United States v. Smith: Sixth Circuit Reasserts Deferential Review and District-Court Discretion in Retroactive Amendment 821 Sentence Reductions

Introduction

United States v. Odell P. Smith, Jr.

This Sixth Circuit appeal arose from Odell Smith’s request for a larger sentence reduction after the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s 2023 Amendment 821 retroactively lowered certain criminal-history “status points.” Smith contended that the district court abused its discretion by cutting only six months—174 months total—off his original 180-month sentence for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine.

The appellate panel (McKeague, Murphy, and Davis, JJ.) framed two key questions:

Appellate Jurisdiction & Standard of Review: May the court reach the substantive reasonableness of a § 3582(c)(2) sentence modification when 18 U.S.C. § 3742 generally bars such review—and, if so, under what standard?
Merits: Did the district court place “undue weight” on Smith’s prison disciplinary record when deciding the quantum of reduction?

Summary of the Judgment

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the 174-month sentence. It held:

Although § 3742(a) ordinarily forecloses reasonableness review of § 3582(c)(2) modifications, the Government waived that bar by litigating the issue on the merits. Thus the panel could examine substantive reasonableness.
The district court’s six-month reduction—well within the amended 151-to-188-month guideline range—enjoys a presumption of reasonableness. Smith failed to rebut it, particularly given seven documented prison infractions (including fighting and biting a guard) that the district court permissibly treated as aggravating.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

United States v. Obi, 132 F.4th 388 (6th Cir. 2025) – Clarifies that § 3742 limits appellate review of sentence-modification orders, but the Government can waive that “claim-processing” bar. Smith follows the same waiver pathway.
United States v. Richardson, 960 F.3d 761 (6th Cir. 2020) – Source of the principle that § 1291 alone does not authorize reasonableness review of sentences.
United States v. Bowers, 615 F.3d 715 (6th Cir. 2010) – First recognized that § 3742(a) bars substantive reasonableness review of § 3582(c)(2) orders absent waiver.
United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2018) – Defines substantive-reasonableness challenges as alleging a sentence is too long.
Vonner (516 F.3d 382) & Gall (552 U.S. 38) – Establish presumptions of reasonableness and deference to district-court weighing of § 3553(a) factors.
Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010) – Holds district courts need reassess only the factors “relevant” at the time of a § 3582(c)(2) resentencing.

2. Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning proceeds in two stages:

Stage A – Jurisdiction & Waiver

Statutory Framework: Sentences are normally reviewed under § 3742(a). Subsection (a) does not list “substantive reasonableness” among the permissible grounds for appeal after a sentence modification.
Claim-Processing Rule: As Obi explains, § 3742(a)’s limitations are not jurisdictional; the Government can waive them. In Smith’s appeal, the Government expressly argued the merits, so the panel treated the limitation as waived.

Stage B – Merits Review

Standard Applied: Even more deferential than “ordinary” substantive-reasonableness review because § 3582(c)(2) modifications are not de novo resentencings. The sentence enjoys a presumption of reasonableness if it falls inside the amended guideline range.
District-Court Discretion: The lower court (i) recalculated the new range (151–188 months), (ii) considered the entire record, including Smith’s post-sentencing conduct, and (iii) tied its six-month reduction to concerns about disciplinary infractions.
Weight of Prison Infractions: The Sixth Circuit reiterated that district courts may give serious weight to prison misconduct because it illuminates a defendant’s “history and characteristics” (§ 3553(a)(1)) and informs the need to protect the public (§ 3553(a)(2)(C)). The panel refused to second-guess the district court’s qualitative assessment.

3. Impact of the Decision

a) Clarifies Litigation Strategy under Amendment 821.
Hundreds of incarcerated individuals are filing retroactive motions. Smith teaches:

Defendants should be prepared for district courts to scrutinize prison conduct and may receive only partial reductions even when the guideline range falls.
Prosecutors can prevent appellate reasonableness review simply by invoking § 3742(a); if they stay silent, they risk waiver.

b) Strengthens District-Court Gatekeeping.
By approving a “modest” reduction in light of misconduct, the Sixth Circuit signals broad deference to trial judges managing the resentencing docket—echoing the Supreme Court’s directive in Dillon that sentence-modification proceedings remain narrow.

c) Precedential Value.
Although labeled “Not Recommended for Publication,” unpublished Sixth-Circuit decisions can still guide lower courts and counsel. The case reaffirms that:

Within-range sentences carry a strong presumption of substantive reasonableness.
Waiver doctrine under § 3742 remains alive and fact-sensitive.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Amendment 821 (Part A) – Reduced “status points” for committing a crime while under a criminal-justice sentence from two to one for defendants with ≥ 7 criminal-history points, thereby lowering many defendants’ Criminal History Category (CHC).
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) – Allows courts to modify a sentence when the Sentencing Commission retroactively lowers a guideline range.
18 U.S.C. § 3742 – The statute governing appellate review of sentences. It lists limited grounds for challenging sentences; “substantive reasonableness” of a § 3582(c)(2) reduction is not one of them.
Presumption of Reasonableness – An appellate doctrine: a sentence inside the advisory guideline range is presumed sound unless the appellant shows it is too harsh relative to § 3553(a) goals.
Waiver vs. Forfeiture – Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a right (here, the Government’s choice not to invoke § 3742(a)); forfeiture is accidental omission. Waiver opens the door to appellate review.

Conclusion

United States v. Smith reaffirms two intertwined principles:

Appellate scrutiny of § 3582(c)(2) modifications remains narrowly circumscribed unless the Government waives § 3742(a).
District courts retain wide latitude to calibrate reductions under Amendment 821, especially in light of a defendant’s post-sentencing behavior.

For practitioners, the decision underscores the importance of (i) compiling a positive incarceration record before seeking retroactive relief and (ii) recognizing that a purely mathematical “status-point” change does not guarantee a proportionate reduction. For courts, it affirms that fidelity to § 3553(a) factors—coupled with a clear explanation—will survive even the limited appellate review that may occur.