United States v. Sims: Post‑Esteras Limits on Revocation Sentencing and the Role of State Sentences and Violation Conduct

I. Introduction

The Sixth Circuit’s published decision in United States v. Donald Sims, No. 25‑3229 (6th Cir. Dec. 10, 2025), sits at the intersection of two important strands of federal sentencing law:

• the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Esteras v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2031 (2025), which constrains the use of retributive considerations when revoking supervised release; and
• the longstanding framework for reviewing the procedural and substantive reasonableness of above‑Guidelines sentences, especially in the supervised‑release context.

Donald Sims appealed an 18‑month prison term imposed upon revocation of his supervised release. The district court varied upward from the advisory policy‑statement range of 7–13 months and ordered the revocation term to run consecutive to Sims’s state‑court sentence for cocaine possession. Sims argued that the sentence was both procedurally flawed and substantively excessive.

The Sixth Circuit (Judge Readler, joined by Judges Boggs and Bush) affirmed. Along the way, the court clarified how Esteras operates in revocation proceedings and confirmed that:

• a district court may consider the length and adequacy of a related state sentence when fashioning a revocation sentence; and
• a court may treat violation conduct as drug trafficking—despite a state conviction only for possession—when reliable evidence (here: cocaine plus a scale and scoop) supports that inference by a preponderance of the evidence.

This commentary examines the opinion in detail, highlights its doctrinal contributions, and explains its likely impact on supervised‑release practice in the Sixth Circuit and beyond.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Sims’s Prior Federal Firearms Convictions and Supervision History

Sims’s case arises against a backdrop of repeated federal convictions and repeated failures on supervision:

1. First federal conviction (2010). After a traffic stop yielded a loaded firearm and marijuana, Sims was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. He received:
   • 34 months’ imprisonment; and
   • three years’ supervised release.
   He violated that supervision by testing positive for marijuana and absconding, prompting revocation and a 10‑month revocation sentence.
2. Second federal conviction (2016). In 2016, Sims sold a pistol and loaded magazine to a confidential informant. He pled guilty to another felon‑in‑possession charge and received:
   • 48 months’ imprisonment; and
   • another three‑year term of supervised release.
   The current appeal arises from violations of this second term of supervised release.

B. Early Supervision: Warnings, Leniency, and Some Progress

Sims was released from prison in August 2021 and began supervised release. By late 2023:

• he had twice tested positive for marijuana;
• he was in intensive outpatient treatment; and
• he was pursuing custody of his ten‑year‑old son.

The district court, balancing these factors, allowed him to remain on supervision but expressly warned that further drug use would jeopardize his status. At an April 2024 hearing, after a period of negative drug tests and employment, the court again continued supervision with another warning.

C. Cocaine Arrest and State Conviction

In May 2024, only a month after the court renewed its lenient approach:

• police stopped Sims’s vehicle after it crossed the center line;
• from his car they recovered 2.4 grams of cocaine, a digital scale, and a measuring scoop; and
• Sims later pled guilty in state court to felony cocaine possession, receiving a 9‑month sentence.

D. Supervised‑Release Violations and Revocation Hearing

Sims’s probation officer filed a superseding violation report alleging that Sims had:

• used controlled substances without authorization;
• possessed cocaine; and
• failed to report his police contact.

At the revocation hearing:

• Sims admitted the violations but denied ownership of the cocaine;
• the district court found this denial not credible, relying in part on:
  • his guilty plea in state court; and
  • his prior refusal to consent to a police search;
• the court recognized Sims’s improvements (employment, treatment) but characterized the cocaine offense as an “escalation” in seriousness amid a “lengthy pattern of supervision violations” (R. 64, PageID 293); and
• in relation to his custody dispute, the court remarked that a “good parent does not sell cocaine or deal with cocaine or have cocaine in their system.”

E. Sentencing on Revocation

Everyone agreed that the applicable advisory policy‑statement range (under Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines) was 7 to 13 months.

