United States v. Terry: Post-Bruen Reaffirmation of § 922(g)(1) Constitutionality and Clarification of Sentencing-Explanation Duties

1. Introduction

United States v. Charod Terron Terry, an unpublished opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (decided August 7, 2025), showcases two recurring battlegrounds in federal criminal practice:

Second Amendment challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) after the Supreme Court’s watershed decision in N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022); and
Claims that a district court’s failure to engage expressly with mitigation arguments renders a sentence “procedurally unreasonable.”

Terry, a previously convicted felon, pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. On appeal, he argued (i) that Bruen invalidated § 922(g)(1) as applied to him, and (ii) that the district court inadequately addressed his mitigation arguments, thereby abusing its discretion at sentencing. The Fourth Circuit affirmed both the conviction and the 110-month sentence.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The court, in a per curiam opinion, held:

Constitutional Challenge. Terry’s Bruen-based attack on § 922(g)(1) is foreclosed by existing circuit precedent—principally United States v. Hunt, 123 F.4th 697 (4th Cir. 2024) and United States v. Canada, 123 F.4th 159 (4th Cir. 2024).
Sentencing Procedure. Applying the two-step reasonableness review framework, the panel found no “significant procedural error” in the district court’s sentencing explanation. Context and record statements demonstrated that the court considered Terry’s mitigation arguments and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Because the sentence sits at the bottom of the properly calculated Guidelines range, it receives a presumption of substantive reasonableness that Terry did not rebut.

Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed in full, without oral argument.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

(a) Second Amendment Line

Hunt, 123 F.4th 697 (4th Cir. 2024): After Bruen, the Fourth Circuit rejected as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1), holding the statute’s historical analogues sufficient. Terry’s claim is thus controlled by Hunt.
Canada, 123 F.4th 159 (4th Cir. 2024): Reaffirmed § 922(g)(1)’s facial constitutionality, emphasizing its “plainly legitimate sweep.” The panel cites Canada to buttress the view that no facial invalidity arises.
Askew, 98 F.4th 116 (4th Cir. 2024): Distinguishes possession of firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking; cited to show the court’s consistent Second Amendment reasoning.
Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022): Though central to Terry’s argument, Bruen ultimately does not aid him because inferior courts are bound by direct circuit precedent (Hunt).

(b) Sentencing Line

McCain, 974 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2020): Articulates the abuse-of-discretion standard.
Lewis, 958 F.3d 240 (4th Cir. 2020) & Friend, 2 F.4th 369 (4th Cir. 2021): Establish the two-step procedural/substantive framework for reasonableness review.
Fowler, 948 F.3d 663 (4th Cir. 2020) & Gaspar, 123 F.4th 178 (4th Cir. 2024): Clarify how much explanation is required and when contextual cues suffice.
Gillespie, 27 F.4th 934 (4th Cir. 2022): Provides the presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences.
Arbaugh, 951 F.3d 167 (4th Cir. 2020) & Nance, 957 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2020): Stress that a district court need only “show its work” sufficiently to permit appellate review.

By weaving these authorities, the panel reaffirms (1) the unavailability of § 922(g)(1) constitutional attacks in the Fourth Circuit post-Bruen, and (2) a pragmatic approach to sentencing explanations—district courts need not deliver exhaustive narratives so long as the record makes their rationale “patently obvious.”

3.2 Legal Reasoning

Second Amendment Issue

Terry lodged an as-applied challenge: under his personal circumstances § 922(g)(1) allegedly violates the Second Amendment. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that it was bound by Hunt, which already conducted the historical-tradition analysis mandated by Bruen and upheld § 922(g)(1). Because a panel cannot overrule a prior panel (see the circuit’s rule of orderliness), Terry’s claim necessarily failed. Essentially, the court applied stare decisis at the intra-circuit level.

Sentencing Issue

Step 1: Procedural Reasonableness. The court examined whether the district judge (a) calculated the Guidelines correctly, (b) treated them as advisory, (c) considered § 3553(a) factors, and (d) addressed non-frivolous mitigation. Citing Lewis and others, it concluded the judge passed all checkpoints. Importantly, even though the judge did not rebut each mitigation point sequentially, contextual references, acknowledgment of the memorandum, and a bottom-of-range sentence satisfied the explanation duty.
Step 2: Substantive Reasonableness. Because the sentence falls at the low end of the range, it enjoys a presumption of reasonableness. Terry advanced no cogent argument to overcome that presumption, so the sentence stands.

3.3 Potential Impact

Although unpublished (and thus non-precedential under Fourth Circuit Local Rule 32.1), Terry is a signal case that:

Amplifies the circuit’s post-Bruen consensus that § 922(g)(1) remains intact. Defendants bringing similar Second Amendment challenges in district courts within the Fourth Circuit will confront swift dismissal or denial.
Solidifies guidance for sentencing courts: detailed discourse is not required when the circumstances and record make the reasoning “patently obvious,” particularly for within-Guidelines sentences. This may streamline sentencing hearings and insulate judgments from appellate reversal.
Highlights the importance of preservation and specificity. Defense counsel must craft mitigation arguments that forcefully link facts to § 3553(a) factors; otherwise, a district judge’s brief reference to reviewing the memorandum may suffice.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Facial vs. As-Applied Challenge: A “facial” challenge claims a law is unconstitutional in all applications; an “as-applied” challenge attacks its application to specific facts. Terry raised only the latter.
§ 922(g)(1): Federal statute prohibiting firearm possession by anyone convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year imprisonment.
The Bruen Test: Requires the government to demonstrate that modern gun regulations are consistent with the Nation’s historical firearm tradition.
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Advisory framework that yields an offense level and criminal-history category, producing a recommended imprisonment range.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) Factors: Statutory list guiding sentencing, including nature of offense, history and characteristics of defendant, deterrence, public safety, and avoidance of unwarranted disparities.
Procedural vs. Substantive Reasonableness: Procedural looks at the process (calculations, explanations); substantive examines the length itself in light of § 3553(a).
Presumption of Reasonableness: Within-Guidelines sentences are presumed valid on appeal, though the defendant can rebut by showing the sentence is unreasonable in light of § 3553(a).

5. Conclusion

United States v. Terry may not blaze new doctrinal trails, yet it meaningfully reinforces two critical principles within the Fourth Circuit:

Post-Bruen, § 922(g)(1) remains immune from as-applied Second Amendment attacks, as set out in Hunt and Canada.
For within-Guidelines sentences, a district court’s succinct, context-based explanation can satisfy procedural requirements, provided the record shows awareness of mitigation arguments and § 3553(a) considerations.

Practitioners should view Terry as yet another cautionary tale: creative constitutional or sentencing arguments that are incompatible with entrenched circuit precedent—or unsupported by robust factual development—are unlikely to prevail. Future litigants must either distinguish their circumstances from the Hunt line of authority or seek en banc or Supreme Court review if they wish to reshape the landscape. Until then, § 922(g)(1) prosecutions and bottom-of-Guidelines sentences will continue to survive appellate scrutiny in the Fourth Circuit.