United States v. Smith: Mandate-Rule Limits on Bruen-Based § 922(g)(1) Challenges and Incorporation-by-Reference of Standard Supervised Release Conditions

I. Introduction

In United States v. Benjamin Smith, No. 24-11377 (11th Cir. Dec. 4, 2025) (unpublished, per curiam), the Eleventh Circuit addressed two increasingly common issues in federal criminal practice:

Whether a defendant, on a limited remand for resentencing, may raise a new Second Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) based on New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), when Bruen was decided while his first appeal was still pending; and
Whether a district court violates due process by imposing the standard conditions of supervised release without reading each condition aloud or specifically justifying each one, instead incorporating them by reference.

The panel (Judges Newsom, Branch, and Brasher) affirmed Smith’s conviction and his post-remand sentence. Although the opinion is “Not for Publication” and therefore not binding precedent under Eleventh Circuit rules, it meaningfully clarifies how existing precedent applies in two important areas:

The limits of the mandate rule as a vehicle for belated Bruen-based challenges to § 922(g)(1); and
The scope of the oral pronouncement requirement for supervised release conditions, including the sufficiency of incorporation-by-reference of standard conditions and the degree of explanation required under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c).

II. Case Background and Procedural History

A. Underlying Conviction and First Appeal

In 2019, a jury convicted Benjamin Smith of one count of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced him under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) to 235 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release.

On his first appeal, the Eleventh Circuit:

Affirmed his conviction under § 922(g)(1); but
Vacated his ACCA sentence, concluding that his prior convictions did not qualify him for the ACCA enhancement; and
Remanded the case for resentencing only. United States v. Smith, Nos. 20‑12609 & 20‑12773, 2023 WL 1860518 (11th Cir. Feb. 9, 2023).

That earlier decision issued several months after the Supreme Court decided Bruen in June 2022.

B. Proceedings on Remand

On remand, the district court’s task, under the mandate, was to resentence Smith without the ACCA enhancement. Before resentencing, however, Smith filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing for the first time that:

Bruen rendered § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional under the Second Amendment; and
Because Bruen was “controlling authority that ha[d] since made a contrary decision of law,” he could raise this challenge despite the prior mandate affirming his conviction.

The district court rejected the motion, holding that it exceeded the scope of the mandate and that no exception to the mandate rule applied. The court also observed that Eleventh Circuit precedent upholding § 922(g)(1) remained binding even after Bruen.

At resentencing, the court:

Imposed a sentence of 110 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release;
Stated that Smith must comply with:
- the mandatory conditions of supervised release; and
- “the standard conditions of supervision, which [had] been adopted by [the district court] and [were] incorporated by reference”;
Then orally specified several special conditions of supervised release.

Smith objected to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence and to the Guidelines calculation, but he did not object to the supervised release conditions or the manner in which they were imposed. The written judgment later listed the 13 standard conditions in full.

On this second appeal, Smith challenged:

The denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment based on Bruen; and
The validity of the supervised release portion of his sentence, arguing the district court failed to pronounce and justify the 13 standard conditions.

III. Summary of the Eleventh Circuit’s Opinion

A. Mandate Rule and the Bruen-Based Challenge to § 922(g)(1)

The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court correctly refused to entertain Smith’s new Second Amendment attack on § 922(g)(1) at resentencing because:

Scope of the mandate: The earlier mandate affirmed Smith’s conviction and remanded solely “for resentencing.” A district court on limited remand cannot revisit issues resolved by the appellate court or introduce new issues beyond the mandate’s scope.
No applicable exception: The “intervening change in controlling law” exception to the mandate rule did not apply because:
- Bruen was decided while Smith’s first appeal was still pending, so it was not “intervening” relative to that appeal; he could have raised it then via supplemental briefing under United States v. Durham, 795 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc), but did not; and
- Even assuming arguendo that Bruen were “intervening” at the resentencing stage, it did not “dictate a different result” because Eleventh Circuit precedent—United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010)—upholding § 922(g)(1) remained binding, and United States v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025), had held that Bruen did not abrogate Rozier.

Accordingly, the district court properly denied the motion to dismiss the indictment as outside the mandate.

