United States v. Thomas: Consensual Encounters, Fake Identification, and Probable Cause to Arrest After a Littering Complaint

I. Introduction

The Eleventh Circuit’s published decision in United States v. John Wayne Thomas, No. 24‑11427 (11th Cir. Dec. 1, 2025), addresses a recurring and practically important Fourth Amendment question: when a police officer responds to a complaint about minor misconduct — here, littering in a McDonald’s parking lot — and asks a driver for identification, has a “seizure” occurred, and under what circumstances may the officer escalate the encounter into a custodial arrest?

The case arose from a littering complaint that escalated into an arrest, a pepper-spray assault on the officer, the defendant’s flight, and ultimately the discovery of drugs, counterfeit currency, and extensive identity-theft materials in the defendant’s vehicle. The defendant, John Wayne Thomas, moved to suppress the fruits of a subsequent search warrant on the theory that all of the information used to support that warrant flowed from an unlawful “stop” for a mere civil infraction.

The district court upheld the search, concluding that the officer had authority to conduct an investigatory detention based on the littering complaint and that the officer lawfully requested identification during that detention. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress, but on different grounds. It held that:

the initial encounter between Officer Kaiser and Thomas was a consensual encounter that did not implicate the Fourth Amendment; and
when the encounter later escalated into a physical detention, that escalation was an arrest supported by probable cause for the Florida felony of possessing or displaying a fictitious driver’s license.

Because there was no antecedent Fourth Amendment violation, the affidavit supporting the warrant was not tainted, and the evidence discovered in the car was admissible.

The opinion is significant for at least three reasons:

It delineates the boundary between consensual encounters and seizures in the context of a traffic-adjacent, parking‑lot interaction initiated by a minor complaint.
It underscores that possession or display of a fictitious driver’s license under Florida law can, based on a relatively modest body of evidence (age mismatch and dispatcher confirmation), furnish full probable cause for a custodial arrest.
It reinforces that appellate courts in the Eleventh Circuit may affirm on any ground supported by the record, particularly when video evidence clarifies the facts of the encounter.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

On January 31, 2023, a McDonald’s employee in DeFuniak Springs, Florida, called police to report that a male in a gray Acura was littering in the restaurant parking lot. Officer Anthony Kaiser responded. On arrival he:

observed a gray Acura matching the description; and
noticed trash on the ground next to the driver’s side door.

Kaiser:

asked dispatch to run the Louisiana license plate;
approached the driver (Thomas), informed him of the complaint; and
heard Thomas admit to discarding the trash.

Thomas exited, picked up the trash, and then returned to the driver’s seat. When Kaiser then asked for identification, Thomas produced a Louisiana driver’s license that:

bore a different name and
reflected a birth year of 1947.

Kaiser suspected the license was fake because Thomas did not appear to be in his mid‑70s. He:

stepped away from the driver’s door;
re‑read the license plate and gave dispatch the plate and license number; and
continued to speak with Thomas while waiting for a records check.

Dispatch reported that the driver’s license number did not belong to the name on the card (“S.M.D.”) and had a different name and date of birth. While this was unfolding:

Thomas’s passenger, Amanda Breaux, left the car and spoke with Kaiser in another part of the parking lot;
Kaiser began to suspect Breaux of criminal activity and directed her to his patrol car; and
Thomas briefly left his own car, walked to an adjacent parking lot, and returned, underscoring that he felt free to move around.

Once dispatch confirmed the mismatch between the license number and the identifying information, Kaiser returned to Thomas’s car. He:

opened the driver’s door,
grabbed Thomas,
told him to “come on out,”
said he was putting him “in handcuffs” and that he was being detained for giving false identification.

Thomas refused to exit. Kaiser walked back to his patrol car to retrieve a Taser. Thomas closed his car door, leaving the window slightly open. When Kaiser approached with the Taser, Thomas pepper-sprayed him through the crack in the window. Kaiser fired his Taser. Thomas reversed out of the parking space and fled. Kaiser fired two shots at the vehicle as it fled.

Thomas abandoned the Acura in a nearby neighborhood. A canine tracking unit located Thomas several hours later, with several canisters of pepper spray on his person.