• Defense counsel requested a 9‑month term, to align with the state sentence.
• The government recommended a 12‑month consecutive sentence.
• The district court imposed:
  • 18 months’ imprisonment (five months above the top of the range); and
  • ordered it to run consecutive to the 9‑month state term.

The court justified the upward variance primarily by:

• emphasizing repeated failures on supervision and prior leniency that “apparently had no effect”; and
• seeking to “send the appropriate message” that drug trafficking and failure to report to probation would not be tolerated (R. 64, PageID 293–95).

Defense counsel objected “to the upward variance,” but did not specify particular procedural defects. The district court overruled the objection, and Sims appealed, asserting both procedural and substantive unreasonableness.

III. Summary of the Sixth Circuit’s Holding

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentence in full. The key holdings can be distilled as follows:

1. Considering the state‑court sentence was permissible and consistent with Esteras. The district court did not commit procedural error by taking into account the length of Sims’s state‑court sentence when setting the revocation term. Esteras prohibits reliance on the seriousness of the original underlying conviction for retributive purposes but does not bar consideration of:
   • the seriousness of the supervised‑release violation conduct itself; or
   • the adequacy of the state‑court punishment for that violation conduct, in light of the goals of deterrence and public protection in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B)–(C) and § 3583(e).
2. The court could infer drug trafficking from the violation conduct despite a state conviction only for possession. District courts in revocation proceedings may find facts by a preponderance of the evidence and may rely on reliable information beyond the formal elements of a state conviction. The evidence of 2.4 grams of cocaine, a digital scale, and a measuring scoop supported the district court’s inference that Sims’s conduct indicated trafficking, not mere possession.
3. The district court adequately explained its variance. The sentencing explanation focused on:
   • Sims’s history of poor performance on supervised release;
   • the escalation reflected by the cocaine offense while on supervision; and
   • the need for increased deterrence after prior leniency had failed.
   This satisfied procedural reasonableness requirements; no “ritual incantation” of every § 3553(a) factor was necessary.
4. The 18‑month sentence was substantively reasonable despite exceeding the advisory range. Given Sims’s repeated violations, recurring substance‑use problems, and prior failed revocation sentence, a five‑month upward variance was within the district court’s broad discretion. Sims’s mitigation arguments (treatment progress, personal stressors) were considered but reasonably outweighed by his recidivism.

The court either assumed abuse‑of‑discretion review or held that Sims could not show plain error in any event, because no error—procedural or substantive—was identified.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Procedural Reasonableness

1. Preservation and Standard of Review

The panel began by noting an unresolved question: Did Sims preserve his procedural objections by lodging only a generalized objection “to the upward variance,” without identifying specific alleged errors?

• United States v. Vaughn, 119 F.4th 1084 (6th Cir. 2024) requires a party to object “with a reasonable degree of specificity” to preserve an issue for appellate review.
• Because Sims’s counsel did not identify particular procedural flaws—e.g., failure to consider a factor, reliance on an impermissible factor, or clearly erroneous fact—the court suggested that plain‑error review might apply.
• However, the panel ultimately bypassed this doctrinal question because, under either standard, Sims could not show any error at all.

This reinforces a practical point: defense counsel who anticipate appealing a revocation sentence should articulate concrete, specific objections at the hearing, not merely object to “the upward variance” in general terms.

2. Considering the State Sentence Under § 3583(e) After Esteras

Sims’s first procedural claim was that the district court erred by considering the length of his state‑court sentence (nine months for felony cocaine possession) when imposing the federal revocation term. He argued the court never explained how this was relevant to the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).

The Sixth Circuit rejected this argument at multiple levels.

a. Statutory framework: § 3583(e) and cross‑reference to § 3553(a)

When revoking supervised release, a court must consider certain (but not all) § 3553(a) factors, as incorporated by § 3583(e). The relevant incorporated factors include:

• § 3553(a)(1): “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant;”
• § 3553(a)(2)(B): “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;”
• § 3553(a)(2)(C): “to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant;” and
• § 3553(a)(4)–(7): Guideline ranges, policy statements, avoiding unwarranted disparities, and restitution (to the extent applicable).

