United States v. Spencer: Credit for Legitimate Services in Fraud Loss and Restitution Calculations

I. Introduction

In United States v. Frederick Andre Spencer, No. 24‑13026 (11th Cir. Dec. 4, 2025) (per curiam) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a defendant’s fraud convictions but vacated his sentence and restitution order because the district court misapplied the Sentencing Guidelines’ loss-calculation rules and improperly failed to credit value the defendant had legitimately provided to the victim.

The opinion addresses four issues:

Whether Spencer was prejudiced by being tried with a co-defendant facing many unrelated charges (joinder/severance).
Whether there was sufficient evidence that Spencer conspired to commit wire fraud against an individual victim, “Q.W.”
Whether the district court miscalculated “loss” under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 by undervaluing services Spencer provided to Q.W.
Whether the restitution order improperly failed to account for any value returned to the victim.

The case is especially significant for how it interprets and applies the “credit for value” rule in Application Note 3(E)(i) to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1: the court holds that legitimate services to the victim must be credited in loss calculations regardless of how the defendant funded those services, and that sentencing courts must explain why they credit some items but not others when those decisions can alter the Guidelines range.

II. Background and Procedural History

A. Parties and Schemes

The federal prosecution against Frederick Andre Spencer arose from two sets of conduct:

Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) Fraud. Spencer pleaded guilty before trial to several counts (Counts 30, 33, and 34) involving wire fraud and making false statements to the Small Business Administration to obtain PPP loans. Those pleas are relevant primarily because the PPP-related losses were included in the overall loss figure for Guidelines and restitution purposes.
Fraud Against Individual Victim Q.W. Separate from the PPP scheme, Spencer and co-defendant Anthony Lamon Frazier created “Head of Game,” an entity positioned to provide marketing and promotional services to athlete Q.W. (evidently an NFL draftee, given references to the NFL Draft). Based on Spencer’s and Frazier’s representations that $500,000 would be used to grow Head of Game and advance Q.W.’s brand, Q.W. wired $500,000 to a Head of Game account.

Evidence later showed that:

Frazier transferred $214,825 from the Head of Game account to an account in the name of “Mom & Son’s Towing,”
That account was opened by Spencer’s mother one day before the transfer,
Spencer spent substantial sums from those funds on personal expenditures (including $21,000 for equipment and a truck motor),
Frazier used other portions of Q.W.’s money to pay credit card debt and flip houses, and
Spencer later lied to investigators, claiming the Mom & Son’s Towing transfer was to finance a nightclub venture.

B. Indictment and Trial Posture

A superseding indictment charged Frazier with numerous counts, including drug money laundering, structuring, and tax fraud (Counts 1–27, 29, 35–37), and charged Spencer with multiple fraud-related counts, among them Count 28: conspiracy with Frazier to commit wire fraud against Q.W.

Before trial:

Spencer pled guilty to PPP-related fraud counts (Counts 30, 33, 34).
He proceeded to trial on Count 28 (conspiracy to commit wire fraud relating to Q.W.).
Frazier went to trial on Count 28 and his many other counts.

Spencer moved to sever his trial from Frazier’s broader case, arguing that evidence of Frazier’s unrelated drug and financial crimes would prejudice the jury against him. The district court denied severance and held a joint trial. The jury convicted Spencer on Count 28 and on other counts (resulting in four total convictions: two conspiracy-to-commit-wire-fraud counts, one false-SBA-statement count, and one wire-fraud count).

C. Sentencing and Restitution

The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) calculated a total loss of $664,426:

$500,000 attributed to the fraud against Q.W. (the Head of Game transfer), plus
$164,426 attributed to the PPP fraud to which Spencer had pled guilty.

Under the 2023 Sentencing Guidelines:

Loss > $550,000 but ≤ $1,500,000 triggers a 14-level enhancement. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1).
Loss > $250,000 but ≤ $550,000 triggers a 12-level enhancement.

