United States v. Stafford: Prior-Day Evidence as “Intrinsic” to Charged Conduct and the Knowledge Threshold for §2K2.1(b)(5)

1. Introduction

On 1 August 2025 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit handed down United States v. Brian Stafford, No. 22-2351, a non-precedential order that nonetheless offers fresh analytical guidance on two recurring questions:

• When “other-act” evidence occurring shortly before the charged conduct is properly treated as intrinsic, non-Rule 404(b) evidence or, in the alternative, as admissible under Rule 404(b) through a propensity-free chain of reasoning.
• The evidentiary showing the Government must make to trigger the firearm-trafficking enhancement in U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5), especially as to what the defendant must “know or have reason to believe” about the recipient’s criminal history.

Although designated “Nonprecedential,” the panel’s treatment of these issues—together with its careful harmless-error discussion—will inevitably inform district-court practice throughout the Circuit.

2. Case Background

Brian Stafford, a convicted felon living in Bellwood, Illinois, sold three boxed assault rifles to a long-time friend acting as a confidential source (“CS”) for the FBI on 24 October 2016. On 1 November 2016 he sold the same CS approximately 103 grams of heroin inside his home and, moments later, an additional three grams retrieved from a Ford Taurus parked outside. A day later agents executed search warrants on the house, garage and Taurus; they recovered two handguns, ammunition, heroin, crack cocaine, cutting agents, packaging tools and a ballistic vest.

The initial 2019 information charged firearm possession (Count 1), felon-in-possession of two handguns (Count 2), drug-possession-with-intent (Count 3) and § 924(c) gun possession in furtherance of a drug crime (Count 4). A December 2019 jury convicted only on Count 1 and hung on the rest.

In 2020 a superseding indictment converted the October 24 gun offense into uncharged conduct and added a new Count 1 for the 1 November heroin sale. Stafford pled guilty to that new count but went to a second jury on Counts 2-4. Over Stafford’s Rule 404(b) objection, the district court admitted the prior-day heroin-sale evidence. The second jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts and the judge imposed a 160-month sentence that incorporated:

• a four-level § 2K2.1(b)(5) firearm-trafficking enhancement, and
• a base-offense-level of 20 under § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) because of Stafford’s earlier Illinois cocaine-delivery conviction.

3. Summary of the Judgment

The Seventh Circuit (Judge Lee writing; Judges Pryor and Wood—retired—on the panel) affirmed both conviction and sentence, holding:

1. The November 1 heroin-transaction evidence was properly admitted. It was either (a) intrinsic to the charged “on or about November 2” offenses, or (b) admissible under Rule 404(b)(2) to prove knowledge, control and intent without invoking impermissible propensity reasoning. Any shortcoming in the district court’s Gomez analysis was, at most, harmless.
2. The § 2K2.1(b)(5) enhancement requires only that the defendant know or have reason to believe the transferee has a qualifying conviction—proof of the conviction itself is unnecessary. Stafford’s decades-long friendship with the CS and the CS’s extensive criminal record supported the district court’s finding.
3. Consistent with United States v. Ruth, 966 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2020), Illinois’ broader definition of “cocaine” does not preclude the earlier Illinois conviction from serving as a “controlled substance offense” for § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) purposes.

4. Analysis

4.1 Precedents Cited

• United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc) – Governs Rule 404(b) admissibility: evidence must be admitted through a propensity-free chain of reasoning; court must articulate how the evidence is relevant.
• United States v. Prieto, 85 F.4th 445 (7th Cir. 2023) – Holds Government need not prove recipient’s actual qualifying conviction for § 2K2.1(b)(5); defendant’s knowledge or reason to believe suffices.
• United States v. Ruth, 966 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2020) – State drug convictions qualify as “controlled substance offenses” even if state definition is broader than the federal CSA; incorporated by § 2K2.1 via § 4B1.2.
• United States v. Chapman, 765 F.3d 720 (7th Cir. 2014) – Demonstrated when erroneous admission of prior-bad-act evidence is not harmless; contrasted sharply with Stafford.
• Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110 (2009) – A hung jury has no preclusive effect and reveals nothing about sufficiency of evidence.
• Additional precedents: Adkins, Morgan, Mabie, Alviar, Edwards, Gorman, and recent Seventh Circuit harmless-error decisions such as Diggs.