B. Oral Pronouncement and Justification of Supervised Release Conditions

On the supervised release issue, the court held:

Standard of review: Because Smith did not object at sentencing to the supervised release conditions or to the court’s mode of pronouncing them, his claims were reviewed only for plain error, not de novo.
Oral pronouncement satisfied: Under United States v. Rodriguez, 75 F.4th 1231 (11th Cir. 2023), and United States v. Hayden, 119 F.4th 832 (11th Cir. 2024), a district court must pronounce discretionary supervised release conditions, but may do so by expressly incorporating a written, publicly available list of standard conditions. The sentencing judge satisfied this requirement by:
- Stating that Smith must comply with “the standard conditions of supervision, which [had] been adopted by [the district court] and [were] incorporated by reference”;
- Relying on the standard conditions codified in the Sentencing Guidelines and adopted by the Northern District of Georgia (and publicly posted on the court and probation office websites); and
- Including those same conditions in the written judgment.
There was therefore no due process violation.
No requirement to justify each standard condition individually: While 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) requires the court to state its reasons for the sentence in open court, Eleventh Circuit precedent (United States v. Hamilton, 66 F.4th 1267 (11th Cir. 2023); United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2005)) does not require:
- Separate explanations for imprisonment and supervised release; or
- Condition-by-condition justifications tying each supervised release condition to the § 3553(a) factors.
The district court’s general explanation of its sentencing decision, referencing the § 3553(a) factors, sufficed to cover the supervised release term and its standard conditions.

The Eleventh Circuit therefore affirmed the sentence in full.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Legal Framework

1. The Mandate Rule and Law-of-the-Case

The opinion roots its procedural analysis in the law-of-the-case doctrine and its specific application, the mandate rule.

Thomas v. United States, 572 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2009): Confirms that application of law-of-the-case is reviewed de novo.
United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 2007): Describes the mandate rule as a “case-specific application” of law-of-the-case, promoting efficiency, finality, and obedience within the judiciary.
United States v. Tamayo, 80 F.3d 1514 (11th Cir. 1996): Holds that a district court acting under an appellate mandate “cannot vary it” or “give any other or further relief” beyond executing the mandate; stepping outside a limited mandate is an abuse of discretion.
United States v. Escobar-Urrego, 110 F.3d 1556 (11th Cir. 1997): Catalogues exceptions to the mandate rule:
1. substantially new evidence at a subsequent trial;
2. an intervening change in controlling law; or
3. a prior decision that is clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.
United States v. Stein, 964 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2020): Tightens the “intervening law” exception, emphasizing that not “just any change in law” suffices; rather, there must be “an intervening change in the controlling law that dictates a different result” (emphasis in original opinion).
United States v. Durham, 795 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc): Explains how parties should handle new Supreme Court decisions issued while an appeal is pending. If the Supreme Court hands down a decision that overturns prior controlling authority and creates a new theory for the appellant, the appellant must timely move to file a supplemental or substitute brief raising that theory.

The Smith panel leans heavily on Durham to reject the idea that Bruen, decided during Smith’s first appeal, could later be treated as “intervening law” at the resentencing stage. Because Durham provides a clear procedural vehicle (a motion for supplemental briefing), failure to use it waives reliance on the new decision as a basis to escape the mandate.

2. Second Amendment and § 922(g)(1): Rozier, Bruen, and Dubois

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1): Prohibits possession of firearms by anyone convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year (the “felon-in-possession” statute).
United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010): Longstanding Eleventh Circuit precedent upholding § 922(g)(1) against a Second Amendment challenge. Relying on District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), Rozier held that laws disarming felons do not offend the Second Amendment and described such statutes as “presumptively lawful.”
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022): Reoriented Second Amendment analysis away from tiers-of-scrutiny interest-balancing and toward a text-and-history test. Bruen invalidated New York’s “proper cause” requirement for public carry licenses, but did not directly address felon-in-possession laws.
United States v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025): As described in Smith, Dubois held that Bruen did not overrule or abrogate Rozier; thus, in the Eleventh Circuit, Rozier remains binding authority that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Second Amendment.