B. The Search Warrant and Evidence Found

An investigator prepared an affidavit to obtain a search warrant for the Acura. The affidavit recounted, among other things, that:

Thomas had provided Kaiser with a fake Louisiana driver’s license containing fake information;
Kaiser had informed Thomas that he was under arrest;
Thomas refused to comply, sprayed Kaiser with pepper spray, and fled;
Thomas later admitted he “maced” the officer because the officer had a Taser and Thomas felt he was not being respectful; and
Breaux reported that Thomas had a firearm in his possession.

The warrant requested authority to search the car for:

firearms and ammunition,
pepper spray/mace and spent projectiles, and
documents including false identification,

as evidence of:

battery on a law enforcement officer and
giving false identification while lawfully detained.

The circuit judge issued the warrant. When officers executed it, they discovered:

approximately 105 grams of methamphetamine;
two counterfeit $100 bills;
numerous personal identification documents belonging to others (wage records, mail, copies of Social Security cards, birth certificates, account statements, and tax documents); and
a laptop with images of Social Security cards, driver’s licenses, credit cards, checks, birth certificates, and multiple driver’s licenses bearing Thomas’s photograph but other persons’ identifying information.

C. Charges, Motion to Suppress, and District Court Ruling

A grand jury indicted Thomas on five federal counts:

Unlawful possession of a means of identification, 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7), (b)(2)(B);
Fraudulent use of 15 or more unauthorized access devices, 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3), (c)(1)(A)(i);
Aggravated identity theft (unlawful possession of a means of identification during and in relation to a felony), 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1);
Mail theft, 18 U.S.C. § 1708; and
Possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of a mixture containing methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(viii).

Thomas moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the Acura, arguing:

Officer Kaiser’s initial “stop” for littering violated the Fourth Amendment because littering was a noncriminal civil infraction, and Florida law did not authorize a detention based on mere reasonable suspicion of such an infraction; and
because he was unlawfully detained when he produced the fake ID, the information in the warrant affidavit was fruit of an illegal seizure, requiring suppression of all fruits of the search.

The government replied that:

Kaiser had adequate information for an investigatory stop under Florida law and could request identification to issue a citation; and
even if analyzed under federal standards, Thomas was not “seized” (did not believe he was being detained) until later, and by that time Kaiser had probable cause that Thomas had committed crimes (false ID and battery on an officer), justifying a search for evidence in the vehicle.

The district court denied the motion to suppress. It held:

Kaiser had authority to conduct an investigatory stop based on the littering complaint;
within that lawful stop, Kaiser could request identification, and Thomas was obliged to comply;
even though Thomas picked up the trash, Kaiser was not required to terminate the investigation and could still cite him; and
once Thomas produced false identification, police had probable cause to search the car for evidence of criminal activity.

The government dismissed one count, and Thomas pleaded guilty to the remaining four counts, while reserving his right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. The district court sentenced him to 212 months’ imprisonment and five years of supervised release.

D. The Eleventh Circuit’s Holding

On appeal, Thomas challenged only the denial of the motion to suppress, arguing that:

the search warrant was based on information acquired during an unlawful stop for a civil infraction; and
therefore, the resulting search of his vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. In doing so, it took a different analytical path than the district court:

It held that the initial encounter — including Kaiser’s approach, conversation about littering, and request for identification — was a consensual encounter that did not trigger Fourth Amendment protections. Therefore, no “stop” needed to be justified by reasonable suspicion at that stage.
It concluded that a seizure occurred only later, when Kaiser told Thomas to exit the car, said he was placing him in handcuffs, and physically grabbed him. At that point, the court agreed with Thomas that this was properly characterized as an arrest, not merely a Terry-style investigatory detention.
It held that, by the time of this arrest, Kaiser had probable cause to believe Thomas had committed the Florida felony of possessing or displaying a fictitious or unlawfully issued driver’s license under Fla. Stat. § 322.212(1)(a), (6). That probable cause rendered the arrest lawful under the Fourth Amendment.
Because there was no antecedent unlawful seizure, the information in the search warrant affidavit (fake ID, pepper-spray assault, etc.) was not tainted, and the motion to suppress was properly denied.

