United States v. Snipe and the Oral Pronouncement of Supervised Release Conditions After Maiorana

I. Introduction

The Second Circuit’s summary order in United States v. Snipe, No. 24‑2101 (2d Cir. Dec. 19, 2025), though non‑precedential, provides a dense and instructive application of several important strands of federal criminal law:

• the enforceability and scope of appeal waivers in plea agreements;
• when the government’s advocacy at sentencing constitutes a breach of the plea bargain;
• the constitutional limits and delegation issues surrounding “non‑association” conditions of supervised release; and
• the implementation of the Second Circuit’s en banc decision in United States v. Maiorana, 153 F.4th 306 (2d Cir. 2025), which requires oral pronouncement (or specific incorporation) of all non‑mandatory supervised release conditions, including the “standard” conditions.

While the order explicitly lacks precedential effect under Local Rule 32.1.1, it illustrates how district courts and litigants in the Second Circuit are expected to apply Maiorana, manage appeal waivers, and craft supervised-release conditions in gang- and conspiracy‑related cases.

A. Parties and Charges

Defendant‑appellant Julian Snipe (a.k.a. “Biz” or “Bizzzy”) pleaded guilty in the Eastern District of New York to:

• one count of murder‑for‑hire conspiracy (Count One), and
• one count of substantive murder‑for‑hire (Count Two),

both under 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a). He faced a five‑count indictment exposing him to a potential life sentence, but through the plea agreement he pleaded to lesser‑included offenses and received:

• 240 months (20 years) of imprisonment, and
• three years of supervised release.

The case arose from a broader murder‑for‑hire conspiracy involving several co‑defendants and the targeted killings of Sylvester and Salvatore Zottola. The court noted Snipe’s association with the “Gorilla Stone” set of the Bloods gang as part of the factual backdrop.

B. Issues on Appeal

On appeal, Snipe—represented by counsel—raised a “host of challenges” to his conviction and sentence, including:

1. Substantive challenges to the validity of his conviction and the statutory maximum applicable to Count Two;
2. A claimed government breach of the plea agreement (particularly regarding acceptance of responsibility and the government’s request for a “serious sentence”);
3. Multiple constitutional and statutory objections to a special supervised‑release condition prohibiting association with gangs, organized crime, or criminal enterprises (the “non‑association condition”); and
4. A post‑sentencing challenge, under United States v. Maiorana, to the standard conditions of supervised release imposed in the written judgment but not orally pronounced.

The government invoked an appeal waiver in Snipe’s plea agreement to bar most of these challenges, conceding only that his arguments about supervised-release conditions were not covered by the waiver. The panel (Judges Chin, Sullivan, and Nathan) agreed in large part, but vacated the standard conditions of supervised release in light of Maiorana and remanded for further proceedings limited to those conditions.

II. Summary of the Court’s Decision

The Second Circuit’s disposition can be broken down into three core rulings:

A. Appeal Waiver Enforced as to Conviction and Sentence

• The court held that Snipe knowingly and intelligently executed a valid appeal waiver, relinquishing his right to appeal “the conviction or sentence in the event that the court imposed a term of imprisonment of 480 months or below.”
• Because he was sentenced to 240 months—far below that cap—the waiver was triggered.
• The panel rejected Snipe’s claim that the waiver was invalid due to a government breach of the plea agreement, concluding there was no breach and, in any event, no plain error affecting his substantial rights.
• All non‑supervised‑release challenges to the conviction and sentence were therefore dismissed.

B. Special Non‑Association Condition of Supervised Release Affirmed

• The district court imposed Special Condition #1, a “non‑association condition” prohibiting Snipe from associating with individuals affiliated with “organized crime groups, gangs or any other criminal enterprise,” and from frequenting certain places.
• Snipe argued that this condition violated the First Amendment, was vague and overbroad, and improperly delegated sentencing authority to the Probation Office.
• Reviewing for plain error (no objection was made below), the Second Circuit rejected each argument, finding the condition:
  • reasonably related to Snipe’s offense and gang involvement,
  • within the established line of permissible non‑association conditions, and
  • a proper use of Probation’s authority to manage “minor details,” not an improper delegation of core sentencing authority.
• The panel also held that the condition was sufficiently “pronounced” at sentencing, even though it was not read verbatim.