The district court accepted the PSR’s baseline total of $664,426 and therefore applied a 14-level enhancement. It reasoned that Spencer would need to show that he had returned at least $114,426 of “value” to Q.W. (thus reducing the total loss below $550,000) to qualify for a lower 12-level enhancement.

The court did credit some work Spencer and Head of Game performed that resulted in marketing and endorsement deals for Q.W. (with Bose, Everett Sports, Nike, Procter & Gamble, and Hyundai), but it refused to credit other items, such as:

Production of documentary and promotional videos for Q.W.,
Cash and a gold chain provided to Q.W.,
Travel expenses, and
A custom suit for Q.W. to wear at the NFL Draft.

The court imposed a 55‑month sentence and ordered restitution in the amount of $664,426, including $500,000 to Q.W.

D. The Appeal

Spencer raised four issues on appeal:

Improper joinder and denial of severance.
Insufficient evidence to support his conviction for conspiracy to commit wire fraud against Q.W. (Count 28).
Erroneous Guidelines loss calculation for Q.W.’s loss, particularly failing to credit the value of services and goods he provided.
Erroneous restitution order failing to account for any value returned to Q.W.

The Eleventh Circuit:

Affirmed all convictions, but
Vacated the sentence and restitution order, and
Remanded for resentencing and recalculation of restitution.

III. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit’s per curiam opinion proceeds issue by issue:

Joinder/Severance (Issue I): Even assuming some counts were improperly joined, any error was harmless. Repeated cautionary instructions and strong, distinct evidence of Spencer’s guilt on Count 28 defeated any showing of actual or compelling prejudice.
Sufficiency of the Evidence (Issue II): Circumstantial evidence that Q.W.’s funds were diverted, that Spencer personally benefitted, and that Spencer lied to investigators sufficed to prove that Spencer knowingly and voluntarily joined a conspiracy with Frazier to defraud Q.W.
Guidelines Loss Calculation (Issue III): While some aspects of the district court’s loss calculation were upheld, the court abused its discretion by failing to explain why it credited certain marketing services but not others (notably expensive marketing videos and a draft-day suit), especially where the defendant’s estimates suggested those items could have reduced the offense level.
Restitution (Issue IV): The restitution order was vacated both because it depended on the flawed loss calculation and because, independent of that, the district court clearly erred by ordering full restitution to Q.W. without subtracting even the value it had already found Spencer provided.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Joinder and Severance: Rules 8 and 14

1. Legal Framework

Two Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure control this area:

Rule 8(a) permits joining offenses against a single defendant if they are of the same or similar character, based on the same act or transaction, or part of a common scheme or plan.
Rule 8(b) permits joining defendants if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction, or the same “series of acts or transactions,” constituting an offense or offenses.

The Eleventh Circuit, quoting United States v. Wilson, 894 F.2d 1245 (11th Cir. 1990), reiterates that the “same series of acts or transactions” requirement under Rule 8(b) is satisfied when the acts are “united by some substantial identity of facts and/or participants.” Importantly:

Not every participant need be involved in every phase of the venture.
Participants need not know all other participants’ roles or identities.
Even separate conspiracies with different memberships may be joined if they form part of a single series of acts or transactions (United States v. Weaver, 905 F.2d 1466 (11th Cir. 1990)).

However, even if joinder is technically improper under Rule 8, reversal is not required where the misjoinder was harmless. In Weaver, the Eleventh Circuit held that improper joinder is harmless unless it has a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the verdict—that is, unless it results in actual prejudice.

Relatedly, Rule 14 allows a court to sever properly joined defendants or counts if joinder appears to prejudice a defendant. But as United States v. Mosquera, 886 F.3d 1032 (11th Cir. 2018), explains, denial of severance is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and reversal requires “compelling prejudice” against which the court’s instructions could offer no protection.