The court therefore affirmed Thomas’s convictions.

III. Analysis of the Opinion

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Standards of Review: United States v. Cohen and United States v. Schmitz

The court begins by reciting the familiar standard of review for suppression rulings:

Factual findings are reviewed for clear error;
Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo; and
Facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party (here, the government).
(United States v. Cohen, 38 F.4th 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 2022))

The court further invokes United States v. Schmitz, 153 F.4th 1334, 1340 n.6 (11th Cir. 2025), for the proposition that it may:

“affirm the denial of a motion to suppress on any ground supported by the record.”

This is critical: it allows the Eleventh Circuit to bypass the district court’s specific reasoning about whether Florida law authorizes an investigatory detention for littering and instead affirm on the alternative ground that the initial encounter was consensual and the later arrest supported by probable cause for a different offense.

2. Suppression Remedy: United States v. Gonzalez‑Zea

The opinion cites United States v. Gonzalez‑Zea, 995 F.3d 1297, 1302 (11th Cir. 2021), for the basic rule that:

“Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be suppressed.”

This frames the core question in the appeal: was there a Fourth Amendment violation (an unlawful seizure) that tainted the information used to obtain the search warrant for the Acura? If not, suppression is off the table.

3. Categories of Police–Citizen Encounters: United States v. Perez

The court relies on United States v. Perez, 443 F.3d 772, 777 (11th Cir. 2006), which recognizes three broad categories of encounters:

Consensual encounters involving no coercion or detention;
Brief seizures/investigatory detentions (often called “Terry stops”); and
Full-scale arrests.

The classification matters because:

Consensual encounters do not implicate the Fourth Amendment at all; there is no “seizure.”
Investigatory detentions must be supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Arrests must be supported by probable cause.

The critical questions in this case are:

When did the encounter move from consensual to non-consensual?
At that moment, did Kaiser have sufficient legal justification (reasonable suspicion or probable cause) to detain or arrest Thomas?

4. Consensual Encounters: United States v. Knights and United States v. Drayton

The core precedent guiding the “consensual” analysis is United States v. Knights, 989 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2021).

Knights sets out the test: an encounter is consensual if the officer has not, by physical force or show of authority, restrained the citizen’s liberty. The test is objective: whether a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would feel free to terminate the encounter. The opinion lists factors such as:

whether the citizen’s path is blocked or impeded;
the length of the detention and questioning;
the number of officers present;
whether weapons are displayed;
whether there is physical touching; and
the language and tone used by the police.

The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002), reinforces that:

Officers may pose questions,
ask for identification, and
request consent to search,

without necessarily effecting a seizure, so long as they do not use coercive means.

In Knights itself, officers approached a vehicle in a parking lot based on suspicion of theft. They parked in a way that allowed the vehicle to leave, one of the individuals actually walked away and entered a house, and the defendant, seated in the driver’s seat, could have driven away. The Eleventh Circuit held that the initial encounter was consensual, even though an officer shone a flashlight and knocked on the window. The key was that a reasonable person in the defendant’s shoes would have felt free to end the interaction.

Knights thus provides a template for analyzing parking-lot interactions with drivers who have apparent freedom to move or leave.

5. Role of Video Evidence: O’Brien v. Town of Bellingham and Scott v. Harris

Thomas argued that the Eleventh Circuit could not re‑classify the encounter as consensual without impermissibly re‑weighing facts not found by the district court. In response, the panel invoked two authorities about video evidence:

O’Brien v. Town of Bellingham, 943 F.3d 514, 531 (1st Cir. 2019), which advises that when there is unchallenged video evidence, a reviewing court should ordinarily view the facts in the light depicted by the video; and
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007), where the Supreme Court similarly directed courts to view the facts as shown on the videotape when the parties’ versions conflict.

Those authorities permit an appellate court to determine, based on video, that the objective circumstances of the encounter did not show coercion, without treating that determination as forbidden fact-finding.