Critically, § 3583(e) does not incorporate § 3553(a)(2)(A), which refers to:

• “the need for the sentence imposed—
• (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.”

Those § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors are retributive, focusing on just punishment for the original crime of conviction.

b. Esteras and the prohibition on retributive use of the original offense

In Esteras v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2031 (2025), the Supreme Court held that when revoking supervised release under § 3583(e), a sentencing court may not rely on § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors—i.e., it may not justify the revocation sentence by appealing to the seriousness of the original underlying conviction and the need for just punishment of that original offense.

The Sixth Circuit reads Esteras in conjunction with its own earlier cases to mean:

• a court may not treat a revocation sentence as additional punishment for the original crime; but
• a court may consider:
  • the seriousness of the supervised‑release violation conduct itself; and
  • the adequacy of other sanctions (such as related state sentences) to achieve the goals of deterrence and public protection.

The panel cites United States v. Patterson, 158 F.4th 700 (6th Cir. 2025), as reinforcing this interpretation: Esteras bars reliance on the seriousness of the original crime but permits reliance on the conduct underlying the release violations.

c. Why the state sentence was a permissible consideration

Applying this framework, the panel concludes that the district court could properly consider the state‑court sentence for two distinct reasons:

1. The state offense formed the basis of the violation itself. Sims’s cocaine possession was not an unrelated prior; it was the very conduct that constituted his supervised‑release violation. Understanding the severity of that conduct and its real‑world consequences (a felony conviction and a nine‑month state sentence) was “plainly relevant” to:
   • the “nature and circumstances” of the violation (§ 3553(a)(1)); and
   • whether additional federal punishment was necessary for deterrence and public protection (§ 3553(a)(2)(B), (C)).
2. The Guidelines direct courts to consider the interaction between federal and state sentences. Under U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f), the Chapter 7 policy statements instruct that “[a]ny term of imprisonment imposed upon the revocation of ... supervised release shall be ordered to be served consecutively to any sentence of imprisonment that the defendant is serving,” reflecting the Sentencing Commission’s view that revocation sentences ordinarily should be consecutive. Even though Chapter 7 is advisory, the district court was required to consider this policy. That necessarily involves thinking about:
   • the length of the existing state sentence; and
   • the combined punishment that will result once the revocation term is added.

Thus, nothing in Esteras forbids a court from evaluating the adequacy of a state sanction when determining what additional federal time is necessary to deter further crime and protect the public. The panel therefore finds no procedural error, “plain” or otherwise, on this point.

3. Factfinding: Trafficking vs. Possession at Revocation

Sims next argued that the district court erred by characterizing his violation conduct as trafficking in cocaine when his state conviction was only for possession.

a. Standard of proof and evidentiary rules at revocation

The Sixth Circuit reiterated a foundational principle of revocation proceedings:

• A district court may find facts relevant to revocation by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard that governs criminal trials.
  • United States v. Graham‑Wright, 715 F.3d 598, 601 (6th Cir. 2013).
  • United States v. Rankin, 929 F.3d 399, 407 (6th Cir. 2019).
• A revocation court may consider any reliable information, not limited to the elements of prior convictions or the content of a plea agreement. The proceeding is less formal than a criminal trial and is focused on compliance with supervision conditions, not on guilt or innocence of a new crime.

b. Evidence supporting a trafficking inference

In Sims’s case, the record at the revocation hearing showed that officers recovered:

• 2.4 grams of cocaine;
• a digital scale; and
• a measuring scoop

from his vehicle. The panel, citing United States v. Massey, 758 F. App’x 455, 461 (6th Cir. 2018), notes that “intent to distribute may be inferred from ... the presence of drug distribution paraphernalia, including scales.”

Given the combination of cocaine plus distribution‑type paraphernalia, the district court could reasonably infer that Sims was engaged in, or preparing for, trafficking rather than mere personal consumption. Importantly:

• This did not re‑try or overturn the state conviction; it merely assessed the violation conduct under the lower preponderance standard applicable to revocation.
• The inference of trafficking was used to evaluate the seriousness of the supervised‑release violation, which is squarely permissible under § 3583(e) and consistent with Esteras.

