United States v. Valdez: Oral Sentencing Controls Over Unpronounced Supervised-Release Conditions; Tailored Minor-Contact Restrictions Upheld

United States v. Valdez: Oral Sentencing Controls Over Unpronounced Supervised-Release Conditions; Tailored Minor-Contact Restrictions Upheld

Introduction

In United States v. Valdez, No. 23-6482 (2d Cir. Sept. 12, 2025) (summary order), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, in substantial part, a sentence imposing a five-year term of supervised release with special conditions on Michael Valdez, who pleaded guilty to sex trafficking a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591. The panel (Judges Calabresi, Park, and Nathan) upheld an oral special condition restricting “deliberate contact” with minors (with a carve-out for Valdez’s own children and a path for probation approval), but remanded to strike a different special condition—an adult pornography restriction—that appeared only in the written judgment and was not orally pronounced at sentencing.

Although issued as a summary order and therefore non-precedential under Second Circuit Local Rule 32.1.1, the decision is instructive on two recurring supervised-release issues:

  • First, the court reaffirms that the oral pronouncement of sentence controls over a conflicting written judgment, and unpronounced special conditions must be stricken on remand.
  • Second, the court explains why an appropriately tailored restriction on “deliberate contact” with minors is reasonably related to § 3553(a) factors and neither overbroad nor vague when grounded in the offense conduct and defendant’s history.

The case arose from sentencing proceedings before Judge Oetken in the Southern District of New York, where Valdez received 156 months’ imprisonment and five years of supervised release. On appeal, Valdez challenged the minor-contact condition as inadequately explained, overbroad, and vague; he also contested the adult-pornography condition that appeared in the written judgment but was not pronounced in court.

Summary of the Opinion

  • Standard of Review: The court noted that special conditions are reviewed for abuse of discretion, United States v. MacMillen, 544 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2008), and that unpreserved challenges are ordinarily reviewed for plain error, United States v. Green, 618 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2010), sometimes with a “relaxed” plain-error approach where notice was lacking, United States v. Matta, 777 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2015). The panel found the result the same under either standard.
  • Minor-Contact Condition: Affirmed. The court held that, in light of the seriousness of the offense, Valdez’s history (including conduct involving sex with another minor and multiple orders of protection), and the sentencing court’s thorough § 3553(a) analysis, a prohibition on “deliberate contact” with minors (subject to probation approval and exempting Valdez’s own children) was reasonably related to supervision goals and not overbroad or vague. The district court need not separately justify each special condition where its overarching rationale for the sentence is clear. See United States v. Williams, 998 F.3d 538 (2d Cir. 2021); United States v. Rosa, 957 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2020); United States v. Walter, 848 F. App’x 479 (2d Cir. 2021).
  • Adult-Pornography Condition: Vacated from written judgment. Because the condition was not orally pronounced at sentencing, the panel remanded to amend the judgment to strike it, consistent with the rule that oral pronouncements control and unpronounced burdens must be removed. See United States v. Rosario, 386 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. Rosado, 109 F.4th 120 (2d Cir. 2024); United States v. Peguero, 34 F.4th 143 (2d Cir. 2022).
  • Outcome: Judgment affirmed except as to the adult-pornography special condition, and remanded to strike that condition.

Analysis

A. Standards and Framework Applied

The panel began from the established premise that district courts “retain wide latitude” in crafting supervised-release conditions, but those conditions must be:

  • Reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, deterrence, protection of the public, and effective correctional treatment; and
  • No more restrictive than reasonably necessary to serve those purposes.

See U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b); United States v. Betts, 886 F.3d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 2018). The court treated the challenge under both abuse-of-discretion and plain-error paradigms (Green; MacMillen), remarking that even a “relaxed” plain-error approach (Matta) would not alter the outcome given the district court’s detailed § 3553(a) discussion and the direct connection between the condition and the harms at issue.

B. Precedents Cited and Their Role

  • Betts, 886 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2018)

    Betts supplies the governing test: conditions must be reasonably related to statutory purposes and involve no greater deprivation than necessary. The panel emphasized it was “self-evident” (a phrase borrowed from Betts) that restricting deliberate contact with minors deters the precise danger Valdez had previously “terrorized”—underscoring the tight nexus between the condition and the offense conduct.

