United States v. Tejan: Reaffirming Forfeiture-by-Wrongdoing, Harmless-Error Review of Miranda Violations, and Post-Verdict Judge Substitution

United States v. Tejan: Reaffirming Forfeiture-by-Wrongdoing, Harmless-Error Review of Miranda Violations, and Post-Verdict Judge Substitution

I. Introduction

The unpublished decision in United States v. Madani Ilara Tejan, No. 24‑4144 (4th Cir. Dec. 22, 2025), is a compact but dense opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Although designated “unpublished” and therefore nonbinding within the circuit, it is instructive in at least four important areas of federal criminal procedure and evidence:

  • The high threshold for obtaining a Franks hearing to challenge a search warrant affidavit;
  • The treatment of alleged Miranda violations under harmless-error review, including pre- and post‑warning statements;
  • The scope and evidentiary standard for the forfeiture‑by‑wrongdoing exception to the hearsay rule under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6); and
  • The standards governing post‑verdict substitution of the trial judge and motions for new trial under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 25(b) and 33.

Tejan was convicted by a federal jury in the District of Maryland of:

  • Conspiracy to distribute fentanyl and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846;
  • Possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C);
  • Hobbs Act robbery (interference with interstate commerce by robbery), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); and
  • Use of a firearm in furtherance of a Hobbs Act robbery resulting in murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), (j).

On appeal, Tejan raised six primary challenges:

  1. The denial of his request for a Franks v. Delaware hearing to challenge the search warrant affidavit;
  2. The denial of his motion to suppress incriminating statements made in custody (both pre‑ and post‑Miranda);
  3. The admission of a deceased witness’s out‑of‑court statements under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6) (forfeiture by wrongdoing);
  4. The district court’s response to a jury question about whether aiding and abetting liability applies to first‑degree murder under his firearm‑murder count;
  5. The refusal to give a defense‑requested “buyer–seller” instruction on the drug conspiracy charge; and
  6. The denial of his motion for a new trial, including based on the fact that a different judge handled post‑trial proceedings after the trial judge’s resignation.

The Fourth Circuit (Judges Niemeyer, King, and Richardson) affirmed in a brief per curiam opinion. While the court did not announce new doctrine, it consolidated and applied a line of recent and older precedents in a way that is valuable for practitioners and scholars, particularly in violent drug‑conspiracy and homicide prosecutions.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit’s holdings can be summarized as follows:

  • Franks hearing: Tejan failed to make the “substantial preliminary showing” required to obtain a Franks hearing. The district court properly denied his request.
  • Suppression of statements:
    • Any error in admitting pre‑Miranda custodial statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the statements were merely cumulative of other trial evidence.
    • Tejan validly waived his Miranda rights before making post‑warning statements; there was no coercion and no error in denying suppression as to those statements.
  • Forfeiture-by-wrongdoing hearsay: The district court correctly admitted a deceased declarant’s hearsay statements under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6). By a preponderance of the evidence, Tejan at least acquiesced in wrongdoing intended to make the witness unavailable, and that wrongdoing in fact caused the unavailability.
  • Jury instructions:
    • The district court’s answer to the jury’s question—that aiding and abetting liability applies to first‑degree murder (here, in the context of § 924(j))—correctly stated the law.
    • The court acted within its discretion in declining Tejan’s requested buyer–seller instruction, because the overall instructions were accurate, and the law was correctly conveyed.
  • New trial and judge substitution:
    • The substitution of a different judge after the verdict (due to the original trial judge’s resignation) complied with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 25(b) and did not itself warrant a new trial.
    • The verdict was not against the weight of the evidence, nor did it result in a miscarriage of justice. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial.

The appellate court also emphasized the applicable standards of review—de novo for pure legal questions, clearly erroneous review for factual findings, and abuse-of-discretion review for evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and Rule 33 motions—and used those standards to cabin its review and defer significantly to the district court.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Standards of Review as a Structural Framework

A notable feature of the opinion is how carefully it organizes the analysis around standards of review. For almost every issue, the court first states the standard, then applies it to the facts. This is doctrinally significant because:

  • Franks hearing: Legal determinations are reviewed de novo, factual findings for clear error (United States v. Sanders, 107 F.4th 234 (4th Cir. 2024)).
  • Suppression: Factual findings are reviewed for clear error and legal conclusions de novo (United States v. Lewis, 606 F.3d 193 (4th Cir. 2010)). Evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the government after denial of suppression (United States v. Palmer, 820 F.3d 640 (4th Cir. 2016)).
  • Hearsay / Rule 804(b)(6): Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion (United States v. Faulls, 821 F.3d 502 (4th Cir. 2016)).
  • Jury instructions and responses to jury questions: Abuse of discretion governs whether to give a particular instruction; whether the instructions correctly state the law is reviewed de novo (Sanders; United States v. Miltier, 882 F.3d 81 (4th Cir. 2018); United States v. Burgess, 684 F.3d 445 (4th Cir. 2012)).
  • New trial motions: Denial of a new trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and can be reversed only in “exceptional circumstances” (Hicks v. Ferreyra, 64 F.4th 156, 171 (4th Cir. 2023); United States v. Rafiekian, 68 F.4th 177 (4th Cir. 2023)).

For practitioners, this opinion underscores that many of the most consequential trial rulings—evidentiary decisions, jury instructions, and Rule 33 motions—are insulated by deferential standards, making appellate reversals unlikely absent clear legal error or an “arbitrary or irrational” exercise of discretion.

B. The Franks Hearing Issue

1. Legal Background and Precedents

A Franks hearing (from Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)) allows a defendant to challenge the veracity of a warrant affidavit. It is an extraordinary remedy, not granted routinely.

The Fourth Circuit summarizes the governing standard from United States v. Sanders, 107 F.4th 234, 252 (4th Cir. 2024), and prior cases:

To obtain a Franks hearing, the defendant must make a substantial preliminary showing that the affiant made (1) a false statement (2) knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth that was (3) necessary to the finding of probable cause.

Key doctrinal components:

  • Presumption of validity. An affidavit supporting a search warrant is presumed valid (United States v. Haas, 986 F.3d 467, 474 (4th Cir. 2021)). This presumption is strong and places a “heavy burden” on the defendant.
  • Scienter requirement. It is not enough that a statement is false or mistaken. The affiant must have made it knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth. Mere negligence or innocent error will not suffice.
  • Reckless disregard defined. In United States v. Pulley, 987 F.3d 370, 377 (4th Cir. 2021), the court held that “reckless disregard in the Franks context requires a showing that the affiant personally recognized the risk of making the affidavit misleading.” This underscores that it is the affiant’s state of mind that matters, not general agency errors.
  • Materiality. The false statement (or omission) must be “necessary to the finding of probable cause.” If probable cause would exist even without the challenged statement, no hearing is required.

Moreover, the defendant must present this showing through offers of proof—affidavits, sworn statements, or reliable documentary evidence. Bare allegations or speculation are insufficient.

2. Application in United States v. Tejan

Tejan requested a Franks hearing, but the opinion does not detail the specific alleged misstatements or omissions in the search warrant affidavit. The court simply concludes:

We conclude that the district court correctly found that Tejan did not make the necessary showing to obtain a Franks hearing.

Because the opinion is brief and fact‑light on this issue, one can infer:

  • Either Tejan’s allegations were inadequately supported (e.g., not backed by affidavits or concrete evidence);
  • Or, even assuming falsity, the challenged material was not “necessary” to probable cause once the remainder of the affidavit was considered; or
  • He failed to show deliberate or reckless disregard for the truth under Pulley’s standard.

The appellate court’s reliance on the “heavy burden” language from United States v. Moody, 931 F.3d 366, 370 (4th Cir. 2019), reinforces that courts are reluctant to open up the “four corners” of a warrant affidavit absent a very specific and well‑supported challenge.

3. Commentary and Practical Implications

Although no new rule is announced, Tejan is a reminder that:

  • Franks challenges must be surgically precise. Defendants need concrete, record‑backed proffers showing not only inaccuracy, but also the affiant’s intent or recklessness and the materiality of the statement.
  • Recklessness is strict. Under Pulley, it is not enough for counsel to show that the affidavit could have been clearer or more complete. There must be evidence that the affiant appreciated the risk that their omission or wording would mislead the magistrate.
  • Appeals are uphill. Because the district court’s factual determinations are reviewed for clear error, once a trial judge finds no deliberate or reckless falsehood, the appellate court will rarely disturb that conclusion.

In practice, Tejan provides further confirmation within the Fourth Circuit that Franks remains an exceptional remedy, not a vehicle for generalized challenges to police investigations.