Accordingly, there was no procedural error in characterizing the violation as trafficking‑related.

4. Adequacy of the Sentencing Explanation for the Upward Variance

Finally, Sims claimed that the district court did not adequately explain why it chose an above‑Guidelines (or, more precisely, above‑policy‑statement) sentence.

a. Governing standard

Under Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007), a sentence is procedurally unreasonable if the district court:

• fails to adequately explain the chosen sentence, including any deviation from the Guidelines range; or
• selects a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts or impermissible factors.

The Sixth Circuit has further elaborated that a district court satisfies this requirement if it:

• addresses the relevant § 3553(a) factors; and
• provides enough explanation to allow meaningful appellate review, especially when varying from the advisory range. (United States v. Solano‑Rosales, 781 F.3d 345, 351 (6th Cir. 2015)).

But the court need not conduct a mechanical, factor‑by‑factor recitation. As the panel quotes, “we do not require a ‘ritual incantation’ of the Guidelines or statutory factors.” United States v. Vines, 799 F. App’x 371, 375 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 403 F.3d 813, 816 (6th Cir. 2005)).

b. The district court’s explanation

The panel finds the explanation adequate for several reasons:

• The court explained that Sims:
  • had “been on supervised release before and performed miserably” (R. 64, PageID 288);
  • had a “recurring problem” with illicit‑substance use (id.); and
  • “ha[d] not learned,” “d[id] not appear to want to change his behavior,” and had not been deterred by his previous 10‑month revocation sentence (PageID 293–94).
• The court explicitly connected the upward variance to:
  • the need for increased deterrence (a § 3553(a)(2)(B) consideration); and
  • concerns about continued recidivism and public safety (a § 3553(a)(2)(C) consideration).
• The court walked through the specific conduct and history:
  • pattern of supervision violations;
  • the cocaine offense as an “escalation” in seriousness; and
  • prior leniency and numerous opportunities that “apparently had no effect.”

Citing United States v. Taylor, No. 24‑5578, 2025 WL 848107 (6th Cir. Mar. 18, 2025), the panel notes that repeated violations can justifiably distinguish a case from the heartland and warrant a higher sentence than typical.

On this record, the panel concluded the explanation was procedurally adequate and grounded in permissible factors.

B. Substantive Reasonableness

1. The Standard for Reviewing Above‑Guidelines Sentences

A substantive‑reasonableness challenge asks whether the sentence is “too long” in light of the statutory factors or whether the district court unreasonably weighted certain factors over others. (United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436, 442 (6th Cir. 2018).)

Where a court imposes a sentence outside the Guidelines (or pol­icy‑statement) range, Gall requires that:

• the extent of the variance be supported by a “sufficiently compelling” justification.

But review is “highly deferential”:

• Defendants face a “high bar” when challenging a sentence as substantively unreasonable. (United States v. Thomas, 933 F.3d 605, 613 (6th Cir. 2019).)
• The appellate court does not reweigh the § 3553(a) factors but asks whether the district court’s balancing was within the range of reasonable choices. (United States v. Devaney, 992 F.2d 75, 76–77 (6th Cir. 1993).)

2. Application to Sims’s Sentence

Sims pointed to several mitigating considerations:

• his progress in therapeutic treatment;
• employment and family responsibilities; and
• his exposure to unusually intense personal stressors.

The district court acknowledged these factors but concluded they did not outweigh:

• his long history of poor performance on supervision;
• recurring substance‑abuse problems; and
• the escalation represented by possessing cocaine with distribution paraphernalia while on supervised release.

Sims further claimed the court over‑weighted the cocaine offense and its finding of trafficking. But as already discussed, the trafficking inference was supported by the evidence and by Sixth Circuit precedent such as Massey. Even apart from “trafficking” as a label, the possession of cocaine itself—while on supervision and after repeated warnings—reasonably signaled a more serious violation warranting a stricter response.