Several more precedents shape the prejudice analysis:

United States v. Morales, 868 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1989): courts may often resolve joinder disputes by focusing directly on whether prejudice resulted.
United States v. Watson, 866 F.2d 381 (11th Cir. 1989): actual prejudice exists when there is a reasonable chance that the jury would not have convicted if the trial had been severed.
United States v. Leavitt, 878 F.2d 1329 (11th Cir. 1989): courts presume that juries follow cautionary instructions to consider the evidence against each defendant and count separately.
United States v. Prosperi, 201 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2000): the risk of “spillover” prejudice is reduced where the evidence supporting each count is dissimilar.
United States v. Kennard, 472 F.3d 851 (11th Cir. 2006): a limiting instruction “will normally mitigate the risk of spillover effects.”
United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1501 (11th Cir. 1990): disparity in the amount of evidence against co-defendants does not, alone, constitute compelling prejudice.
United States v. Hernandez, 921 F.2d 1569 (11th Cir. 1991): short deliberations and uniform verdicts do not, by themselves, show prejudice; they may simply reflect a strong government case.

2. Application to Spencer

The panel first held that Count 29 (a money-laundering charge against Frazier) was properly joined with Count 28 because the laundered funds in Count 29 were the proceeds of the very wire-fraud conspiracy charged in Count 28. Thus, under Rule 8(b) and Wilson, Count 29 arose from the “same series of acts or transactions,” sharing a substantial identity of facts (use of Q.W.’s $500,000).

The court then assumed, without definitively deciding, that joining the other Frazier counts (Counts 1–27, 35–37) with Count 28 might have been erroneous under Rule 8. Even so, any misjoinder was harmless because Spencer failed to show “actual prejudice” under Weaver and Watson:

The district court repeatedly instructed the jury that:
- Each crime and its supporting evidence had to be considered separately and individually.
- Spencer’s case had to be considered separately from Frazier’s case, particularly on Count 28.
Under Leavitt, the appellate court presumes juries follow such limiting instructions, and Spencer offered no specific basis to overcome that presumption.
The evidence of Frazier’s prior drug distribution and financial offenses did not implicate Spencer and was dissimilar in nature to the fraud against Q.W., reducing the risk of spillover prejudice under Prosperi.
Even abstracting away all evidence about Frazier’s drug money laundering, structuring, and tax violations, the remaining trial record contained “strong evidence” that Spencer conspired with Frazier to defraud Q.W. (as detailed under Issue II). Thus, Spencer could not show a “reasonable probability” that a jury would have acquitted him in a severed trial.
The disparity in the volume of evidence against Frazier and Spencer was, under Smith, legally insufficient to show compelling prejudice.
Short deliberations and a unanimous verdict did not, under Hernandez, support a prejudice claim; they could as easily reflect the strength of the government’s case.

For these reasons, the Eleventh Circuit found neither reversible misjoinder under Rule 8 nor “compelling prejudice” warranting severance under Rule 14 as described in Mosquera.

3. Impact of the Joinder Analysis

The decision reinforces several practical points in Eleventh Circuit practice:

Joint trials remain the default in multi-defendant, multi-count federal prosecutions; severance is “the exception, not the rule.”
Defendants must demonstrate concrete, outcome-affecting prejudice, not merely speculate that “bad character” evidence about a co-defendant spilled over.
Strong and distinct evidence of a defendant’s own guilt will frequently defeat claims of joinder-related prejudice.
Trial judges who provide clear, repeated limiting instructions are strongly protected on appeal.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence: Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud

1. Legal Standard and Elements

The conspiracy charge (Count 28) was based on 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1349:

Wire fraud (§ 1343) prohibits devising or intending to devise a scheme to defraud, or to obtain money or property by false or fraudulent pretenses, and transmitting (or causing to be transmitted) interstate wire communications for the purpose of executing the scheme.
Conspiracy to commit wire fraud (§ 1349) punishes agreeing with another to commit wire fraud.