C. Suppression of Custodial Statements and Harmless-Error Review

1. Miranda Framework and Custodial Interrogation

The Fifth Amendment states that “[n]o person … shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” The Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), required that, before a suspect is subjected to custodial interrogation, police must advise him of his rights to remain silent and to counsel; any waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.

The opinion, citing United States v. Azua-Rinconada, 914 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 2019), and United States v. Giddins, 858 F.3d 870 (4th Cir. 2017), emphasizes:

  • Miranda applies only to “custodial interrogation.” As United States v. D’Anjou, 16 F.3d 604, 608 (4th Cir. 1994), defines it, “interrogation” means:
    express questioning or its functional equivalent, which includes any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.
  • Booking exception. Questions seeking basic identifying or biographical information ordinarily fall outside “interrogation” and are exempt from Miranda (D’Anjou).
  • Voluntariness and coercion. “Coercive police activity is a necessary finding for a confession or a Miranda waiver to be considered involuntary” (Giddins, 858 F.3d at 881). Thus, even if a suspect is in custody and has been read his rights, the waiver and subsequent statements must not be the product of physical or psychological coercion.

On appellate review, the court distinguishes:

  • Factual findings about the circumstances of questioning—reviewed for clear error; and
  • The legal determination whether those facts constitute a “custodial interrogation” requiring warnings—reviewed de novo (United States v. Sullivan, 138 F.3d 126, 131 (4th Cir. 1998); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995)).

2. Harmless-Error Review for Miranda Violations

Even if a constitutional violation occurs—such as admitting a statement taken in violation of Miranda—reversal is not automatic. The Fourth Circuit applies harmless‑error review, following cases like:

  • United States v. Watson, 703 F.3d 684, 698 (4th Cir. 2013);
  • Thompson v. Leeke, 756 F.2d 314, 316 (4th Cir. 1985); and
  • United States v. Giddins, 858 F.3d at 885–86.

The court’s formulation:

We determine whether the admission of the statement[s] at issue was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, such that it is clear that a rational fact finder would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.

But it refines that test by emphasizing:

The test … is not whether laying aside the erroneously admitted evidence there was other evidence sufficient to convict beyond a reasonable doubt … but, more stringently, whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.

To evaluate harmlessness, the court considers:

  1. The importance of the statement to the government’s case;
  2. The impact on the credibility of other evidence; and
  3. Whether the statement’s admission allowed in otherwise prejudicial evidence.

The government bears the burden of showing that the error did not contribute to the conviction (United States v. Elsheikh, 103 F.4th 1006, 1014 (4th Cir. 2024)).

3. Application in United States v. Tejan

Tejan raised two distinct arguments about his custodial statements:

  1. Pre‑Miranda statements: He argued that statements made before he was advised of his rights should have been suppressed.
  2. Post‑Miranda statements: He claimed that he never validly waived his rights, rendering later statements inadmissible.

The Fourth Circuit approached these contentions as follows:

  • Pre‑Miranda. The panel did not definitively decide whether there was error in admitting the pre‑warning statements. Instead, it held that even if those statements should have been suppressed, any such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court characterized the information in those statements as “merely cumulative of other evidence admitted at trial.” That strongly indicates that the statements either duplicated other testimony or documents, or were relatively inconsequential in light of overwhelming independent evidence.
  • Post‑Miranda. The court concluded that Tejan validly waived his Miranda rights and that the district court did not err in finding no coercion and no involuntariness. The opinion does not recite the interrogation facts, but by relying on Giddins, the court implicitly found that there was no significant police overreaching or improper pressure.

Given the deferential approach to factual findings and the harmless‑error framework, the suppression issues did not move the needle on appeal. The panel emphasized that when a district court denies suppression, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the government (Palmer), which further narrows the defendant’s path to reversal.

4. Observations and Practice Pointers

Several practical lessons emerge from Tejan:

  • Harmless error will often salvage Miranda problems. Where the prosecution has independent, robust evidence (physical evidence, cooperating witnesses, surveillance, phone records, etc.), even a clear Miranda violation may not yield reversal if the statement is cumulative or marginal.
  • Defense counsel should develop a record showing the centrality of the statement. To defeat harmless‑error review, counsel must be able to show how the contested statement uniquely shaped the government’s narrative, affected credibility assessments, or opened the door to otherwise inadmissible evidence.
  • Voluntariness is distinct from technical Miranda compliance. Even if warnings are properly given, a statement can be excluded if coercive tactics are used. Conversely, as Giddins makes clear, the lack of coercive police conduct is usually fatal to a voluntariness challenge.

