United States v. Tita: Circumstantial Knowledge, Pinkerton Liability, and Supervised Release Conditions in a Firearms Smuggling Conspiracy

United States v. Tita: Circumstantial Knowledge, Pinkerton Liability, and Supervised Release Conditions in a Firearms Smuggling Conspiracy

I. Introduction

In United States v. Tita (consolidated with United States v. Nji and United States v. Fonguh), the Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences of three Cameroonian–American defendants involved in a clandestine scheme to ship firearms and ammunition from Maryland to Anglophone separatist fighters in Cameroon.

The case sits at the intersection of federal firearms law, conspiracy doctrine, evidentiary limits on contextual “political violence” testimony, and the technical but important requirements governing supervised release conditions under Rogers and its progeny. It also illustrates how courts treat “diaspora conflicts” (foreign civil wars supported from the U.S.) within the ordinary framework of federal criminal law.

The key issues on appeal were:

  • Sufficiency of the evidence that defendants knew firearms had obliterated serial numbers under 18 U.S.C. § 922(k), and the use of Pinkerton conspiracy liability to sustain those convictions.
  • The propriety of evidentiary rulings, including:
    • Exclusion of expert testimony about the Cameroonian conflict and state repression.
    • Exclusion of testimony and a prior proffer statement of a co-conspirator who invoked the Fifth Amendment.
  • Challenged jury instructions on Pinkerton, willful blindness, and “knowledge.”
  • Sentencing enhancements under the Guidelines for:
    • Number of firearms involved (U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(C)).
    • Firearms trafficking (U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) (2021)).
  • Alleged inconsistency between oral pronouncement and written judgment on supervised release conditions under United States v. Rogers, and the scope of permissible “incorporation by reference” as clarified by United States v. Turner.

Judge Niemeyer, writing for a unanimous panel (Judges Gregory and Harris joining), rejected all challenges and affirmed in full.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

  • Defendants Wilson Tita, Eric Nji, and Wilson Fonguh joined a small group of Cameroonian–Americans that formed the so‑called “Peanut Project” to send arms and ammunition to Anglophone fighters in Cameroon.
  • The group operated out of the basement “lab” of co-conspirator Tamufor St. Michael in Baltimore County, Maryland, using tools and equipment to:
    • Reload and refurbish ammunition;
    • Assemble firearms;
    • Grind off serial numbers; and
    • Package weapons for covert shipment in vehicles and compressor tanks.
  • The group had written bylaws, kept minutes, used encrypted WhatsApp messaging, and placed heavy emphasis on secrecy and “concealment methods.”
  • In 2019, law enforcement intercepted a 40-foot shipping container originally bound for Nigeria (adjacent to Cameroon) and found:
    • 39 firearms (28 with obliterated serial numbers; 9 privately manufactured without serials);
    • Over 35,000 rounds of ammunition;
    • Other military-type equipment, all heavily concealed in modified compressor tanks and other cargo.
  • A search of St. Michael’s home uncovered a “full-scale manufacturing operation” consistent with the conspiracy.

B. Procedural Posture

  • A superseding indictment charged all three defendants with:
    1. Conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 (to export arms without a license, to conceal and smuggle them, and to transport firearms with obliterated serial numbers);
    2. Unlicensed exportation of defense articles (Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778);
    3. Unlicensed exportation of controlled items (Export Control Reform Act, 50 U.S.C. § 4819);
    4. Transportation of firearms with obliterated serial numbers, 18 U.S.C. § 922(k);
    5. Smuggling goods from the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 554(a).
  • After a 10‑day jury trial at which two insider witnesses (former group members) testified for the government, the jury:
    • Convicted all three on:
      • Conspiracy (Count I);
      • § 922(k) transportation of firearms with obliterated serial numbers (Count IV);
      • Smuggling under § 554(a) (Count V).
    • Acquitted them of the AECA and ECRA export-control counts (Counts II and III).
  • The district court (Judge Bennett) overruled post-trial motions and, following presentence reports, applied two enhancements:
    • +6 levels for an offense involving 25–99 firearms (§ 2K2.1(b)(1)(C));
    • +4 levels for engaging in firearms trafficking (§ 2K2.1(b)(5) (2021 ed.)).
  • Each defendant received a Guidelines range of 63–78 months and was sentenced to:
    • 63 months’ imprisonment (bottom of the range); and
    • 2 years of supervised release with standard and additional conditions.
  • They appealed; the Fourth Circuit consolidated the appeals and affirmed.