C. Standard Conditions of Supervised Release Vacated under Maiorana

• After sentencing but before argument, the Second Circuit decided United States v. Maiorana (en banc), which held that non‑mandatory supervised-release conditions—including the “standard” conditions in U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)—must either be:
  • orally pronounced during the sentencing proceeding, or
  • specifically incorporated by reference to a written list made available to the defendant at sentencing.
• In Snipe’s case, the district court had:
  • pronounced the special (non‑association) condition, but
  • neither pronounced nor specifically incorporated the 13 standard conditions later set out in the written judgment.
• Applying Maiorana (which by its own terms applies to cases “currently on direct review”), the Second Circuit:
  • vacated the 13 standard conditions of supervised release, and
  • remanded to the district court to consider, under Maiorana, whether and how to reimpose them.

In sum, the judgment was “AFFIRMED in part and VACATED and REMANDED in part,” with the remainder of the appeal dismissed under the appeal waiver.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Appeal Waivers and the Plea Agreement

1. Contract‑like Interpretation of Plea Agreements

Plea agreements, including appeal waivers, are interpreted using contract principles. As the court noted (citing United States v. Vaval, 404 F.3d 144, 152 (2d Cir. 2005)), the question is what “the parties reasonably understood to be the terms of the agreement.”

Key features of Snipe’s written plea agreement included:

• An appeal waiver: Snipe “agreed not to appeal or in any way challenge [his] sentence or conviction” if the term of imprisonment was 480 months or less.
• A guidelines stipulation: an “effective Guidelines range of imprisonment” of 360–480 months, based on certain offense‑level assumptions, including a reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
• An acceptance‑of‑responsibility clause: a three‑level reduction would be recommended “[i]f [Snipe] clearly demonstrate[d] acceptance of responsibility” to the satisfaction of the government and the court.
• A sentencing‑position clause: the government would “take no position concerning where within the Guidelines range determined by the court the sentence should fall,” and “make no motion for an upward departure,” subject to information “now known” to the U.S. Attorney’s Office.

2. Validity and Enforceability of the Waiver

The panel emphasized the thorough Rule 11 colloquy:

• The district court confirmed that Snipe had read and understood the plea agreement.
• The court specifically addressed the appeal waiver and its consequences.
• The judge found that Snipe acted voluntarily and understood both his rights and the consequences of his plea.

Against this record, the court found “nothing … to substantiate” Snipe’s assertion that “his plea was involuntary and unknowing.” He also received a substantial benefit: pleading to lesser‑included counts and avoiding a potential life sentence under the broader indictment. This triggered the familiar principle (citing United States v. Yemitan, 70 F.3d 746, 747–48 (2d Cir. 1995)) that a defendant is “bound by his undertaking in the plea agreement,” and the government is entitled to the “benefit of its bargain.”

3. Waiver vs. Forfeiture

The panel invoked United States v. Spruill, 808 F.3d 585, 596–97 (2d Cir. 2015), to distinguish:

• Forfeiture: failing to timely raise an issue, which permits appellate courts to correct clear or “plain” errors under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b); and
• True waiver: an intentional relinquishment of a known right, which leaves the appellate court with “no such discretion” to correct the alleged error.

By “actively” entering into an appeal waiver and reaping benefits from it, Snipe fell into the “true waiver” category for all covered issues (i.e., his conviction and sentence so long as they did not exceed 480 months). Thus, his non‑supervised‑release claims were dismissed as waived unless he could show that the government itself had materially breached the agreement.

B. Alleged Government Breach of the Plea Agreement

1. The Two Alleged Breaches

Snipe argued that the government breached the agreement by:

1. Opposing an acceptance‑of‑responsibility reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, and
2. Advocating for a “serious sentence” and recommending 360 months at sentencing.

He urged that any such breach would render the appeal waiver unenforceable.

2. Standard of Review: Plain Error

Because Snipe did not raise these objections at sentencing, the court reviewed for plain error, following United States v. Taylor, 961 F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir. 2020) and United States v. Bleau, 930 F.3d 35, 39 (2d Cir. 2019). Under that standard, he had to show:

1. There was an “error,”
2. That was “plain” (clear or obvious),
3. That affected his “substantial rights” (typically, that it affected the outcome), and
4. That seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings (for the appellate court to exercise its discretion to correct it).