6. Probable Cause for Arrest: Holmes v. Kucynda, United States v. Roy, and Rankin v. Evans

Once the court classifies the interaction as an arrest at the moment Kaiser told Thomas he was going into handcuffs and physically grabbed him, the central question becomes whether Kaiser had probable cause at that time.

The opinion relies on:

Holmes v. Kucynda, 321 F.3d 1069, 1079 (11th Cir. 2003), which defines probable cause as existing when the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge would warrant a prudent person in believing the suspect had committed or was committing an offense.
United States v. Roy, 869 F.2d 1427, 1433 (11th Cir. 1989), which emphasizes that probable cause is judged by objective standards, not by the officer’s subjective beliefs or the specific criminal charge he articulates.
Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1436 (11th Cir. 1998), which instructs courts to apply a “common sense view to the realities of normal life” when evaluating probable cause.

These cases support two key propositions:

The existence of probable cause is evaluated at the moment of arrest based on what the officer knew then.
If those facts objectively establish probable cause for any offense, the arrest is lawful, even if the officer cited or emphasized a different legal basis.

7. The Florida False-ID Statute: Fla. Stat. § 322.212 and State v. Koczwara

The crucial substantive offense supporting probable cause is Fla. Stat. § 322.212(1)(a), (6). The statute makes it a third-degree felony to:

“[k]nowingly have in [one’s] possession or to display any … forged, stolen, fictitious, counterfeit, or unlawfully issued driver license or identification card.”

The panel notes State v. Koczwara, 837 So. 2d 591, 593 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003), which recognized that § 322.212(1)(a) covers possession of a “license with a false name.”

Kaiser knew:

the license bore a name and date of birth that did not match the records associated with the license number, and
Thomas clearly did not appear to be in his seventies, as the card’s birth year of 1947 suggested.

Under § 322.212 and applying common sense (per Rankin), the court found it objectively reasonable for Kaiser to believe that Thomas was knowingly possessing and displaying a fictitious driver’s license — a felony offense.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Step One: Characterizing the Initial Encounter as Consensual

The central defense theory was that Kaiser “stopped” Thomas based on suspicion of only a noncriminal infraction (littering), so the detention fell outside the scope of permissible Terry-type investigative detentions. The Eleventh Circuit sidestepped the state-law debate by holding that there was, at first, no detention at all.

Applying Knights and Drayton, the court examined the objective circumstances:

Patrol Car Position: Kaiser parked “a few spaces away” rather than directly blocking the Acura’s path to exit the lot. As in Knights, the defendant “could have driven away.”
Movement of the Defendant: Thomas actually exited his car, picked up the trash, returned to the driver’s seat, and later left his vehicle again to walk into an adjacent parking lot and back, without any indication that Kaiser impeded him.
Number of Officers and Tone: Only one officer was involved at that stage; the opinion notes no brandishing of weapons, no raised voice, and no physical touching prior to the command to get out of the car.
Request for ID: Kaiser simply asked for identification after informing Thomas of the littering complaint. Under Drayton, officers may ask for ID in a consensual encounter as long as they do not coerce cooperation.
Video Evidence: The court emphasizes that “nothing from the video of the incident” established “physical force or show of authority” prior to the point when Kaiser ordered Thomas out of the car.

Taking these factors together, the panel concluded that a reasonable person in Thomas’s position would have felt free to terminate the encounter up until the moment Kaiser escalated the interaction by ordering him out and reaching into the car. Therefore:

The initial approach and conversation about littering were consensual.
The request for and viewing of Thomas’s license occurred during a non‑seizure interaction.

This is crucial: if the encounter was consensual at that point, then:

Thomas had no constitutional basis to object to Kaiser’s request for ID; and
the discovery that the license was likely fictitious was not the product of an unlawful seizure.

2. The Use of Video to Resolve Disputed Characterizations

Thomas argued that the Eleventh Circuit was improperly “div[ing] into the record to make [its] own factual determinations” in labeling the encounter as consensual. The court responded by invoking:

its authority to affirm on any record-supported ground (Schmitz), and
the principle that unchallenged video evidence can guide the appellate court’s view of the facts (O’Brien, Scott).