C. Core Holdings

  1. Sufficiency of Evidence: There was ample circumstantial evidence that the defendants knew the serial numbers had been obliterated; alternatively, obliteration was reasonably foreseeable under Pinkerton, sustaining their § 922(k), § 554(a), and § 371 convictions.
  2. Expert Witness Exclusion: The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the defense expert on the Cameroonian conflict; under Diaz v. United States, experts may provide background relevant to mental state, but judges retain broad discretion to exclude minimally relevant, potentially confusing or prejudicial testimony.
  3. Co-conspirator’s Fifth Amendment and Proffer Statement: The district court properly honored co-conspirator Tse Bangarie’s Fifth Amendment invocation, excusing him from testifying. It also correctly refused to admit his pre-plea proffer under Rule 807 because it lacked sufficient indicia of trustworthiness and was not more probative than other available evidence.
  4. Jury Instructions: The Pinkerton instruction, willful blindness instruction, and definition of “knowledge” were legally correct and supported by the evidence; they did not lower the government’s burden of proof.
  5. Sentencing Enhancements:
    • The district court correctly applied the +6 enhancement for 25–99 firearms; under § 1B1.3’s relevant conduct standard, the conspiracy “offense” involved 28 firearms with obliterated serial numbers, and each conspirator was accountable for that jointly undertaken activity.
    • The +4 trafficking enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(5) (limited to each defendant’s own conduct and aiding-and-abetting) was also supported by the record.
  6. Supervised Release Conditions (Rogers Issue): There was no Rogers error. By expressly incorporating the district’s standing “standard conditions” and then summarizing some of them, the district court validly imposed the full text of those conditions found in the written judgment.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence, § 922(k), and Pinkerton Liability

1. Governing Standard

The court recited the familiar Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), standard:

  • Evidence is sufficient if, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found” the elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • All reasonable inferences are drawn in the government’s favor; contradictions are assumed to have been resolved by the jury in that direction. See United States v. Hunt, 99 F.4th 161 (4th Cir. 2024); United States v. Freitekh, 114 F.4th 292 (4th Cir. 2024).

The defendants faced what the panel called a “heavy burden” to overturn a jury verdict on insufficiency grounds.

2. Knowledge of Obliterated Serial Numbers

Section 922(k) criminalizes transporting in interstate or foreign commerce a firearm that has had its serial number removed or obliterated, knowing of that status. The defendants argued that the government failed to prove this mens rea element.

The Fourth Circuit identified multiple converging strands of circumstantial evidence:

  • Group’s mission and secrecy:
    • The “Peanut Project” was a small, tight-knit group explicitly formed to ship weapons covertly to Anglophone fighters.
    • Bylaws (drafted by Tita) emphasized “concealment methods” and secrecy; members policed confidentiality.
    • There had been an earlier incident where the Cameroonian government successfully traced a firearm back to the U.S. using its serial number, making concealment of serial numbers a core part of the mission.
  • The physical obliteration process in a small lab:
    • The “lab” was a very small basement space (~3 meter square), where grinding off serial numbers took place using noisy tools, with visible safety gear (goggles, gloves).
    • Insider witness Alambi Muma testified that St. Michael assigned him to grind off serial numbers in the presence of Nji and Fonguh, and that the grinding was “noisy and obvious.”
    • Members worked in the lab up to three days per week over an extended period; operations were open and visible to those present.
  • Visible condition of the firearms:
    • Physical firearms and photographs introduced at trial showed “highly visible” coarse grinding where serial numbers had been located.
    • These visibly defaced weapons were packaged in the lab, wrapped in “layers and layers” of foil, plastic, and duct tape for concealment.
  • Insider testimony on group understanding:
    • Witness Roger Akem testified that it was the “understanding of the group” that they had to conceal weapons to avoid detection by U.S. and Nigerian authorities; the defendants participated in this mission and lab work.
    • Muma testified that “all of us that came together” understood that what they were doing was illegal and that discovery by U.S. or Cameroonian authorities would stop them.
    • He described specific roles: Nji took notes and maintained inventory; Nji and Fonguh prepared and packed ammunition; Tita supervised and directed activities.

From this, the court concluded a rational juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that each defendant knew serial numbers were being removed from the guns that the group was shipping.