3. Acceptance of Responsibility and Post‑Plea Conduct

The plea agreement conditioned the three‑level § 3E1.1 reduction on Snipe “clearly demonstrat[ing] acceptance of responsibility, through allocution and subsequent conduct prior to the imposition of sentence, to the satisfaction of the government.” The facts recited in the order are critical:

• After pleading guilty, Snipe moved “multiple times” to withdraw his plea.
• He “assert[ed] actual innocence,” declaring, “I didn’t help plot or carry out this conspiracy,” and “I didn’t have any part of this conspiracy.”
• In response, the government opposed the acceptance‑of‑responsibility reduction and argued that he should not receive that benefit.

The panel found this opposition was fully consistent with U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 and its Application Note 1(A), which lists as an “appropriate consideration” for acceptance:

“truthfully admitting the conduct comprising the offense(s) of conviction, and truthfully admitting or not falsely denying any additional relevant conduct.”

Citing United States v. Beltre, 562 F. App’x 15, 19 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[A] post‑plea disavowal of guilt may be treated as inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility.”), the court held that Snipe’s claimed innocence plainly undercut any entitlement to the reduction. Under these circumstances, the government did not breach the agreement by withdrawing its earlier contemplated support for acceptance of responsibility.

4. Sentencing Recommendation and the “Take No Position” Clause

The plea agreement provided that the government would:

• “take no position concerning where within the Guidelines range determined by the court the sentence should fall,” and
• “make no motion for an upward departure.”

Both commitments were explicitly premised on “information now known to the [U.S. Attorney’s] Office.” After Snipe’s post‑plea assertions of innocence and motions to withdraw, the landscape changed. The government then:

• recommended a 360‑month sentence, which was:
  • the “low end” of the guidelines range contemplated in the plea (360–480 months), and
  • below the final guidelines sentence of 480 months (driven by the statutory maximums on the stacked counts and U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a)).

The panel, citing United States v. Habbas, 527 F.3d 266, 271 (2d Cir. 2008), treated Snipe’s change of position as “new justifying facts” that permitted the government to alter its stance without acting in bad faith or breaching the agreement. Rather than deprive Snipe of his bargain, the 360‑month recommendation actually:

• honored the original guidelines stipulation, and
• recommended the minimum sentence within that estimated range—even though the final guidelines calculation, once acceptance was denied, reached a higher ceiling (480 months).

On these facts, the court concluded there was no breach.

5. No Plain Error Even Assuming Breach

Even assuming arguendo that the government had erred, the panel relied on Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009), and United States v. Arigbodi, 924 F.2d 462, 464 (2d Cir. 1991), to find no effect on Snipe’s substantial rights:

• Without acceptance of responsibility, everyone agreed the applicable guidelines sentence was 480 months (the statutory maximum for the two stacked counts).
• The district judge repeatedly emphasized that he would have imposed the same 240‑month sentence even if Snipe had received a two‑level acceptance reduction.
• Indeed, even with an extra two‑level reduction, Snipe’s offense level would still have produced an advisory guideline of life, capped at 480 months by statute.

Thus, any putative breach did not change the sentencing outcome, and Snipe could not satisfy the third prong of plain‑error review.

6. Rule 28(j) Letter and the Fisher Issue

Snipe filed a Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j) letter on the eve of oral argument, attempting to:

• rely on ongoing Supreme Court merits briefing to challenge the Second Circuit’s rule in United States v. Fisher, 232 F.3d 301, 304 (2d Cir. 2000) (that an otherwise enforceable waiver is not undone by a district judge’s post‑sentencing suggestion that the defendant may appeal); and
• argue that the government had “forfeited and/or waived” its ability to enforce the appeal waiver beyond what the sentencing judge described orally.

The panel refused to consider these arguments, relying on:

• United States v. Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d 572, 575 (2d Cir. 1987) (Rule 28(j) letters cannot be used to raise new arguments or expand briefing), and
• Poor v. Amazon.com Servs. LLC, 104 F.4th 433, 444 n.10 (2d Cir. 2024) (arguments first made in a Rule 28(j) letter are forfeited).

As a result, Fisher remained binding law, and the court treated the waiver as fully enforceable.

C. The Non‑Association Special Condition of Supervised Release

1. The Condition and the Challenge

Special Condition #1—the “non‑association condition”—barred Snipe from:

• associating with individuals affiliated with “organized crime groups, gangs or any other criminal enterprise,” and
• frequenting certain locations associated with criminal activity, as determined in part by Probation.