In effect, the panel says: where the video clearly shows that the officer did not box in the car, display weapons, or otherwise exert coercive authority before giving a command to exit, the court may treat that as an undisputed fact, even if the district court did not explicitly label the encounter as “consensual.”

3. Step Two: Identifying the Moment of Seizure — and Its Nature

The court then turns to the moment when the encounter ceased to be consensual and became a “seizure.” The parties agreed that Kaiser eventually seized Thomas; the dispute was whether this seizure was a mere investigatory detention or a full arrest.

Two pieces of evidence are key:

The affidavit supporting the search warrant states that after Kaiser realized the identification was false, he “informed Thomas he was under arrest, and directed him to exit the vehicle.”
The video shows Kaiser telling Thomas “come on out” and “you’re going in handcuffs” and physically grabbing him even before any active resistance.

On these facts, the panel concedes Thomas’s point: this was not a momentary Terry stop but an attempted arrest. The combination of:

an explicit declaration of arrest,
the statement about handcuffs, and
immediate physical control of the suspect

goes well beyond the lesser restraint associated with an investigatory detention.

That characterization favors Thomas only if the arrest lacked probable cause. If probable cause existed, then an arrest is constitutionally permissible even if the officer or government initially described the seizure as only an “investigatory detention.”

4. Step Three: Probable Cause to Arrest for a Felony Fake-ID Offense

The crucial analytic step is the court’s finding that Kaiser had probable cause to believe Thomas violated Fla. Stat. § 322.212(1)(a), (6) by possessing or displaying a fictitious driver’s license.

The relevant facts known to Kaiser at the moment he attempted the arrest:

Thomas produced a Louisiana driver’s license in another person’s name.
The license showed a birth year of 1947, indicating the holder should be in his mid‑70s.
Thomas plainly did not appear to be that age, based on Kaiser’s common-sense observation.
Dispatch reported that the license number was associated with a different name and birth date than those displayed on the card.

Under the objective standard articulated in Holmes, Roy, and Rankin, these facts would “warrant a prudent man” in believing Thomas was knowingly possessing and displaying a forged or fictitious driver’s license.

Two doctrinal points are particularly salient:

The government did not have to show that Kaiser himself subjectively thought in terms of § 322.212. Under Roy, probable cause is evaluated objectively; if the facts support probable cause for any offense, the arrest is valid.
The court did not require any additional evidence that Thomas had actually used the license to obtain a benefit or commit fraud. Mere knowing possession or display of a fictitious card is enough under the Florida statute, as confirmed by Koczwara.

Thus, when Kaiser reached into the car and began to place Thomas in handcuffs, he had probable cause to arrest for a Florida felony offense, irrespective of whether the initial encounter had involved only littering.

5. Step Four: No Fourth Amendment Violation, No Taint, No Suppression

Once the court concludes that:

the initial interaction was consensual and
the subsequent seizure was a lawful arrest supported by probable cause,

the rest of the suppression analysis follows straightforwardly:

Because there was no unlawful seizure, there is no “poisonous tree.”
The information in the search warrant affidavit — the fake ID, the pepper-spray assault, Breaux’s statement about a firearm, etc. — was lawfully obtained and can support the warrant.
Thus the warrant is valid, the search is lawful, and the evidence from the Acura is admissible.

The panel therefore affirms the denial of Thomas’s motion to suppress and, by extension, his convictions.

C. Potential Impact on Future Cases and on the Law

1. Clarifying the Scope of Consensual Encounters in Parking-Lot Contexts

United States v. Thomas reinforces and slightly extends Knights by emphasizing that:

When an officer responds to a complaint about minor misconduct and
approaches a car parked in a public lot without blocking it in,
speaks calmly, and
asks for ID without more,

the encounter ordinarily remains consensual for Fourth Amendment purposes, even if:

the officer is responding to a report of wrongdoing (here, littering); and
the officer communicates the substance of the complaint.

This gives law enforcement significant latitude to:

approach vehicles in open lots,
ask questions, and
request identification,

without necessarily creating a “stop” that must be justified by reasonable suspicion. For defense practitioners, it underscores the importance of the specific physical set‑up (blocking exits, number of officers, display of weapons) and officer demeanor when arguing that such encounters became seizures.