Under United States v. Feldman, 931 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2019), the government had to prove:

That a conspiracy to commit wire fraud existed,
That Spencer had knowledge of the conspiracy, and
That Spencer knowingly and voluntarily joined it.

As United States v. Vernon, 723 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2013), emphasizes, conspiracies are typically proved through circumstantial evidence and inferences from conduct, not formal written or spoken agreements. United States v. Sosa, 777 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2015), further makes clear:

A defendant can be convicted if he is aware of the conspiracy’s “essential nature,” even if he does not know all details,
Even if he plays only a minor role, and
Even if he does not participate in every stage or have direct contact with every co-conspirator.

On appellate review of sufficiency, the Eleventh Circuit, under United States v. Trujillo, 146 F.3d 838 (11th Cir. 1998), views the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict.

2. Evidence Supporting the Conspiracy Finding

The jury heard the following key pieces of evidence:

Q.W. wired $500,000 to Head of Game on the understanding—based on representations from Spencer and Frazier—that the money would be used to build and market Head of Game for Q.W.’s professional benefit.
A day after the $500,000 arrived, Frazier transferred $214,825 to a Mom & Son’s Towing account that Spencer’s mother had opened just one day earlier.
Spencer then used substantial sums for personal expenditures, including $21,000 for a Bobcat, tire, and truck motor.
Frazier used significant amounts of Q.W.’s money to pay off personal credit card debt and to flip houses.
Spencer lied to investigators, claiming that the Head of Game funds transferred to Mom & Son’s Towing were to launch a nightclub with a friend. The jury was entitled to treat this false exculpatory statement as evidence of guilty knowledge.
Although Q.W. technically had access to the Head of Game account, he testified he trusted Spencer, was close to him, and had limited marketing knowledge—supporting the inference that Spencer and Frazier did not expect close monitoring.

3. The Court’s Reasoning

The panel held that, from this evidence, a rational jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that:

A conspiracy existed to misappropriate Q.W.’s $500,000 under the guise of building Head of Game.
Spencer was aware of the conspiracy’s essential nature: that he and Frazier would divert Q.W.’s investment and use it for other, non-marketing purposes.
Spencer voluntarily joined and furthered the conspiracy by:
- Using funds routed through his mother’s newly-opened account,
- Spending Q.W.’s money on personal items unrelated to Q.W.’s marketing, and
- Lying to investigators to conceal the true purpose of the transfers.

The defense argued that there was no evidence Spencer had access to the Head of Game account and that some expenditures could have benefitted Head of Game. The court rejected these points:

Under Sosa, Spencer did not need direct control over the Head of Game account or involvement in every stage of the scheme.
Partial or even mixed-purpose use of funds (some for legitimate business, some misappropriated) does not negate the existence of a fraudulent conspiracy, particularly where “sizable portions” of the funds were misused.

Accordingly, Spencer’s challenge to the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal failed.

4. Broader Implications on Conspiracy Law

The opinion reinforces recurring themes in conspiracy and fraud prosecutions:

Circumstantial evidence—especially financial flows, personal benefits, and false explanations to investigators—can readily establish conspiratorial agreement.
A defendant’s partial performance of promised services (e.g., some genuine marketing work) does not immunize him if he misappropriates a substantial portion of the investor’s money.
In relationships built on trust and informational asymmetry (here, a young athlete and a more sophisticated marketer), deliberate exploitation of that trust can strongly support a finding of fraudulent intent.

C. Sentencing: Loss Calculation and Credit for Value

1. Guidelines Framework

Spencer’s sentence turned primarily on how much “loss” he caused for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 (2023). Two features of that guideline are central:

The loss table in § 2B1.1(b)(1), which assigns offense-level increases based on the amount of loss.
The “credit for value” rule in Application Note 3(E)(i).