D. Forfeiture-by-Wrongdoing and Admission of a Deceased Witness’s Statements

1. The Forfeiture-by-Wrongdoing Doctrine

Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6) codifies the forfeiture‑by‑wrongdoing exception to the hearsay rule:

A statement offered against a party that wrongfully caused—or acquiesced in wrongfully causing—the declarant’s unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result.

This doctrine serves two related functions:

  • Hearsay rule. It creates a hearsay exception allowing admission of out‑of‑court statements despite their hearsay character.
  • Confrontation Clause. Following Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008), and earlier cases, it also prevents a defendant from invoking the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses when the defendant has caused their unavailability with the intent to prevent their testimony. In other words, a defendant cannot “profit” from silencing a witness.

The Fourth Circuit’s leading pre‑Tejan precedents include:

  • United States v. Gray, 405 F.3d 227, 241 (4th Cir. 2005): articulating the three‑part test for Rule 804(b)(6): (1) engagement in or acquiescence in wrongdoing; (2) intent to render the declarant unavailable as a witness; and (3) actual causation of unavailability.
  • United States v. Elsheikh, 103 F.4th 1006, 1024 (4th Cir. 2024): confirming that the government must prove the Rule 804(b)(6) elements by a preponderance of the evidence, and clarifying that the rule applies both to direct wrongdoing and to “acquiescence” in others’ wrongdoing.

The “acquiescence” element is particularly important in organized criminal activity: a defendant can forfeit confrontation rights not only by personally killing or threatening the witness, but also by encouraging, facilitating, or at least knowingly approving an associate’s silencing of that witness.

2. Application in United States v. Tejan

In Tejan, a key witness was deceased and thus unavailable to testify. The government introduced that witness’s out‑of‑court statements under Rule 804(b)(6). Tejan objected on hearsay grounds.

The Fourth Circuit recounts the district court’s task under Gray:

Under Rule 804(b)(6), otherwise inadmissible hearsay may be admitted upon a showing that: “(1) the defendant engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing (2) that was intended to render the declarant unavailable as a witness and (3) that did, in fact, render the declarant unavailable as a witness.” … The government bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the exception applies.

The appellate court concluded:

Here, the district court did not clearly err in finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Tejan acquiesced in wrongdoing intending to render the deceased unavailable as a witness. Therefore, the court properly admitted the statements pursuant to Rule 804(b)(6).

Although the opinion does not describe the factual circumstances of the witness’s death, the language “acquiesced in wrongdoing intending to render the deceased unavailable” signals that:

  • The government presented evidence linking Tejan to the decision or plan to eliminate the witness as a potential trial witness; and
  • The trial court found, by a preponderance, that this conduct (or acquiescence) both caused the witness’s death and was motivated at least in part by a desire to prevent testimony.

3. Significance and Impact

The Tejan decision continues a trend in the Fourth Circuit toward robust use of Rule 804(b)(6) in violent and organized‑crime contexts:

  • Intent requirement is strictly enforced, but often inferable. Following Giles and Gray, courts require proof that the defendant intended to prevent testimony—not merely that the witness was incidentally harmed. But intent can be inferred from circumstances: e.g., the timing of the killing, the witness’s known cooperation, and statements by co‑conspirators.
  • Acquiescence broadens liability. The focus on “acquiesced in wrongdoing” extends forfeiture to defendants who do not personally act against the witness but knowingly approve or tolerate associates’ violence to prevent testimony.
  • Preponderance standard is relatively low. Compared to the beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt standard at trial, the preponderance standard at the Rule 804(b)(6) stage allows courts to admit otherwise crucial hearsay in serious cases, even when the precise details of the witness’s silencing are disputed.

For future cases, Tejan signals that in drug trafficking and robbery‑murder prosecutions, when a witness is killed or “disappears” under suspicious circumstances tied to the defendant’s circle, courts are prepared to admit that witness’s statements if the prosecution can link the defendant to the wrongdoing with the requisite intent—even indirectly.