3. Pinkerton as an Alternative Basis

Even assuming arguendo that some defendants lacked actual knowledge, the court invoked Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946), as an alternative theory.

Under Pinkerton and Fourth Circuit precedent such as United States v. Ashley, 606 F.3d 135 (4th Cir. 2010):

  • A conspirator is vicariously liable for a substantive offense committed by a coconspirator if:
    1. The offense was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy; and
    2. Its commission was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant.

Given the group’s:

  • Focus on secrecy and concealment;
  • Past experience with a traced firearm;
  • Bylaw emphasis on concealment methods; and
  • Overall goal of covertly supplying arms to a foreign conflict,

the court found it “certainly” foreseeable that co-conspirators would remove serial numbers to prevent tracing. Thus, even if a defendant did not personally grind the numbers or see them, he could still be held liable for § 922(k) and, derivatively, for smuggling (§ 554(a)) and conspiracy (§ 371) on a Pinkerton theory.

4. “Firearms” Element

The defendants also argued that the government had not shown the seized items were “firearms” within 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) (weapons designed to or readily convertible to expel a projectile by explosive).

The panel found this argument insubstantial:

  • The government introduced the actual weapons or photographs, with law-enforcement witnesses identifying manufacturer, make, and model.
  • Most importantly, the entire enterprise was about sending guns to fighters in Cameroon.

On this record, a rational jury could easily conclude the items were “firearms.”

5. Doctrinal Significance

  • The case reaffirms that mens rea for firearms offenses can be proven by circumstantial evidence of group activity and physical conditions (small workspace, noisy grinding, visibly defaced weapons), especially in conspiracies where concealment is a central aim.
  • It also illustrates how Pinkerton remains a powerful tool for prosecutors in conspiracy cases, particularly where the specific act (here, obliteration of serial numbers) is closely aligned with the conspiracy’s obvious purpose.

B. Exclusion of Defense Expert on the Cameroonian Conflict (Diaz, Rule 702/403)

1. The Proposed Testimony

The defense sought to call Efi Walters Tembon, described as an Anglophone Cameroonian who fled government persecution, to testify about:

  • The armed conflict between the Francophone-controlled government and Anglophone populations; and
  • The Cameroonian government’s violent retaliatory measures, even against non‑violent dissent.

Defense counsel argued this was critical to show that:

  • The defendants’ secrecy was motivated by a desire to protect their families and allies in Cameroon from reprisals,
  • Rather than by consciousness of illegality under U.S. law.

2. The District Court’s Ruling and Diaz

The district court excluded the expert testimony, reasoning that:

  • The expert’s “point of view” about the conflict risked conveying a normative justification for the defendants’ conduct.
  • The details of the Cameroonian conflict had, at best, minimal relevance to whether the defendants knew their U.S. conduct was illegal.
  • The testimony risked confusing the jury and inviting them to decide based on sympathy or political views rather than on the evidence of elements.

The court nonetheless allowed the defendants themselves to testify about:

  • The conflict;
  • Their fears of the Cameroonian government; and
  • Their reasons for secrecy.

On appeal, defendants relied on Diaz v. United States, 602 U.S. 526 (2024), where the Supreme Court held that:

  • Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) bars only expert testimony that directly states whether a defendant did or did not have the requisite mental state.
  • Experts may nonetheless describe patterns or background (e.g., drug courier roles) from which juries can infer mental state on their own.

The Fourth Circuit acknowledged Diaz, but held that it did not compel admission here. Diaz addresses the substantive limit imposed by Rule 704(b) on expert opinion; it does not eliminate the district court’s broad discretion under Rules 702 and 403 to:

  • Exclude marginally probative, highly contextual, or emotionally charged testimony that risks confusing the issues or inviting jury nullification.

3. Abuse of Discretion Review

Applying deferential abuse-of-discretion review, the Fourth Circuit found:

  • The trial court reasonably concluded that an extended mini-trial on the politics and atrocities of the Cameroonian conflict would distract from, rather than illuminate, whether:
    • Defendants knew they were secretly shipping guns and ammunition from the U.S. without required export authorizations; and
    • They knew about obliterated serial numbers.
  • Because the defendants themselves were allowed to testify about their fears and motivations, the exclusion did not deprive them of a meaningful opportunity to present their mental-state defense.