Under the 2023 version:

Loss > $550,000 and ≤ $1,500,000 yields a 14‑level increase.
Loss > $250,000 and ≤ $550,000 yields a 12‑level increase.

The Application Note provides:

“Loss shall be reduced by … [t]he money returned, and the fair market value of the property returned and the services rendered, by the defendant or other persons acting jointly with the defendant, to the victim before the offense was detected.” (U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, comment. (n.3(E)(i)) (2023)).

The Eleventh Circuit, citing United States v. Campbell, 765 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2014), notes that this “credit accounts for the fact that value may be rendered even amid fraudulent conduct,” and the key question is whether legitimate value was rendered to the victim. However:

Defendants cannot claim credit for value provided solely to conceal or perpetuate the scheme.
Nor can they subtract their own internal costs of running the fraudulent enterprise.

The opinion also reaffirms other well-established principles:

The district court need only make a reasonable estimate of loss. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, comment. (n.3(C)) (2023).
Loss is measured from the victim’s perspective. United States v. Foster, 878 F.3d 1297, 1306 (11th Cir. 2018).
Sentencing courts have “considerable leeway,” but must support loss findings with “reliable and specific evidence.” Campbell, 765 F.3d at 1301.

As to standards of review, the court cites:

United States v. Gyetvay, 149 F.4th 1213 (11th Cir. 2025), for reviewing procedural reasonableness— including correct Guidelines calculation—under an abuse-of-discretion standard.
United States v. Annamalai, 939 F.3d 1216 (11th Cir. 2019), for reviewing Guidelines interpretations de novo and factual findings (including loss) for clear error.
United States v. Lawrence, 47 F.3d 1559 (11th Cir. 1995), for the rule that the government must prove disputed sentencing facts by a preponderance of the evidence.

2. Reliance on Guidelines Commentary After Dupree

The opinion briefly addresses the Eleventh Circuit’s en banc decision in United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269 (11th Cir. 2023), which held that courts may not automatically defer to Sentencing Guidelines commentary where the guideline’s text is unambiguous. However, citing United States v. Jews, 74 F.4th 1325 (11th Cir. 2023), the panel notes that courts may rely on commentary when no party contests its validity or its compatibility with the guideline’s text.

In Spencer’s case, neither side challenged the propriety of Application Note 3(E)(i). Accordingly, the court treated the Note as a valid and authoritative gloss on § 2B1.1, reinforcing that, post-Dupree, unchallenged commentary continues to play a practical role in Eleventh Circuit sentencing law.

3. The District Court’s Loss-Calculation Approach

The district court:

Accepted a total loss of $664,426 (including $500,000 to Q.W. and $164,426 PPP loss).
Applied the +14-level enhancement because the total exceeded $550,000.
Concluded Spencer needed to show at least $114,426 in “value returned” to reduce the total loss below $550,000 and thereby qualify for the +12-level enhancement.

The court acknowledged that Spencer, via Head of Game, did provide some value to Q.W., such as helping secure endorsement and marketing deals (Bose, Everett Sports, Nike, Procter & Gamble, Hyundai). Based largely on Spencer’s own estimates:

Those deals generated about $102,500 in total face value for Q.W.
Head of Game’s commission was about 10%, implying roughly $10,250 in services rendered by Head of Game.

That amount fell far short of the $114,426 needed to lower the offense level, and the Eleventh Circuit held it was not clearly erroneous to calculate the value of those services in that way.

However, the district court refused to credit other items, including:

Several marketing videos and documentary-style footage produced for Q.W., which Spencer said cost approximately $30,000, $90,000, and $150,000 for different projects,
A $50,000 gold chain given to Q.W.,
Cash payments of $25,000 (in a Louis Vuitton bag) and $2,500 (after an Atlanta meeting), and
A custom suit Spencer purchased for Q.W. to wear at the NFL Draft.

