United States v. Seabrook: Co‑Defendant Sentencing Disparities Are Not “Extraordinary and Compelling” Grounds for Compassionate Release

I. Introduction

The Second Circuit’s summary order in United States v. Seabrook, No. 23‑6279‑cr (2d Cir. Dec. 4, 2025), addresses an increasingly common argument in compassionate release litigation: whether a later sentencing disparity between a defendant and his co‑defendants can itself constitute an “extraordinary and compelling reason” under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

The case arises from a public corruption and kickback scheme involving Norman Seabrook, the longtime president of the New York City Correction Officers Benevolent Association (COBA); hedge fund founder Murray Huberfeld of Platinum Partners; and intermediary/cooperator Jona Rechnitz. After substantial appellate litigation over the proper Sentencing Guidelines and sentences for the co‑defendants, Seabrook—who went to trial, was convicted of honest services wire fraud, and received a 58‑month sentence—sought compassionate release on the ground that his ultimate sentence was much longer than those of Huberfeld and Rechnitz.

District Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein agreed and reduced Seabrook’s sentence to time served (about 21 months), expressly relying on the disparity with co‑defendants as “an unjust disparity” amounting to an extraordinary and compelling circumstance. The government appealed.

The Second Circuit reversed, directed reinstatement of the original 58‑month sentence, and ordered reassignment to a different district judge on remand. Building on its prior decision in United States v. Fernandez, 104 F.4th 420 (2d Cir. 2024), the court held that sentencing disparities arising from differences in plea posture, cooperation, offense of conviction, and Guidelines calculations are not “extraordinary and compelling reasons” under § 3582(c)(1)(A).

Although a “summary order” without precedential effect under the Second Circuit’s rules, Seabrook offers an important and concrete application of Fernandez and clarifies the limits of compassionate release in the co‑defendant disparity context.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Underlying Corruption Scheme

Norman Seabrook was the longtime president of COBA, the union representing New York City correction officers.
Murray Huberfeld was a founder of Platinum Partners, a hedge fund.
Jona Rechnitz was an intermediary who facilitated the corrupt arrangement.

As described in the Second Circuit’s earlier opinion, United States v. Seabrook, 968 F.3d 224, 227–31 (2d Cir. 2020), Seabrook used his position to direct approximately $20 million in COBA union funds into investments with Platinum Partners. In exchange, Huberfeld paid Seabrook a kickback. Rechnitz acted as go‑between, literally delivering a luxury handbag containing $60,000 in cash to Seabrook.

B. Proceedings Against Co‑Defendant Rechnitz

After law enforcement approached him, Rechnitz began cooperating. He:

Pled guilty under a cooperation agreement to conspiracy to commit honest services wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1349.
Agreed to testify against both Seabrook and Huberfeld.
Was promised a motion under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 for a downward departure based on substantial assistance, contingent on meeting his cooperation obligations.

Rechnitz fulfilled his cooperation commitments and was sentenced by Judge Hellerstein on December 19, 2019, to a principally 5‑month term of imprisonment. After multiple appeals, the Second Circuit remanded for reassignment and plenary resentencing. See United States v. Rechnitz, 75 F.4th 131 (2d Cir. 2023). At the time of the Seabrook order, Rechnitz was awaiting resentencing before Judge Katherine Polk Failla.

C. Proceedings Against Co‑Defendant Huberfeld

Seabrook and Huberfeld were jointly indicted on:

Conspiracy to commit honest services wire fraud, and
Substantive honest services wire fraud,

arising out of the COBA/Platinum kickback scheme.

The first joint trial before Judge Andrew L. Carter ended in a mistrial after a hung jury. The case was then reassigned to Judge Hellerstein.

Before the retrial, Huberfeld reached a plea agreement with the government. He:

Pled guilty to a superseding information charging conspiracy to commit wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 371,
On a distinct theory: that he defrauded his own employer, Platinum Partners, out of the $60,000 he paid to Seabrook by falsely invoicing it as reimbursement for Knicks tickets.

At sentencing, Judge Hellerstein treated the offense as “commercial bribery” and applied U.S.S.G. § 2B4.1, producing a Guidelines range of 30–37 months and imposing a 30‑month sentence. On appeal, the Second Circuit held that this was error: because Huberfeld had pled to wire fraud conspiracy, not honest services fraud, the court should have applied the standard fraud guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. See Seabrook, 968 F.3d at 232–35.

