United States v. Sharper: Eleventh Circuit Reaffirms Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) After Bruen and Rahimi

Introduction

On 1 August 2025, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit released an unpublished per curiam opinion in United States v. Shi-Young Lamar Sharper, No. 24-10371. The defendant–appellant, Shi-Young Sharper, challenged his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The appeal presented two distinct issues:

Whether sufficient evidence showed that Sharper knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm.
Whether § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller, New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, and United States v. Rahimi.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding that a reasonable jury could find knowledge of status and that binding circuit precedent—United States v. Rozier and United States v. Dubois—forecloses the Second Amendment challenge. Although designated “Do Not Publish,” the opinion is significant because it represents the first post-Rahimi decision in the Eleventh Circuit to address, and reaffirm, the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1).

Summary of the Judgment

Sufficiency of the Evidence: Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the Government, the panel found ample circumstantial evidence—flight from police, possession of the firearm in the door pocket, post-arrest statements, and failure to protest the “felon” label—permitting the jury to infer knowledge of felon status.
Second Amendment Claim: The Court rejected both facial and as-applied challenges (the latter deemed abandoned), relying on Rozier (2010) and Dubois III (2025) to hold that Heller’s description of felon-in-possession bans as “presumptively lawful” remains controlling after Bruen and Rahimi.
Disposition: Conviction AFFIRMED.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Chafin, 808 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2015) – reiterated the de novo standard for reviewing Rule 29 denials.
United States v. Holmes, 814 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2016) – clarified that any reasonable construction of evidence sustaining a jury verdict precludes reversal.
United States v. Johnson, 981 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 2020) – stated that ignorance of the law is no defense where the defendant knows his status.
United States v. Bates, 960 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2020) and United States v. Innocent, 977 F.3d 1077 (11th Cir. 2020) – supplied examples of circumstantial evidence from which knowledge of status can be inferred.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) – recognized an individual right to keep and bear arms but declared felon-possession bans “presumptively lawful.”
United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010) – held § 922(g)(1) constitutional; central, binding precedent.
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) – adopted a text-and-history test, but reaffirmed Heller.
United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024) – upheld § 922(g)(8); repeated Heller’s “presumptively lawful” language.
United States v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025) (“Dubois III”) – explicitly ruled that neither Bruen nor Rahimi undermined Rozier.

2. Court’s Legal Reasoning

a. Knowledge-of-Status Requirement

The Supreme Court in Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. ___ (2019), held that § 922(g) requires proof the defendant knew he belonged to a prohibited class. The Eleventh Circuit applied Rehaif through the prism of its own precedents:

“Knowledge can be inferred from circumstantial evidence.” —Bates, 960 F.3d at 1296.

By fleeing, concealing the firearm in his car, lying about who drove, and tacitly accepting the label “convicted felon,” Sharper supplied a pool of circumstantial evidence from which the jury could infer knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court emphasized that the Government’s burden is “not onerous.”

b. Second-Amendment Analysis

The panel noted that Heller, Bruen, and Rahimi all describe the right to keep and bear arms as belonging to “law-abiding, responsible citizens.” Felons are categorically outside that class. Because Rozier resolved the issue on the threshold question of whether a felon is qualified to possess arms, the subsequent shift in methodology from “means-end scrutiny” to “text-and-history” does not unsettle the holding.

The Court also followed the Dubois III framework: the Supreme Court has not “clearly abrogated” Rozier, making it binding. Therefore, any panel of the Eleventh Circuit is required to reject a facial attack on § 922(g)(1) unless and until the Supreme Court rules otherwise.

3. Impact of the Decision

Reinforces Circuit Stability: Sharper fortifies the Eleventh Circuit’s post-Bruen/post-Rahimi line, signaling that panels will continue to treat § 922(g)(1) as constitutional unless the Supreme Court intervenes.
Guidance for Trial Prosecutors: The opinion underscores practical categories of circumstantial evidence (e.g., flight, statements, lack of protest) that will satisfy the Rehaif knowledge element.
Blueprint for Defense Counsel: Defense counsel seeking to mount knowledge-of-status defenses must now address the kind of circumstantial cues that Sharper validates.
Second Amendment Litigation: Litigants challenging felon-in-possession bans in the Eleventh Circuit face an even steeper climb. Panels are unlikely to certify questions to the Supreme Court absent a conflict with another circuit.
National Trend: Although unpublished, Sharper joins parallel rulings in the Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits reiterating that Bruen did not unsettle felon-disarmament statutes. Thus, the weight of lower-court authority remains strongly in favor of § 922(g)(1)’s constitutionality.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Facial vs. As-Applied Challenge: A facial challenge alleges the statute is invalid in all circumstances; an as-applied challenge alleges invalidity as applied to the defendant’s particular facts. Sharper only preserved a facial challenge.
Rule 29 Motion: A request, at trial, for judgment of acquittal because the evidence is legally insufficient for a reasonable jury to convict.
Circumstantial Evidence: Evidence that permits an inference of a fact (e.g., fleeing suggests consciousness of guilt). It may be used to prove knowledge or intent.
Binding Precedent (Horizontal Stare Decisis): A three-judge panel must follow an earlier published decision of the same circuit unless it is overruled by the en banc court or clearly abrogated by the Supreme Court.
“Presumptively Lawful”: Language from Heller indicating that certain traditional firearm regulations—such as felon disarmament—are assumed to be valid without detailed historical analysis.

Conclusion

United States v. Sharper is a concise yet consequential reaffirmation of two core principles:

The Government may satisfy Rehaif’s knowledge-of-status requirement through ordinary circumstantial evidence, including flight, post-arrest conduct, and silence in the face of “felon” accusations.
The Eleventh Circuit remains steadfast that § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment, even after the paradigm-shifting decisions in Bruen and Rahimi.

While unpublished and non-precedential under Eleventh Circuit rules, the opinion serves as a practical roadmap for prosecutors, defense attorneys, and district judges confronting felon-in-possession cases. It also signals to litigants that, within this circuit, only the Supreme Court—or an en banc reconsideration—can unsettle the constitutional status of § 922(g)(1).