4. What the Court Agreed With

The Eleventh Circuit upheld some of the district court’s exclusions:

Pre-transfer items (e.g., gold chain and cash). The gold chain and certain cash payments predated the January 15, 2019 $500,000 transfer to the Head of Game account. Q.W. testified that his $500,000 investment was not supposed to cover expenses incurred before that transfer. On this record, the panel held:
- It was reasonable to find that those items fell outside the scope of what Q.W. intended his $500,000 to fund.
- Therefore, they were not “services rendered” in exchange for the $500,000 and need not be credited against that loss.
Valuation of marketing deals. By using Spencer’s own estimates and treating Head of Game’s 10% commission as the measure of the “fair market value” of services rendered, the district court reached a value (~$10,250) that the panel found comfortably below the $114,426 threshold and supported by the record.

5. Where the Court Found Abuse of Discretion

The core of the reversal lies in the district court’s treatment of the marketing videos and the draft-day suit:

The court credited Spencer for helping Q.W. land endorsement deals because they plainly fit within Head of Game’s marketing role.
But it gave no explanation for refusing to credit the marketing videos, even though those also obviously fell “within the scope of the work that Head of Game was supposed to perform” and Spencer’s uncontradicted estimates placed their costs alone above $114,426.
Likewise, it refused to credit Spencer for the draft-day custom suit, despite its clear marketing function in the high-visibility context of the NFL Draft.

The panel inferred that the district court may have denied credit because Spencer paid for the videos and suit from his personal bank account rather than from the Head of Game account. It rejected that reasoning as legally unsound:

Application Note 3(E)(i) speaks in terms of “the fair market value of the property returned and the services rendered” to the victim, regardless of the source of the funds used to provide that value.
The text does not limit credit to services purchased with the victim’s own money. The proper question, under Foster, is whether, from the victim’s perspective, the services or goods conferred legitimate value.
Thus, if the marketing videos and suit were part of the legitimate marketing services Head of Game agreed to provide in exchange for the $500,000—and if they had actual value to Q.W.—they should be credited regardless of whether Spencer funded them personally.

Alternately, if the district court meant to say these items were not “attributable to something that Head of Game did,” the panel found that logic untenable on this record. The endorsement deals, videos, and suit all appear to be marketing activities under the same Head of Game engagement. The court’s failure to explain why one set of marketing services counted but another did not, especially where the latter might have altered the Guidelines range, was an abuse of discretion.

In the court’s words, the district judge:

“adequately explained why some benefits counted and why others did not, but was silent as to evidence of other benefits that reasonably could have counted and would have altered the offense level.”

6. Consequences for the Guidelines Calculation

Because:

The marketing videos and suit clearly fell within the scope of the marketing services Head of Game promised,
The district court did not reject Spencer’s cost estimates as inflated or find that the videos provided no value to Q.W., and
Those estimates, if credited in whole or in part, could easily exceed the $114,426 threshold necessary to move to the lower 12-level enhancement,

the Eleventh Circuit vacated the loss calculation and remanded for resentencing. The district court must, on remand:

Make explicit findings regarding the fair market value of the videos and suit (from Q.W.’s perspective), and
Explain clearly which items qualify as “services rendered” and why.

7. Practical Impact on Sentencing Law

The decision yields several practical guidelines:

Funding source is irrelevant to credit for value. Courts must look at the victim’s perspective: If the victim received valuable services or property as part of the fraudulent relationship, those must be credited against loss, even if the defendant paid for them from “personal” accounts or other sources.
Pre-fraud or out-of-scope expenditures may be excluded. Expenses incurred before the victim’s payment—and not contemplated as part of what the payment was supposed to cover—need not be treated as offsetting value.
District courts must explain their line-drawing. When a court credits some services (e.g., particular deals) but not others (e.g., promotional content) that are plausibly part of the same legitimate-services bundle, it must articulate a rational, record-based reason, especially where the decision affects the Guidelines range.
Defense strategy. Defendants should:
- Develop a detailed record on the value of legitimate services provided (with documentation and expert or market-based valuation if possible), and
- Press for explicit findings on each category’s fair market value and on whether it falls within the scope of the bargain with the victim.
Government strategy. Prosecutors, if contesting such credits, should be prepared to show that:
- Some services were sham, valueless, or purely instrumental to concealing the fraud, or
- They fell outside the scope of what the victim’s funds were supposed to purchase.