2. Avoidance of the State-Law Question About Detaining for Civil Infractions

Notably, the Eleventh Circuit did not decide whether Florida law authorizes a Terry-style detention based solely on reasonable suspicion of a noncriminal littering infraction. The district court had relied on such authority, but the panel instead used the “consensual encounter” characterization to avoid resolving a potentially thorny state-law issue.

The practical effect:

The question of whether a Florida officer may forcibly detain someone solely to issue a civil citation for littering remains open at the federal appellate level.
But the court suggests that many real-world interactions of this sort can be analyzed as consensual, which makes the underlying state-law question less outcome-determinative in many suppression cases.

3. Strengthening the Use of Fake-ID Possession as a Basis for Arrest

Another important consequence concerns the use of fake identification. Thomas signals that:

When an officer sees an ID that is internally inconsistent with state records (name/DOB mismatch for the license number) and facially inconsistent with the holder’s apparent age,
the officer can reasonably infer that the card is fictitious and that the holder is knowingly possessing and displaying it,

thus furnishing probable cause for arrest under Fla. Stat. § 322.212.

This is significant because:

Fake IDs are ubiquitous in a range of criminal activity, from underage drinking to sophisticated identity theft.
Once a fake ID is discovered, probable cause for a felony arrest can dramatically expand police authority to conduct searches incident to arrest and to seek warrants, even if the original reason for the encounter was minor.

In identity-theft and fraud prosecutions, this holding provides a clear route for the government to defend arrests and subsequent searches that derived from an ostensibly minor contact.

4. Emphasis on Objective Probable Cause and Any-Offense Justification

By citing Roy, the court reiterates that probable cause is an objective standard and that an arrest is lawful so long as the facts known to the officer support probable cause for any offense, not necessarily the one cited by the officer or the prosecutor’s original theory.

In practice, this:

gives prosecutors flexibility to defend arrests on alternative statutory grounds identified during appellate litigation; and
axes defense arguments focused solely on the government’s articulated theory for the arrest, pushing defense counsel instead to contest the underlying facts or the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.

5. Reinforcing the Role of Video Evidence in Suppression Appeals

The court’s reliance on unchallenged video (and its citation to Scott and O’Brien) continues the trend of:

treating dashcam/bodycam footage as a central, sometimes determinative record of events; and
allowing appellate courts to correct or refine characterizations of encounters even when district court findings are sparse.

For litigants, this means:

video must be carefully analyzed and framed at the suppression stage; and
on appeal, factual arguments that contradict clear video will carry little weight.

IV. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

1. Fourth Amendment “Seizure” vs. Consensual Encounter

Under the Fourth Amendment, a person is “seized” only when, by means of physical force or show of authority, an officer restrains the person’s liberty such that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave or terminate the encounter.

Consensual encounter: The person is free to ignore the officer and go about their business; no Fourth Amendment protection applies, and no justification is required.
Seizure: The person’s liberty is constrained by physical force (e.g., being grabbed) or by an assertion of authority that a reasonable person would feel obliged to obey (e.g., “You’re under arrest,” blocking the person’s car).

In Thomas, the key was that Thomas could (and did) get out of his car, walk around, and potentially drive away before Kaiser exerted any coercive force.

2. Terry Stop (Investigatory Detention) vs. Arrest

A Terry stop is a brief, investigative detention based on reasonable suspicion that the person is involved in criminal activity. It allows limited questioning and, if needed, a frisk for weapons, but it does not amount to a full arrest.

An arrest is a more intrusive seizure, often involving physical restraint and transportation to a police station, and must be supported by probable cause that the person committed a crime.

In Thomas:

The government argued that Kaiser was conducting a Terry stop when he ordered Thomas out of the car.
The court disagreed, noting Kaiser’s explicit statements (“you’re going in handcuffs,” “under arrest”) and his physical grabbing of Thomas. Those hallmarks elevated the interaction to a full arrest.