4. Implications

  • Tita confirms that Diaz does not open the door to all politically or morally charged expert testimony that might indirectly bear on state of mind. Trial courts retain authority to exclude such evidence when:
    • The probative value on mens rea is slight, and
    • The risk of jury confusion or nullification is substantial.
  • For defense counsel in politically motivated or diaspora-related cases, this underscores the importance of:
    • Building state-of-mind evidence through the defendants and direct fact witnesses; and
    • Keeping expert testimony narrowly focused on matters closely tied to an element (e.g., specific forms of legal confusion or misadvice), rather than broad geopolitical narratives.

C. Co-conspirator Bangarie’s Fifth Amendment Privilege and Proffer Statement

1. Facts

Before pleading guilty, co-conspirator Tse Bangarie took part in a proffer session with the government (an off-the-record discussion to explore possible cooperation). In that proffer, he reportedly stated:

  • He had warned St. Michael that shipping arms from the U.S. to Cameroon was illegal.
  • St. Michael claimed he had military training and even a badge and suggested that his “military superiors” knew and approved of his actions.
  • These assurances allegedly convinced Bangarie there was no need for concern.

Later, Bangarie pled guilty and, in his sworn statement of facts, admitted he knew the group’s shipping of defense items overseas was unlawful. He had not yet been sentenced at the time of trial.

The defense subpoenaed him, saying they would question him only about the portion of the proffer suggesting:

  • St. Michael led group members to believe the operation was legitimate or sanctioned,
  • Bolstering defendants’ claimed good-faith belief.

Bangarie’s counsel informed the court that he would invoke the Fifth Amendment if called, given:

  • His unsentenced status; and
  • Potential inconsistency between his proffer and his later sworn plea statement.

2. Legal Standard: Oliver, Gaskins, and Mitchell

The panel relied on United States v. Oliver, 133 F.4th 329 (4th Cir. 2025), and Gaskins v. McKellar, 916 F.2d 941 (4th Cir. 1990), which require:

  • A “proper and particularized inquiry” into the legitimacy and scope of a witness’s Fifth Amendment claim when it may conflict with the defendant’s right to present a complete defense.
  • A witness may be excused entirely only if the court finds he could legitimately refuse to answer all relevant questions; otherwise, questions must be asked and the privilege invoked question-by-question.

However, the court emphasized that a district court is not required to put the witness on the stand and go through a question-by-question invocation when the record already shows that any relevant questioning would create a real risk of self‑incrimination.

The court also cited Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999), which held that a defendant retains the Fifth Amendment privilege through sentencing: unsentenced defendants may legitimately refuse to answer questions that could affect their sentence or expose them to further charges (including perjury).

3. Application and Residual Hearsay

The Fourth Circuit held:

  • The district court reasonably concluded that:
    • Any testimony confirming the proffer version (that he believed the conduct might be officially sanctioned) could conflict with his sworn plea allocution (that he knew it was illegal);
    • This exposed him to:
      • Potential perjury or false statement issues;
      • Adverse consequences at sentencing; and
      • Even, at least theoretically, motions around the validity of his plea.
  • Under these circumstances, excusing him completely from testifying was within the court’s discretion; there was no constitutional violation of the defendants’ right to present a defense.

Regarding the defense request to introduce the proffer record under the residual hearsay exception, Federal Rule of Evidence 807, the panel agreed with the district court that:

  • Proffer statements not accepted by the government, not given under oath, and inconsistent with later sworn statements do not carry “sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness.”
  • They were not “more probative” on the point (alleged belief in legitimacy) than:
    • Other available evidence, such as testimony from the defendants themselves and from St. Michael (who denied making such assurances).

4. Impact

  • Tita underscores how difficult it is for defendants to use unsentenced co‑conspirators as exculpatory witnesses when:
    • There are inconsistencies between prior proffers and sworn plea statements; and
    • The testimony would necessarily touch on knowledge, intent, or credibility affecting sentencing.
  • It also confirms that unaccepted, unsworn proffer statements rarely satisfy Rule 807’s “trustworthiness” and “more probative” requirements, particularly when contradicted by later sworn admissions.

D. Jury Instructions: Pinkerton, Willful Blindness, and Knowledge

1. Pinkerton Instruction

The defense did not dispute the accuracy of the Pinkerton instruction as a statement of law but argued there was insufficient evidence of foreseeability to justify giving it, and that the case was “too complex” for Pinkerton vicarious liability (relying on the First Circuit’s warning in United States v. Serrano-Delgado, 29 F.4th 16 (1st Cir. 2022)).

