United States v. Santos: Second Circuit Re-Affirms Broad District-Court Discretion to Deny Compassionate Release Solely on § 3553(a) Factors

Introduction

United States v. Santos, No. 22-3213-cr (2d Cir. June 23, 2025) is a summary order in which the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed two district-court orders denying federal inmate Rafael Santos (acting pro se) both compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) and reconsideration of that denial. Although the ruling lacks precedential effect, it reinforces—and clarifies—the already-established principle that a district court may, in sole reliance on the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, deny compassionate release even after assuming the existence of “extraordinary and compelling reasons.”

Santos, serving multiple life sentences for a 1989 conspiracy and two shootings during a DEA raid, argued that his deteriorating health, expressions of remorse, and time served justified release. The district court found otherwise, and the Second Circuit now confirms that finding, offering important guidance on: (1) the burden a prisoner bears; (2) the scope of district judges’ discretion; and (3) the strict standard for reconsideration motions.

Summary of the Judgment

Disposition: The Second Circuit AFFIRMED the Southern District of New York’s orders denying (i) compassionate release and (ii) reconsideration.
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion for both compassionate-release determinations (United States v. Halvon) and motions for reconsideration (Commerzbank AG v. U.S. Bank).
Key Holdings:
1. The district court did not abuse its discretion by assigning “significant weight” to the severity of Santos’s offense and the need for deterrence when balancing the § 3553(a) factors.
2. Mere disagreement with how the § 3553(a) factors were balanced is insufficient to establish abuse of discretion.
3. For reconsideration, Santos pointed to no controlling authority or overlooked fact; therefore, the strict standard was not met.
4. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) (addressing “unusually long sentences” after changes in law) did not aid Santos because (a) he identified no relevant change in law and (b) the district court had already assumed extraordinary reasons.

Detailed Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Keitt, 21 F.4th 67 (2d Cir. 2021)
– Established that a district court may deny compassionate release solely on the § 3553(a) factors after assuming extraordinary and compelling reasons exist. Santos relies heavily on Keitt’s framework; the court simply applied it.
United States v. Jones, 17 F.4th 371 (2d Cir. 2021)
– Clarified that defendants bear the burden of proving entitlement to release. The panel cites Jones to underscore Santos’s failure to meet that burden.
United States v. Halvon, 26 F.4th 566 (2d Cir. 2022)
– Provides the “mere disagreement” language on appellate review for compassionate release. Halvon forecloses Santos’s argument that the district court simply undervalued his remorse.
United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc)
– Articulates how appellate courts evaluate whether a factor can “bear the weight” assigned. The order quotes Cavera in upholding the district court’s emphasis on the violent nature of the offense.
Commerzbank AG v. U.S. Bank, 100 F.4th 362 (2d Cir. 2024)
– Sets the strict reconsideration standard: the movant must show that the court overlooked controlling decisions or crucial data. Applied to defeat Santos’s Rule 59(e)/Rule 60(b)-style request.
Grune v. Coughlin, 913 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1990) & Publicola v. Lomenzo, 54 F.4th 108 (2d Cir. 2022)
– Cited for liberal construction of pro-se notices of appeal, allowing the panel to review both underlying orders.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning tracks the three-step framework inherent in § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions:

Exhaustion and Eligibility: Not in dispute; Santos had administratively exhausted.
Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons: The district court assumed arguendo that Santos’s age and health met this prong, thereby sidestepping the Guidelines commentary debate post-Brooker.
§ 3553(a) Factors: The court focused on:
- The “wantonness” of Santos’s crimes: shooting a DEA agent in the face and then a cooperating witness.
- The need for general deterrence: protecting federal agents and witnesses.
- Public safety: skepticism about Santos’s asserted lack of dangerousness.
- Remorse: deemed genuine but insufficient to outweigh the above.

Because any one § 3553(a) factor can be dispositive, the district court’s reliance on those considerations—even after assuming Santos qualified under the first step—was within the “heartland of its discretion.”

3. Anticipated Impact of the Decision

No Precedential Force but Persuasive Weight
Although labeled a “summary order,” federal practitioners routinely cite such orders for persuasive value under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1. Santos will therefore serve as an accessible citation for the proposition that health-based compassionate release may be denied purely on § 3553(a) balancing.
Re-affirmation of Keitt
Santos cements Keitt’s approach, providing district judges further comfort that they can—without an elaborate analysis of medical evidence—deny release where the offense gravity and need for deterrence dominate.
Reconsideration Motions
The order’s short but pointed discussion of Commerzbank reinforces the stringent reconsideration standard, discouraging repetitive filings unless new, controlling authority truly arises.
Guidelines § 1B1.13(b)(6)
By rejecting Santos’s argument rooted in the recently amended § 1B1.13(b)(6), the Second Circuit signals that defendants must identify actual statutory or guidelines changes creating a gross sentencing disparity—not merely rely on broad policy shifts.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Compassionate Release (§ 3582(c)(1)(A)): A mechanism allowing courts to shorten a prisoner’s sentence for extraordinary reasons (e.g., severe illness), but only after weighing sentencing factors.
§ 3553(a) Factors: Statutory list guiding sentencing (seriousness of offense, deterrence, public safety, etc.). Courts must revisit these when considering early release.
“Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons”: Not exhaustively defined by statute; historically guided by U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, but post-Brooker courts may exercise independent judgment.
Summary Order: A non-precedential appellate disposition used when full published opinion is unnecessary; still citable for its reasoning.
Abuse of Discretion Standard: Appellate deference; reversal occurs only if the lower court’s decision was arbitrary, irrational, or outside the range of permissible choices.
Reconsideration Motions: Requests that the same court revisit its own order; require showing overlooked controlling law or critical facts—not simply re-arguing the merits.

Conclusion

United States v. Santos underscores that even persuasive evidence of declining health and post-offense rehabilitation cannot compel compassionate release where the sentencing judge finds that § 3553(a) factors—especially offense severity and deterrence—counsel otherwise. The Second Circuit’s summary order adds persuasive heft to the line of cases, led by Keitt, granting district courts broad discretion to deny release after assuming extraordinary circumstances. For defense counsel, the lesson is clear: marshal not only humanitarian claims but also a compelling narrative addressing each § 3553(a) factor; for prosecutors, Santos offers renewed support for opposing release of violent offenders on public-safety and deterrence grounds. Ultimately, the decision re-balances compassionate-release jurisprudence toward deference to district-court judgment, preserving the integrity of original sentencing objectives.