United States v. Sims: Eleventh Circuit Solidifies “Crime-of-Violence” Status for Georgia Aggravated Assault and Clarifies Loss of Acceptance-of-Responsibility Credits for In-Custody Misconduct

Introduction

United States v. Christopher Sims, No. 24-11810 (11th Cir. July 25, 2025), is the Eleventh Circuit’s most recent non-published decision addressing two recurring federal sentencing questions:

Whether Georgia aggravated assault with a deadly weapon categorically qualifies as a “crime of violence” for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2); and
Whether post-plea misconduct while awaiting sentencing can justify denial of the two-level reduction for “acceptance of responsibility” under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.

After law-enforcement officers discovered a semiautomatic pistol on the appellant, a previously convicted felon, Sims pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court calculated a guideline range of 77–96 months, denied acceptance credit because Sims twice possessed contraband (cell phones, marijuana, tobacco) while in pre-trial custody, and imposed a 96-month sentence. Sims appealed on three grounds: the “crime-of-violence” classification, the denial of acceptance-of-responsibility, and the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.

Summary of the Judgment

In a per curiam opinion, Judges Jordan, Jill Pryor, and Luck affirmed:

Crime of Violence: Bound by United States v. Hicks, 100 F.4th 1295 (11th Cir. 2024), the panel reiterated that Georgia aggravated assault with a deadly weapon is categorically a “crime of violence” under § 2K2.1.
Acceptance of Responsibility: The district court’s refusal to grant a two-level reduction because Sims engaged in new misconduct—possession of contraband in jail—was not clearly erroneous.
Substantive Reasonableness: A top-of-guideline, 96-month sentence—well below the 15-year statutory maximum—was within the court’s discretion and not an abuse of the § 3553(a) factors.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Hicks, 100 F.4th 1295 (11th Cir. 2024) – Held that Georgia aggravated assault with a deadly weapon is a crime of violence; Sims relies on Hicks as controlling precedent.
United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 676 F.3d 1017 (11th Cir. 2012) – Reaffirmed de novo review for crime-of-violence determinations.
United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2008) – Articulates the prior-panel rule; the panel in Sims was bound by Hicks absent en banc or Supreme Court abrogation.
United States v. Amedeo, 370 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Pace, 17 F.3d 341 (11th Cir. 1994) – Govern clear-error review and allow post-plea misconduct to defeat acceptance credit.
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007); United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) – Frame substantive-reasonableness review and deference to district courts.

2. Legal Reasoning

a. Crime-of-Violence Inquiry:
Using the “categorical approach,” the court compared the Georgia aggravated-assault statute with the “elements” clause of § 4B1.2(a) (imported into § 2K2.1). Under Hicks, the least-culpable conduct captured by Georgia law still involves “the threatened use of violent force,” even if committed recklessly. Thus, Sims’s prior conviction triggered the elevated base-offense level of 24.

b. Acceptance of Responsibility:
Section 3E1.1 allows—but does not compel—credit if the defendant “clearly demonstrates acceptance.” The district court weighed countervailing evidence: Sims’s two instances of contraband undermined the notion that he had withdrawn from criminal conduct (Commentary n.1(B)). Under clear-error review, the appellate panel needed “a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made,” which it lacked given the record.

c. Substantive Reasonableness:
Applying the abuse-of-discretion standard, the panel highlighted (i) Sims’s three previous firearm-related felonies, (ii) his rapid re-offending while on parole, and (iii) the within-guideline, below-statutory-maximum nature of the sentence. These facts justified the 96-month term.

3. Impact of the Decision

Although unpublished, Sims reinforces—and likely cements for district courts—the following:

Precedential Strength of Hicks: Defendants in the Eleventh Circuit challenging the crime-of-violence status of Georgia aggravated assault must now overcome a solid wall of precedent.
Practical Guidance on § 3E1.1: Jail-house misconduct—even non-violent and unrelated to the offense—can readily thwart acceptance-of-responsibility credits. Defense counsel should caution clients that post-plea compliance is critical.
Sentencing Dynamics for § 922(g) Cases: With an elevated base level and denied acceptance credit, low-level gun-possession cases can escalate quickly to multi-year sentences, particularly for repeat violent offenders.
Future Litigation: Unless the Supreme Court revisits the recklessness question left open in Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021), the Eleventh Circuit’s position on Georgia aggravated assault is settled, narrowing defendants’ arguments to fact-specific challenges rather than categorical ones.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Crime of Violence: A legal term used in the Sentencing Guidelines to enhance punishment for certain prior felonies. It turns on statutory elements, not the facts of a particular case.
Categorical Approach: Courts compare the “least culpable” conduct criminalized by a statute to the generic definition in federal law, ignoring case-specific facts.
Acceptance of Responsibility (§ 3E1.1): A potential 2–3-level sentencing discount when defendants plead guilty and cease criminal activity. It is discretionary.
Clear-Error Review: An appellate standard that defers heavily to trial judges; reversal occurs only when the appellate court is firmly convinced a mistake was made.
Substantive Reasonableness: The fairness of a sentence in light of statutory goals (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). Even if the guidelines are followed, appellate courts can reduce sentences that are “shockingly high or low,” but they rarely do.

Conclusion

United States v. Sims offers a two-fold takeaway for federal practitioners in the Eleventh Circuit. First, the panel’s reliance on Hicks leaves little room to dispute that Georgia aggravated assault with a deadly weapon is a “crime of violence” under § 2K2.1. Second, it underscores the fragility of acceptance-of-responsibility credits: post-plea misconduct, even misdemeanor-level contraband, can erase the benefit. Collectively, the decision bolsters prosecutorial leverage in firearm-possession cases and signals to defense counsel the importance of spotless post-plea conduct. While unpublished, the reasoning is persuasive authority and will likely shape plea negotiations, PSR objections, and sentencing advocacy across the circuit.