E. Jury Instructions: Aiding and Abetting First-Degree Murder and Buyer–Seller Theory

1. General Standards for Reviewing Jury Instructions

The court reiterates the basic framework:

  • The decision to give or withhold a particular instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
  • Whether an instruction accurately states the law is reviewed de novo (Sanders, 107 F.4th at 259).
  • The instructions are considered “as a whole and in the context of the entire charge,” not in isolation.
  • Even if a specific instruction is erroneous, reversal is warranted only if the error “seriously prejudiced” the defendant’s case (Miltier, 882 F.3d at 89).

The district court’s response to a jury question is also reviewed for abuse of discretion. The trial judge must answer in a way that addresses the jury’s confusion “accurately, without creating prejudice” (Burgess, 684 F.3d at 453).

2. Aiding and Abetting First-Degree Murder Under § 924(j)

One of Tejan’s convictions was for using a firearm in furtherance of a Hobbs Act robbery resulting in murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), (j). Section 924(j) incorporates the definition of “murder” from 18 U.S.C. § 1111, which uses the concept of “first‑degree murder” (e.g., premeditated killing, or killing in perpetration of certain felonies).

During deliberations, the jury asked whether aiding and abetting liability (under 18 U.S.C. § 2) applied to first‑degree murder in this context. The district court responded that aiding and abetting does apply.

The Fourth Circuit upheld this answer, noting in essence:

  • The district court correctly stated the law.
  • The judge’s response did not introduce prejudice or confusion.

This is consistent with long‑standing principles:

  • Aiding and abetting is a general mode of liability. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2, anyone who “aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures” the commission of an offense is punishable as a principal. This generally applies to any substantive federal offense, including homicide and § 924(c)/§ 924(j) offenses.
  • Mens rea alignment is required. For first‑degree murder, the aider and abettor must share, or at least know of and intentionally facilitate, the requisite mental state (e.g., premeditation or a murder‑during‑felony theory), but this requirement is built into standard aiding‑and‑abetting law.

By affirming the instruction, the Fourth Circuit confirms that juries may consider whether a defendant is guilty of murder under § 924(j) not only as a direct shooter, but also as an aider and abettor who intentionally facilitated the killing in connection with the underlying crime of violence (here, Hobbs Act robbery).

3. Buyer–Seller Instruction in Drug Conspiracy Cases

On the drug‑conspiracy count (21 U.S.C. § 846), Tejan requested a jury instruction emphasizing that a mere buyer–seller relationship does not establish participation in a drug distribution conspiracy.

Although the opinion does not quote the requested instruction or the district court’s substitute, the Fourth Circuit states:

Tejan argues that the district court erred in … instructing the jury on a the buyer-seller relationship for the drug conspiracy count. As the district court provided correct statements of the law as to each, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion.

In the Fourth Circuit and elsewhere, the “buyer–seller” concept is well‑recognized:

  • Mere purchases are not enough. A one‑time, arm’s‑length drug transaction (buyer and seller) does not, by itself, prove that the buyer is a member of the seller’s conspiracy. Conspiracy requires an agreement to commit the crime, which implies a shared stake in the illegal venture (see, e.g., United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc)).
  • But repeated or structured dealings may indicate conspiracy. Large quantities, repeated transactions, fronting drugs on credit, mutual trust, shared profits, or coordinated distribution activities can turn a buyer–seller relationship into a conspiratorial one.

Because the appellate court affirms that the instructions given were legally correct and that no abuse of discretion occurred, the implication is that:

  • The trial court either gave a form of buyer–seller instruction consistent with existing Fourth Circuit law, or;
  • The instructions as a whole adequately conveyed that mere purchase/sale is insufficient, making a further defense‑specific formulation unnecessary.

The opinion thus reinforces that district courts have substantial leeway in how they phrase the buyer–seller principle so long as the core legal rule is adequately conveyed.

F. Motion for New Trial and Post-Verdict Substitution of the Judge

1. Rule 25(b): Judge Substitution After Verdict

After Tejan’s trial, the judge who presided over the trial resigned. A different judge then handled sentencing and post‑trial motions. Tejan argued that this change itself should have prompted a new trial.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 25(b)(1) directly addresses this scenario:

After a verdict or finding of guilty, any judge regularly sitting in or assigned to a court may complete the court’s duties if the judge who presided at trial cannot perform those duties because of absence, death, sickness, or other disability.