Taken together, Rozier and Dubois foreclose Bruen-based facial attacks on § 922(g)(1) in ordinary Eleventh Circuit panel cases, absent en banc intervention or a contrary Supreme Court ruling.

3. Supervised Release Conditions, Due Process, and Sentencing Explanation

18 U.S.C. § 3583(d): Establishes mandatory supervised release conditions (e.g., no new federal, state, or local crimes) and allows courts to impose additional conditions, so long as they are reasonably related to certain statutory sentencing purposes and impose no greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary.
U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c): Recommends 13 “standard” conditions of supervised release (reporting to probation, residence and employment requirements, restrictions on travel, association with felons, weapons prohibition, etc.).
United States v. Nash, 438 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2006): Confirms that supervised release conditions are generally reviewed for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Rodriguez, 75 F.4th 1231 (11th Cir. 2023): Holds that:
- A district court must orally pronounce “discretionary” supervised release conditions (i.e., all conditions other than statutorily mandatory ones under § 3583(d)).
- Failure to do so violates the defendant’s Fifth Amendment due process rights, because the defendant is entitled to be present for sentencing and to hear the sentence pronounced.
- However, the court may satisfy this requirement by referencing a written list of conditions at the hearing, provided the defendant has a fair opportunity to know and challenge them.
United States v. Hayden, 119 F.4th 832 (11th Cir. 2024): Clarifies that “a reference to a written list of conditions is enough” to meet due process: the defendant need not hear each individual condition read aloud if the court clearly incorporates a known, written set.
United States v. Hamilton, 66 F.4th 1267 (11th Cir. 2023): Interprets 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), which requires courts to “state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence.” Hamilton holds that:
- Because supervised release is part of the “sentence,” § 3553(c) applies to it as well as imprisonment; but
- The statute does not require two separate explanations—one for imprisonment and one for supervised release; a unified explanation suffices if it shows a reasoned basis under § 3553(a).
United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2005): States that nothing requires a district court to explicitly discuss each § 3553(a) factor on the record; it is enough if the record shows the court considered the relevant factors and arguments.

Smith also cites:

United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020): A Fourth Circuit case that is often read as calling for a more detailed, individualized justification of supervised release conditions.
United States v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc): A Fifth Circuit en banc decision focusing on the requirement to orally pronounce supervised release conditions. The Eleventh Circuit accurately notes that Diggles addressed the pronouncement question, not a requirement to articulate separate justifications for each condition.

The Eleventh Circuit expressly declines to follow any broader “justification” rule that might be inferred from these out-of-circuit cases, emphasizing that it is not bound by the Fourth or Fifth Circuits. See Minor v. Dugger, 864 F.2d 124, 126 (11th Cir. 1989).

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Application of the Mandate Rule to Smith’s Bruen Argument

The critical procedural point is that Smith’s Bruen-based challenge to § 922(g)(1) came too late given the procedural posture. The prior panel had:

Already reviewed and affirmed his conviction; and
Issued a limited remand directing only a resentencing.

Under Tamayo and Amedeo, the district court on remand “cannot vary” that mandate; it must confine itself to the specific tasks authorized. A motion to dismiss the indictment—which would effectively undo the affirmed conviction—is outside that scope.

Smith tried to escape the mandate rule by invoking the “intervening change in controlling law” exception, arguing that Bruen fundamentally changed Second Amendment analysis and rendered § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional. The panel rejected this argument on two independent grounds:

Timing: Bruen was decided while the first appeal was pending.
The court held that Bruen was not an “intervening” decision at the resentencing stage because it was decided before the Eleventh Circuit resolved Smith’s first appeal. Citing Durham, the panel notes that when a new Supreme Court case issues during an appeal, appellants must seek leave to file supplemental briefing to raise new arguments based on that decision.

Smith did not do that. Nothing in the record suggests he attempted to raise a Bruen claim during his first appeal, despite having “months between the issuance of Bruen and [the Eleventh Circuit’s] decision.” Because the opportunity existed and was not used, the law-of-the-case doctrine binds the previously affirmed conviction, and the mandate limits the district court to resentencing.
Substance: Bruen does not dictate a different result for § 922(g)(1) in the Eleventh Circuit.
Even assuming arguendo that Bruen could somehow count as “intervening” at the resentencing phase, the panel relies on Stein to emphasize that an intervening law must “dictate a different result” for the exception to apply.