Snipe argued that the condition:

1. violated his First Amendment rights to free speech and association,
2. was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and
3. impermissibly delegated to Probation the power to define prohibited associations and locations.

He also asserted that it was not properly “pronounced” at sentencing.

2. Governing Law: 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)

The panel reiterated the standard framework:

• District courts have “broad discretion” to impose supervised-release conditions (United States v. Betts, 886 F.3d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 2018)).
• Conditions must be “reasonably related” to:
  • the nature of the offense and the defendant’s history and characteristics,
  • the need for deterrence, and
  • the need to protect the public from further crimes (18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)).
• Conditions that restrict liberty are permissible if they are reasonably related to the crime and adequately explained (United States v. Schiff, 876 F.2d 272, 276 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Sims, 92 F.4th 115, 119 (2d Cir. 2024)).

Snipe did not object in the district court, so the Second Circuit again applied plain-error review.

3. Reasonableness and Relationship to the Offense

The record showed that:

• Snipe had acknowledged association with the “Gorilla Stone set of the Bloods” street gang.
• The district court expressly found that his relationships with gang members “pulled [him] into the orbit of [the murder‑for‑hire] conspiracy.”

On that basis, the panel held that:

• The need to prevent Snipe’s return to gang‑related criminal activity was “self‑evident.”
• The condition was “reasonably related” to both his history and the need to protect the public, satisfying § 3583(d) and § 5D1.3(b).

4. Vagueness and Overbreadth

Snipe attacked the condition as impermissibly vague and overbroad, but the panel noted a robust body of Second Circuit precedent upholding similar non‑association conditions:

• United States v. Sims, 92 F.4th 115, 125 n.6 (2d Cir. 2024): rejecting vagueness and overbreadth challenges to similar gang‑association conditions.
• United States v. Green, 618 F.3d 120, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2010): upholding a bar on association with “criminal street gangs,” finding the federal criminal law framework provided sufficient content to the term.
• United States v. Marshall, 808 F. App’x 11, 12–14 (2d Cir. 2020): approving a condition that a defendant “not associate with any member, associate, or prospect of any criminal gang, club, or organization.”
• United States v. Rakhmatov, No. 21‑151, 2022 WL 16984536 (2d Cir. Nov. 17, 2022): similar non‑association conditions upheld.
• United States v. MacMillen, 544 F.3d 71, 74–76 (2d Cir. 2008): approving a condition barring the defendant from “frequenting locations where children are likely to congregate,” despite its generalized wording.
• United States v. Reeves, 591 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 2010): “Conditions need not be cast in letters six feet high, or describe every possible permutation, or spell out every last, self‑evident detail.”

These authorities undercut the notion that a non‑association condition is facially unconstitutional merely because it uses general terms like “gang,” “organized crime,” or “criminal enterprise” that derive content from the criminal law and can be applied in a common‑sense way.

5. Delegation to Probation

The order addressed the classic delegation problem: when does a condition impermissibly delegate judicial authority to Probation, and when does it merely assign administration of “details”?

• United States v. Matta, 777 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2015), distinguished:
  • impermissible delegation of the decision to impose or lift restrictions affecting liberty, from
  • permissible delegation of authority over “certain minor details of supervised release.”
• United States v. Kunz, 68 F.4th 748, 766 (2d Cir. 2023), treated the identification of particular people and locations covered by a general non‑association condition as “matters of detail” within Probation’s purview, recognizing that “sentencing judges cannot reasonably be expected to compile a detailed list” of all prohibited associates and places.

Applying this framework, the panel held:

• The district court itself imposed the substantive restriction—no association with individuals affiliated with organized crime groups, gangs, or criminal enterprises.
• Probation’s role in identifying specific individuals or locations was limited to implementation and did not make Snipe’s “liberty itself contingent” on Probation’s independent decisionmaking.

Accordingly, there was no unconstitutional delegation.

6. Pronouncement of the Special Condition

Snipe’s assertion that the non‑association condition “was not pronounced at sentencing” was “belied by the record.” The district court:

• expressly referenced the “non‑association condition,” stating:

  “[H]e cannot associate with other individuals engaged in criminal activity or gang activity.”

• explained on the record why this condition was necessary, linking it to Snipe’s gang associations and the risk of recidivism.
• directed Snipe and counsel to the Presentence Report (PSR) and Probation’s recommendation, both of which contained the condition.