Rule 25(b)(2) further provides that the successor judge:

may grant a new trial if [she is] satisfied that: (A) a judge other than the one who presided at the trial cannot perform the post-trial duties; or (B) a new trial is necessary for some other reason.

Thus, the rules contemplate and authorize precisely what occurred: a successor judge takes over after verdict due to the original judge’s unavailability (here, resignation). A new trial is not automatic; it is conditional on necessity.

2. Rule 33 and the “Weight of the Evidence” Standard

Tejan also argued that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and that a new trial was required to prevent a miscarriage of justice.

The Fourth Circuit, drawing on Hicks v. Ferreyra, 64 F.4th 156 (4th Cir. 2023), and United States v. Rafiekian, 68 F.4th 177 (4th Cir. 2023), reiterated the demanding standard:

A district court may grant a new trial only if the verdict: (1) is against the clear weight of the evidence; (2) is based upon false evidence; or (3) will result in a miscarriage of justice.

Crucially:

  • The district court, unlike on a motion for judgment of acquittal, is not required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government; it may weigh evidence and evaluate witness credibility (United States v. Arrington, 757 F.2d 1484, 1485 (4th Cir. 1985)).
  • But new trials “based on the weight of the evidence [are] only in ‘rare’ instances” where “the evidence weighs so heavily against the verdict that it would be unjust to enter judgment” (Rafiekian, 68 F.4th at 186).
  • Because credibility and fact‑finding are primarily the jury’s domain, the standard for overturning a verdict is “demanding.”

Applying these principles, the Fourth Circuit held:

  • The substitution of a successor judge fully complied with Rule 25(b) and did not itself require a new trial.
  • After reviewing the record, the district court properly found that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence and that no miscarriage of justice had occurred.
  • Accordingly, denying a new trial was not an abuse of discretion.

3. Broader Implications

This portion of the opinion has two important systemic implications:

  • Continuity despite judicial transitions. Criminal proceedings do not collapse when a trial judge retires, passes away, or otherwise becomes unavailable post‑verdict. Rule 25(b) is designed to preserve the integrity and finality of jury verdicts while ensuring that a competent, duly assigned judge can perform remaining tasks (rulings on post‑trial motions, sentencing, etc.).
  • New trials remain exceptional. The combination of a high threshold under Rule 33 and deferential appellate review effectively cabins the circumstances in which a new trial will be ordered. Tejan confirms that even serious allegations (such as evidentiary errors, weight‑of‑the‑evidence challenges, or a change in presiding judge) must meet a very high bar to undo a jury’s findings.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

For readers less familiar with criminal procedure, the following brief explanations may help clarify key doctrines invoked in United States v. Tejan.

1. Franks Hearing

A Franks hearing is a specialized evidentiary hearing to test the truthfulness of statements in a search warrant affidavit. To even obtain such a hearing, a defendant must preliminarily show:

  • The affidavit contained a false statement (or a critical omission);
  • The affiant made the false statement intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth; and
  • The false statement was crucial to the finding of probable cause.

If the defendant meets this threshold, the court may hold a hearing where the affiant is examined and the affidavit’s accuracy is tested. If the affidavit is then found deliberately false in a material way, evidence obtained from the warrant can be suppressed.

2. Miranda Rights and Custodial Interrogation

When someone is in police custody and subject to interrogation, officers must advise them that:

  • They have the right to remain silent;
  • Anything they say can be used against them in court;
  • They have the right to an attorney; and
  • If they cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed.

These are known as Miranda rights. Statements made during custodial interrogation before these warnings are given (or after a defective waiver) are normally inadmissible in the prosecution’s case‑in‑chief.

However, not all questions count as “interrogation” (e.g., routine booking questions), and not all failures to give warnings result in reversal if the violation is deemed harmless in light of the rest of the evidence.

3. Forfeiture-by-Wrongdoing

The forfeiture‑by‑wrongdoing doctrine, codified at Rule 804(b)(6), prevents a defendant from objecting to hearsay (or invoking confrontation rights) when the defendant is responsible for a witness’s unavailability and acted with the purpose of preventing that witness from testifying.

If the government shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, that:

  • The defendant engaged in or acquiesced in wrongdoing (such as threats, intimidation, or murder);
  • The wrongdoing was intended, at least in part, to keep the witness from testifying; and
  • The wrongdoing actually caused the witness’s unavailability (e.g., death, disappearance, refusal to testify),

then the witness’s prior statements can be admitted at trial, even though they are hearsay and the witness is not present for cross‑examination.