The panel also cites:

• United States v. Childress, 468 F. App’x 471, 478 (6th Cir. 2012), for the proposition that a defendant’s performance on supervision is a valid factor in revocation sentencing; and
• United States v. Perez‑Rodriguez, 960 F.3d 748, 753–54 (6th Cir. 2020), to emphasize that a court may legitimately give more weight to recidivism and less to rehabilitation efforts.

Given Sims’s repeated violations and the ineffectiveness of prior leniency, the Sixth Circuit held that an additional five months above the top of the advisory range (from 13 to 18 months) was not “too long” and fell well within the district court’s discretion. The sentence was therefore substantively reasonable.

C. Precedents and Authorities Cited

The opinion draws on several significant precedents and authorities. A structured overview helps illuminate their role:

1. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007)

• Used for: Defining procedural and substantive reasonableness; requiring an adequate explanation for variances; insisting on deferential abuse‑of‑discretion review.
• In Sims: The panel uses Gall to frame the procedural inquiry (was the deviation from the Guidelines adequately explained and based on accurate, permissible factors?) and the substantive inquiry (was the justification compelling enough to support a five‑month upward variance?).

2. Esteras v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2031 (2025)

• Used for: Limiting reliance on § 3553(a)(2)(A) retributive factors (seriousness of the original offense, respect for law, just punishment) at revocation under § 3583(e).
• In Sims: Distinguishes between impermissible consideration of the seriousness of the original crime and permissible consideration of:
  • the seriousness of the supervised‑release violation conduct; and
  • the adequacy of a related state sentence for deterrence and public protection.

3. United States v. Patterson, 158 F.4th 700 (6th Cir. 2025)

• Used for: Interpreting Esteras to allow courts to consider the conduct underlying supervised‑release violations when assessing revocation sentences.
• In Sims: Supports the panel’s conclusion that nothing in Esteras bars a revocation court from evaluating the seriousness of the violation conduct and the related state punishment.

4. United States v. Richardson, 843 F. App’x 775 (6th Cir. 2021)

• Used for: Recognizing that considering an impermissible factor at sentencing is a form of procedural error.
• In Sims: Provides the doctrinal hook: Sims argued the district court considered an impermissible factor (the state sentence); the panel concludes that factor was, in fact, permissible.

5. United States v. Vaughn, 119 F.4th 1084 (6th Cir. 2024)

• Used for: Preservation rule for sentencing objections—requiring reasonably specific objections to preserve issues for appeal.
• In Sims: Raises the question whether Sims’s generic objection to the “upward variance” preserved his more targeted procedural arguments; the court sidesteps the issue by finding no error under any standard.

6. United States v. Graham‑Wright, 715 F.3d 598 (6th Cir. 2013) and United States v. Rankin, 929 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2019)

• Used for: Standard of proof and evidentiary scope at revocation—facts may be found by a preponderance of the evidence; reliable information beyond convictions may be considered.
• In Sims: Justifies the district court’s ability to infer trafficking from cocaine plus paraphernalia, notwithstanding a state conviction only for possession.

7. United States v. Massey, 758 F. App’x 455 (6th Cir. 2018)

• Used for: Permitting inference of intent to distribute drugs from the presence of scales and other distribution paraphernalia.
• In Sims: Supports the finding that 2.4 grams of cocaine with a digital scale and scoop reasonably suggested trafficking conduct.

8. United States v. Solano‑Rosales, 781 F.3d 345 (6th Cir. 2015) and United States v. Vines, 799 F. App’x 371 (6th Cir. 2020)

• Used for: Clarifying that sentencing courts must address relevant § 3553(a) factors and explain their reasoning but need not recite each factor mechanically.
• In Sims: Underpin the holding that the district court’s explanation—focused on deterrence, recidivism, and escalation—was procedurally adequate.