On remand, Judge Hellerstein recused himself. Judge Lewis Liman resentenced Huberfeld to 7 months’ imprisonment under the correct, lower Guidelines range of 6–12 months.

D. Seabrook’s Trial, Conviction, and Original Sentence

Unlike his co‑defendants, Seabrook did not plead guilty. He proceeded to a second trial before Judge Hellerstein. The jury convicted him of:

Conspiracy to commit honest services wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1346, 1349; and
Substantive honest services wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1346, 2.

On February 8, 2019, Judge Hellerstein sentenced Seabrook to 58 months’ imprisonment. The Second Circuit affirmed on direct appeal.

Critically for the later compassionate release motion, the sentencing court:

Applied an enhancement for abuse of a position of trust under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, based on Seabrook’s betrayal of COBA members for personal gain.
Treated his offense as more serious in scope and impact than Huberfeld’s employer‑fraud plea.

E. Seabrook’s Compassionate Release Motion

While incarcerated—and after learning of the appellate vacatur of Huberfeld’s 30‑month sentence and the 7‑month sentence imposed by Judge Liman—Seabrook filed a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) seeking compassionate release.

His core argument: the emerging disparity between his 58‑month term and his co‑defendants’ lower sentences (5 months for Rechnitz, later reduced for cooperating; 7 months for Huberfeld after resentencing) constituted an “extraordinary and compelling reason” justifying a sentence reduction.

Judge Hellerstein agreed. He ruled that:

“Huberfeld’s successful appeal changed the calculus,” and
The resulting sentencing gap created “an unjust disparity” between Seabrook’s sentence and those of his co‑defendants.

The court reduced Seabrook’s sentence to time served (approximately 21 months).

F. The Government’s Appeal

The government appealed, contending that:

Co‑defendant sentencing disparity is not, on these facts, an “extraordinary and compelling” reason under § 3582(c)(1)(A), particularly where it is the predictable product of:
- Plea vs. trial choices,
- Different offenses of conviction,
- Cooperation and substantial assistance, and
- Different Guidelines calculations including enhancements.
The district court’s reliance on this disparity was a legal error and an abuse of discretion.

The Second Circuit agreed and reversed.

III. Summary of the Second Circuit’s Decision

The Second Circuit held that:

Sentencing disparities with co‑defendants who pled guilty, accepted responsibility, cooperated, or were convicted of different offenses do not, without more, constitute “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
The district court abused its discretion by treating the disparity between Seabrook’s 58‑month sentence and his co‑defendants’ much shorter sentences as such a reason.
It is “not extraordinary (indeed, it should be expected)” that:
- Defendants who plead guilty and cooperate receive more lenient sentences than a co‑defendant who insists on trial and is convicted of more serious charges.
This logic follows and applies the court’s earlier holding in United States v. Fernandez, 104 F.4th 420 (2d Cir. 2024).
The fact that a co‑defendant (such as Huberfeld) later obtains a reduced sentence after a successful appeal and resentencing under a different, correct Guidelines provision does not create an extraordinary and compelling reason to revisit another defendant’s otherwise lawful, previously affirmed sentence.
The panel therefore:
- Reversed the grant of compassionate release,
- Ordered reinstatement of the original 58‑month sentence, and
- Directed reassignment to a different district judge on remand, consistent with its approach in United States v. Rechnitz, 75 F.4th 131.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Statutory and Guidelines Framework

1. Compassionate Release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)

Section 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by the First Step Act, allows a district court to reduce a term of imprisonment when:

Administrative remedies have been exhausted or 30 days have lapsed since a request to the Bureau of Prisons,
The court has considered the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, and
The defendant has shown “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warranting a reduction that is consistent with applicable policy statements and does not undermine the purposes of sentencing.

The Second Circuit in Keitt and Halvon (discussed below) has distilled this into a three‑prong test. Importantly, § 3582 is not a vehicle for general resentencing or correcting ordinary sentencing disagreements; it is meant for unusual situations.

2. The “Full Slate” of Reasons – United States v. Brooker

In United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228 (2d Cir. 2020), the Second Circuit held that, after the First Step Act, district courts are not limited to the Sentencing Commission’s pre‑existing policy statement in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 when evaluating compassionate release motions brought by defendants. Courts may consider the “full slate” of reasons a defendant presents.

The Seabrook panel reaffirms that Brooker was the governing standard because Judge Hellerstein decided Seabrook’s motion before the amended § 1B1.13 policy statement took effect. The panel therefore did not need to address the impact of the new guideline, and it simply noted—citing several appellate decisions from other circuits and a district court decision—that courts nationwide have been grappling with that amendment.