4. Buyer–Seller Relationship in Drug Conspiracies

In drug cases, a buyer–seller relationship refers to simple, isolated transactions where one person buys drugs from another. Standing alone, such transactions do not prove a conspiracy to distribute drugs, because conspiracy requires proof of an agreement to work together to commit the crime.

However, when the relationship involves:

  • Repeated transactions;
  • Large quantities suggestive of redistribution;
  • Drugs provided on credit (“fronted”); or
  • Coordination on price, territory, or customers;

courts often find that a buyer–seller relationship has evolved into a conspiratorial partnership.

5. Harmless Error

Not every legal error at trial requires a new trial. Under the harmless‑error doctrine, even constitutional errors (like admitting a statement taken in violation of Miranda) may be deemed harmless if the appellate court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdict.

The question is not simply whether there was enough evidence to convict without the tainted evidence, but whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction. If no such possibility exists, the conviction stands despite the error.

6. New Trial Based on Weight of the Evidence

A motion for a new trial under Rule 33 asks the trial judge to set aside the jury’s verdict and order a new trial. Unlike sufficiency challenges, the judge can weigh evidence and judge credibility.

But such motions are granted sparingly—only when the verdict is clearly against the great weight of the evidence, is based on false evidence, or would result in a miscarriage of justice. Appellate courts then review the denial of such motions only for abuse of discretion, making reversals uncommon.

V. Impact and Broader Significance

Although United States v. Tejan is unpublished and therefore not binding precedent in the Fourth Circuit, it nonetheless offers several signals about how the court is likely to approach recurring issues in serious drug and violent crime prosecutions:

  • Reaffirmation of high thresholds. The opinion reinforces the high thresholds for:
    • Obtaining a Franks hearing;
    • Achieving reversal based on alleged Miranda violations; and
    • Securing a new trial on weight‑of‑the‑evidence grounds.
    Trial courts retain broad discretion in managing these issues, and appellate intervention will be rare.
  • Strong support for forfeiture-by-wrongdoing in violent conspiracies. By approving the admission of a deceased witness’s statements under Rule 804(b)(6) based on acquiescence in wrongdoing, the court underscores its willingness to use forfeiture doctrine to prevent defendants from benefitting from witness intimidation or elimination.
  • Confirmation of aiding-and-abetting liability in § 924(j) homicide cases. The court’s approval of the jury instruction on aiding and abetting first‑degree murder in a § 924(j) context confirms that accomplice liability reaches this serious firearm‑murder offense, so long as the jury finds the requisite intent.
  • Institutional continuity despite judicial turnover. The application of Rule 25(b) to uphold the substitution of a successor judge after trial demonstrates a commitment to maintaining verdicts and ensuring that judicial transitions do not, by themselves, destabilize completed trials.

Collectively, these points illustrate a continuity in Fourth Circuit jurisprudence: a combination of doctrinal rigor and practical deference to trial‑level decision‑making, particularly in complex, high‑stakes criminal cases involving conspiracies, firearms, and homicide.

VI. Conclusion

United States v. Tejan is a concise but instructive Fourth Circuit opinion touching on multiple significant areas of criminal law and procedure. The court:

  • Reaffirms the stringent requirements for a Franks hearing and the presumption of validity accorded to search warrant affidavits;
  • Applies a robust harmless‑error analysis to alleged Miranda violations, emphasizing the centrality (or lack thereof) of the contested statements to the government’s case;
  • Endorses the use of forfeiture‑by‑wrongdoing under Rule 804(b)(6) to admit the statements of a deceased witness where the defendant acquiesced in the wrongdoing that caused the unavailability with intent to silence the witness;
  • Affirms correct jury instructions regarding aiding and abetting first‑degree murder and the buyer–seller distinction in drug conspiracies; and
  • Confirms the propriety of substituting a new judge post‑verdict under Rule 25(b) and the demanding standards for granting a new trial under Rule 33.

While unpublished and nonprecedential, the decision synthesizes several strands of Fourth Circuit and Supreme Court jurisprudence into a coherent framework that will be persuasive in future cases. It offers a clear reminder that successful appellate challenges in this domain require not only identifying error, but also overcoming formidable standards of review and demonstrating concrete prejudice in the context of the trial as a whole.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

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