United States v. Webster: Sixth Circuit Reaffirms a Stronger Presumption of Substantive Reasonableness for Below‑Guidelines Sentences and Treats Remote-Control Manipulation as “Hands‑On” Abuse for § 3553(a)

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Date: October 21, 2025

Disposition: Sentence affirmed

Publication status: Not recommended for publication (non-precedential in the Sixth Circuit, but persuasive)

Introduction

In United States v. Jason Webster, the Sixth Circuit rejected a challenge to the substantive reasonableness of a 300-month aggregate sentence for child exploitation and child pornography offenses. Webster pleaded guilty without a plea agreement to three counts: coercion and enticement of a minor, attempted production of child pornography, and receipt of child pornography. Although his advisory Guidelines range was 324–405 months, the district court imposed a below‑Guidelines sentence of 300 months. On appeal, Webster argued the sentence was still too long under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

The appeal raised three central issues:

How strongly the appellate presumption of reasonableness applies to below‑Guidelines sentences;
Whether the district court erred in characterizing Webster’s conduct as “hands‑on abuse” based on remotely controlling a vibrator used by the minor victim;
Whether theories of marginal deterrence, sentencing statistics, and rehabilitation warranted a further reduction.

The panel (Judges White, Stranch, and Murphy; opinion by Judge Murphy) affirmed, emphasizing the high deference owed to the district court’s § 3553(a) balancing, the especially robust presumption of reasonableness for below‑Guidelines sentences, and the consequences of failing to object to presentence report (PSR) facts.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit held that Webster’s 300‑month sentence was substantively reasonable:

The court reiterated that appellate review of substantive reasonableness is highly deferential, and that below‑Guidelines sentences receive a strong presumption of reasonableness—indeed, stronger than the presumption applied to within‑Guidelines sentences.
The district court reasonably weighed the § 3553(a) factors, highlighting the severity of the offense conduct, including “hands‑on” abuse by remotely operating a vibrator while watching the minor victim use it, the extensive child pornography collection, and the need to protect the public.
Webster’s attempts to relitigate sentencing arguments failed because the court of appeals does not reweigh § 3553(a) factors; it reviews only for abuse of discretion.
His attacks on “hands‑on” findings were procedural in nature, unpreserved (no objection to the PSR and no contemporaneous objection at sentencing), and thus reviewed only for plain error—an inquiry he could not satisfy given the PSR’s unchallenged factual statements.
The district court’s use of sentencing statistics (an average of 257 months for similarly situated defendants) was appropriate, and the court reasonably concluded Webster’s conduct warranted a longer term than the average while still staying below the advisory range.
Arguments rooted in “marginal deterrence” failed because the sentence was not among the most severe available and the statutory and Guidelines framework left ample headroom to punish more aggravated conduct more harshly.
The “total punishment” method under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2 supported the aggregate 300‑month sentence across multiple counts; there was no requirement to test proportionality count-by-count in isolation.
Rehabilitation (amenability to treatment) did not warrant a larger variance; in light of Tapia, courts cannot lengthen a sentence to promote rehabilitation and, even assuming they might shorten for that reason, the district court reasonably concluded the other § 3553(a) factors predominated.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): Establishes abuse‑of‑discretion review for sentencing and warns appellate courts not to substitute their own judgment for the district court’s in weighing § 3553(a) factors. Here, it underpins the deferential posture and the rejection of Webster’s invitation to “rebalance” the factors on appeal.
United States v. Drake, 126 F.4th 1242 (6th Cir. 2025): Reaffirms Gall in the Sixth Circuit; the panel cites Drake for the principle that appellate courts do not reweigh the factors but review only for reasonableness.
United States v. Lynde, 926 F.3d 275 (6th Cir. 2019): Provides the presumption of reasonableness for within‑Guidelines sentences; the panel uses Lynde as a springboard to explain that a presumption also applies here, even though the sentence is below the range.
United States v. Wells, 55 F.4th 1086 (6th Cir. 2022): Critical to this case, Wells articulates that the presumption of reasonableness for a below‑Guidelines sentence is even stronger than for a within‑Guidelines sentence. The panel leans on Wells to fortify the deference owed to the district court’s 300‑month sentence.
United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2018): Frames substantive reasonableness as the question whether a sentence is “too long” or “too short” in light of § 3553(a), reinforcing the appellant’s steep burden.
United States v. Swafford, 639 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 2011): Emphasizes that adherence to the Guidelines promotes uniformity and reduces unwarranted disparities; deviations, especially larger ones, risk creating disparities. The panel cites Swafford to rebut Webster’s claim that a still greater variance would better avoid disparities.
United States v. Parrish, 915 F.3d 1043 (6th Cir. 2019): Distinguishes substantive reasonableness claims from procedural ones. The court uses Parrish to explain that disputing a factual finding (e.g., whether the conduct was “hands‑on”) is procedural, not substantive.
United States v. Cover, 800 F.3d 275 (6th Cir. 2015) (per curiam): Establishes that factual statements in a PSR may be accepted as true if not objected to. This principle is pivotal: Webster’s failure to object to PSR statements that he remotely controlled the vibrator made those statements binding at sentencing.
United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc): Sets the framework for plain-error review when a party fails to preserve an objection at sentencing, especially after the so‑called “Bostic” question. The panel applies Vonner to conclude there was no “obvious” error in the district court’s factual findings.
United States v. Holt, 116 F.4th 599 (6th Cir. 2024): Cited for the limited appellate role (no rebalancing of § 3553(a)) and, in tandem with Vonner, for preservation principles.
United States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000 (6th Cir. 2020): Reinforces broad district court discretion when considering § 3553(a) and rejecting variance arguments, relevant to the court’s treatment of rehabilitation.
Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011): Prohibits increasing imprisonment to promote rehabilitation and leaves unresolved whether rehabilitation can justify a shorter term. The panel treats rehabilitation as, at most, a neutral factor here, and finds no abuse in declining to vary further.
United States v. Newsom, 402 F.3d 780 (7th Cir. 2005) and United States v. Reibel, 688 F.3d 868 (7th Cir. 2012): Articulate the “marginal deterrence” principle (reserving the harshest sentences for the worst offenders). The panel explains that concern is inapposite where the sentence is not at or near the statutory or Guidelines maximum and there remains headroom to punish more aggravated conduct.
United States v. Warren, 2023 WL 1961222 (6th Cir. Feb. 13, 2023): Supports reliance on unobjected-to PSR facts to establish the offense circumstances.