Citing United States v. Sims, 92 F.4th at 119, and United States v. Maiorana, 153 F.4th at 314, the panel reiterated that a sentencing court:

• “need not read the full text of every condition on the record,” and
• may fulfill its pronouncement duty by “summary” reference to written documents (like the PSR) if their content is sufficiently identified and made available at sentencing.

On these facts, the panel found that the special condition was adequately pronounced and explained.

D. Maiorana and the Standard Conditions of Supervised Release

1. The Maiorana Rule

The central forward‑looking aspect of Snipe is its application of the Second Circuit’s en banc decision in United States v. Maiorana, 153 F.4th 306 (2d Cir. 2025). There, the court announced a “new rule of criminal procedure”:

“[A] sentencing court intending to impose non-mandatory conditions of supervised release, including the ‘standard’ conditions described in § 5D1.3(c) of the Sentencing Guidelines, must notify the defendant during the sentencing proceeding; if the conditions are not pronounced, they may not later be added to the written judgment.” (emphasis added)

The en banc court further clarified that:

• It is sufficient for the sentencing court to “specifically incorporate by reference particular conditions that have been set forth in writing and made available to the defendant.”
• The rule applies to “cases currently on direct review.” Maiorana, 153 F.4th at 314 & n.11.

In other words, “standard” conditions no longer enjoy an implied, automatic status: they must be either orally imposed or clearly incorporated on the record to become part of the sentence.

2. Application to Snipe’s Sentencing

At the time of Snipe’s sentencing (August 2, 2024), pre‑Maiorana practice did not require the oral pronouncement of standard conditions. The district court:

• did pronounce certain special conditions (including the non‑association condition), and
• relied on the PSR and written judgment for the standard conditions.

Post‑Maiorana, that is no longer sufficient. The panel noted:

• The district court “neither pronounced Snipe’s standard conditions of supervised release listed in the judgment at sentencing, nor specifically incorporate[d] by reference particular conditions that ha[d] been set forth in writing and made available to [Snipe].”
• The government conceded that this was error under Maiorana and agreed that vacatur and remand were appropriate.

While acknowledging that it is “not bound to accept the Government’s concession,” the Second Circuit agreed that vacatur was necessary to ensure that Snipe was “afforded the constitutionally grounded protections encompassed by the right to be present at sentencing.” See Maiorana, 153 F.4th at 314.

3. Scope of the Remand

The panel vacated “the imposition of the thirteen standard conditions of his supervised release” and remanded with instructions that:

• the district court address the standard conditions “in accordance with the procedures laid out in Maiorana.”

Importantly, nothing in the order suggests any need to revisit Snipe’s custodial term or the special non‑association condition. The remand is thus limited: the district court must decide whether to reimpose the standard conditions, and if so, do so in conformity with the oral‑pronouncement or express‑incorporation requirement.

IV. Impact and Broader Legal Significance

A. Appeal Waivers: Stability and Narrow Escape Routes

Snipe reinforces several enduring principles about appeal waivers in the Second Circuit:

• Well‑drafted, clearly explained waivers are robustly enforced, even where they bar meritorious or colorable claims.
• A defendant who has benefitted from a favorable plea (here, avoiding a possible life sentence) will have difficulty convincing the court that his waiver was uninformed or involuntary.
• Allegations of government breach must be carefully preserved in the district court, or they will be reviewed only for plain error. After Puckett, showing an adverse effect on the sentence is essential.
• Rule 28(j) letters are not a vehicle to raise entirely new theories or challenge existing circuit precedent based on pending Supreme Court cases; such arguments must appear in the principal briefing.

For practitioners, Snipe is a reminder that:

• defense counsel must build any “breach of plea” record at sentencing, and
• plea agreements should be drafted and discussed with clients under the assumption that their appeal waivers will be enforced as written unless a clear, preserved breach is established.

B. Supervised Release Conditions: Non‑Association and Delegation

On the substantive side, Snipe confirms the Second Circuit’s willingness to:

• uphold broad but conceptually anchored non‑association conditions (gangs, organized crime, criminal enterprises) when linked to the defendant’s conduct and criminal history;
• tolerate moderate vagueness, so long as terms draw meaning from the criminal law and common understanding;
• permit Probation to administer and specify “details” (people and places) under general supervision conditions, without treating that as a delegation of core judicial power; and
• accept “summary” oral explanation, combined with references to the PSR, as sufficient “pronouncement” for special conditions.

