United States v. VanOchten – The Sixth Circuit Confirms Conditional Disarmament of “Dangerous” Drug-Users Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3)

1. Introduction

In United States v. Terrence Wayne VanOchten, No. 23-1901, the Sixth Circuit confronted the recurring, post-Bruen question whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) – the federal ban on firearm possession by “unlawful users of controlled substances” – survives Second Amendment scrutiny. The panel (Clay, Thapar & Readler, J.J., opinion by Readler) affirmed a 52-month sentence that rested on a Sentencing Guideline enhancement triggered by that subsection, holding that § 922(g)(3) is constitutional as applied to individuals who are demonstrably dangerous.

The decision offers three important takeaways:

It extends the Sixth Circuit’s earlier reasoning in United States v. Williams (felon-in-possession) to the drug-user context.
It crystallises a two-step framework: (i) membership in “the people” and (ii) an opportunity for an individualised danger assessment.
It establishes that courts may uphold § 922(g)(3) when the record shows a “clear risk of future harm” if the defendant were armed – here, shooting while drunk and high toward a propane tank in a neighbourhood.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Terrence VanOchten, a regular marijuana user, pleaded guilty to possessing pipe bombs. At sentencing the district court adopted U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B)’s base-offense level 20 because he was a “prohibited person” under § 922(g)(3). VanOchten argued the statute was unconstitutional after N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen.

Applying Bruen’s two-step test as refined by Rahimi and Williams, the Sixth Circuit held:

(1) The plain text of the Second Amendment covers VanOchten’s conduct: he is among “the people” and seeks to possess arms.
(2) History nonetheless permits disarming dangerous persons; Congress may label a class “presumptively dangerous” so long as each member can show he is not.
(3) On the facts – drunk, high, firing toward a propane tank, homemade pipe bombs – VanOchten was “dangerous,” so § 922(g)(3) validly applied.

Accordingly, the sentence was procedurally reasonable and affirmed.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen (2022) – Established the current two-step historical analogue test. The Sixth Circuit faithfully deployed this structure.
United States v. Rahimi (2024) – Clarified that disarmament is permissible where an individual poses a “credible threat.” The court borrowed Rahimi’s language in defining dangerousness.
United States v. Williams (6th Cir. 2024) – The linchpin precedent. Williams upheld § 922(g)(1) for felons deemed dangerous, conditioning categorical bans on an opportunity for individualised rebuttal. Readler, J., imported that rationale wholesale, treating drug users analogously to felons.
Founding-Era “Going-Armed” and Militia statutes – Historical laws allowing temporary or class-based disarmament of those terrorising the public or deemed disloyal (e.g., 1662 Militia Act, colonial loyalty oaths). These analogues supplied the constitutional pedigree for modern disarmament.
Parallel Circuit Authority

United States v. Veasley, 8th Cir. (2024)
United States v. Cooper, 8th Cir. (2025)
United States v. Connelly & Daniels, 5th Cir. (2024-25)
United States v. Harris, 3d Cir. (2025)

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

Step One – Textual Coverage
• “The people” includes all Americans, even felons or drug users.
• Possessing a firearm at home lies at the core of “keep and bear.”
Step Two – Historical Analogue
• Principle extracted: Governments historically disarmed persons posing a clear risk of violence.
• Congress’s categorical judgment (drug users = presumptively dangerous) is acceptable if each person may prove individual non-dangerousness.
• Application Note 3 of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 validly incorporates § 922(g)(3) because the statute itself passes muster.
Individualised Danger Finding
• Record showed simultaneous intoxicant use and reckless gunfire toward explosive material.
• That conduct mirrors historical “going-armed to the terror of the people” offences.
• Therefore the as-applied constitutional challenge fails.

3.3 Potential Impact

Sentencing Practice – District courts in the Sixth Circuit may continue applying the § 2K2.1 “prohibited person” enhancement to unlawful drug users, provided they make an explicit dangerousness determination when constitutionality is challenged.
Litigation Strategy – Defense counsel will likely pivot to demonstrating the client’s non-dangerousness under the Williams/VanOchten framework (elderly, medicinal use, clean record, etc.) rather than asserting facial invalidity.
National Split Narrowed – By aligning with the Eighth Circuit and tempering the Fifth Circuit’s more skeptical approach, the decision nudges the circuits toward a unified test hinging on “clear risk of future harm.”
Scope Beyond Drug Use – The reasoning (class-based disarmament + individual rebuttal) could influence debates over other § 922(g) subsections (e.g., mental-health, domestic restraining orders) and state-level analogues.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

§ 922(g)(3): The federal law that bars anyone who is an “unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance” from possessing guns which have moved in interstate commerce.
As-Applied vs. Facial Challenge: • Facial: attacks the statute in all circumstances.
• As-Applied: argues the statute is unconstitutional only as applied to the particular defendant’s facts.
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B): Guideline setting Base Offense Level 20 when the offense involves a NFA “firearm” (e.g., pipe bomb) and the defendant is a “prohibited person” – here, a drug user under § 922(g)(3).
“The People”: Constitutional term broadly covering ordinary Americans; the Court refuses to carve out sub-groups (felons, drug users) automatically.
“Dangerousness” Standard: Post-Williams: Does the individual presently pose a clear, credible risk of violence if armed? Courts look to past conduct, criminal history, and the circumstances of the offense.

5. Conclusion

United States v. VanOchten cements a pragmatic middle path after Bruen: while the Second Amendment’s protection extends even to unpopular sub-groups such as unlawful drug users, the government retains historical authority to disarm those who demonstrably imperil public safety. The Sixth Circuit’s insistence on an individualised “dangerousness” inquiry preserves due-process protections and provides a workable template for lower courts. Future litigants will focus less on the abstract validity of § 922(g)(3) and more on the concrete question: Does this particular defendant, in light of his conduct and history, present a clear risk if armed?

By answering that question in the affirmative for Terrence VanOchten and upholding both the statute and the Guidelines enhancement, the court deepens the jurisprudential theme that the Second Amendment, though robust, is not without historically grounded limits aimed at protecting the community from objectively dangerous behavior.