4.2 Legal Reasoning

4.2.1 404(b) / Intrinsic Evidence

The panel approached the November 1 heroin sale in dual fashion:

1. Intrinsic Theory: Because the sale occurred the day before agents recovered the same type of drugs and one of the same handguns, the evidence “complete[d] the story” of the charged November 2 offenses. Under Seventh Circuit jurisprudence, intrinsic evidence lies outside Rule 404(b) entirely (Edwards, 26 F.4th 449).
2. Rule 404(b) Theory: Even if treated as “other-act” evidence, it was admissible for non-propensity purposes—namely, to establish (a) Stafford’s knowledge & control of the Ford Taurus and its contents and (b) his intent to distribute the seized narcotics. Those logical steps do not require any forbidden “once a dealer, always a dealer” inference.

The court acknowledged that the district judge’s written explanation was terse but, following Mabie, held that the record made the basis for admissibility “plain enough.” Limiting instructions—given twice—further reduced unfair-prejudice concerns under Rule 403.

4.2.2 Harmless-Error Framework

Even assuming arguendo the admission were erroneous, reversal would be warranted only if the evidence significantly enhanced persuasiveness of the Government’s case. Unlike Chapman, Stafford’s first-trial hung jury is not an inconsistent verdict and independent forensic, fingerprint and DNA evidence connected Stafford to the guns and drugs. Consequently, any error was harmless.

4.2.3 § 2K2.1(b)(5) Firearm-Trafficking Enhancement

The opinion re-affirms Prieto: the Government does not have to introduce certified copies of the recipient’s convictions. The question is subjective/objective—what did the seller know or have reason to believe?—and can be proved circumstantially. Decades-long intimacy with the CS easily satisfied that standard.

4.2.4 § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) Base Offense Level

The panel declined to revisit Ruth: distinctions between Illinois and federal controlled-substance schedules are irrelevant for Guidelines purposes because § 4B1.2(b) deliberately omits any CSA cross-reference.

4.3 Potential Impact

• Evidentiary Practice: District courts may more confidently admit temporally proximate transactions—especially within 24–48 hours of the charged date—as either intrinsic or admissible under Rule 404(b) for knowledge/intent. The case provides a model limiting instruction (mirroring Judge Hamilton’s concurrence in Gomez).
• Harmless-Error Appeals: The decision underscores that a prior mistrial/hung jury, standing alone, does not mimic the “factually inconsistent verdict” scenario that drove reversal in Chapman.
• Guidelines Litigation: Stafford cements Prieto’s interpretation of § 2K2.1(b)(5) and reinforces Ruth’s staying power, signaling that panels are unlikely to upset either rule absent en banc intervention.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Rule 404(b) – Generally bars “other-crime” evidence to prove character, but allows it to prove things like intent, knowledge, or plan without relying on “he did it before, so he did it now.”
• Intrinsic Evidence – Evidence that is so intertwined with the charged conduct that it forms part of the same narrative; it escapes Rule 404(b) entirely.
• § 2K2.1(b)(5) Enhancement – Adds four offense levels if the defendant trafficked two or more firearms to someone the defendant knows or suspects has a serious criminal past. Proof of the transferee’s conviction is unnecessary; the focus is on the defendant’s mindset.
• Harmless Error – Even if the trial court erred, an appellate court won’t reverse unless the error likely affected the verdict. The Government bears the burden to show the verdict would have been essentially the same.

6. Conclusion

United States v. Stafford offers a compact but consequential roadmap for trial courts and litigators confronting evidentiary and sentencing questions. First, it illustrates how events from the day before a charged offense can qualify as intrinsic evidence or clear the Rule 404(b) hurdle via non-propensity logic, provided the trial judge delivers robust limiting instructions. Second, it underscores that the firearm-trafficking enhancement turns on the defendant’s knowledge or reasonable belief, not the Government’s ability to prove the recipient’s rap sheet to Guidelines standards. Finally, by reaffirming Ruth, the panel puts to rest any near-term hope of narrowing the definition of “controlled substance offense” in the Seventh Circuit.

Practitioners should absorb these lessons: (1) marshal temporal and narrative links to claim “intrinsic” status for other-act evidence; (2) develop circumstantial proof of a defendant’s awareness of a buyer’s criminal record; and (3) preserve, but temper, challenges to state-drug-predicate enhancements pending broader circuit or Supreme Court review.