3. Probable Cause

“Probable cause” is a flexible, common-sense standard. It does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt or even a preponderance of evidence. Rather, it exists when the facts and circumstances, viewed through the lens of common sense, would lead a reasonable person to believe that a crime has been committed and that the suspect committed it.

In this case, probable cause came from:

a driver presenting an ID that clearly did not match his apparent age;
a mismatch between the license number and the name/DOB in official records; and
a state statute making knowing possession/display of a fictitious license a felony.

4. The Exclusionary Rule and “Fruit of the Poisonous Tree”

The exclusionary rule generally prevents the government from using evidence obtained through violations of the Fourth Amendment. The “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine extends that suppression to evidence derived from the initial illegality.

The defendant’s argument in Thomas was classic “fruit of the poisonous tree”:

He claimed the initial stop was illegal (the “poisonous tree”).
Information gleaned during that stop (fake ID, pepper-spray assault) then supported the search warrant (the “fruit”).
Therefore, all evidence from the search should be suppressed.

Because the Eleventh Circuit found no “poisonous tree” — no unlawful seizure — the doctrine never came into play, and the search fruits remained admissible.

5. Civil Infraction vs. Crime

A civil infraction is a violation of the law that is not considered a crime and is usually punishable only by a fine (e.g., many traffic violations, some forms of littering). A crime (misdemeanor or felony) is punishable by fines, imprisonment, or both, and carries a more severe stigma.

Thomas’s strategy was to emphasize that littering was a noncriminal infraction under Florida law, arguing that officers could not perform a Terry stop based only on reasonable suspicion of such an infraction. The Eleventh Circuit’s shift to a “consensual encounter” framework rendered that question largely irrelevant at the federal constitutional level, though it remains an interesting unresolved matter of Florida law.

6. Objective vs. Subjective Justification for Arrest

The court’s reliance on Roy underscores an important principle: the constitutionality of an arrest depends on an objective assessment of the facts, not on:

the officer’s personal motives, or
the specific crime the officer thought of at the time.

If the facts, viewed objectively, establish probable cause for any offense, the arrest is valid, even if the officer subjectively had a different (or no clearly articulated) offense in mind.

V. Conclusion and Key Takeaways

United States v. Thomas is a notable Eleventh Circuit decision for its careful parsing of a seemingly routine police–citizen encounter that escalated dramatically. The principal holdings can be distilled as follows:

Initial encounter as consensual: An officer’s response to a complaint about minor misconduct (littering) in a parking lot, coupled with a non-blocking vehicle position, calm dialogue, and a simple request for ID, remains a consensual encounter absent a show of force or authority that would make a reasonable person feel unable to leave.
Arrest, not Terry stop: When the officer tells the individual he is “under arrest,” announces handcuffing, and physically grabs him, the seizure is properly characterized as a full arrest, not a mere investigatory detention.
Probable cause for felony fake‑ID offense: Based on an age mismatch and dispatch’s confirmation that the license number does not match the name and date of birth on the face of the card, an officer in Florida has probable cause to arrest for the felony of possessing or displaying a fictitious driver’s license under Fla. Stat. § 322.212.
No Fourth Amendment violation, no suppression: Because both the initial encounter and the subsequent arrest were lawful, the information in the search warrant affidavit was untainted, and the resulting search of the vehicle complied with the Fourth Amendment. Suppression of the evidence was correctly denied.
Appellate flexibility and video evidence: The Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed its ability to affirm on any record-supported ground and underscored the central role of clear video evidence in defining the factual contours of police–citizen encounters.

In the broader legal context, Thomas provides:

Guidance to law enforcement on how to structure consensual interactions with motorists in parking lots and similar settings;
A roadmap for using fake-identification discoveries to establish probable cause for custodial arrests;
A caution to defense counsel that arguments based solely on the initial reason for an officer’s approach (e.g., a minor civil infraction) may fail if the encounter is fairly classifiable as consensual and later escalated on independent grounds.

Taken together, the decision deepens Eleventh Circuit precedent on the continuum from consensual encounter to detention to arrest, and it highlights how a seemingly minor complaint can, through lawful investigative steps, lead to major federal prosecutions when independent evidence of serious crimes emerges.