United States v. Yelizarov: Narrowing the “Miscarriage-of-Justice” Escape Hatch to Appellate-Waiver Clauses After a § 924(c) Vacatur

Introduction

The Fourth Circuit’s published decision in United States v. Stanislav Steven Yelizarov (2025) resolves a procedurally tangled criminal saga that began with a violent jewelry-store robbery and ended with separate federal convictions for robbery-related crimes and a later-discovered 2009 murder. Over eight years, the defendant:

entered two plea agreements (the second a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) “Type-C” agreement for a capped 30-year sentence);
filed two § 2255 motions (one challenging counsel’s effectiveness, the other invoking post-Simms/Davis changes to § 924(c)); and
was sentenced twice—first to 360 months (including an 84-month § 924(c) term) and, after that term was vacated, to the same 360-month total on the remaining counts.

On appeal, Yelizarov pressed two arguments: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) in plea negotiations; and (2) procedural and substantive unreasonableness of his resentencing. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of the IAC claim and dismissed the sentencing appeal as barred by a valid waiver contained in the plea agreement. In doing so, the Court announced a clarifying principle:

Where a § 924(c) conviction is later vacated and the defendant is resentenced, the existing appellate-waiver clause remains enforceable—absent an independent claim of actual innocence on the convictions that survive resentencing—and no “miscarriage of justice” exception applies merely because the vacatur altered the sentencing package.

Summary of the Judgment

Judge John A. Gibney Jr., writing for a unanimous panel, held:

Ineffective Assistance (Affirmed): Even assuming counsel’s performance was deficient, Yelizarov failed to prove prejudice under Strickland because contemporaneous evidence showed he would have pleaded guilty regardless of counsel’s alleged missteps.
Sentencing Appeal (Dismissed): A knowing and voluntary waiver of appellate rights, confirmed in a thorough Rule 11 colloquy, bars challenges to the length and procedural regularity of the new sentence. The Court declined to extend the “miscarriage-of-justice” exception recognized in United States v. McKinney to cases where the underlying conviction triggering that exception (here § 924(c)) has already been vacated.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) – Provides the two-prong test (deficient performance & prejudice) for IAC claims. The panel relied on the doctrine that courts may dispose of an IAC claim on prejudice alone.
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) – Tailors Strickland to guilty-plea contexts, requiring proof that the defendant would have gone to trial absent counsel’s errors.
Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. 357 (2017) – Emphasizes the need for contemporaneous evidence (not merely post-hoc statements) to show prejudice.
United States v. Mayhew, 995 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2021) – Holds that mis-advice cured by an accurate Rule 11 colloquy cannot establish prejudice.
United States v. Adams, 814 F.3d 178 (4th Cir. 2016) – Governs enforcement of appellate waivers; a knowing, voluntary waiver covers sentencing challenges.
United States v. McKinney, 60 F.4th 188 (4th Cir. 2023) – Created a limited exception allowing § 2255 relief despite a waiver where enforcing it would perpetuate conviction for conduct that is no longer criminal (Hobbs-Act-conspiracy-based § 924(c)).
United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc) – Removed Hobbs-Act conspiracy from the “crime of violence” definition, setting the stage for vacating Yelizarov’s § 924(c) count.
United States v. Friend, 2 F.4th 369 (4th Cir. 2021) – Confirms that sentencing courts need not “robotically tick through” every § 3553(a) factor.

The Court synthesized these authorities to (i) reject assertions of prejudice contradicted by the plea colloquy and (ii) refuse to broaden McKinney to cover appellate challenges once the invalid count has already been discarded.

2. Legal Reasoning in Detail

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Judge Gibney assumed arguendo that counsel might have fallen below professional standards (e.g., by not fully investigating the unrelated murder or explaining the plea’s scope). Nevertheless, the prejudice analysis was dispositive:

The district court credited counsel’s testimony that he informed Yelizarov of the murder investigation and the plea’s non-coverage of that offense.
Yelizarov acknowledged under oath that the written stipulation did not mention a murder. The Rule 11 hearing expressly limited immunity to offenses in that stipulation.
The panel applied Lee and Mayhew: post-hoc claims of ignorance cannot overcome sworn colloquy statements where the court itself clarified the misunderstanding.