  • Williams, 998 F.3d 538 (2d Cir. 2021); Rosa, 957 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2020); Walter, 848 F. App’x 479 (2d Cir. 2021)

    These decisions relieve district courts of the need to recite a discrete justification for each individual condition so long as the record reflects the considerations driving the overall sentence. The panel held that Judge Oetken’s explanation—detailing the brutality of the offense, Valdez’s prior sex-related conduct with a minor, and the need for deterrence and protection—sufficed to validate the special condition.

  • Bullock, No. 23-7341, 2025 WL 2423493 (2d Cir. Aug. 22, 2025)

    The panel contrasted Valdez’s less restrictive condition with more demanding conditions upheld in Bullock, which forbade direct contact with minors absent probation permission and barred presence in locations where minors congregate without permission. By comparison, Valdez’s condition is narrower—limited to “deliberate contact,” exempting his own children, and omitting place-based and digital-contact prohibitions—underscoring its tailored nature.

  • Bleau, 930 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 2019)

    Bleau vacated a broad no-contact-with-minors condition where the district court failed to adequately explain the restriction and the offense involved possession/receipt of child pornography without evidence of inappropriate contact. The panel distinguished Bleau on both fronts: the district court here provided a thorough § 3553(a) analysis, and Valdez’s conduct directly and violently targeted a real minor, including commercial sexual exploitation, physical abuse, and exploitation via images, coupled with a prior conviction involving a different minor.

  • Rosario, 386 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2004); Rosado, 109 F.4th 120 (2d Cir. 2024); Peguero, 34 F.4th 143 (2d Cir. 2022)

    This line of authority supplies the remedial rule for discrepancies between oral pronouncements and written judgments: the oral sentence controls; any additional burdens in the written judgment must be removed; remand is appropriate to amend the judgment. Applying that rule, the unpronounced adult-pornography condition must be stricken.

  • MacMillen, 544 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2008); Green, 618 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2010); Matta, 777 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2015)

    These cases frame the appellate review. The panel emphasized that even if plain error applied (and even under the “relaxed” variant when notice is lacking), the minor-contact condition stands given the record’s clarity and the condition’s fit with the offense and history.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The panel’s analysis of the minor-contact condition turned on three pillars:

  1. Robust § 3553(a) explanation

    The district court expressly found the offense “extremely serious,” described terrorizing conduct against a sixteen-year-old victim—including beating, threats, confinement, prostitution, and posting nude photographs—and noted Valdez’s prior conduct involving sex with another minor and multiple orders of protection. It weighed mitigation (difficult upbringing, harsh pretrial conditions, family support) but concluded the need for deterrence and protection justified a significant sentence and supervision.

  2. Fit and tailoring

    The condition targets “deliberate contact” with minors and contains two built-in safety valves: (1) probation-office approval, and (2) an express carve-out for Valdez’s own children. Notably, the court removed broader recommendations from the PSR, such as loitering prohibitions near child-centered locations and sweeping bans on viewing or accessing profiles of minors online without prior approval. This pruning reflects a calibrated approach—minimizing liberty deprivation while addressing the concrete risks presented by the offense and history.

  3. Overbreadth and vagueness rejected

    By limiting the restriction to “deliberate” contact, the condition avoids ensnaring incidental or unavoidable interactions, thus curbing vagueness and breadth concerns. The panel also relied on its recent approval of stricter regimes (Bullock) to underscore the reasonableness of this narrower restraint in Valdez’s circumstance.

On the adult-pornography condition, the panel did not reach the merits because the dispositive defect was procedural: it was not orally pronounced at sentencing. Under Rosario/Rosado/Peguero, the oral sentence controls, and the cure is to remand to strike the condition from the written judgment.

D. Likely Impact and Practical Significance

  • Oral pronouncement rule reinforced

    The decision underscores that special conditions must be announced in open court. Prosecutors and probation officers should ensure that any desired condition is expressly read into the record; defense counsel should vigilantly compare the written judgment to the oral sentence and seek correction if discrepancies exist.

  • Tailored minor-contact restrictions

    For offenses involving hands-on exploitation of minors or analogous conduct, narrowly framed “no deliberate contact” conditions—especially with allowances for probation approval and family carve-outs—are likely to be sustained. District courts can rely on the overall § 3553(a) explanation for the sentence without repeating condition-specific justifications if the link is apparent.

  • Boundary-setting for breadth and vagueness

    By rejecting sweeping PSR recommendations and focusing on deliberate contact, the decision illustrates how courts can design conditions that are less vulnerable to overbreadth and vagueness challenges. Specificity (e.g., “deliberate”), exceptions (own children), and procedural pathways (probation approval) all matter.