The Fourth Circuit rejected both contentions:

  • The small size of the group, their ongoing collaboration in a tiny lab, their explicit purpose of secret arms shipments, the prior tracing incident, and written bylaws all made serial-number obliteration easily foreseeable to each member.
  • This case was not analogous to the “complex” multi-episode scenario in Serrano-Delgado where a jury might improperly infer a conspiracy from a “series of disparate criminal acts.” Here, conspiracy was clear and unified.

Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving a Pinkerton instruction.

2. Willful Blindness Instruction

The panel acknowledged its own cautionary language from United States v. Hale, 857 F.3d 158 (4th Cir. 2017), and United States v. Jinwright, 683 F.3d 471 (4th Cir. 2012), warning that willful blindness instructions risk allowing convictions based on negligence or recklessness. Nonetheless, such an instruction is proper when:

  • The defendant claims lack of guilty knowledge, and
  • The evidence supports an inference of deliberate ignorance, satisfying:
    1. Subjective belief in a high probability that a fact exists; and
    2. Deliberate actions to avoid learning that fact. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 769 (2011).

Here, the same circumstantial evidence supporting actual knowledge also supported willful blindness:

  • The defendants worked repeatedly in the small lab, handling or at least loading the very packages containing visibly defaced guns.
  • Insider testimony indicated that they were present when instructions were given and grinding took place.
  • If the jury believed defendants’ claim that they only ever handled wrapped parcels and never saw the guns themselves, it could infer that this was a conscious choice to avoid confronting what they otherwise strongly suspected.

The court thus held the willful blindness instruction was supported by the evidence and properly given.

3. “Knowledge” Instruction

The district court instructed that “the defendant’s knowledge is a matter of inference” that the jury “may infer from the facts that have been proved.” Defendants argued this improperly emphasized inference and distracted from the need to find an agreement to violate the law.

The panel found nothing objectionable: the instruction simply reminded jurors that knowledge is typically proven circumstantially, a basic principle of criminal law.

4. Overall Effect

  • Read as a whole, the instructions required the jury to find proof beyond a reasonable doubt of:
    • Knowing participation in an unlawful conspiracy; and
    • Either actual knowledge or willful blindness regarding the obliteration of serial numbers (or foreseeability under Pinkerton).
  • The instructions did not “reduce the standard of the government’s proof” as defendants claimed.

E. Sentencing: Relevant Conduct, Firearm-Count Enhancement, and Trafficking

1. Enhancement for Number of Firearms: § 2K2.1(b)(1)(C)

Section 2K2.1(b)(1)(C) provides a +6 offense level if “the offense involved” 25–99 firearms. The presentence reports for each defendant stated that “the offense involved 28 firearms,” corresponding to the 28 guns with obliterated serial numbers.

Key points:

  • Nji and Fonguh objected, arguing there was no jury finding about how many firearms each personally knew about or trafficked.
  • Tita did not object but raised the issue on appeal under plain-error review.

The district court overruled the objections, reasoning:

  • The defendants were convicted of a single conspiracy to transport and smuggle firearms.
  • Evidence at trial and the PSRs established that 28 firearms with obliterated serial numbers were involved in that conspiracy.
  • Under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), a defendant is accountable for acts of others that:
    • Were within the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity;
    • Were in furtherance of that activity; and
    • Were reasonably foreseeable in connection with that activity.

On appeal, defendants argued that the district court improperly conflated Pinkerton liability with relevant-conduct accountability, contrary to United States v. Evans, 90 F.4th 257 (4th Cir. 2024), which distinguished the two doctrines.

The Fourth Circuit rejected this, noting:

  • The district court never cited Pinkerton in its relevant-conduct analysis; it expressly applied § 1B1.3.
  • Section 2K2.1(b)(1) looks to whether “the offense involved” a certain number of firearms; it does not require proof that each defendant knew or handled each one.
  • All 28 defaced firearms were part of the same smuggling conspiracy for which the defendants were convicted, and there was no real dispute about that number.

Therefore:

  • The enhancement correctly applied to each defendant.
  • For Tita, there was no error (plain or otherwise); thus, his unobjected‑to enhancement was also affirmed.