D. Restitution Under the MVRA and VWPA

1. Statutory Framework

Restitution in federal criminal cases is governed primarily by two statutes:

Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A.
Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663.

Under these provisions:

A court must (under the MVRA) or may (under the VWPA) order restitution for certain offenses, including Title 18 property crimes involving fraud or deceit, where an identifiable victim has suffered pecuniary loss.
Restitution must be based on “the amount of loss that the defendant’s conduct actually caused.” United States v. Young, 108 F.4th 1307, 1319–20 (11th Cir. 2024).
It must reflect the net loss, accounting for any value that the defendant’s scheme conferred on the victim. Young; see also United States v. Brown, 665 F.3d 1239, 1252 (11th Cir. 2011).

As United States v. Edwards, 728 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2013), reiterates, courts have authority to order restitution only as authorized by statute. Factual findings underlying restitution are reviewed for clear error (Brown).

The Eleventh Circuit, quoting Young, stresses:

“The purpose of restitution is not to provide a windfall for crime victims but rather to ensure that victims, to the greatest extent possible, are made whole for their losses.”

2. Application in Spencer’s Case

The district court ordered Spencer to pay Q.W. $500,000 in restitution, representing the entire amount Q.W. had wired to Head of Game, without subtracting any value Q.W. received via marketing services or endorsement deals.

The Eleventh Circuit vacated the restitution order for two independent reasons:

Dependence on a flawed loss calculation. Because the court vacated and remanded the loss calculation under § 2B1.1, it necessarily followed that restitution— which must reflect the victim’s actual economic loss—also needed to be reconsidered.
Failure to credit even acknowledged value. Independently, even if the original loss calculation had been correct, the district court clearly erred by ordering full $500,000 restitution to Q.W. without subtracting the value of the services it had already credited (e.g., the endorsement deals). Under Young, restitution must be reduced for actual value conferred; to ignore that value is to risk a victim windfall.

3. Implications for Restitution Practice

The opinion reinforces that:

Courts must align restitution with the actual, net loss the victim suffered, not merely the gross amount of money the victim transferred.
Any value recognized for Guidelines loss purposes (e.g., credit for services rendered) must generally also be reflected in restitution, absent some distinct statutory reason to treat them differently.
Failure to account for recognized value to the victim is clear error under Eleventh Circuit law.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Joinder and Severance

Joinder allows prosecutors to bring multiple related charges and multiple defendants together in a single trial, in the interest of efficiency and completeness. But combined trials risk “guilt by association”—one defendant being convicted because jurors hear damaging evidence about someone else.

Severance is the tool to combat that risk. A defendant can ask for a separate trial if joinder of defendants or charges might unfairly prejudice the jury against him. The bar is high: he must show more than discomfort or tactical disadvantage; he must show a serious risk that jurors cannot compartmentalize the evidence even with careful instructions.

B. Wire Fraud and Conspiracy

Wire fraud essentially involves:

A dishonest plan to get money or property (by lying, omitting key facts, or otherwise deceiving someone), and
Use of interstate electronic communications—emails, bank wires, phone calls—to carry out that plan.

A conspiracy is an agreement between two or more people to commit a crime, plus the defendant’s knowing and voluntary decision to join that agreement. The government usually proves conspiracies by circumstantial evidence: who controlled the money, who benefitted, who lied when questioned, and how the players coordinated their actions.

C. Sentencing Guidelines “Loss” and Credit for Value

For many fraud offenses, the Sentencing Guidelines base the severity of punishment partly on how much financial loss the crime caused.