9. United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2018); United States v. Thomas, 933 F.3d 605 (6th Cir. 2019); United States v. Devaney, 992 F.2d 75 (6th Cir. 1993)

• Used for: Articulating the high bar for substantive‑reasonableness challenges and emphasizing appellate deference to the district court’s weighing of § 3553(a) factors.
• In Sims: Frame the review of the five‑month upward variance as highly deferential; the panel declines to reweigh the mitigation evidence.

10. United States v. Childress, 468 F. App’x 471 (6th Cir. 2012) and United States v. Perez‑Rodriguez, 960 F.3d 748 (6th Cir. 2020)

• Used for: Validating the consideration of past supervision performance and allowing courts to give greater weight to recidivism than to rehabilitation.
• In Sims: Support the district court’s emphasis on repeated violations and limited weight on Sims’s recent improvements and treatment efforts.

V. Clarifying Key Legal Concepts

A. Supervised Release and Revocation

Supervised release is a period of community supervision that follows a term of federal imprisonment. It is distinct from probation; it attaches to a custodial sentence and is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3583.

If a defendant violates a condition of supervised release (for example, by committing a new crime, using drugs, or failing to report to probation), the court may:

• continue supervision as is;
• modify the conditions; or
• revoke supervised release and impose a term of imprisonment.

Revocation sentences are not new punishments for the original crime; rather, they sanction the defendant’s failure to abide by conditions of release.

B. Procedural vs. Substantive Reasonableness

• Procedural reasonableness focuses on the method:
  • Did the court correctly calculate the advisory range?
  • Did it consider the relevant § 3553(a) factors?
  • Did it rely on accurate facts and permissible factors?
  • Did it adequately explain the chosen sentence and any variance?
• Substantive reasonableness focuses on the outcome:
  • Is the sentence “too long” or “too short” relative to the § 3553(a) factors?
  • Did the court give unreasonable weight to some factors and insufficient weight to others?

On appeal, a sentence must pass both tests to be affirmed.

C. The Role of the Guidelines in Revocation Sentencing

For supervised‑release revocation, the Sentencing Guidelines provide:

• policy statements (Chapter 7) rather than binding Guidelines; and
• advisory ranges based on the severity of the violation and the defendant’s criminal history.

Courts must “consider” these ranges but are not bound to follow them. They may impose sentences outside the range as long as they:

• consider the § 3553(a) factors (as incorporated through § 3583(e)); and
• adequately explain any departure or variance.

D. Plain‑Error Review and Preservation

If a defendant fails to properly preserve a sentencing objection by making a specific, contemporaneous objection in the district court, appellate review is limited to “plain error.” To obtain relief under that standard, the defendant must show:

1. an error;
2. that is plain (clear or obvious);
3. that affected his substantial rights; and
4. that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

Because Sims’s counsel did not specify his procedural concerns, the government argued for plain‑error review. The panel ultimately found no error under any standard, so the choice of standard did not affect the outcome.

E. Consecutive vs. Concurrent Revocation Sentences

U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f) recommends that imprisonment imposed upon revocation of supervised release run consecutively to any undischarged term of imprisonment. Though advisory, courts must consider this policy.

Accordingly, district courts may (and often must) think about:

• the length of a defendant’s state or federal sentence for new conduct; and
• the combined total punishment once a consecutive revocation sentence is imposed.

Sims confirms that this consideration remains legitimate and does not conflict with Esteras, so long as it serves non‑retributive purposes like deterrence and public protection.

F. Trafficking Inferences from Paraphernalia

While the presence of a small quantity of drugs might suggest personal use, courts often infer trafficking or intent to distribute when:

• scales;
• baggies;
• measuring devices; or
• other distribution paraphernalia

are present with the drugs. At revocation, such inferences need only be supported by a preponderance of the evidence, making them easier for the government to establish than at a criminal trial.