2. Enhancement for Firearms Trafficking: § 2K2.1(b)(5) (2021)

The 2021 version of § 2K2.1(b)(5) provided a +4 offense level “if the defendant engaged in the trafficking of firearms.” The commentary, note 13(B), clarified that:

  • “Defendant,” consistent with § 1B1.3, is limited to:
    • The defendant’s own conduct; and
    • Conduct he aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused.
  • It does not automatically include all co-conspirators’ conduct by vicarious conspiracy liability.

The defendants argued that the district court failed to make individualized findings showing that each defendant personally engaged in or aided the trafficking of two or more firearms.

The Fourth Circuit concluded that:

  • The record plainly showed personal participation:
    • Nji maintained inventory and helped prepare and load ammunition and firearms for shipment;
    • Fonguh prepared ammunition and helped package and load goods;
    • Tita oversaw operations and directed others, fitting at least the “aiding and abetting” rubric.
  • Given the scale and repeated nature of the shipments, there was no credible argument that any defendant’s involvement was limited to a single firearm; the threshold for “trafficking” was easily met.

Thus, the +4 trafficking enhancement was properly applied to each defendant based on his own conduct and aid to the conspiracy’s trafficking activity.

3. Doctrinal Significance

  • For § 2K2.1(b)(1): The case reinforces that:
    • In conspiracy-based firearms offenses, the numerosity enhancement focuses on the offense as a whole, not each conspirator’s subjective knowledge of the precise count.
    • So long as the conspiracy encompassed the full quantity and it was within the jointly undertaken activity and reasonably foreseeable, each conspirator can be held responsible for that number at sentencing.
  • For § 2K2.1(b)(5): The opinion emphasizes that the trafficking enhancement requires at least:
    • Personal involvement, or
    • Aiding and abetting conduct meeting the trafficking criteria.
    While the court found that requirement satisfied here, it implicitly confirms the commentary’s limitation and does not adopt a pure Pinkerton-style numerosity for this enhancement.

F. Supervised Release Conditions: Rogers, Singletary, Lassiter, Turner, and Bullis

1. Legal Framework

When imposing supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583:

  • The court must impose certain mandatory conditions listed in § 3583(d) (e.g., not committing another federal, state, or local crime).
  • The court may impose additional discretionary conditions if they:
    • Are reasonably related to sentencing factors;
    • Involve no greater deprivation of liberty than necessary; and
    • Are consistent with Sentencing Commission policy statements.
  • Under § 3583(f), probation must provide the defendant a written statement of the conditions.

The Sentencing Guidelines mirror this structure:

  • § 5D1.3(a): mandatory conditions.
  • § 5D1.3(c): 13 recommended “standard conditions” that may be imposed in appropriate cases.
  • § 5D1.3(d), (e): specialized “special conditions” for particular circumstances.

Key Fourth Circuit precedents:

  • United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020):
    • The district court must orally pronounce all discretionary conditions at sentencing; written judgments may not add new discretionary conditions or materially change them.
    • Mandatory conditions need not be read aloud because defendants are on notice of them by statute.
  • United States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2021):
    • When a written judgment includes discretionary conditions not orally pronounced, the sentence generally must be vacated and remanded.
  • United States v. Lassiter, 96 F.4th 629 (4th Cir. 2024):
    • Reaffirmed that oral pronouncement controls over a conflicting written judgment.
  • United States v. Turner, 122 F.4th 511 (4th Cir. 2024):
    • Clarified that a district court can satisfy Rogers by incorporating by reference a set of standard conditions:
      • For example, referencing conditions listed in the PSR or a standing order, so long as the defendant is clearly informed those conditions will apply.
  • United States v. Bullis, 122 F.4th 107 (4th Cir. 2024):
    • Warned that when a judge “summarizes” conditions without clear incorporation, discrepancies or ambiguities between oral statements and written judgments may create Rogers problems.

2. What Happened in Tita

The District of Maryland had adopted a standing order (Standing Order 2020-13) listing 13 standard conditions of supervised release that largely track § 5D1.3(c). Among them:

  • Standard Condition 6: Permit the probation officer to visit at any time at home or elsewhere and seize any contraband observed in plain view.
  • Standard Condition 7: Work full-time (at least 30 hours/week) in lawful employment unless excused by probation, actively seek work if unemployed, and notify probation of changes in employment in advance (or within 72 hours where advance notice is impossible).