But in real life, fraud cases are not always “all-or-nothing.” Sometimes, a fraudster provides some genuine value to the victim (e.g., partial construction work on a house, or some legitimate investment returns) alongside misappropriating other funds. Application Note 3(E)(i) tells courts to:

Start from the gross amount the victim gave the defendant, and then
Subtract the fair market value of any legitimate goods or services the victim received (and any money returned) before the fraud was detected.

The result is a “net loss” figure, from the victim’s point of view. This is intended to reflect the real economic harm, not to overstate the loss by ignoring partial performance or genuine value.

D. Restitution and “No Windfall”

Restitution is court-ordered repayment by the defendant to the victim, separate from fines or forfeitures. Federal law aims to make the victim “whole,” not to punish beyond that.

Because of that, restitution:

Must be based on the actual monetary loss caused by the crime, and
Must be reduced by acknowledging any genuine economic value the victim received (for example, real services they would have paid for anyway).

VI. Broader Significance and Potential Impact

A. Status as Unpublished Opinion

This decision is marked “NOT FOR PUBLICATION” and thus is non-precedential under Eleventh Circuit rules. It is not binding on future panels, though it may be cited as persuasive authority and reflects how one panel interprets and applies controlling law in this context.

B. Sentencing Law and White-Collar Defense

United States v. Spencer contributes meaningfully to the ongoing development of loss-calculation principles:

It clarifies that legitimate services must be credited against loss regardless of whether the defendant paid for those services from misappropriated funds or personal funds.
It demands transparent, reasoned explanations by district courts when they choose to credit some items of value but not others.
It underscores that in many fraud schemes—especially those involving ongoing “relationships” like agent–client or adviser–investor arrangements—partial performance can be substantial and must be carefully valued.

In practice, this can narrow loss amounts and reduce Guidelines ranges where defendants did perform real work of substantial value, even amid deceit.

C. Restitution: Guarding Against Overcompensation

Alongside Young, this case signals the Eleventh Circuit’s tight adherence to the “no windfall” principle:

Restitution must truly match the victim’s net loss, not simply equal the money that changed hands.
Sentencing and restitution analyses are closely linked: credits for value in one context should normally be mirrored in the other.

D. Conspiracy and Multi-Defendant Trials

The opinion also:

Reaffirms the high bar for severance where limiting instructions are given and the evidence against a defendant is strong and distinct.
Illustrates again how circumstantial evidence—especially money flows, personal benefits, and lies to investigators— can be enough to sustain conspiracy convictions.

E. Industry Context: Athlete Marketing and Agent Relationships

Though unstated in doctrinal terms, the facts highlight risks inherent in relationships between young professional athletes and agents or marketing promoters handling large sums of money:

Courts will scrutinize whether funds ostensibly dedicated to brand-building are actually diverted for personal use.
Where trust and informational asymmetry are high, unmonitored control of large amounts of client funds is fertile ground for criminal exposure if misused.

VII. Conclusion

United States v. Spencer leaves Spencer’s convictions intact but significantly reshapes his sentencing landscape. It sends a clear message on several fronts:

Convictions: The evidence was sufficient to prove Spencer knowingly joined a conspiracy to defraud Q.W. of his $500,000 investment, and joint trial with Frazier did not produce reversible prejudice.
Loss and Sentencing: District courts must carefully and transparently apply the “credit for value” principle, focusing on the victim’s perspective and not the defendant’s funding source, and must explain why they credit some services but not others when those decisions drive the Guidelines result.
Restitution: Victims are entitled to be made whole, not to receive a windfall; restitution orders must reflect net loss after accounting for any real value conferred by the defendant’s conduct.

As a practical matter, the opinion arms both courts and litigants with a more nuanced framework for valuing partial performance in fraud cases, ensuring that punishment and restitution remain closely tethered to actual economic harm.