For district courts, the order underscores the need to:

• explicitly connect special conditions to the defendant’s offense and history, and
• provide at least a brief, on‑the‑record explanation of why a particular restriction is needed.

C. Maiorana in Practice: Pronouncing “Standard” Conditions

The most forward‑looking impact lies in the implementation of Maiorana:

• “Standard” conditions can no longer be silently imported into a judgment; they must be:
  • spoken on the record, or
  • incorporated by explicit reference to an identified written list made available at sentencing (for example, “the 13 standard conditions listed in the PSR at ¶ 127, which I adopt as conditions of supervised release”).
• This requirement is rooted in the defendant’s right to be present at sentencing and to hear the complete terms of punishment imposed.
• Failure to comply now results in vacatur of the unpronounced non‑mandatory conditions, at least in cases on direct appeal.

Practically, the decision encourages:

• more deliberate, transparent sentencing hearings, where judges indicate all non‑mandatory conditions either expressly or via careful, recorded incorporation;
• defense counsel to listen closely for any unpronounced conditions in the written judgment and seek correction via Rule 35(a) or on appeal; and
• probation offices and prosecutors to ensure draft judgments conform to what was actually stated or incorporated at sentencing.

V. Complex Legal Concepts Simplified

1. Appeal Waiver

An appeal waiver is a clause in a plea agreement where a defendant agrees not to challenge his conviction or sentence on appeal, often up to a specified sentencing cap. Courts enforce these waivers if:

• the waiver was knowing and voluntary, and
• the government did not materially breach the agreement.

2. Plain‑Error Review

When a defendant fails to object in the district court, the appellate court reviews only for plain error, which requires showing:

1. an error,
2. that is clear or obvious,
3. that affected the outcome, and
4. that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

This is a highly deferential standard and is rarely satisfied.

3. Acceptance of Responsibility (U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1)

The federal sentencing guidelines allow a reduction in offense level if a defendant clearly accepts responsibility for his crime. This usually requires:

• truthful admission of the conduct,
• no false denial of relevant conduct, and
• no post‑plea conduct inconsistent with accepting guilt (like asserting actual innocence).

If a defendant later claims he is innocent or seeks to withdraw his plea, the court and prosecution may fairly conclude he no longer qualifies for the reduction.

4. Standard vs. Special vs. Mandatory Conditions of Supervised Release

• Mandatory conditions are required by statute (e.g., not committing another crime, mandatory DNA collection where applicable).
• Standard conditions are a set of typical conditions recommended by the guidelines (e.g., reporting to Probation, seeking lawful employment, not leaving the district without permission).
• Special conditions are tailored to a particular defendant (e.g., substance abuse treatment, internet restrictions, non‑association with gangs).

After Maiorana, all non‑mandatory conditions (standard and special) must be pronounced on the record or expressly incorporated by reference at sentencing in the Second Circuit.

5. Delegation to Probation

Courts may not delegate to probation:

• the fundamental decision to impose or lift a restriction that affects the core of a defendant’s liberty.

But they may delegate:

• implementation details (such as identifying specific associates or locations covered by a broad non‑association condition, setting the schedule for drug testing, or choosing a specific therapy provider).

VI. Conclusion

United States v. Snipe, despite its formal status as a non‑precedential summary order, is an important interpretive guide to current Second Circuit doctrine on:

• the reach and enforceability of appeal waivers,
• the standards for finding a government breach of a plea agreement,
• the constitutionality and permissible scope of non‑association supervised‑release conditions in gang‑related cases, and
• the practical application of the en banc decision in Maiorana, requiring oral pronouncement (or explicit incorporation) of all non‑mandatory supervised-release conditions.

The panel enforced Snipe’s plea‑based appeal waiver, rejected his claim that the government had breached its obligations, affirmed a broad non‑association condition as reasonably related to his gang‑driven criminal conduct, and, crucially, vacated the 13 standard conditions of supervised release that had not been announced at sentencing. The remand instructs the district court to reconsider and, if appropriate, reimpose those standard conditions under the procedural safeguards mandated by Maiorana.

Taken together, the order underscores an emerging equilibrium in federal sentencing in the Second Circuit:

• plea agreements are enforced strictly as contracts,
• supervised-release conditions must be substantively justified and administrable, and
• the defendant’s right to be present and informed at sentencing now encompasses a clear, on-the-record articulation of all non‑mandatory terms of post‑custodial supervision.