Here, it does not. The Eleventh Circuit had already held in Rozier that:

“Statutes disqualifying felons from possessing a firearm under any and all circumstances do not offend the Second Amendment.”

And in Dubois, the Eleventh Circuit expressly concluded that Bruen did not abrogate Rozier. Thus, Bruen does not compel a different outcome for § 922(g)(1) convictions in this circuit. For mandate-rule purposes, this means Bruen cannot be used to revisit a conviction already affirmed on direct appeal.

Because both the timing and substantive requirements of the mandate-rule exception fail, the district court correctly refused to entertain the constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1) on remand.

2. The “Jurisdictional” Label and Its Limits

Smith attempted to characterize his Bruen challenge as “jurisdictional,” arguing that subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time. The panel’s treatment of this claim is notable:

The court acknowledges that denials of motions to dismiss indictments “based on subject matter jurisdiction grounds” are reviewed de novo. United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815, 820 (11th Cir. 2024).
However, rather than treating the issue as one of true subject-matter jurisdiction (which cannot be waived), the panel analyzes it entirely through the mandate rule and law-of-the-case. That strongly implies that the panel views the Second Amendment challenge as a merits question, not a jurisdictional defect.

This approach is consistent with modern Supreme Court doctrine (e.g., United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002)), which holds that defects in an indictment or even the constitutional validity of a criminal statute do not typically deprive the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction. Instead, they are subject to ordinary appellate and procedural rules, including waiver, forfeiture, and law-of-the-case.

3. Oral Pronouncement of Standard Conditions of Supervised Release

On the second issue, the panel applies Rodriguez and Hayden to the specific facts of Smith’s sentencing.

a. Standard of Review: Plain Error

Smith argued for de novo review, claiming he had no opportunity to object because the district court did not recite each condition. The Eleventh Circuit rejected that framing. At sentencing, the judge:

Expressly imposed:
- the mandatory conditions of supervised release; and
- “the standard conditions of supervision, which [had] been adopted by [the district court] and [were] incorporated by reference.”

At that point, Smith:

Knew he was being subjected to a specific, pre-existing set of conditions (“the standard conditions” adopted by the court); and
Had the opportunity to:
- Ask the court to explain or recite them;
- Object to one or more conditions; or
- Argue that the reference was insufficient.

He did none of these. Under Hayden, such silence triggers plain error review, not de novo review.

b. Compliance with the Oral Pronouncement Requirement

The core of Smith’s argument was that due process requires the court to orally pronounce each of the 13 standard conditions. The Eleventh Circuit flatly rejects this proposition, reaffirming its holdings in Rodriguez and Hayden.

The panel explains:

The 13 standard conditions recommended in U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c) have been formally adopted as the standard conditions of supervised release in the Northern District of Georgia.
They are:
- Included in the district’s standard “Judgment in a Criminal Case” form (AO 245B); and
- Published on the Northern District of Georgia probation office’s website as “Conditions of Supervision.”
At sentencing, the court referred specifically to these “standard conditions” and stated they were “incorporated by reference.”

Under Rodriguez and Hayden:

A defendant has a due process right to be present and to hear the court pronounce discretionary conditions of supervised release.
But the court may satisfy this obligation by:
- Expressly referencing a known, written set of conditions (such as locally adopted “standard conditions”); and
- Incorporating those conditions by reference, as long as they are then accurately reflected in the written judgment.

The panel concludes:

“Contrary to Smith’s argument, the district court was not required to orally pronounce each individual standard discretionary condition. Rather, the district court complied with the oral pronouncement requirement when it referenced the standard conditions of supervision, explained that those conditions had been adopted by the court, and that it was incorporating those conditions by reference.”

Because there was no error at all—let alone “plain” error—the due process challenge fails.

4. Explanation and Individualized Assessment of Supervised Release Conditions

Smith also argued that the district court:

Failed to conduct an “individualized assessment” of the standard conditions; and
Was required to justify each condition on the record by tying it to the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.