Without credible evidence that he would have insisted on trial—or even pursued a different plea—Yelizarov failed the prejudice prong, ending the IAC inquiry.

B. Validity and Enforceability of the Appellate Waiver

The Court next assessed the plea’s waiver provision:

Knowing & Voluntary? The Rule 11 colloquy was meticulous; the court explained that the 360-month sentence was binding and that appeal rights were waived if that sentence was imposed.
Within Scope? The waiver expressly covered sentencing challenges and the weighing of § 3553(a) factors—precisely what the defendant raised.
Exceptions?
- IAC-tainted waiver – Already rejected; no deficient performance–prejudice nexus.
- Miscarriage of justice – The panel distinguished McKinney. There, the waiver would have preserved an unlawful conviction. Here, the unlawful § 924(c) count had already been vacated; enforcing the waiver inflicts no injustice.

C. Procedural/ Substantive Reasonableness

Because the waiver controlled, the Court dismissed these claims but added dicta underscoring that sentencing courts are not required to recite each § 3553(a) factor verbatim—thus rebutting a common tactic for attacking “Type-C” resentencings after § 924(c) vacaturs.

3. Likely Impact of the Decision

Appellate-Waiver Doctrine: After Yelizarov, defendants cannot rely on vacatur of a § 924(c) (or similar) count to re-open globally waived sentencing disputes unless they demonstrate actual innocence of the remaining counts or IAC infecting the waiver.
§ 2255 Litigation: The opinion reinforces the Fourth Circuit’s emphasis on contemporaneous evidence and credibility findings when evaluating prejudice.
Plea-Bargaining Strategy: Counsel must assume that a waiver will survive future legal changes and that resentencing will not revive barred appellate arguments—even if a predicate offense doctrine shifts.
District-Court Sentencing Practice: Courts in the Fourth Circuit can rely on Friend and now Yelizarov as shields against “magic-words” challenges to the thoroughness of their § 3553(a) explanations.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 11(c)(1)(C) (Type-C) Plea: A plea agreement that binds the court to a specific sentence if accepted. Here, 360 months was guaranteed, making later § 924(c) vacatur irrelevant to the total.
§ 924(c): Federal statute criminalising using or carrying a firearm “during and in relation to” a “crime of violence.” The precise definition of “crime of violence” has narrowed after Davis, Simms, etc.
Hobbs Act Conspiracy: Agreement to commit robbery that affects interstate commerce. Post-Simms, it is not a “crime of violence” for § 924(c).
Appellate-Waiver Clause: A contractual provision in a plea agreement where a defendant relinquishes the right to appeal certain matters (usually sentence and conviction).
Miscarriage-of-Justice Exception: Judicially created doctrine allowing courts to disregard a waiver to prevent fundamental unfairness (e.g., imprisonment for non-criminal conduct). Yelizarov narrows its reach.
§ 2255 Motion: Post-conviction federal remedy enabling prisoners to challenge convictions/sentences as unconstitutional or illegal.

Conclusion

United States v. Yelizarov stands as an important clarification of the Fourth Circuit’s waiver jurisprudence and the prejudice component of ineffective-assistance claims. The Court:

demonstrated that a carefully conducted Rule 11 colloquy almost invariably defeats later assertions of misunderstanding or coercion;
re-affirmed that courts may resolve IAC claims on the prejudice prong alone;
limited the McKinney “miscarriage-of-justice” exception, holding it inapplicable once the unlawful count has already been excised; and
reiterated that district courts do not commit procedural error merely by omitting a factor-by-factor recital at sentencing.

Practitioners should take heed that in the Fourth Circuit, appellate waivers endure shifts in substantive criminal law unless an independent ground—actual innocence of the surviving counts or truly defective counsel—renders enforcement unjust. Plea agreements, therefore, remain powerful and durable instruments, and defendants must evaluate them with the expectation that tomorrow’s doctrinal winds will not reopen yesterday’s bargains.