At sentencing:

  • The court told each defendant that he would be subject to:
    • The mandatory conditions; and
    • The “standard conditions” and certain “additional” conditions.
  • The court expressly stated that it was imposing “all of the mandatory and standard conditions” as adopted in the standing order.
  • The PSRs (which defendants had reviewed) also listed these standard conditions in full.
  • The court then summarized some standard conditions orally, including:
    • SC 6: telling defendants they “must allow the probation officer to visit [them] at any time” at home or elsewhere; and
    • SC 7: telling them they “must work full time at a lawful type of employment” or “make every effort to work full-time, at least 30 hours per week.”
  • In its written judgments, the court included the full text of the standard conditions, including SC 6 and SC 7.

The defendants argued on appeal that:

  • The written conditions (with details like the 72-hour notice rule) were broader than the oral “summaries,” creating a Rogers conflict.
  • Under Rogers and Bullis, this required vacatur and full resentencing.

3. The Fourth Circuit’s Resolution

The Fourth Circuit held that there was no Rogers violation because:

  • The district court unambiguously:
    • Adopted the standard conditions via express oral incorporation of the standing order; and
    • Referred to them in terms that put defendants on notice that that entire set of conditions would apply.
  • Under Turner, such express incorporation is sufficient; the court is not required to read each condition verbatim, so long as:
    • The defendant is clearly informed which set of conditions is being imposed; and
    • The written judgment tracks that set “word-for-word.”
  • The later “summaries” of selected conditions did not:
    • Limit or contradict the previously-incorporated conditions; nor
    • Purge or modify the incorporated text.
    They were merely non-exhaustive explanations of certain conditions the court chose to highlight.

The court distinguished Bullis, where the problem was:

  • Ambiguous or incomplete oral statements without clear incorporation, leading to uncertainty as to what exactly had been imposed.

In Tita, by contrast, the incorporation and the content of the standing conditions were clear from:

  • The court’s oral pronouncements;
  • The standing order; and
  • The PSRs that defendants had reviewed.

4. Practical and Doctrinal Takeaways

  • For district judges:
    • You may satisfy Rogers by:
      1. Expressly incorporating by reference a known set of “standard conditions” (e.g., via standing order or PSR); and
      2. Ensuring the written judgment reproduces those conditions verbatim.
    • You may then summarize or explain key conditions without creating a Rogers conflict, so long as:
      • The explanations do not contradict or materially narrow/expand the incorporated text; and
      • There is no ambiguity about which conditions actually apply.
  • For defense counsel:
    • Standard conditions incorporated via standing orders and PSRs are now clearly enforceable, even if only summarized at sentencing.
    • Rogers-based appeals must focus on true mismatches or additions in the written judgment, not on differences between the court’s brief oral summary and the fuller written language, where proper incorporation occurred.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Pinkerton Liability

Under Pinkerton v. United States, a member of a conspiracy can be held guilty of substantive offenses committed by a co‑conspirator if:

  1. The offense was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy;
  2. The offense fell within the scope of the unlawful project; and
  3. The offense was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant as a natural consequence of the conspiracy.

Pinkerton does not require that the defendant personally perform, assist in, or even know about the specific act, so long as these conditions are met.

2. Willful Blindness

Willful blindness (or “deliberate ignorance”) allows a jury to treat a defendant as having knowledge where:

  1. He believed there was a high probability that a fact existed (e.g., serial numbers were removed); and
  2. He took deliberate steps to avoid learning that fact (e.g., intentionally not looking at the guns being packaged, delegating tasks to avoid seeing incriminating details).

This is more than negligence or even recklessness; it requires a conscious decision not to confirm what the defendant strongly suspects.

3. Relevant Conduct (Guidelines § 1B1.3)

“Relevant conduct” determines what a sentencing judge may consider when calculating the Guidelines range. For jointly undertaken criminal activity (like conspiracy), a defendant is accountable for:

  • His own acts; and
  • Acts of others that were:
    • Within the scope of the criminal activity he agreed to jointly undertake;
    • In furtherance of that activity; and
    • Reasonably foreseeable to him.

This is similar to but not identical with Pinkerton; courts must make a defendant‑specific determination of the scope of the “jointly undertaken” criminal activity.

4. Proffer Sessions and Rule 807

A proffer session is typically an off-the-record meeting between a defendant and prosecutors where:

  • The defendant gives information in hopes of obtaining a cooperation agreement;
  • The government often agrees not to use the statements directly against the defendant in its case-in-chief (subject to exceptions).