The Eleventh Circuit rejected this claim as inconsistent with its own precedent and the text of § 3553(c).

a. Section 3553(c) and the Scope of the Explanation Duty

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), a district court must state “in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence.” As Hamilton confirms, this requirement applies to the entire sentence, including supervised release.

But Hamilton and Scott make clear that:

The court is not required to:
- Give separate, distinct explanations for the imprisonment portion and the supervised release portion; or
- Tick through each § 3553(a) factor or each component of the sentence on the record.
Instead, it is sufficient if the court:
- States enough to demonstrate that it considered the parties’ arguments and the § 3553(a) factors; and
- Provides a reasonable basis for its overall sentencing decision.

In Smith’s case, the district court:

Reviewed the relevant § 3553(a) factors;
Explained why it chose a 110-month prison term; and
Imposed a standard three-year supervised release term with standard and special conditions.

The panel held this explanation adequate to satisfy § 3553(c) for the entirety of the sentence, including supervised release and its standard conditions.

b. Distinguishing Rogers and Diggles

Smith relied on:

United States v. Rogers (4th Cir.), which has been read to require more detailed, condition-specific explanation; and
United States v. Diggles (5th Cir.), an en banc decision on oral pronouncement.

The Eleventh Circuit responds in two ways:

It notes that Diggles addressed whether conditions must be pronounced, not whether each must be separately justified on the record.
It emphasizes that neither Rogers nor Diggles is binding in the Eleventh Circuit, and that Eleventh Circuit law has never required condition-by-condition justifications for supervised release terms or any other component of the sentence.

The court underscores this point by citing Scott, reiterating that a district court need not explicitly discuss each sentencing factor or each element of the sentence, so long as the overall explanation shows a reasoned exercise of discretion.

C. Impact and Implications

1. Bruen-Based Challenges to § 922(g)(1) After an Initial Appeal

Substantively, Smith is in line with Rozier and Dubois: in the Eleventh Circuit, Bruen does not invalidate § 922(g)(1). Procedurally, it adds a sharp mandate-rule dimension:

Defendants cannot wait until after an initial appeal is resolved (and the conviction is affirmed) to raise a Bruen-based challenge, particularly when Bruen was already decided during that appeal.
Under Durham, the proper course is to move promptly for supplemental briefing when a pertinent Supreme Court case emerges while an appeal is pending.
Failure to do so may bar relying on the new decision as an “intervening” change in law for purposes of the mandate-rule exception at later stages.

Thus, Smith functions as a cautionary tale for litigants: even transformative Supreme Court decisions like Bruen must be raised in a timely manner within the existing appellate process, or they risk being procedurally foreclosed.

2. “Jurisdictional” Arguments as a Workaround

Smith’s attempt to recast his Second Amendment claim as “jurisdictional” also has broader implications. The panel’s willingness to apply law-of-the-case and the mandate rule to this challenge indicates that:

Constitutional arguments about the validity of § 922(g)(1) are treated as substantive defenses on the merits, not as true subject-matter jurisdiction defects under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.
Labeling an argument “jurisdictional” will not automatically override law-of-the-case principles or the scope of the appellate mandate.

This aligns with the Supreme Court’s general trend of narrowing “jurisdictional” categorizations and treating many statutory and constitutional requirements as non-jurisdictional claim-processing or merits rules.

3. Sentencing Practice: Incorporation-by-Reference of Standard Conditions

On sentencing, Smith reinforces a practical rule beneficial to busy district courts:

A court need not read each standard supervised release condition aloud at sentencing.
It may satisfy the due process requirement by:
- Referencing the mandatory conditions;
- Specifically referencing the “standard conditions” that the court or district has adopted (preferably a uniform, published list); and
- Ensuring those conditions are accurately memorialized in the written judgment.

This approach:

Preserves the defendant’s opportunity to inquire and object at sentencing;
Reduces the administrative burden on courts of reading lengthy lists of standardized conditions in every case; and
Encourages transparency by ensuring those standard conditions are publicly posted and readily accessible.

4. No Condition-by-Condition Justification Requirement

By declining to require individualized justification for each standard condition, the Eleventh Circuit:

Retains a relatively flexible explanation standard under § 3553(c);
Avoids imposing a potentially onerous requirement that could significantly lengthen sentencing hearings; and
Differentiates itself from circuits that have signaled a more demanding approach (e.g., the Fourth Circuit in Rogers).