3. Sentencing Factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

Even if a defendant shows extraordinary and compelling reasons, the court must still weigh the § 3553(a) factors, such as:

The nature and circumstances of the offense,
The history and characteristics of the defendant,
The need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment,
Deterrence, protection of the public, and
Sentencing range and policy statements.

In Seabrook, the Second Circuit focused predominantly on the third prong—whether the disparity with co‑defendants was itself “extraordinary and compelling.” The panel’s reasoning effectively foreclosed that theory on these facts, making it unnecessary to re‑weigh § 3553(a) once the legal premise was rejected.

B. Precedents Cited and Their Role

1. United States v. Keitt, 21 F.4th 67 (2d Cir. 2021)

Keitt supplies both:

The standard of review: compassionate release rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion, with underlying legal questions reviewed de novo, and
The three‑part structure of § 3582(c)(1)(A) analysis: exhaustion, § 3553(a) factors, and “extraordinary and compelling reasons.”

The Seabrook panel restates this standard and defines an “abuse of discretion” as:

Reliance on an erroneous view of the law,
A clearly erroneous assessment of evidence, or
A decision outside the range of permissible options.

Here, the key error was on the legal question: the district court’s mischaracterization of co‑defendant disparity as “extraordinary and compelling.”

2. United States v. Halvon, 26 F.4th 566 (2d Cir. 2022)

Halvon is cited for the same standard of review and to confirm that district courts may reduce sentences under § 3582(c)(1)(A) but must do so within the statutory structure. The Second Circuit again emphasizes that compassionate release is a limited mechanism, not a full resentencing.

3. United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228 (2d Cir. 2020)

Brooker is central to the framework for defendant‑initiated compassionate release motions:

District courts have broad discretion to identify extraordinary and compelling reasons beyond those enumerated in the pre‑First Step Act policy statement.
But that breadth does not mean every rationale qualifies; the reason still must be genuinely “extraordinary and compelling.”

The Seabrook opinion is an example of the Second Circuit drawing a line: even under Brooker’s broad approach, co‑defendant sentencing disparity of the sort present here is not extraordinary.

4. United States v. Fernandez, 104 F.4th 420 (2d Cir. 2024)

Fernandez is the key substantive precedent. There, the Second Circuit squarely held that:

“A sentencing disparity between a defendant and his co‑defendants” is not an extraordinary and compelling reason that justifies a sentence reduction.

The panel in Seabrook quotes and applies that holding, explaining:

“It is not extraordinary (indeed, it should be expected) that a defendant who proceeds to trial and is convicted receives a longer sentence than his co‑defendants who plead guilty to different crimes, accept responsibility, and assist the government by cooperating.”

The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Fernandez to consider a different question: whether reasons that could also support a collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 may also be treated as “extraordinary and compelling” under § 3582(c)(1)(A). See Fernandez v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2731, 2732 (2025). The Seabrook panel notes that whatever the Supreme Court decides on that issue will not affect this case, which turns on co‑defendant disparity, not alleged sentencing error.

In substance, Seabrook is a straightforward application of Fernandez to a specific factual pattern involving:

A trial conviction for more serious honest‑services offenses,
Co‑defendants who pled to different (often narrower) offenses, and
Substantial cooperation and downward departures for one co‑defendant.

5. United States v. Joyner, 924 F.2d 454 (2d Cir. 1991)

Joyner is cited to emphasize a foundational principle of Guidelines sentencing: Congress and the Sentencing Commission deliberately created different ranges for different conduct and offender characteristics. This necessarily produces differing sentences for co‑defendants whose conduct, roles, or convictions differ.

By invoking Joyner, the panel underscores that:

Disparity is often a feature, not a bug, of Guidelines sentencing.
Thus, the mere fact of differential sentences, where based on legitimate Guidelines distinctions, is not extraordinary.

6. Earlier Seabrook and Rechnitz Decisions

Two additional Second Circuit decisions frame the background:

United States v. Seabrook, 968 F.3d 224 (2d Cir. 2020): vacated the 30‑month sentence imposed on Huberfeld because the district court applied the wrong Guideline (§ 2B4.1 for commercial bribery instead of § 2B1.1 for fraud), leading to resentencing.
United States v. Rechnitz, 75 F.4th 131 (2d Cir. 2023): remanded for resentencing of cooperator Jona Rechnitz before a different district judge.