Legal Reasoning

The Sixth Circuit’s analysis proceeds in three methodical steps: deference, facts, and fit.

1) Deference and the presumption of reasonableness

The panel begins with the high bar for substantive reasonableness challenges. Under Gall and its Sixth Circuit progeny, appellate courts defer to the district court’s on‑the‑ground balancing of § 3553(a) factors, reversing only for abuse of discretion. Because Webster’s sentence fell below the properly calculated advisory range, the court applied a presumption of reasonableness that is, under Wells, even stronger than the presumption for within‑Guidelines sentences. This framing effectively front‑loads the appeal against the defendant: the below‑Guidelines posture requires a clear showing that the district court’s weighing was irrational, ignored a pertinent factor, or gave undue weight to an improper factor. Webster could not make that showing.

2) Facts and preservation: calling the conduct “hands‑on”

The district court characterized the conduct as “hands‑on” abuse because Webster remotely manipulated a vibrator through an app while watching the child use it. On appeal, Webster challenged that characterization as “clearly erroneous.” The panel identified three fatal problems:

It is a procedural challenge to a factual finding, not a substantive reasonableness claim (Parrish).
Webster did not object to the PSR, which expressly stated the vibrator could be remotely controlled and that “Jason” controlled it; the PSR also reflected a sexual‑contact enhancement based on the same conduct (Cover).
He did not assert the objection when asked at sentencing (the Vonner/Bostic preservation step), so review was only for plain error—a standard he could not meet because the PSR supported the finding and no “obvious” error existed.

Importantly, while the panel endorsed the district court’s “hands‑on” label for § 3553(a) purposes, its reasoning rested on unobjected PSR facts and the deferential standards of procedural and plain‑error review. The opinion does not announce a categorical rule that remote-control manipulation is invariably “hands‑on” for guideline enhancements; rather, it approves the district court’s assessment on this record and under this posture. Still, the approval will be persuasive in future cases.

3) Fit with § 3553(a): nature of offense, history, protection of the public, and disparities

The panel then walks through the district court’s § 3553(a) analysis:

Nature and circumstances of the offense: The court emphasized the gravity and harm of the conduct, including the “monstrous” imagery involving very young children and the “hands‑on” abuse of the 13‑year‑old victim via the remote device.
History and characteristics: Nothing in Webster’s background mitigated the seriousness; the court noted past employment terminations for sexual harassment and the absence of excusing circumstances.
Needs for the sentence: The court found a “great need” to protect the public from future harm, and the 300‑month sentence served deterrence and incapacitation.
Avoiding unwarranted disparities: The district court considered statistical averages (257 months for comparably situated defendants) but reasonably concluded Webster’s case was worse than average due to the hands‑on component and the harm to the victim and family. The panel additionally invoked Swafford to caution that still greater variances may create rather than reduce disparity.

The panel further rejected specific defense theories:

Marginal deterrence: No perverse incentive arises because the sentence is not at the top of the Guidelines or statutory cap; more aggravated crimes could be punished more severely.
Count‑by‑count proportionality: Under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2, the court properly determined a “total punishment” for all counts and imposed concurrent terms, adjusting only where the receipt count was capped by the 20‑year statutory maximum.
Rehabilitation: Tapia bars using rehabilitation to lengthen imprisonment; whether it can shorten a sentence remains unresolved. Regardless, the district court reasonably concluded the other § 3553(a) factors outweighed any further variance based on treatment prospects, and any lengthy sentence would allow access to counseling and treatment programs.

