a preponderance of the evidence.

C. Mandatory Minimum vs. Statutory Maximum vs. Guidelines

Mandatory minimum: The lowest sentence the judge is legally allowed to impose for a particular offense (e.g., 10 years for discharging a firearm under § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii)).
Statutory maximum: The highest sentence allowed by statute for a particular count (e.g., 20 years for assault on a federal officer under § 111(a)).
Sentencing Guidelines: An advisory range suggested by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines based on the offense characteristics and criminal history (e.g., 46–57 months here for Count Two). Judges must consider but are not bound by this range.

D. Upward Variance and § 3553(a) Factors

Variance: A sentence above or below the advisory guideline range based on statutory sentencing factors.
Upward variance: A higher-than-guideline sentence because the court believes the guidelines understate the seriousness of the offense, the need for deterrence, or risk to the public.
§ 3553(a) factors include:
- Nature and circumstances of the offense;
- History and characteristics of the defendant;
- The need for the sentence to:
  - Reflect seriousness;
  - Promote respect for law;
  - Provide just punishment;
  - Deter crime;
  - Protect the public;
  - Provide needed training, care, or treatment;
- Guideline range and policy statements;
- Need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities;
- Need to provide restitution (if applicable).

E. Standards of Review: “Clear Error” and “Abuse of Discretion”

Clear error (for facts): The appellate court will overturn a factual finding only if, after reviewing the record, it has a firm conviction that a mistake was made. If the district court’s view is plausible, even if another view is also plausible, there is no clear error.
Abuse of discretion (for the overall sentence): The appellate court asks whether the sentence is within a reasonable range, not whether it is the sentence the appellate court would have imposed. A sentence is reversed only if it lies outside that broad range—i.e., if the judge made a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors.

VIII. Conclusion

United States v. Renaldo Smith offers a compact but telling illustration of the Eleventh Circuit’s sentencing jurisprudence:

It reaffirms that unobjected-to PSR facts are powerful: they may be treated as admitted and support substantial inferences, such as characterization of an event as a hostage scenario.
It upholds a significant upward variance—more than tripling the guideline range on Count Two—based on the seriousness of firing on officers, Smith’s violent criminal history, and repeated standoff-like conduct, illustrating the wide discretion district courts retain under § 3553(a).
It underscores that mental health mitigation, while important, does not immunize a defendant from very long sentences when public safety and deterrence concerns are acute.
It clarifies that claims of unwarranted sentencing disparity require robust comparator data; partial descriptions do not suffice.

Though non-precedential, the opinion functions as a practical guide to how the Eleventh Circuit is likely to treat similar sentencing appeals, especially in cases involving violence against law enforcement and repeated dangerous conduct. For practitioners, Smith underscores the imperative of precise PSR objections, careful development of mitigating mental health narratives, and fully sourced comparator data when invoking § 3553(a)(6).