In Seabrook (2025), the panel uses these cases in two ways:

To explain why Huberfeld’s sentence moved from 30 months (under an erroneous Guideline) to 7 months (under the correct one), and why that change does not justify modifying Seabrook’s sentence.
To justify ordering reassignment to a different district judge for Seabrook’s case, mirroring what was done in Rechnitz.

7. Cases on Amended U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (Footnote 2)

The panel notes, in footnote 2, that Judge Hellerstein’s ruling predated the amendment to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, so it applies Brooker. It cites appellate decisions from the First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits and a Southern District of New York decision (Feliz) as examples of courts addressing the new guideline. But the panel expressly declines to engage that issue because it is not necessary to the disposition.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Standard of Review and Identified Error

Applying the abuse‑of‑discretion standard, the Second Circuit focused on whether the district court:

“Based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law” (the first Keitt prong).

The identified error: the district court’s reliance on co‑defendant sentencing disparity as an “extraordinary and compelling reason,” contrary to Fernandez.

2. Why Co‑Defendant Disparity Was Not “Extraordinary and Compelling”

The panel’s analysis proceeds as follows:

Different plea postures and acceptance of responsibility.
Seabrook:
- Went to trial twice and was convicted.
By contrast:
- Huberfeld pled guilty,
- Rechnitz pled guilty and cooperated extensively.
Consistent with longstanding practice and Guidelines policy, defendants who plead guilty (especially cooperators) regularly receive lower sentences than defendants who contest guilt at trial. The panel calls this “expected,” not extraordinary.
Different offenses of conviction and seriousness of conduct.
The panel highlights that Seabrook:
- Was convicted of conspiracy to commit honest services wire fraud and honest services wire fraud,
- For conduct involving directing $20 million of union funds to Platinum Partners for his personal benefit.
By contrast:
- Huberfeld pled only to conspiracy to commit wire fraud under § 371,
- On a far narrower factual basis: defrauding his employer out of $60,000 via a false reimbursement invoice.
- Rechnitz pled to conspiracy to commit honest services wire fraud, but as a cooperator.
Different statutes and factual scopes logically entail different Guideline calculations and potential ranges. That structural difference undercuts the notion that a disparity in the final sentences is inherently unjust or extraordinary.
Different Guidelines provisions and enhancements.
The panel points out:
- Seabrook’s Guidelines calculation included a two‑level abuse‑of‑trust enhancement under § 3B1.3, because, as COBA president, he betrayed his fiduciary‑like position vis‑à‑vis the union membership “in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense.”
- Neither Huberfeld nor Rechnitz occupied or abused such a position of trust, so they did not receive that enhancement.
Because Guidelines ranges are sensitive to offense level adjustments and different offense guidelines, differing final ranges and sentences are a deliberate feature of the system. The panel cites Joyner to confirm that the Guidelines were “purposefully structured” to produce different ranges—and thus different sentences—for different conduct.
Cooperation and § 5K1.1 downward departures.
Rechnitz’s substantial cooperation led to a motion under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, enabling a significantly reduced sentence. This is both doctrinally and practically how the system is supposed to work: the government and courts reward substantial assistance to law enforcement with meaningful sentence reductions.
The predictable nature of the disparity.
Synthesizing these elements, the panel held that the disparity was:
- A predictable consequence of:
  - Plea decisions,
  - Cooperation,
  - Different offenses of conviction, and
  - Different Guidelines calculations.
- Not the product of arbitrary or capricious decision‑making.
Therefore, under Fernandez, such a disparity is not “extraordinary and compelling.”

3. Effect of Huberfeld’s Successful Appeal and Resentencing

A significant part of Judge Hellerstein’s reasoning below was that “Huberfeld’s successful appeal changed the calculus.” The Second Circuit rejected this:

The earlier 30‑month sentence imposed on Huberfeld was vacated because the wrong Guidelines provision was used.
On remand, Judge Liman correctly applied § 2B1.1 (fraud) rather than § 2B4.1 (commercial bribery), producing a lower range and a 7‑month sentence.
This correction of a procedural Guidelines error in one co‑defendant’s case does not retroactively invalidate or “change the calculus” for sentences of other defendants whose Guidelines had been correctly applied and whose sentences had been affirmed on direct review.

The panel emphasizes that:

“The fact that Judge Liman resentenced Huberfeld to a lower term of imprisonment, within a lower and correctly calculated guidelines range, did not justify revisiting and recalculating the sentences of any or all of Huberfeld’s co-defendants.”