Rule 807 (the “residual” hearsay exception) admits hearsay only where:

  • There are strong guarantees of trustworthiness (e.g., oath, corroboration, lack of motive to lie); and
  • The statement is more probative than any other evidence reasonably available.

Unsworn proffers not accepted by the government—and inconsistent with later sworn statements—rarely qualify.

5. Supervised Release: Mandatory vs. Standard vs. Special Conditions

  • Mandatory conditions are required by statute for all persons on supervised release (e.g., do not commit another crime; cooperate with DNA collection).
  • Standard conditions are discretionary but recommended conditions that apply in most cases (e.g., work regularly, answer probation’s questions, allow home visits).
  • Special conditions are tailored to the defendant’s circumstances (e.g., drug treatment, mental health counseling, restrictions on computer use).

Under Rogers, only discretionary conditions (standard and special) must be orally pronounced or expressly incorporated at sentencing; mandatory conditions are deemed known and need not be read aloud.

V. Broader Impact and Significance

1. Firearms Trafficking and Diaspora Conflicts

United States v. Tita demonstrates that:

  • U.S.-based support for foreign armed conflicts—however politically or morally motivated—will be analyzed within ordinary domestic criminal frameworks (firearms statutes, smuggling laws, export controls, conspiracies).
  • Efforts to frame such support as protecting families or engaging in “freedom fighting” do not insulate conduct from prosecution, especially where:
    • Participants engage in elaborate concealment;
    • Attempt to evade law-enforcement detection; and
    • Manipulate serial numbers and shipping records.

2. Evidence of Knowledge in Group Operations

The opinion is instructive on how courts handle:

  • Knowledge elements in small-group conspiracies where there is no direct admission of awareness of a specific detail (like obliterated serial numbers) but:
    • The physical setup and duration of the operation strongly support a common understanding;
    • Members share goals and are present during overt acts.

It confirms that circumstantial evidence of how a group operates—physical layout, repetitive cooperation, visibility and audibility of key acts—can be more than sufficient to satisfy mens rea requirements.

3. Sentencing Clarity

On the Guidelines, the case:

  • Clarifies that for § 2K2.1(b)(1), courts may look at the “offense” (here, the conspiracy) as a whole to count the number of firearms, not at each conspirator’s subjective knowledge of the count.
  • Reaffirms that the trafficking enhancement in § 2K2.1(b)(5) is anchored in the defendant’s own conduct and aiding-and-abetting activity, but that this limitation will rarely bar the enhancement where the defendant plays even a moderately active role in the conspiracy.

4. Supervised Release Pronouncement: Refining Rogers

Finally, Tita fits within a line of cases (Rogers, Singletary, Turner, Bullis, Lassiter) progressively refining how supervised release conditions must be imposed:

  • It affirms that express incorporation by reference of standard conditions, coupled with later written judgments repeating them verbatim, satisfies Rogers.
  • It also gives district courts practical leeway to summarize or highlight certain conditions without inadvertently creating a mismatch with the written judgment.

VI. Conclusion

United States v. Tita is a comprehensive reaffirmation of several important doctrines in federal criminal law:

  • Conspirators cannot escape liability for specific firearms offenses by compartmentalizing tasks when the group’s structure and operations make key facts—like obliterated serial numbers—inescapably visible or reasonably foreseeable.
  • Trial courts retain substantial discretion to exclude contextual or political background expert testimony when its probative value on mens rea is marginal and its potential to confuse or mislead is high, even in the wake of Diaz.
  • The balance between a defendant’s right to present a defense and a witness’s Fifth Amendment privilege remains firmly in place: unsentenced co‑conspirators with inconsistent statements may validly refuse to testify, and their unaccepted proffers will rarely be admitted under Rule 807.
  • At sentencing, the Guidelines’ relevant-conduct rules allow courts to treat conspiracy-based firearms offenses as unitary for numerosity enhancements, while still requiring some individualized conduct for trafficking enhancements.
  • In the supervised-release context, the case clarifies that express incorporation of standard conditions, followed by written judgments that simply restate those conditions, is consistent with Rogers, even if the court only summarizes some of them orally.

Taken together, the opinion offers a detailed, fact-rich application of established law to a modern, transnational firearms-smuggling conspiracy, and it will serve as a useful reference in future cases involving conspiratorial knowledge, willful blindness, firearm enhancements, and the technicalities of supervised release pronouncements in the Fourth Circuit.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

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