VI. Practical and Doctrinal Impact

A. Guidance for District Courts Post‑Esteras

Sims provides important clarification for district courts in the Sixth Circuit:

• What remains prohibited: Using revocation as a vehicle to impose additional punishment for the original offense based on its seriousness or a perceived shortfall in its punishment (retributive use of § 3553(a)(2)(A)).
• What is permitted:
  • considering the seriousness of the supervised‑release violation conduct;
  • considering related state or federal sentences for that violation conduct;
  • assessing whether those sentences are adequate to:
    • deter future criminal conduct; and
    • protect the public from further crimes by the defendant;
  • factfinding based on reliable evidence at the preponderance standard, even if it paints the violation conduct in a harsher light than the formal state conviction (e.g., trafficking vs. possession).

The opinion reassures district judges that they retain wide discretion to address persistent noncompliance and recidivism through enhanced revocation sentences—even above the advisory range—if they tie their reasoning to deterrence, public protection, and the defendant’s history and characteristics.

B. Implications for Defense Counsel

For defense practitioners, Sims carries several lessons:

• Preserve objections with specificity. Defence counsel should:
  • identify particular procedural errors (e.g., misapplication of Esteras, failure to consider certain mitigating factors, reliance on clearly erroneous facts); and
  • object clearly on those grounds at the sentencing hearing.
  A generic objection to “the upward variance” risks limiting appellate review to plain error.
• Prepare to contest characterization of violation conduct. When the government uses paraphernalia or circumstantial evidence to recast a possession‑type violation as trafficking, defense counsel should:
  • develop a record that challenges the inference (e.g., alternative explanations for the paraphernalia, minimal quantity, lack of packaging materials); and
  • press the court on the limits of what the evidence shows.
• Emphasize rehabilitation but anticipate recidivism focus. Sims confirms that courts can—and often will—give more weight to a pattern of violations than to recent progress. Mitigation strategies should therefore:
  • document sustained, not just short‑term, rehabilitation efforts; and
  • offer concrete plans showing why this time is different (e.g., stronger treatment structures, changed circumstances).
• Be strategic about advocating for concurrent vs. consecutive time. Given § 7B1.3(f)’s presumption of consecutiveness, defense arguments for concurrency need particularly strong justification: overlapping purposes of punishment, low risk of recidivism, or extraordinary mitigating factors.

C. Broader Impact on Supervised‑Release Jurisprudence

Doctrinally, Sims is significant because it:

• cements a post‑Esteras framework in which:
  • the original offense is off limits as a retributive justification; but
  • the violation conduct and related state sentencing remain fully available grounds for revocation punishment, so long as framed in terms of deterrence and public safety;
• reaffirms broad district‑court latitude in treating repeated violations and prior leniency as grounds for upward variances in revocation cases; and
• illustrates the continued vitality of the lower evidentiary standard at revocation in enabling courts to respond more aggressively to violation conduct than the formal state conviction might suggest.

In practice, this may lead to:

• more aggressive use of revocation sentences to supplement relatively short state sentences for new criminal conduct committed on supervision; and
• frequent reliance on paraphernalia‑based inferences (like trafficking) at revocation, even when state charges are limited or plea‑bargained down.

VII. Conclusion

United States v. Sims is a consequential Sixth Circuit decision at a time when revocation sentencing doctrine is adjusting to the Supreme Court’s guidance in Esteras. The court affirms an above‑Guidelines, consecutive revocation sentence against both procedural and substantive challenges, and in doing so it:

• clarifies that district courts may still consider the seriousness of supervised‑release violation conduct and the adequacy of related state sentences under § 3553(a)(2)(B)–(C);
• approves factfinding that treats possession‑type violations as trafficking when supported by reliable evidence such as scales and measuring equipment;
• underscores that repeated failures on supervision and ineffectiveness of prior leniency can justify upward variances; and
• reiterates the deferential nature of appellate review of both procedural and substantive reasonableness in the revocation context.

In the broader legal landscape, Sims stands as a key exposition of post‑Esteras supervised‑release sentencing in the Sixth Circuit, delineating the boundary between impermissible retributive use of the original offense and permissible reliance on violation conduct, deterrence, and public protection. It signals that, so long as sentencing courts carefully articulate their reliance on the latter, robust revocation sentences—even above advisory ranges and in addition to state terms—will be upheld.