  • Litigation strategy

    Defense counsel seeking to challenge a minor-contact condition should distinguish cases like Valdez by highlighting a lack of hands-on conduct, thin record support, or inadequate explanation (Bleau-type arguments). Conversely, the government may cite the fit between the condition and demonstrable risk factors to show the restriction is “self-evidently” related to deterrence and public protection.

  • Adult-pornography conditions

    The panel did not opine on the substantive validity of adult-pornography bans in supervision. The teaching is procedural: if not pronounced, it cannot stand. On remand, the condition must be removed without a full resentencing. Future attempts to impose such a condition should be orally pronounced, justified under § 5D1.3(b), and carefully tailored to the supervision goals.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Supervised release and special conditions

    After prison, a defendant serves a period of supervised release. Courts can add “special conditions” tailored to the defendant’s risks and needs (e.g., restrictions on contact, places, or internet use). These conditions must be reasonably related to sentencing goals and not unduly restrictive.

  • Abuse of discretion vs. plain error

    Abuse of discretion: the appellate court asks whether the district court made a reasonable choice based on the record and the law. Plain error: when a defendant did not object below, the appellate court fixes only clear, obvious errors affecting substantial rights. In rare instances without prior notice, the Second Circuit has used a “relaxed” version of plain error in sentencing.

  • Overbreadth and vagueness in conditions

    Overbreadth: a condition sweeps too broadly into lawful behavior without sufficient reason. Vagueness: a condition is so unclear that a person cannot reasonably know what is prohibited. Narrow wording and clear exceptions reduce both problems.

  • Oral pronouncement controls

    The sentence spoken in court is the legal sentence. If the written judgment later adds heavier burdens (like extra conditions) that were not said aloud, those added burdens must be removed.

  • “No greater deprivation than reasonably necessary”

    Conditions shouldn’t restrict liberty more than what’s needed to achieve deterrence, public protection, and rehabilitation. Tailoring and alternatives (like allowing probation approval) help satisfy this requirement.

Application to the Facts

The panel’s holding draws strength from the specifics of Valdez’s case. The district court characterized the conduct as “extremely serious” and “brutal”: Valdez beat, threatened, confined, prostituted, and exploited a sixteen-year-old victim, and he had a history of conduct with another minor. These facts tightly connect the minor-contact restriction to the goals of deterring recidivism and protecting the public. The condition’s careful drafting—limiting it to “deliberate” contact, exempting Valdez’s own children, and offering a probation-approval route—addresses liberty concerns and distinguishes the case from Bleau, where the record did not show contact offenses and the explanation was lacking.

Separately, the adult-pornography restriction—imposed only in writing—ran afoul of the basic rule that the oral sentence governs. The panel’s limited remand to strike that condition is a straightforward application of Rosario, Rosado, and Peguero.

Practical Takeaways for Stakeholders

  • For judges: Ensure all special conditions are orally pronounced and the rationale for the overall sentence under § 3553(a) is clear on the record; condition-by-condition mini-allocutions are not required if the global reasoning suffices.
  • For prosecutors/probation: If seeking conditions like adult-pornography restrictions or internet limitations, ensure they are announced in open court and grounded in record facts and supervision needs; consider narrowly drawn language and approval mechanisms.
  • For defense counsel: Preserve objections to special conditions; press for narrower wording (e.g., “deliberate contact” rather than all contact), carve-outs (family), and approval pathways; after sentencing, compare the written judgment against the oral pronouncement and move to correct any additions.
  • For appellate practice: Where the record contains a robust § 3553(a) analysis and facts of hands-on minor exploitation, challenges to reasonably tailored minor-contact restrictions face long odds; however, Bleau remains a meaningful tool where the record lacks contact conduct or explanations are sparse.

Conclusion

United States v. Valdez reinforces two durable principles in supervised-release jurisprudence. First, the oral pronouncement of sentence is paramount: conditions not pronounced in open court cannot be added later in the written judgment and must be stricken on remand. Second, when the offense conduct and defendant’s history show hands-on exploitation of a minor, a carefully tailored restriction on “deliberate contact” with minors—backed by a thorough § 3553(a) explanation, exceptions for family, and pathways for probation approval—will be sustained against claims of inadequate explanation, overbreadth, and vagueness.

While the order is non-precedential, it offers a practical roadmap for crafting, defending, and challenging supervised-release conditions in cases involving sexual offenses against minors and spotlights the continuing importance of getting sentencing conditions right in open court.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

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