Impact and Significance

Although non‑precedential, Webster carries meaningful practical lessons for sentencing and appeals in the Sixth Circuit:

Preservation is paramount: Failure to object to PSR facts or to lodge contemporaneous objections at sentencing narrows appellate options to plain error review, which is rarely satisfied in sentencing disputes.
Below‑Guidelines “super-presumption” matters: By applying Wells, the panel signals that below‑Guidelines sentences are especially insulated on appeal. Defendants who receive such sentences face an even steeper climb.
Remote sexual exploitation can be treated as “hands‑on” in § 3553(a) analysis: The court’s acceptance of the district court’s characterization—especially where PSR facts support remote manipulation—will likely embolden prosecutors to argue that technologically mediated sexual abuse is qualitatively akin to contact offenses for purposes of assessing harm and dangerousness.
Sentencing statistics are double‑edged: District courts can cite averages to situate a case and then justify departures from the mean based on specific aggravating or mitigating facts. Swafford continues to anchor disparity analysis in the Guidelines, not only in raw averages.
Marginal deterrence rhetoric has limited leverage: Courts will reject the argument where the sentence is not near maxima and meaningful gradations remain for worse conduct.
Multi‑count sentencing must be understood holistically: The “total punishment” framework under § 5G1.2 directs courts to an aggregate term reflecting overall culpability; litigants should avoid atomizing counts when arguing proportionality.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Substantive reasonableness: On appeal, the question is whether the length of the sentence is reasonable in light of § 3553(a) factors (nature of the offense, defendant’s history, deterrence, protection of the public, etc.). Appellate courts defer heavily to the district court’s judgment.
Procedural vs. substantive error: Procedural errors include miscalculating the Guidelines range, relying on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to consider relevant factors. Substantive reasonableness addresses whether the chosen length is too high or too low. Challenges to factual findings are procedural.
Presumption of reasonableness: In the Sixth Circuit, sentences within the Guidelines range carry a presumption of reasonableness—and, per Wells, a below‑Guidelines sentence carries an even stronger presumption.
Plain error review: If a defendant fails to object at sentencing, appellate review is for “plain error”—an obvious error affecting substantial rights and seriously affecting the fairness or integrity of proceedings. This is a demanding standard rarely met in sentencing appeals.
PSR reliance: Facts in the Presentence Report are accepted as true unless the defendant specifically objects. Unobjected PSR facts can support enhancements and the district court’s § 3553(a) assessment.
“Hands‑on” abuse (in this context): The district court treated remote control of a device used by a minor during sexual activity as “hands‑on” for § 3553(a) purposes, reflecting direct causation and contemporaneous involvement despite the absence of physical proximity.
Unwarranted disparities: § 3553(a)(6) directs courts to avoid unjustified sentence differences among similarly situated defendants. The Guidelines remain the primary tool to promote uniformity; raw averages can be informative but do not displace individualized analysis.
Marginal deterrence: A criminological concept urging courts to preserve harsher punishments for more serious crimes to avoid incentives to escalate. Here, it did not compel a lower sentence because the court retained headroom to impose harsher penalties for more aggravated facts.
Total punishment (U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2): In multi‑count cases, the court determines a single “total punishment” reflecting aggregated culpability, then structures concurrent or consecutive terms (respecting statutory maxima) to implement that total.
Tapia constraint on rehabilitation: Courts cannot lengthen imprisonment to promote rehabilitation. Whether rehabilitation can support a shorter sentence remains open; district courts typically treat it as one consideration within § 3553(a)(2)(D), subordinate to the offense’s seriousness and public protection.

Conclusion

United States v. Webster reinforces several practical and doctrinal themes in Sixth Circuit sentencing law. First, below‑Guidelines sentences enjoy an especially robust presumption of reasonableness on appeal, making substantive reasonableness challenges exceptionally difficult. Second, defendants must preserve objections to PSR facts and contemporaneously challenge factual findings; failure to do so will trigger plain‑error review and, as here, effectively foreclose relief. Third, the panel’s acceptance of the district court’s “hands‑on” characterization for technologically mediated abuse—grounded in unobjected PSR facts—signals that courts may treat remote manipulation as akin to contact for § 3553(a) purposes. Fourth, reliance on both Guidelines norms and sentencing statistics is permissible in disparity analysis, and marginal‑deterrence arguments will not defeat a reasoned, individualized § 3553(a) assessment. Finally, the decision underscores the centrality of the Guidelines’ “total punishment” approach in multi‑count cases and the limited role rehabilitation plays in adjusting imprisonment terms.

Although non‑precedential, Webster offers a clear, structured application of Sixth Circuit sentencing principles that will guide district courts and practitioners: deference to well‑explained sentencing decisions, strict enforcement of preservation rules, and careful attention to how modern modalities of sexual exploitation can be evaluated as aggravating “hands‑on” conduct under § 3553(a).