In other words, one defendant’s successful sentencing appeal does not, by itself, create an extraordinary and compelling reason” for another defendant’s sentence to be reduced via § 3582(c)(1)(A).

4. Conclusion: Abuse of Discretion

Because the district court’s compassionate release ruling rested on a legal proposition that Fernandez expressly forecloses, the Second Circuit concluded:

The district court’s interpretation of “extraordinary and compelling” was an erroneous view of law.
That legal error was central to the decision to grant relief.
Accordingly, the ruling was an abuse of discretion.

The panel therefore reversed and directed reinstatement of the original 58‑month sentence.

D. Reassignment to a Different District Judge

On remand, the Second Circuit directed that the case be reassigned to a different district judge “for any future proceedings,” aligning with its earlier approach in Rechnitz, 75 F.4th at 134.

While the order does not elaborate on the reassignment factors (such as appearance of impartiality or repeated errors), the instruction reflects the court’s determination that any remaining matters should be handled by another judge to preserve the appearance and reality of neutrality and to avoid the recurrence of the same legal misapprehensions.

V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

1. “Compassionate Release” – § 3582(c)(1)(A)

“Compassionate release” is a shorthand for a statutory mechanism allowing a judge to reduce a prisoner’s sentence after it has been imposed, but only under strict conditions:

The prisoner must exhaust administrative remedies with the Bureau of Prisons, or 30 days must have passed since asking the warden for relief.
The judge must consider the usual sentencing factors in § 3553(a).
There must be “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for the reduction.

Typical examples (before Brooker expanded the scope) included:

Terminal illness,
Severe incapacitation,
Unusual family caregiving needs.

Post‑Brooker, courts may also consider a broader array of circumstances, but the reasons still must be unusual and compelling—something beyond the ordinary run of sentencing factors.

2. “Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons”

This phrase is not fully defined by statute. It essentially means:

Reasons that are rare, serious, and exceptional, and
That justify shortening a lawfully imposed sentence even after it has become final.

Seabrook clarifies that routine co‑defendant sentencing disparities—arising from plea bargaining, cooperation, different charges, and appropriate Guideline distinctions—do not meet this bar.

3. Honest Services Wire Fraud vs. Wire Fraud

Wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343) criminalizes schemes to defraud using interstate wires (such as phone, internet, or financial transfers).
Honest services wire fraud (18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1346) is a specialized form involving deprivation of the public’s or an employer’s “intangible right to honest services,” often used in corruption and bribery cases.

In this case:

Seabrook was convicted of honest services wire fraud based on his corrupt misuse of his union office for kickbacks.
Huberfeld pled only to conspiracy to commit wire fraud for defrauding his employer of $60,000, on a narrower factual theory.

4. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Concepts

§ 2B1.1 (Fraud Guideline): Used for typical financial frauds. Offense level mainly depends on loss amount and other specific offense characteristics.
§ 2B4.1 (Commercial Bribery Guideline): Used for commercial bribery and kickback offenses; can produce different offense levels than § 2B1.1.
§ 3B1.3 (Abuse of Position of Trust): Adds 2 offense levels where the defendant used a position of public or private trust (such as a fiduciary or union leader) to substantially facilitate the crime or conceal it.
§ 5K1.1 (Substantial Assistance): Allows a judge to depart downward from the Guidelines range when the government files a motion recognizing that the defendant provided substantial assistance in investigating or prosecuting others.

These provisions explain why, even if all three men were involved in related events, their Guidelines ranges—and thus their sentences—could legitimately diverge.

5. Standard of Review: “Abuse of Discretion”

When an appellate court reviews a trial judge’s discretionary decision (like a compassionate release ruling), it uses the “abuse of discretion” standard. A decision is reversed only if:

The court applied the wrong law, or
Mishandled the facts in a clearly erroneous way, or
Chose an outcome no reasonable judge could reach.

In Seabrook, the error fell into the first category: the district court misapplied the legal standard for “extraordinary and compelling reasons.”

6. Summary Orders and Precedential Effect

The Second Circuit designates this as a “Summary Order,” which:

Has no precedential effect under the court’s local rules,
May still be cited (subject to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1) as persuasive authority, particularly on similar fact patterns.

Practically, courts and practitioners can still look to Seabrook as a concrete application of binding decisions like Fernandez and Brooker.

VI. Implications and Future Impact

1. Limits on Compassionate Release Based on Sentencing Disparity

Seabrook, together with Fernandez, significantly constrains the argument that co‑defendant sentencing disparity can itself justify compassionate release in the Second Circuit.