This may contribute to an evolving inter-circuit divergence over how much explanation is required for supervised release conditions, especially as they become more complex and intrusive in some cases. However, in the Eleventh Circuit, the message is clear: a single, coherent explanation for the overall sentence ordinarily suffices, as long as it reflects consideration of § 3553(a) and the parties’ arguments.

V. Key Concepts Simplified

1. Law-of-the-Case and the Mandate Rule

Law-of-the-case: Once a court has decided a legal issue in a case, that decision generally governs later stages of the same case.
Mandate rule: When an appellate court sends a case back (“remands”) with instructions, the lower court must follow those instructions and cannot go beyond them.
Exceptions: New evidence, genuinely new controlling law, or clear error causing manifest injustice. But “new law” must actually force a different outcome, not just potentially support a different argument.

2. Bruen’s Second Amendment Test

Bruen rejected interest-balancing (like “intermediate scrutiny”) for Second Amendment cases.
It adopted a text-and-history test:
1. Does the Second Amendment’s text cover the person’s conduct (e.g., carrying a gun)?
2. If so, is the regulation consistent with the historical tradition of firearm regulation in the United States?
Bruen did not directly address whether felon-dispossession statutes like § 922(g)(1) are constitutional. Lower courts must reconcile Bruen with existing precedent like Heller and, in the Eleventh Circuit, Rozier.

3. Supervised Release and Its Conditions

Supervised release: A period of monitoring in the community after prison. Violating conditions can lead to revocation and re-imprisonment.
Mandatory conditions: Imposed by statute (e.g., don’t commit new crimes, submit to DNA collection).
Standard conditions: A set of generally applicable conditions recommended by the Sentencing Commission and often adopted wholesale by local districts (e.g., reporting to probation, maintaining employment, limiting travel).
Special conditions: Tailored to the individual defendant (e.g., mental health treatment, drug testing beyond the norm, computer-use restrictions).

4. Plain Error Review

When a defendant fails to object in the district court, appellate courts typically review for “plain error,” which requires:

A legal error occurred;
The error is “plain” (clear or obvious);
The error affected the defendant’s substantial rights (usually meaning it likely changed the outcome); and
The error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

If any of these prongs is not met, the appellate court will not correct the error.

5. Sentencing Explanation: § 3553(a) and § 3553(c)

§ 3553(a): Lists factors a court must consider in choosing a sentence, including:
- Nature and circumstances of the offense;
- History and characteristics of the defendant;
- Need for deterrence, protection of the public, and rehabilitation;
- The advisory Guidelines range; and
- The need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities.
§ 3553(c): Requires the court to state its reasons for the sentence in open court, but not to give a separate speech for each component (imprisonment, supervised release, fines, etc.) or each § 3553(a) factor.

VI. Conclusion

United States v. Smith is formally an unpublished opinion, but it provides an important and practical synthesis of Eleventh Circuit law on two fronts.

On the mandate rule and Bruen: The court makes clear that defendants cannot use Bruen as a belated lever to reopen § 922(g)(1) convictions that were affirmed after Bruen was already on the books. The proper path is timely supplemental briefing during the first appeal. In the Eleventh Circuit, Rozier (as reaffirmed by Dubois) continues to control the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1), and Bruen does not dictate a contrary result.
On supervised release conditions: The opinion confirms that:
- A district court meets its due process obligations by incorporating a known, written list of standard supervised release conditions by reference, without reading each one aloud; and
- § 3553(c) does not require a condition-by-condition explanation or individualized justification of each standard condition, as long as the court provides a coherent overall explanation for the sentence that reflects consideration of the § 3553(a) factors.

In practice, Smith underscores the importance of:

Timely raising new legal arguments when controlling law changes during an appeal; and
Making contemporaneous objections at sentencing to preserve challenges to supervised release conditions and their pronouncement.

Within the broader legal landscape, the decision exemplifies the Eleventh Circuit’s commitment to finality under the mandate rule and its pragmatic, streamlined approach to supervised release pronouncement and explanation, even as other circuits experiment with more demanding standards.