United States v. Teerlink: No Contractual “Footnote Escape Hatch” from the Invited-Error Doctrine

Introduction

United States v. Teerlink, 94 F.4th ___ (10th Cir. 2025), presented the Tenth Circuit with a crisp procedural question: Can a litigant preserve plain-error review of a jointly proposed jury instruction simply by adding a footnote declaring the Defendant is not waiving plain-error review? Judge Eid, writing for a unanimous panel, answered no; the invitation of the error bars appellate review notwithstanding such self-styled reservations.

The case arose from Cody Byron Teerlink’s conviction for making false statements during the acquisition of a firearm after he misrepresented his felony status on ATF Form 4473. On appeal he challenged the trial court’s “reasonable doubt” instruction—language he himself co-drafted. Relying on the invited-error doctrine, the Court refused to reach the merits, thereby entrenching a new and emphatic rule: Parties cannot “contract around” invited error with disclaimers, footnotes, or other unilateral provisos.

Summary of the Judgment

Holding: Because the defense jointly proposed the contested reasonable-doubt instruction, any error was invited and therefore unreviewable on appeal; the conviction is affirmed.
Key Rationale:
- The invited-error doctrine treats a litigant’s proposal or adoption of an instruction as a knowing, intentional relinquishment (waiver) of future challenges.
- A footnote purporting to preserve plain-error review is ineffective; allowing such a tactic would invert adversarial roles and hollow out the doctrine.
- Neither coercion by the trial judge to “work together” on instructions nor the possibility that the judge would have given a similar instruction sua sponte dispels waiver.
Disposition: Conviction affirmed; motion for judicial notice (of the district judge’s “stock” instructions) granted only for the limited purpose requested.

Analysis

I. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196 (10th Cir. 1991) – Articulated that a party who induces an erroneous ruling cannot overturn it on appeal.
United States v. Cornelius, 696 F.3d 1307 (10th Cir. 2012) – Confirmed that proposing a jury instruction constitutes “affirmative approval,” invoking waiver.
United States v. Sturm, 673 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2012) – First major application in the instruction context; a defendant who drafted the instruction was barred from challenging it.
United States v. Harris, 695 F.3d 1125 (10th Cir. 2012) – Distinguished mere failure to object (forfeiture) from active proposal (waiver).
United States v. Jereb, 882 F.3d 1325 (10th Cir. 2018) – Reaffirmed invited error even where the defendant had vigorously argued for the very language later assailed.
United States v. McBride, 94 F.4th 1036 (10th Cir. 2024) – Most recent authority; joint submission of instructions suffices for invited error regardless of complete agreement.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) & Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954) – Substantive backdrop on the reasonable-doubt standard; cited to illustrate the alleged error but not reached.
Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. 463 (2012) – Defined waiver vs. forfeiture; central to the defendant’s footnote argument.

Collectively these authorities formed an unbroken doctrinal wall. By layering McBride atop earlier cases, the panel signaled that jointly submitted equals affirmatively approved, thereby foreclosing plain-error appeals absent truly supervening law (not present here).

II. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Identifying Waiver: The panel treated the defense’s drafting and submission of the instruction as a subjective indicator of intentional relinquishment. Failure to object merely buttressed that inference.
Rejecting “Coercion”: The district court’s managerial directive to agree where possible left room for separate submissions, so any agreement was voluntary.
Discrediting the Footnote:
- The footnote attempted to convert intentional waiver into mere forfeiture.
- Allowing such a maneuver would reverse the roles of litigant and jurist, forcing judges into a post-submission scavenger hunt for latent errors.
- The doctrine’s purpose—preventing sandbagging—would be gutted if parties could “opt-out” at will.
Policy Concerns: The Court emphasized finality, judicial efficiency, and the adversarial system’s allocation of responsibility to counsel.

III. Likely Impact

Trial Practice: Defense and prosecution teams must vet joint instructions rigorously; boiler-plate footnotes will not preserve appellate rights.
Appellate Strategy: Counsel can no longer assume “plain-error insurance” for jointly proposed text; strategic objections must be lodged contemporaneously.
District Court Management: Judges may feel vindicated in insisting on joint instructions, confident that agreed language is insulated from later attack.
Pattern Instructions: Expect even greater reliance on—and scrutiny of—circuit pattern instructions to minimize disputes and inadvertent waiver.
Substantive Law: Although the substantive “reasonable doubt” standard remains untouched, the decision indirectly preserves doctrinal stability by filtering out manufactured appellate issues.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Invited-Error Doctrine: A rule preventing a litigant from complaining on appeal about an error the litigant intentionally introduced or agreed to at trial.
Waiver vs. Forfeiture: Waiver = intentional relinquishment; bars review. Forfeiture = unintentional failure to object; allows plain-error review.
Plain-Error Review (Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b)): Appellate relief for unobjected-to errors requires: (1) error, (2) plainness, (3) effect on substantial rights, and (4) serious effect on the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
“Reasonable Doubt” Formulations: Acceptable: “a doubt that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act.” Disfavored: “a doubt you would be willing to act upon” (criticized for lowering the burden).
402 Reduction (Utah Code §76-3-402): A post-probation mechanism allowing felony convictions to be re-classified as misdemeanors if “in the interest of justice,” thereby restoring certain civil rights (e.g., firearm possession).

Conclusion

United States v. Teerlink does not reshape substantive firearms law or the definition of reasonable doubt; instead, it fortifies a procedural guardrail. The Tenth Circuit unmistakably signals that the invited-error doctrine is immune to unilateral disclaimers. Lawyers must now treat joint jury-instruction submissions with the same caution as binding contractual terms: once you sign off, the appellate bridge is burned. In the broader legal landscape, Teerlink underscores the judiciary’s commitment to finality, the adversarial system, and the principle that counsel—not courts—bear primary responsibility for preventing error in the instructions that guide juries to verdict.