Key practical consequences:

Defense counsel will face a steep uphill battle relying solely on disparities with co‑defendants where those disparities are:
- Traceable to plea bargaining (trial vs. plea),
- Driven by cooperation and § 5K1.1 motions,
- Explained by different offenses of conviction or narrower/smaller conduct, or
- Reflective of appropriate Guidelines distinctions (including enhancements).
District judges in the Second Circuit are now on clear notice that such disparities are not “extraordinary and compelling” within § 3582(c)(1)(A), absent additional, truly unusual facts.

2. No “Cascade Effect” from One Defendant’s Successful Sentencing Appeal

The decision sends a strong signal: a correction of a Guidelines error in one defendant’s sentence does not automatically, or even ordinarily, supply a compassionate release basis for co‑defendants.

This has important systemic implications:

Appellate or resentencing relief for one defendant will not, by itself, open the door for co‑defendants to relitigate their sentences via § 3582.
Defendants who believe their own sentences contain legal errors must generally pursue:
- Direct appeals, or
- Collateral attacks under 28 U.S.C. § 2255,
rather than repackaging asserted errors as “extraordinary and compelling” compassionate release reasons.

3. Integration with Fernandez and Future Supreme Court Guidance

Seabrook tightly aligns with Fernandez on the co‑defendant disparity question. The pending Supreme Court review in Fernandez concerns a different issue: whether certain alleged sentencing errors that would also support § 2255 relief can qualify as “extraordinary and compelling reasons.”

Whatever the Supreme Court decides there, Seabrook suggests that the Second Circuit views:

Co‑defendant disparity based on plea/cooperation/offense differences as categorically non‑extraordinary.

Unless the Supreme Court squarely speaks to co‑defendant disparity (which the cert grant, as quoted, does not), Seabrook and Fernandez will likely continue to guide the Second Circuit’s analysis in this domain.

4. Guidance for Sentencing and Post‑Sentencing Strategy

For defendants and defense counsel:
- Arguments for compassionate release should focus on genuinely exceptional personal or legal developments—such as severe health conditions, dramatic rehabilitation, family crises, or profound changes in applicable law—rather than routine disparities with co‑defendants.
- Complaints about relative harshness compared to co‑defendants may still be relevant at initial sentencing under § 3553(a)(6) (avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities) but are unlikely to support post‑sentencing relief.
For prosecutors:
- Seabrook strengthens the government’s position in opposing compassionate release motions premised on co‑defendant disparity.
- It underscores the legitimacy of offering significant discounts to cooperators and plea defendants without fear that those discounts will later “infect” co‑defendants’ final sentences via § 3582.
For district courts:
- Courts must distinguish between:
  - Substantive sentencing disagreement (which is for direct appeal or § 2255), and
  - Genuinely extraordinary post‑sentencing developments that warrant compassionate release.
- Seabrook cautions against using § 3582 as a tool to “harmonize” sentences across co‑defendants after the fact simply because appellate and resentencing outcomes diverged.

5. Reassignment as a Signal of Appellate Concern

The instruction to reassign the case to another judge—paired with a similar directive in Rechnitz—indicates the Second Circuit’s concern that the original sentencing judge had difficulty adhering to the governing legal framework in this cluster of related cases.

Reassignment serves several functions:

Preserving public confidence in judicial impartiality,
Ensuring that remaining issues are approached with a fresh legal perspective, and
Reducing the risk of repeated remands or further error.

VII. Conclusion

United States v. Seabrook reinforces a critical limit on compassionate release in the Second Circuit: Ordinary co‑defendant sentencing disparities—particularly those rooted in different plea choices, cooperation, offenses of conviction, and Guidelines calculations—are not “extraordinary and compelling reasons” under § 3582(c)(1)(A).

Applying Fernandez, the court held that it is expected, not extraordinary, that a defendant who goes to trial and is convicted of more serious charges will serve a longer sentence than co‑defendants who plead guilty, cooperate, or are convicted of less serious offenses. It further clarified that a co‑defendant’s successful appeal and resulting sentence reduction under a correct Guideline does not provide a basis to re‑open other defendants’ sentences via compassionate release.

While the order is non‑precedential, it is a clear and practical illustration of how the Second Circuit understands the “extraordinary and compelling” standard in the context of co‑defendant disparities. For future litigants and courts, Seabrook stands as a significant signal that compassionate release is not a general mechanism for re‑balancing relative sentences among co‑defendants but remains reserved for truly exceptional circumstances.